The contentious performances of culture jamming :  art, repertoires of contention, and social movement theory by Iles III, David M
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2013
The contentious performances of culture jamming :
art, repertoires of contention, and social movement
theory
David M. Iles III
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, diles1@tigers.lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Iles III, David M., "The contentious performances of culture jamming : art, repertoires of contention, and social movement theory"
(2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 2812.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/2812
THE CONTENTIOUS PERFORMANCES OF CULTURE JAMMING: 
















Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University in 
partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 



















David M. Iles III 
B.S., Southeastern Louisiana University, 2006 






 This dissertation is the culmination of a project first engaged in the Fall of 2007.  
Either in whole or in part, some of the chapters below are elaborated and refined versions 
of earlier papers, including Chapters Six and Twelve.  My Master’s thesis crystallized many 
of the questions and approaches of this project.  Indeed, the heart of the project (Chapters 
Two and Three) and its climax (Chapter Twelve) were first forged in the crucible of the 
thesis.  During that period I gathered not moss but kindness and direction from Dr. Xi Chen, 
Caroline Payne, Omar Khalid, Jeremiah Russell, Natasha Bingham, and Shaun King. 
 Clearly, like all such works this dissertation is more than the product of my effort.  
Whatever errors and delusions of grandeur contained in this manuscript are not to be 
traced to the intervention and support of others, but to my stoic and misguided willingness 
to ignore their intervention and support.  More than an advisor, Dr. William Clark is a 
friend and a listener.  His confidence in my capacity to perform the enormous task required 
of a doctoral candidate was both (as it should be) frustrating and rewarding.  I can only 
hope that I did not return the frustration in the final product.  As members of my doctoral 
committee, Dr. Cecil Eubanks and Dr. Leonard Ray also performed the unenviable 
responsibilities required of them. In the classroom and out, Dr. Eubanks and Dr. Ray are 
fountains of wisdom, professionalism, and, my savior, humor.   Finally, Dr. Wonik Kim paid 
for too many of my lunches.  He also gave me numerous professional opportunities and 
offered the kind of advice and direction I needed considering he accurately characterized 
me as the rōnin of the department.   
 I must thank my friends who over the last three years failed to refrain from 
repeatedly asking me the same questions and offering the same sage advice about the 
iii 
scope of my ambitions and the necessity of settling for imperfection.  Nathan Price and Tao 
Dumas in particular pushed me to avoid writing a five-volume treatise on street theater.  
The fact that they failed should not be read as a mark against them.  Thanks go to Caroline 
Wiser as well for our long nights of discussion and debate about music, love, and science.  
Catherine Fleming, Jennipher Fullerton, and Jonathon Mayers contributed their expertise 
and knowledge in the area of art history.  I offer special thanks to Catherine Fleming and 
Cassandra Black for their critical comments on early drafts.  Ty Brown’s critiques, 
comments, and outside perspective were especially refreshing considering the notably 
hermetic quality of my work ethic.  Many of the chapters contained herein received their 
first critical lashing under his gaze.  Finally, I thank Christina Avery and Kasie Fallo for their 
personal support, criticism, and impatience throughout this process. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for providing me with all of the support 
imaginable.  Since I was younger than I can remember (and much younger than I can 
imagine), my parents instilled in me the belief that I was capable of doing whatever I 
wanted to do with my life.  Socratic doubt and sociological wisdom mildly tempered this 
sense of self, but their confidence and caring were and remain incalculable and 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................................................................... ii 
 
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................................................... vii 
 




INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Research Questions ................................................................................................................................ 2 
Art and Protest ......................................................................................................................................... 6 
Organization of Dissertation .............................................................................................................. 9 
 
PART I: PROBLEM AND THEORY 
 
1. CULTURE JAMMING ......................................................................................................................................12 
1.1. Culture Jamming and Social Movement Theory ...............................................................13 
1.2. Conceptual Review.......................................................................................................................16 
1.3. Conceptualization .........................................................................................................................20 
1.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................38 
 
2. TILLY AND BOURDIEU .................................................................................................................................39 
2.1. Repertoire Change .......................................................................................................................39 
2.2. Summary ..........................................................................................................................................43 
2.3. Tilly and Bourdieu ........................................................................................................................48 
2.4. Dialogue ...........................................................................................................................................58 
2.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................64 
 
3. SOCIALIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY ....................................................................65 
3.1. Socialization....................................................................................................................................65 
3.2. Collective Action Theory ............................................................................................................67 
3.3. Theoretical Development ..........................................................................................................74 
3.4. Identity and Preferences ...........................................................................................................79 
3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty .....................................................................................................89 
3.6. Familiarity, Effectiveness, and Incentives ....................................................................... 106 
3.7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 115 
 
4. DATA ................................................................................................................................................................ 116 
4.1. Research Constraints ............................................................................................................... 116 
4.2. Sample Design ............................................................................................................................. 120 
4.3. Data Collection ............................................................................................................................ 124 
4.4. Case Descriptions ...................................................................................................................... 128 
4.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 131 
v 
 
PART II: EVERDAY SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
 
5. THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 133 
5.1. Bourdieu’s Sociology of Art ................................................................................................... 133 
5.2. Critical Analysis  ......................................................................................................................... 144 
5.3. The United States  ...................................................................................................................... 147 
5.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 154 
 
6. CRITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE AVANT-GARDE ............................................................................. 156 
6.1. Review ........................................................................................................................................... 157 
6.2. Theoretical Development  ...................................................................................................... 161 
6.3. Data and Method  ....................................................................................................................... 170 
6.4. Dada! (1916-1923)  .................................................................................................................. 171 
6.5. Surrealism (1924-1938) ......................................................................................................... 178 
6.6. The Situationist International (1957-1968)  .................................................................. 184 
6.7. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 191 
 
7. FIELD AND IDENTITY ................................................................................................................................ 192 
7.1. Collective Identity ..................................................................................................................... 192 
7.2. Theory and Hypotheses  ......................................................................................................... 196 
7.3. Analysis I ....................................................................................................................................... 203 
7.4. Analysis II ..................................................................................................................................... 218 
7.5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 238 
 
8. NETWORKS AND RESOURCES ............................................................................................................... 239 
8.1. Review ........................................................................................................................................... 239 
8.2. Theory and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 244 
8.3. Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 253 
8.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 271 
 
PART III: STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
 
9. GOALS AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS .......................................................................................... 273 
9.1. Review ........................................................................................................................................... 274 
9.2. Theory and Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 281 
9.3. Analysis ......................................................................................................................................... 294 
9.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 310 
 
10. IDENTITY AND STRATEGY ................................................................................................................... 312 
10.1. Opportunity Structures ........................................................................................................ 313 
10.2. Theory and Hypotheses........................................................................................................ 320 
10.3. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 333 
10.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 356 
 
vi 
11. EFFECTIVENESS, FAMILIARITY, AND TACTICAL CHOICE  ...................................................... 357 
11.1. Tactical Choice ......................................................................................................................... 357 
11.2. Theory and Hypotheses........................................................................................................ 364 
11.3. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 371 
11.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 397 
 
12. TACTICAL INTERACTON AND INCENTIVES .................................................................................. 398 
12.1. Constraints and Incentives .................................................................................................. 398 
12.2. Tactical Interaction ................................................................................................................ 413 
12.3. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 422 
12.4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 436 
 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................... 438 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................................. 450 
General References ........................................................................................................................... 450 
Case References .................................................................................................................................. 479 
 
APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SURVEY  ......................................................................................................... 493 
 
APPENDIX 2: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD EXEMPTION  ..................................................... 495 
 
APPENDIX 3: MEASURING ART EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONS .............................................. 496 
 





















LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1. A Sample of Academic Definitions of Culture Jamming .................................................. 18 
 
Table 1.2. A Sample of Activist Definitions of Culture Jamming ...................................................... 19 
 
Table 3.1. Goals: Expected Action-Outcome Structures ...................................................................... 84 
 
Table 4.1. Sample of Culture Jamming Organizations ........................................................................ 125 
 
Table 5.1. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force ............................................................... 154 
 
Table 6.1. Strategies of Distinction Available to the Avant-Garde ................................................ 164 
 
Table 7.1. Arts Education and Occupations in the Arts, United States ........................................ 206 
 
Table 7.2. The Arts and CJOs ........................................................................................................................ 217 
 
Table 8.1. Organizational Size ..................................................................................................................... 264 
 
Table 8.2. The Organizational Structures of CJOs ................................................................................ 267 
 
Table 9.1. Types of Economic Goods ........................................................................................................ 278 
 
Table 9.2. The Goals of Old and New Social Movements .................................................................. 284 
 
Table 9.3. The Goal Profiles of CJOs .......................................................................................................... 302 
 
Table 9.4. Insularity, Social Disruption, and Issues ............................................................................ 308 
 
Table 10.1. Narratives and Liberalism ..................................................................................................... 339 
 
Table 10.2. CJO Targets .................................................................................................................................. 355 
 
Table 11.1. Hypothesized Goals and Strategic Orientations ........................................................... 367 
 









LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1. Culture Jam.. ................................................................................................................................... 31 
 
Figure 1.2. Adbusters’ Absolut Impotence.. .............................................................................................. 31 
 
Figure 1.3. The Billionaires for Bush .......................................................................................................... 31 
 
Figure 2.1. Opp’s Structural-Cognitive Model of Mobilization ......................................................... 44 
 
Figure 2.2. General Argument: Art and Protest ...................................................................................... 46 
 
Figure 3.1. Two Socialization Effects: Identity and Familiarity ....................................................... 67 
 
Figure 3.2. Schemas, Information, and Decision-Making ................................................................... 79 
 
Figure 3.3. Everyday Social Organization, Socialization, and Contentious Performances .... 80 
 
Figure 3.4. Goal Structures ............................................................................................................................. 87 
 
Figure 3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty .................................................................................................... 98 
 
Figure 3.6. The Distribution of Familiarity and Tactical Adoption ............................................... 101 
 
Figure 3.7. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption ............................................... 101 
 
Figure 3.8. Uncertainty and Effectiveness: A Scenario ...................................................................... 108 
 
Figure 5.1. Bourdieu’s (1993, 38) Model of Relations of Dominance Between Fields .......... 135 
 
Figure 5.2. Combined Model of the French Literary Field of the Second Half of the        
Nineteenth Century. ........................................................................................................................................ 136 
 
Figure 5.3. Arts Education and Population Growth ............................................................................ 152 
 
Figure 5.4. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force II ......................................................... 155 
 
Figure 10.1 Understandings, Opportunities, and Strategy .............................................................. 323 
 
Figure 10.2. Opportunities, Information, and Action ......................................................................... 324 
 
Figure 11.1. Relations of Effectiveness .................................................................................................... 366 
 
ix 
Figure 11.2. The Distribution of Familiarity and Tactical Adoption ............................................ 369 
 
Figure 11.3. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption............................................. 370 
 
Figure 11.4. Adbusters’ Joe Chemo Subvertisement ........................................................................... 392 
 
Figure 11.5. AAA Shopdropping ................................................................................................................. 393 
 





































 Culture jamming is a form of contentious politics in which activists utilize ironic 
frames to challenge a dominant set of social relationships and institutions.  Despite its 
contestational nature, scholars rarely apply the insights of social movement theory to 
explain this curious phenomenon.  The main concerns of this project are to provide an 
empirical analysis of culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach 
to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice.  The primary thesis mediating these 
empirical and theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development 
of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming.  
Developing this argument and addressing these concerns entails three basic tasks.  First, in 
view of the failure of the literature to provide a robust concept, I develop a rigorous 
conceptualization of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic.  Second, I present an 
approach to theory that begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis.  This 
task involves both a dialogue between sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu and 
their reconciliation with collective action theory, the application of rational choice theory 
to social movements and protest.  Although multi-faceted, this synthesis focuses on 
collective identities and resources as explanations of the evaluations of tactical 
alternatives.  Third, I improve on previous efforts to study culture jamming empirically by 
applying the most rigorous methodological techniques available under significant data and 
sampling constraints.  I compare and contrast the data from a sample of twelve culture 
jamming organizations to generate the most comprehensive empirical portrait of such 





 A small group of young men and women sit in supermarket aisles and pray to the 
products before them.  At a tourist site a crowd gathers around a man playing with a train 
and harasses security personnel that threaten to arrest him.  A group of performers enact a 
play directed at a particular audience: the surveillance camera recording them.  The 
subtitles of old martial arts films are replaced with radical leftist propaganda.  
Impersonators of ExxonMobil representatives give an ‘honest’ presentation of energy 
policy at an oil conference.  An individual exchanges e-mails with a Nike representative 
over his request for a customized shoe with the word ‘sweatshop’ on its side.  Activists 
swap the voice boxes of G.I. Joe and Barbie toys and place them back on the shelves for 
customers to purchase for their children.  Entire city streets are suddenly overwhelmed by 
dance parties that turn the functional accoutrements of the road into festive decor.  A small 
group of people climb atop a billboard and turn an advertisement against itself.   
 These eccentric acts are protests, performances of resistance that traverse a rich 
terrain of politics, art, economics, culture, pleasure, and everyday life.  Their claims are 
numerous: anti-consumerism, anti-sexism, anti-road, the right to privacy, corporate social 
responsibility, freedom of speech, and opposition to the privatization of public space, to 
name a few.  Such contentious actions have a storied history from the early artistic avant-
garde to the turmoil of the 1960s to contemporary environmental, global justice, and other 
movements.  The practitioners of this art of protest are culture jammers.  Product sabotage, 
plagiarism, space reclamation, “shopdropping”, ad subversion, street theater, counter-
surveillance, media pranks, and other acts of mischief, creativity, and resistance constitute 
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the culture jamming repertoire of contention or the available means of protest (Tarrow 
1998; Tilly 1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008).   
Research Questions 
 The study of social movements, protest, and resistance seeks to answer three broad 
questions concerning the determinants of specific clusters of dependent variables.  The 
first question, mobilization, concerns the mechanisms and conditions involved in the 
decision to participate in protest.  The second, strategy, considers those factors that 
influence the form that activism takes once the decision is made to protest.  In other words, 
what are the determinants and mechanisms that are relevant to the choice in how to 
protest?  The third, outcomes, seeks to determine the effects of protest once it has 
transpired.   
 This dissertation engages the study of strategy from two angles.  The first is 
problem-driven.  How can we explain the particular character of the culture jamming 
repertoire of contention? Why do activists decide to engage in contentious politics using these 
methods of contestation?  At bottom, this concerns a series of curious observations.   First, 
as noted above, culture jamming takes a number of bizarre forms.  To the casual observer, 
it is not always obvious what is intended and thus what constitutes effective action.   
Second, culture jamming as a form of ironic rhetoric (Chapter One) suggests a puzzle: Why 
would activists utilize forms of rhetoric and performance that increase the cognitive 
demands on audiences relative to straightforward communication?  Why would activists do 
so in the context of democratic regimes, under which the penalties for open dissent are 
(mostly) comparatively mild, and given that a wide range of alternatives are available?   
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 In approaching this broader question of culture jamming and some of the 
precipitating observations, I entertain a host of others.  What is culture jamming?  How do 
culture jammers make sense of their actions and the actions of their opponents and allies?  
What skills, competencies, and resources do they draw on in their contentious 
performances?  What are their grievances and goals?  Which organizational forms do they 
utilize?    What are the strategic logics that culture jammers use to organize, explain, and 
justify their actions?  What are their targets and issues?  What are their subjective 
evaluations of the range of tactics available to them?  What is the relation of repression and 
facilitation to culture jamming?  Answering these questions and others should provide 
some leverage in tackling the second angle of this project: theoretical development.  While 
this research is motivated by an interest in explaining culture jamming, that is not the sole 
objective.  The central theoretical concern is this: How do we explain change in social 
movement tactics over time?  Throughout this dissertation I avoid what Lofland (1996, 117) 
calls “theory bashing” in favor of what Lichbach (1998) calls “lumping” by developing a 
synthetic approach to explaining protest tactics.  This approach integrates macrosociology 
and behavioral rational choice theory with existing explanations of protest and resistance.  
I thus engage diverse and often antagonistic strains of social movement theory in an effort 
to guide my empirical analysis of culture jamming and to further theoretical development. 
 Studies of protest tactics generally engage one of two approaches: the study of 
tactical variation across populations and long temporal horizons and the study of tactical 
choices among organizations and within protest events in shorter temporal horizons.  This 
study contributes to a small body of work that seeks to link these two perspectives (Tarrow 
1989; 1998).  First, this dissertation contributes to the literature on repertoire change: how 
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do the available means of protest of a population change over time?  However, a proper 
answer to the question of repertoire change necessitates the posing of a second question 
concerning tactical choice: what factors influence the selection of tactics from the available 
means of contention?  In other words, explaining changes in repertoires requires that we 
understand the conditions and calculus of tactical choice.  It is ultimately the diffusion of 
specific choices in contentious interaction that constitutes a change in repertoires of 
contention.  Likewise, explaining choices in tactics requires a grasp of the range of actions 
available to activists; specifying the range of actions available ultimately resolves into an 
historical analysis, for repertoires are always shaped by their history.   
  To some degree, these questions are addressed elsewhere in relation to culture 
jamming.  Within the social movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in 
general are often described as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005; 
Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Wettergren 2005).  New social movement (NSM) theory is 
a loose collection of scholarship purporting to explain the development of new forms of 
activism like the peace, women’s, and environmental movements that sprang up in the 
second half of the twentieth century (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas 
1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).  NSM theorists typically 
develop a holistic view of the social system by focusing on fundamental shifts in the nature 
of social organization over this period of time.  These shifts in turn facilitate new conflicts 
over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist issues.  The 
repertoire that unfolds in such struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve 
novel goals, are specific to the conditions of contemporary society.   
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 NSM theory offers a wealth of expectations about culture jamming organizations 
(CJO).  In several instances over the course of this dissertation I draw on this approach to 
structure my theoretical developments and empirical analyses.  However, only a handful 
(or fewer) of NSM studies deal with culture jamming in particular.  One especially relevant 
application of NSM theory is Wettergren’s (2005; 2009) study of culture jamming.  
Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the emotional culture or 
regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed emotions and behaviors 
that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism.  In order to resist this structure, 
culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime based on genuine or 
authentic pleasure and freedom.  In explaining the choice to engage in culture jamming as 
the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the micro-foundational 
approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo sociologicus, the 
“emotional man.”  Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves as the 
theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005) analysis.  In this theory, individuals and 
groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions.  Such energy can 
range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a lack of initiative.  
Actions are chosen principally for their contribution to an individual or group’s level of 
emotional energy.  
 Wettergren’s emotional explanation of culture jamming as a tactical choice is the 
most thorough in the literature on culture jamming.  Her observations provide numerous 
valuable insights that are referenced throughout this text, but they also provide points of 
comparison.   However, this project is not a strict comparison of the utility of an emotional 
versus a rational explanation of social movement activity. 
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Art and Protest 
 The explanatory emphasis of this dissertation is placed on the development of 
twentieth century art.  In From Mobilization to Revolution, Charles Tilly (1978, 143) 
states,“collective action usually takes well-defined forms already familiar to the 
participants, in the same sense that most of an era’s art takes on a small number of 
established forms.”  If we entertain the analogy further, a number of activist works on 
culture jamming provide possible insights.  In his seminal pamphlet on culture jamming, 
Mark Dery (1993) defines it as a form of art.  For him, culture jammers engage in a wide 
variety of actions that consist in some motley concoction of humor, protest, and art.  David 
Cox’s (2005) quasi-autobiography also considers culture jamming as a set of tactics specific 
to artists.  While both employ general definitions of art and artists, I argue that the 
perceived relation between art and culture jamming indicated in these and other works 
requires more detailed theoretical and empirical attention. 
 Many important works in the study of social movements and protest emphasize the 
significance of cultural production among oppositional agents and their opponents 
(Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Gramsci 1971; Jasper 1997; Johnston 2009; Johnston and 
Klandermans 1995; Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1999; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rochon 1998; 
Snow and Benford 1988; Snow Rochford, Jr., Worden, and Benford 1986; Tarrow 1998).  
However, art as a specific type of cultural production, including music, visual arts, 
performance, etc. has gathered relatively sparse attention.  Despite this paucity of research, 
some studies do find support for a relationship between art and protest.  First, art appears 
to play a valuable role in the mobilization process in some movements.  For example, some 
studies show that it contributes to processes of consciousness-raising and preference 
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formation in a variety of movement contexts (Chaffe 1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; 
Kaplan 1992; Neustadter 1992; Pratt 1992; Wicke 1992), as well as the formation of 
collective identity (Adams 2002; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Jasper 1997; Kaplan 1992; 
Neustadter 1992; Pratt 1992; Reed 2005).  Art contributes to the subsistence of 
movements through emotion management and value reinforcement (Adams 2002; Jasper 
1997; Reed 2005), as well as commitment maintenance and solidarity (Adams 2002; Chaffe 
1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Jasper 1997).  One understudied area, surprisingly, is 
the use of aesthetic practices and artifacts to frame appeals for recruitment (Adams 2002). 
 Second, art also appears to play a number of roles in shaping the strategic 
approaches of movements.  All of the above mentioned processes are often the result of 
strategic efforts by activists to increase mobilization.  In addition, art is itself a form that 
action takes (Eyerman and Jamison 1998; Reed 2005; Teune 2005).   Film, performance, 
literature, poetry, graffiti, music, painting, etc. are all part of the repertoire that activists 
can choose from in achieving objectives.  For example, art can also play an important role in 
strategic framing processes (Adams 2002; Chaffe 1993; Eyerman and Jamison 1998), 
shaping intra-organizational relations, (Roy 2010) and can help generate or accumulate 
resources and external support for activism (Adams 2002; Sanger 1997).   
 Third, art also helps shape the outcomes of and is itself an outcome of activism.  
Forms of art and expression associated with a movement can diffuse into the broader 
culture and continue to shape values and practices long after the movement has dissipated 
(Eyerman and Jamison 1998).   
 Of particular interest for this dissertation is the work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune 
(2005).  They argue implicitly and explicitly that art as a social practice endows artists with 
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unique sets of skills and perceptual schemas.  Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,” 
small groups that are exceptionally experimental and creative, generate tactical 
innovations that social movements appropriate.  These groups are predominantly artist 
collectives.  Teune considers the role of art in protest from the 1960’s to the movements 
against global capitalism.  He suggests that various art movements performed the critical 
function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that were absorbed into the protest 
activities of these periods.  Specifically, he argues that these ideas and practices 
dramatically shaped the tactical behavior of activists in these movements by providing 
unique sets of perceptual schemas that interpreted reality and everyday life as aesthetically 
exploitable, as “raw material for self-expression” (2005, 5). 
 This study contributes to the growing literature on the relation between art and 
protest by conceptualizing art as a historical practice and as a social field that endows 
actors with practical dispositions for perception, appreciation, and action specific to the 
field.  Like Teune, I consider whether the artistic avant-garde performs the critical work 
associated with critical communities in the sense intended by Rochon (1998).  In addition, 
this dissertation builds on the work of Teune (2005) and Rolfe (2005) by attending to the 
specialized sets of skills and competencies available to artists, but goes further by situating 
this analysis within a broader theoretical framework.  It applies Bourdieu’s (1984; 1993; 
1996) sociology of art in an effort to explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention 
as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization, the history of conflict, and the 




Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is divided into three parts.  Part I establishes the broad contours 
by clarifying its conceptual, theoretical, and methodological dimensions.  In Chapter One, I 
argue that a lack of consensus and rigor in the relevant literature necessitates a more 
systematic effort at conceptualizing culture jamming.  Chapter Two is the theoretical core 
of this study.  First, I review the three approaches to explaining repertoire change.   Second, 
I contrast and compare the contributions of sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu 
to a conceptualization of everyday life and an explanation of contentious politics.  Informed 
by this comparison, Chapter Three develops an incomplete model of tactical choice that 
incorporates macro- and meso-level variables.  In order to more effectively link these levels 
of analysis and specify mechanisms of choice, I enlist collective action theory.  I construct a 
model of tactical choice and focus on twin effects of socialization: the distribution of 
familiarity and the attribution of effectiveness.  Chapter Four establishes the 
methodological challenges and opportunities encountered in this research project, 
especially procedures for data collection and sampling.  It also introduces the twelve CJOs 
that constitute this study’s sample. 
 Part II begins the empirical focus of this dissertation by identifying the major 
explanatory variables that I argue are essential in explaining the culture jamming 
repertoire of contention.  In Chapter Five, I explore the structure of, and growth in, the field 
of cultural production, including the incentives, skills, and competencies specific to the 
field, especially the aesthetic disposition.  Chapter Six presents data identifying three 
critical communities in the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition by attending 
to three artistic avant-garde movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the Situationist 
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International.  In Chapter Seven, I establish the relationship between the sample of CJOs 
and the field of artistic production.  This entails both descriptions of the content of their 
collective identities and of the academic and occupational resources at their disposal.  
Chapter Eight concludes the analysis of everyday social organization by identifying the 
social networks and resources that CJOs possess and utilize in contention, including the 
structure of their organization. 
 Part III concludes the empirical focus of this dissertation by linking the field and 
practices of cultural production to the strategic and tactical approaches of CJOs.  Chapter 
Nine presents descriptions of the goals, strategies, and issues of CJOs.  Chapter Ten 
develops theoretical relationships between collective identities and strategic orientations 
by specifying two concepts: ideologies and opportunity structures.  This chapter also 
provides descriptions of the ideologies and targets of CJOs.  In Chapter Eleven, I construct a 
relationship between goals, identities, and strategies that helps explains the attribution of 
effectiveness across the repertoire of contention.  In addition, I present descriptions of the 
tactical repertoires of CJOs, their attribution of effectiveness, the distribution of familiarity 
and its relationship to skills and uncertainty.  Finally, Chapter Twelve considers the 
importance of the variety of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives that may affect tactical 

































CHAPTER 1. CULTURE JAMMING 
 While debates heated up in the last few decades over various methodological 
concerns in political science and the social sciences in general (Brady and Collier 2010; 
George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2001; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Ragin 1989), a 
small body of work developed to explore the difficulties associated with conceptualization 
(Bevir and Kedar 2008; Brady and Collier 2010; Collier and Mahon 1993; Gerring 1999; 
2001; 2003; Goertz 2005; Ragin 2000; Sartori 1970; 1984).  The fundamental problem 
driving this literature is the inability to establish intersubjective agreement on basic 
concepts like democracy and power.  I argue that this problem is also, to a lesser extent, 
symptomatic of work on culture jamming.  Thus, the first challenge this work presents is 
conceptual.  Competing definitions of culture jamming necessitate a conceptualization both 
sufficiently rigorous to satisfy social scientific inquiry and consistent with the discourse 
among culture jamming activists and theorists.   
 Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual approach of this work.  
First, in order to mark the boundaries of the concept, or to increase conceptual coherence 
(Gerring 1999; 2001), the definition proposed here establishes a set of analytic properties 
that together classify a phenomenon as culture jamming.   
 Second, I find it imperative that the concept I construct draw extensively from 
current usage and prominent cases.  Gerring (2001) refers to resonance, or the degree to 
which a concept comports with existing usage in ordinary language and existing research, 
and validity, or the degree of fit between the intension (properties) and the extension 
(cases) of a concept.  The more a concept departs from the existing lexicon, the more 
confusing it is likely to be.  Thus, I sample from existing definitions from academics and 
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activists and check these definitions and my own against cases of culture jamming almost 
universally identified as representative. 
 Finally, I seek to achieve coherence in part by considering the semantic field 
surrounding culture jamming, or by establishing the field utility of the concept (Gerring 
2001).  This entails a series of clarifications regarding the boundaries between culture 
jamming and numerous other related concepts, including resistance, contentious politics, 
tactical media, framing, irony, and others. 
 The broad goal of this chapter is to provide a relatively rigorous definition of culture 
jamming and to delineate the conceptual contours of this study.  This effort ultimately falls 
short of a strict delineation of the concept.  Instead, I aim to unfold and explore the 
contours of culture jamming and ruminate on the particular conceptual challenges it 
provides.  I first review academic works on culture jamming in order to contextualize this 
research project within the existing literature.  Second, I survey the academic and activist 
literatures on culture jamming in order to identify the issues associated with defining this 
concept and to tease out an appropriate definition.  Next, I present the definition that will 
guide this work and carefully consider the utility of each analytic property.  I then carefully 
distinguish culture jamming from a number of potentially overlapping concepts.  Finally, I 
explore culture jamming as a form of ironic framing. 
1.1. Culture Jamming and Social Movement Theory 
Few studies of social movements and protest engage the subject of culture jamming.  
Existing research tends to briefly survey culture jamming within a broader discussion of 
alternative media or activism (Carroll and Hackett 2006; Downing 2001; Heath and Potter 
2004; Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004; Lievrouw 2003; Meikle 2002; Strangelove 
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2005), regard it as a particular expression of anti-consumer or global justice movements 
(Binay 2005; Carty 2002; Kozinets and Handelman 2004; Rumbo 2002), or focus on a 
single action or organization (Binay 2005; Farrar and Warner 2008; Haiven 2007; Hynes et 
al 2007; Peretti and Micheletti 2004; Rumbo 2002).  A great deal of literature critiques it as 
an oppositional practice, meaning they consider the outcomes of culture jamming (Binay 
2005; Carducci 2006; Haiven 2007; Harold 2004; 2007; Heath and Potter 2004).   
 Only a handful of works focus on culture jamming as a specific contentious practice.  
Some describe the strategies and consider the outcomes of culture jamming from a political 
communication or rhetorical perspective.  Cammaerts (2007) analyzes culture jamming as 
a nomadic discourse that critiques the status quo by flowing from counterpublic discourse 
into the mainstream public sphere.   Harold (2004; 2007) determines the rhetorical logic of 
different forms of culture jamming: ad parodies, pranking, and appropriation, and 
evaluates their outcomes.  Others seek to identify the origins of culture jamming in the 
sociological tradition of expressionism (Carducci 2006) or the literary techniques of 
William S. Burroughs (Tietchen 2001).  Sandlin and Milam (2008) explore the utility of 
conceptualizing culture jamming as critical public pedagogy.  Sandlin and Callahan (2009) 
illustrate an emotion cycle of resistance through two case studies of culture jamming 
groups.   Woodside (2001) evaluates the relationship of humor to culture jamming. 
 The most directly relevant academic work to this dissertation aims to identify some 
of the conditions and mechanisms that shape the strategic and tactical approaches of 
culture jammers.  The most consistent finding is the relation between the novel forms of 
collective action forged by various twentieth century art movements and the culture 
jamming repertoire of contention (Binay 2005; Cammaerts 2007; Day 2008; Meikle 2007; 
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Nomai 2008).  Movements that are frequently cited as particularly influential include Dada, 
Surrealism, and the Situationists.  
 The work of Nomai (2008) and Wettergren (2003; 2005) are also relevant to this 
dissertation.  Nomai identifies the strategic and tactical approaches of three CJOs as 
practical manifestations of critical theory from the Frankfurt School to more recent works 
by Frederic Jameson and David Harvey.  Through interviews with nine CJOs and the 
sociology of emotions, Wettergren establishes the emotional constraints or regime unique 
to late capitalism and the emotional dynamics and strategies of culture jamming within this 
context.  She argues that culture jammers engage in their particular style of activism 
because it provides them with higher levels of emotional energy than other forms of 
political activity.   
 Although it has not received a great deal of attention among social movement 
scholars, a study of culture jamming does offer the field a number of benefits.  First, I 
expand on a small literature that aims to explain culture jamming as a contentious practice 
utilizing the tools of social movement theory.  Second, culture jamming is a challenge to 
institutions and authority (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004).  As such there is 
an intrinsic value to its study.  Third, analyses of the conditions and mechanisms associated 
with this form of contention are conducive to generalizations, as I will argue in the 
conclusion of this dissertation.  For example, this study draws from and contributes 
directly to the study of culture in social movement studies.  Fourth, although culture 
jamming may or may not be a social movement, culture jammers are often (though not 
exclusively) associated with the anti-consumer and global justice movements.  The latter 
especially has captured the attention of movement scholars (Della Porta 2006; 2007; 
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Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Smith 2001).  Finally, as demonstrated below, culture jamming 
often deals with a range of issues: the privatization and rationalization of public space, the 
effects of media concentration on public discourse, personal autonomy and creativity, and 
many others.  Thus, this study contributes to the literature exploring issues and challenges 
focused on institutions beyond the state (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Snow 2004; 
Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Walker, Martin, and 
McCarthy 2008; Zald 2000).  
1.2. Conceptual Review 
 There is no consensual definition of culture jamming within the academic literature.  
I suspect that this condition is in part a consequence of the paucity of studies and the lack 
of such a definition in the activist literature (see below).  Still, various scholars have crafted 
definitions from prevailing scholarship, the texts of culture jammers and their critics, and 
the particular constraints and imperatives of research.  Before reviewing this literature, I 
briefly consider the origins and component terms of the concept to provide some direction. 
 The term ‘culture jamming’ was coined by the group Negativland on their 1984 
album Jamcon ‘84.  This early definition was minimalist in its focus on subversive 
alterations of billboards, though it was clear that it was intended more generally.  Indeed, 
once broken in two, the term harbors significant possibilities (Branwyn 1997; Cox 2005; 
Meikle 2007).  First, jamming is appropriated from the concept of radio jamming, which 
refers to the transmission of radio signals in order to disrupt or obstruct communications.  
Jamming also refers to playful improvisation and collaborative spontaneity, usually in the 
context of musical performance.  The term culture thus refers to that which is jammed and 
the means by which it is jammed.  
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 A number of academic works do attempt to define culture jamming.  Table 1.1 
provides a sample of some of the most significant offerings.  Most share at least three 
common themes.  First, they emphasize that the target and the means of action are roughly 
the same: mass media or culture.  For example, the terrain of action includes mass media 
messages, mass culture, cultural codes, dominant discourses, and dominant cultural 
expression.  Second, they focus on the anti-consumerist claims often associated with 
culture jammers.  Third, all of these definitions emphasize the use of culture jamming as an 
oppositional practice and not as a tactic available to targets or other actors. 
 Each of these themes is problematic for a satisfactory conceptualization of culture 
jamming.  First, emphases on the media and consumerism exclude some action or 
organization generally acknowledged to represent or practice culture jamming. 1  For 
example, any exclusive focus on the media as means and/or targets ignores a great deal of 
performance-based culture jamming by organizations like the Critical Art Ensemble, the 
Yes Men, or the Billionaires for Bush (or Gore).  The focus on anti-consumerism in some 
definitions does not permit analysis of culture jamming groups like the Surveillance 
Camera Players, the Yes Men, and the Barbie Liberation Front (Meikle 2007).  Even 
Strangelove’s emphasis on anti-commercialism is likely too restrictive.  Moreover, if tactics 
are defined as exclusive to a specific class of claims (anti-consumerism) and targets (mass 
media), then the risk of crafting narrow concepts ill-equipped to travel seems significant, 
especially when a body of work explores the appropriation of the tactic by opponents and 
others (Cammaerts 2007; Harold 2007; Klein 2000).  Other shortcomings plague a fewer 
number of these definitions.  Woodside forecloses a number of interesting  
                                                          
1 Many groups often purposefully engage the media, but this does not distinguish their action from other 
forms of protest. 
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Table 1.1. A Sample of Academic Definitions of Culture Jamming 
 
“The practice of critiquing mass media messages and their influence on culture by 
subverting their messages through artistic desire” (Binay 2005, 1).   
 
“The re-purposing, deconstructing, or hijacking of mass culture, using the media as a means 
to critique the media” (Day 2008).   
 
“An attempt to reverse and transgress the meaning of cultural codes whose primary aim is 
to persuade us to buy something or be someone” (Jordan 2002, 12).   
 
“An organized, social activist effort that aims to counter the bombardment of consumption-
oriented messages in the mass media” (Kozinets and Handelman 2007). 
 
“A practice that insinuates itself within some form of dominant cultural expression in an 
effort to critique it and promote change” (Nomai 2008, 21).   
 
 “An investigation into the apparatus of representation in late modernity, as it relates to 
both images and discourses of the media and commodity systems, and the expression of 
political will” (Carducci 2006, 116).   
 
“The destruction of commercially produced meanings” (Strangelove 2005, 104).   
 
“An interruption, a sabotage, a hoax, a prank, a banditry, or a blockage of what are seen as 
monolithic power structures governing media and culture” (Harold 2007, xxv). 
 
“A symbolic form of protest in the sense that it targets a central symbol of dominant 
discourses, deconstructs the discourses, and reintroduces the symbols in alternative 
contexts” (Wettergren 2003, 29).  
 
“The practice of taking familiar signs and trying to transform them into question marks” 
(Meikle 2007, 167; 2002). 
 
“An activity aimed at countering the continuous, recombinant barrage of capitalist laden 
messages fed through the mass media” (Sandlin and Callahan 2009, 81). 
 
“The innovative and alternative ways in which people are offering a form of creative, non-
violent resistance against the way we view the world, either for the sake of the interruption 
or for getting an alternative message across” (Woodside 2001, 9). 
 
 
empirical questions, such as the relation of creativity and innovation to culture jamming.  
His insistence on non-violence, however, I take up below.   
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 The activist literature is more diverse and ambiguous in its efforts at 
conceptualization.  Table 1.2 samples from among the most prominent definitions.  Three 
texts in particular are generally ascribed a prominent role in this literature: Naomi Klein’s 
(2000) No Logo, Kalle Lasn’s (1999) Culture Jam, and Mark Dery’s (1993) seminal pamphlet 
Culture Jamming.  Klein’s minimalism contrasts sharply with Lasn, the founder of the 
seminal culture jamming publication Adbusters.  Dery’s pamphlet offers a conceptualization 
without a succinct definition, hence his omission from Table 1.2.  However, his conception 
of culture jamming is highly inclusive as well, consisting of nearly any project or 
performance that welds art, protest, and humor together in a sort of “guerrilla semiotics,” a 
hijacking of dominant signals.   
 
Table 1.2 A Sample of Activist Definitions of Culture Jamming 
 
“The practice of parodying advertisements and hijacking billboards in order to drastically 
alter their messages” (Klein 2000, 280).   
 
“Rerouting [of] spectacular images, environments, ambiences, and events to reverse or 
subvert their meaning, thus reclaiming them” (Lasn 1999, 103).   
 
“The process of taking bits of the media out there in the mainstream: its screens, its 
airwaves, its networks, and its pages, and re-infusing them with new types of messages – 
political ones, which aim to lay bare the true nature of the times in which we live (Cox 
2005, 3).”   
 
 “Any form of media sabotage designed to call attention to the media environment and how 
it’s used to manipulate us” (Branywn 1997, 42).  
 
“A strategy that turns corporate power against itself by co-opting, hacking, mocking, and 
re-contextualizing meanings” (Peretti 2001). 
 




 Aside from Lasn, Dery, and Stern, activist conceptions again emphasize the media 
(or in the case of Peretti, corporations) as well as the oppositional use of culture jamming.  
Though these three exceptions are more general, they remain insufficiently rigorous to 
provide proper conceptual boundaries.   
1.3. Conceptualization 
1.3.1. Definition 
 I begin with a broad conception of culture jamming: (D.1) an act involving the 
disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, object, or discourse of an ensemble of 
representation that is constrained by the elements of that particular representation.   
 It is imperative to make some careful distinctions for the purposes of this study.  
First, this definition does not distinguish between individual or collective forms of action.  
Some well-known culture jammers engage in individual actions.  However, this study 
considers only collective culture jamming actions, meaning the involvement of more than 
one person in the planning or execution of actions in their common interest.   
 Second, this definition does not assume that the action is contentious, meaning that 
the interests of two parties in interaction conflict (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; 
Tarrow 1998).  Indeed, a culture jam may well be crafted in order to further the interests of 
both parties, as when corporations hire advertising agencies to engage in innovative 
marketing campaigns (Klein 2000).  For this study, however, attention is focused only on 
contentious culture jamming.  However, the definition of contention crafted by McAdam et 
al (2001, 5) in which claims made by some subject on an object, such as a social movement 
organization (SMO), “would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants,” 
fails to tackle an important question: does the object of the claim recognize the act as 
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contentious?  Presumably, McAdam et al (2001) assume the condition of mutual 
recognition.  With contentious culture jamming, whether some actions are recognized as 
oppositional by most audiences is debated (Binay 2005).  Still, the intention is for targets to 
recognize the culture jam as oppositional.   
 Third, this dissertation is a study of oppositional culture jamming.  While definition 
D.1) is neutral in terms of the claims or ideology driving the action, this project focuses on 
those contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt dominant ensembles of 
representation in society, however it is perceived.  It is thus political in a broad sense, 
meaning it is concerned with social relations of power or authority.  Thus, this dissertation 
considers a more restricted population of actions than is initially suggested by the above 
definition.  Altogether, these considerations yield a more specific definition of culture 
jamming: (D.2) a contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a 
particular practice, object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is 
constrained by the elements of that particular representation.   
1.3.2. Resistance and Contentious Politics 
 It is helpful to think of culture jamming from this perspective as a form of protest or 
resistance.  Like so many concepts in the social sciences, these are also contested.  
However, we can begin by thinking of resistance as constituting a basic concept; protest is 
thus a form of resistance.  In their efforts at clarifying the conceptual issues associated with 
resistance, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) find a consensual core: opposition and action 
(included in D.2).   In order to organize the issues of conceptualization, they identify three 
dimensions upon which scholars seem to disagree: whether actors intend their acts as 
resistance (intentionality), whether targets recognize the act as resistance, and whether 
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observers recognize the action as resistance.  Actions that are positive on all three are 
defined as overt resistance.  Overt resistance includes, but is not restricted to, public acts of 
opposition like social movements and revolutions.  If we further distinguish between 
collective and individual acts of resistance, then we can preliminarily describe protest as 
collective overt resistance.     
 Within the social movement literature, a debate has erupted over the implications 
for conceptualization and research following two recent trends: 1) protest event coding 
and 2) the effort by leading scholars in the field to develop a consensual research agenda.   
The methodological staple of quantitative research in this field is protest event analysis, or 
the content coding of collective action events found in newspapers (Kriesi, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak, and Guigni 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992; 
2008; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975).  These events generally must satisfy a number of criteria 
specific to the constraints of the data source.  At the least, they must be public, collective 
(generally beyond some threshold regarding the number of participants), and expressive of 
a grievance or claim.  In addition to the widespread use of this approach, some of the 
leading scholars in the field have developed a dynamics of contention (DOC) agenda for 
studying protest (McAdam et al 2001).  Specifically, they define the broader object of study 
as contentious politics: 
 Episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at 
 least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims and (b) the 
 claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants (McAdam et al 
 2000,5). 
 
The criterion of episodicity excludes continuous or regularly scheduled interactions like 
elections and meetings.  Politics refers to the government as a party in the conflict, whether 
as a third party or a central party in contention.  Criterion (b) clarifies that the interactions 
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are contentious.  All action is intended as such and recognized as such by all parties, thus 
satisfying Hollander and Winwohner’s criteria for overt resistance. 
 The success of protest event analysis and the conceptualization of contentious 
politics together spurred a round of criticisms and proposals for alternative approaches 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Snow 2004; 
Snow et al 2004; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Zald 2000).  First, because of source 
constraints specific to newspapers, event analysis systematically over-represents certain 
contentious phenomena like strikes and demonstrations and underrepresents less 
conspicuous tactics (Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004).  In other words, publicity is 
operationalized as reported and newsworthy events.  Such an operationalization (and 
conceptualization) excludes most instances of culture jamming.   
 Second, many critics judge the definition of politics utilized by DOC scholars – “at 
least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or party to the claims” (McAdam et 
al 2001, 5) – as too restricted (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Crossley 2002b; Snow 2004; 
Taylor and Van Dyke 2004).  Instead, these critics propose a broader, inclusive conception 
of protest.  This emerging multi-institutional approach attends to forms of opposition to 
social relations of power and authority in institutional settings like the military, the family, 
corporations, church, the mass media, and many others.  Some instances of culture 
jamming are likely to apply to the state-centered perspective, for example actions by 
Billionaires for Bush (or Gore), the Surveillance Camera Players, and Negativland.  
However, it is likely that most culture jams do not involve any form of regime intervention. 
 While this broader conception of politics and activism is inclusive of culture 
jamming, it may in some instances lack the Hollander and Winwohner criterion of 
24 
recognition by the target.  Still, the intention is for targets to recognize the culture jam as 
oppositional.  Whether they fail to do so is a matter not addressed in this 
conceptualization.2  Thus, culture jamming, as defined here (D.2) satisfies all three criteria.  
Contentious collective action is by this definition intentional and recognized by targets.  
 Finally, the question remains as to whether culture jamming is a social movement.  
While there is a lively debate on precisely what constitutes a social movement 
(Staggenborg and Taylor 2005), I have clearly and unambiguously defined culture jamming 
as a tactical approach.  Moreover, I find it more useful to describe those who practice 
culture jamming as a “loose network” (Lasn 1999) of activists who engage in activities that 
I define as culture jamming.   While some organizations occasionally engage in culture 
jamming, I focus on those organizations that are generally regarded as CJOs and those 
organizations that primarily engage in this form of action. 
1.3.3. Analytic Properties 
 I now complete the intensional analysis of the definition of culture jamming utilized 
here (D.2) in order to further interrogate its scope and utility.  First, to reiterate the above 
discussion, as a contentious collective act a culture jam is an interaction involving more 
than one individual whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the 
claimants.  This excludes individual actions and those actions in which there are no claims 
or in which claims do not affect the interests of any of the claimaints. 
 Second, culture jamming is a contentious collective action involving disruptive re-
contextualization.  The definitions presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 utilize a series of verbs to 
clarify the meaning of culture jamming: re-purpose, critique, counter, subvert, deconstruct, 
                                                          
2 Nor is it addressed in the alternative conceptualization of tactical repertoires offered by Taylor and Van 
Dyke (2004; Taylor, Van Dyke, Kimport, and Anderson 2009). 
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hijack, reverse, destroy, interrupt, block, reintroduce, transform, parody, reroute, re-infuse, 
co-opt, hack, mock, re-contextualize, and disrupt.  I argue that some of these are 
inappropriate.  Destruction, blocking, and reversing do not speak accurately to the full 
intended process of culture jamming.  Transforming and mocking are too vague.  Though 
appropriate for (D.2.), subverting, countering, and critiquing are oppositional in nature and 
thus inappropriate for the more general definition (D.1).  Some are redundant: interrupt 
and disrupt; re-introduce and re-contextualize; co-opt, hack, re-purpose, and hijack.   
 Wading through this list yields several possible routes for definition.   However, 
careful review of the literature leads me to the phrase, disruptive re-contextualization.   
Merriam-Webster defines the verb disrupt as “to break apart: to throw into disorder” and 
“to interrupt the normal course or unity of” (“Disrupt” 2011, def. 1, def. 2).   Disruption 
assumes first a relative state of unity, order, or coherence in some object or intention.  The 
act of interrupting or throwing is thus a process that unfolds into disunity.  There is also 
the connotation of throwing off course from an initial course or intention. Culture jamming 
is precisely this diversion, a throwing or shifting off from some initial course or intention. 
 Yet, as I define it, culture jamming is also a re-contextualization.  This suggests that 
the initial unity or intention is disrupted through its diversion into a new context.  The 
process of re-contextualizing, of situating within a set of relationships that brings sense to 
an object, is not in itself disruptive; the initial unity of the object may be maintained if there 
is sufficient similarity in contexts.  However, a disruptive re-contextualization is a diversion 
that repurposes, or shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or 
intention.  This disruption is not total, for always the debris of prior intention leaves a 
trace, a contamination, a fragment of the original unity that speaks to its former course.  In 
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other words, the object is pregnant and riven with both its former unity or intention and its 
new intention.  The original intention or meaning is thus not destroyed or blocked, but 
rather positioned adjacent some other intention or meaning, thus opening up the object to 
fresh readings.  It is a set of juxtapositions, a tangling of contexts that expresses a claim 
that, if realized, would affect the interests of the original object.   
 Third, culture jamming operates on the plane of representation, of signs and 
symbols, of culture.  It assumes the validity of the thesis that all practices, objects, and 
discourses, even the mundane, are saturated with a surplus of meaning, of significance 
through signification.  In addition, it assumes that there is no single total system of 
meaning.  Rather, each society houses multiple ensembles of representation.3  Each of these 
ensembles is relatively coherent, meaning that each object refers to a wider set of objects 
that together constitute a totality of meaning.  In a sense, I am referring to something like 
Wittgensteinian language games.  However, I do not assume there is a high degree of 
incommensurability between two ensembles; they may have more or less permeable 
boundaries.  The point is that internally they are relatively dense with references. 
 With definition (D.2), ensembles of representation take on a political sense.  Some 
ensembles organize meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate 
some set of social relations that favor one group(s) in society over others.  A classic 
example is Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.  Through various institutions like the family, 
schools, and religion, the dominant interests in a society organize the production and 
maintenance of consent.  It is the task of the subordinate classes to fashion a counter-
hegemonic system of values and beliefs.  However, I raise three objections to this example 
                                                          
3 I chose this concept rather than culture to emphasize degrees of heterogeneity, internal coherence, and 
external differentiation.   
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that should further clarify my terminology.  First, Gramsci’s concept suggests that there are 
only two ensembles; definition (D.2) makes no a priori claims about the number, status, or 
nature of particular ensembles.  Instead, activists draw the lines and name the names.   
 Second, like Gramsci’s hegemony, the concept of an ensemble of representation 
seems strikingly similar to ideology.  Indeed, Nomai (2008) argues that culture jamming 
operates on the plane of ideology.  However, I chose this broad concept to be inclusive of 
not only ideology and challenges to ideology, but also of whatever activists may determine 
they are criticizing or struggling against: frames, narratives, hegemony, codes, etc.  Thus, I 
make no a priori claims about whether culture jams engage ideology.   
 I also make no a priori claims about the scope or content of ensembles.  They may be 
grand or narrow, political, cultural, economic, scientific, etc.   I simply assume that culture 
jammers perceive themselves to engage some ensemble of representation, which maintains 
some minimal level of internal coherence (D.1) and is perceived as dominant (D.2).   
 Definition (D.2) further clarifies that only a particular practice, object, or discourse of 
a dominant ensemble of representation suffers disruptive re-contextualization.  To offer 
some examples drawn from the opening paragraph of the introduction, some of these 
practices, objects, and discourses would include supermarket aisles and consumer 
products, the police and security practices, surveillance cameras, martial arts films, energy 
policy, tennis shoes and corporate brands, and many others.  Culture jamming (D.2) 
assumes that each of these examples is expressive of a dominant ensemble of 
representation in their original intended context.  However, through disruptive re-
contextualization this intention is diverted into juxtaposition in order to confront the very 
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question of its position in relations of power.  Thus, each particular expression refers to 
and implicates the ensemble and the social relations it implicates 
 However, a significant objection arises: does not all action operate on the plane of 
representation, including the actions of protesters?  As I will show in more detail in Chapter 
Ten, some efforts to build typologies of goals emphasize certain goal dichotomies: 
expressive or symbolic and instrumental; identity and strategy; culture and politics (Cohen 
1985; Jenkins 1983; Melucci 1989; 1996; Rucht 1988; Touraine 1981).  However, several 
scholars have argued that activism employs both logics, though it may stress one or 
another at any given time (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Bernstein 1997; Breines 1982; 
Ennis 1987; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; McAdam 1996; Polletta 2002; Turner and Killian 
1987).  Moreover, culture jamming often seeks a number of seemingly instrumental goals, 
such as increasing the salience of an issue, shaping preferences, and occupying spaces.  
These goals involve significant symbolic and expressive dimensions.    
 While all action does convey meaning, culture jamming is an intentional disruptive 
re-contextualization of dominant representations.  It involves the diversion of some initial 
representation from its original intention into a collision with a politically contrasting 
representation.  Moreover, the operation of a culture jam on dominant ensembles of 
representation is a tactical emphasis.  The goal may be instrumental, but the process of 
jamming culture is an explicit intentional process of crafting meaning.4  It is in this sense a 
form of framing, of meaning or signifying work (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 2005; 
Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986).   
                                                          
4 I consider differences in goals in Chapters Three and Nine. 
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 Finally, culture jamming involves a particular constraint: the elements of the 
particular representation.  A culture jam is performed within the dominant ensemble.  It 
does not refer to it from without, but rather nests itself inside the representation or a 
replication of the representation.   Thus, the position of criticism is established within and 
unfolds through the perception of contrast.  In this way, the representation becomes the 
vehicle for its own criticism; in this sense, power is less spoken to than made to testify 
against itself.  The original representation is made to “speak” its own damnation.  
Moreover, the unfolding criticism is always structured as such by the dominant 
representation; the form imposed by the dominant representation, though it can be 
structurally deformed or broken, as in collage, always predominates.  In this sense, the 
content hijacks the form.  One means of clarifying this point is through comparison.  While 
a group like Negativland re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical 
music tracks, groups like Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism 
within sonic structures assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these 
criticisms.   
 Before considering concepts related to culture jamming, I briefly elaborate.  First, I 
provide an extended definition (D.2) of culture jamming:  
 A form of overt resistance constituted by an interaction (a) involving more than one 
 person in the planning or execution of the action in their common interest; (b) 
 whose claim would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants; 
 (c) which shifts the sense or meaning of an object away from its original path or 
 intention, thereby re-positioning this intention or meaning adjacent some other 
 intention or meaning (d) within the original object itself or a reproduction of that 
 object such that the form of the original representation dominates but the content is 
 bifurcated (d) in order to oppose a set of referents (of which the original object is a 
 component) that organizes meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and 




Second, figures 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 provide concrete examples of culture jams.  The first, a jam 
of a caution sign, exemplifies those actions included within definition (D.1) but excluded by 
definition (D.2).  It is not oppositional or contentious, though it may well be collective or 
individual.  Figure 1.2 is a classic example of a culture jam as defined by (D.2).  Produced 
and published in the culture jamming publication Adbusters, this jam replicates a marketing 
campaign for Absolut Vodka in order to juxtapose the preferred interpretation of the 
corporation (virility, sexy, stylish) with the well-known association of alcohol consumption 
with male sexual impotence.   The jam targets the advertising campaign, the corporation, 
alcoholism, and ultimately an ethic of consumerism and commercialism.  Finally, Figure 1.3 
portrays a performance from the Billionaires for Bush (now the Billionaires for 
Wealthcare).  In this action, the group stages a satirical counter-protest of opponents of the 
Bush administration’s tax policies.  Like all culture jams, this performance works through 
disruptive re-contextualization: the initial intention or representation (the wealthy 
[activists impersonating their garb and mannerisms] in support of the Bush 
administration) is confronted with opposing intentions or representations (statements and 
signs expressing presumably unpopular but sincere framings of their support). 
1.3.4. Semantic Field 
 In order to achieve conceptual coherence, it is imperative to explore the semantic 
field which culture jamming inhabits (Gerring 2001).  Indeed, culture jamming is often 
discussed within the context of other forms of action.  Such an effort should draw out some 
of the challenges and limitations of conceptualizing culture jamming.  First, as my 
discussion of the literature on culture jamming suggests, many activists and academics 
equate culture jamming with a form of media activism.  At least four concepts are relevant: 
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Figure 1.1. Culture Jam. A simple culture jam 
involving the motion picture 300 and a 
common daily item conveying a message of 





Figure 1.2. Adbusters Absolut Impotence. A 
culture jam involving an advertising 
campaign forAbsolut Vodka and the 
relationship between alcohol consumption  







Figure 1.3. The Billionaires for Bush.  Activists dress as the wealthy and ‘support’ the tax 
policies of the Bush administration by ‘protesting’ opponents of these policies.  
Source: http://www.fungagement.org/pro-others/billionairsforbush.htm 
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oppositional media (Lievrouw 2003), alternative media (Atton 2002; Downing 2001), 
tactical media (Braman 2002; Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009), and hacktivism or 
cyberactivism (Jordan 2002; Jordan and Taylor 2004).  The first two are very general terms 
that seek, depending on the formulation, to encompass forms of media whose production 
and dissemination represent a challenge or alternative to the mainstream media.  Many 
culture jams are self-reflexive media practices.  Under definition (D.2) these would fall 
under a conception of alternative or oppositional media that encompasses the disruptive 
re-contextualization of practices and products of the mass media, though it is of no 
importance whether a culture jam is presented in an alternative outlet (as in Adbusters).  
However, I argued above that this emphasis on media limits the scope of the concept.   
 The same argument concerns hacktivism or cyberactivism.  Though variously 
defined, hacktivism involves the integration of activism with computer hacking, or “the 
nonviolent use of illegal or legally ambiguous digital tools in pursuit of political ends” 
(Samuel 2004, 2).  This form of activism is exclusive to online activity, while culture 
jamming can occur online or offline.  However, not all forms of hacktivism can be classified 
as culture jamming; actions like data theft, virtual sabotage, virtual sit-ins, and denial-of-
service attacks are basically translations of civil disobedience into the online context.   
Others, however, can be classified as culture jamming, such as a number of website 
parodies and site defacements. These involve oppositional disruptive re-contextualization. 
 This discussion does bring out two issues of significance in conceptualizing culture 
jamming: violence and legality.  First, like hacktivism, culture jamming is a nonviolent form 
of action; while it may deface property it is not in principle a form of action that brings 
physical harm to a person.  Second, culture jamming can be legal or illegal.  It often 
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operates on public or private forms of property, including intellectual property, in such a 
way as to deface or violate the property.  In principle (and often in practice), these 
replications enjoy the protections offered by U.S. copyright law due to their status as satire 
or parody. 
 Tactical media, however, is a more difficult concept.  Raley (2009, 6) defines it as 
“the intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary creation of 
a situation in which signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical thinking 
becomes possible.”  This definition could sit comfortably in Table 1.1.  Although some 
discussions aim to distinguish the two, I contend that in practice there is little difference 
between culture jamming as broadly understood and tactical media.   
 The common equation of tactical media with Michel de Certeau’s concept of tactics 
provides no clear conceptual boundaries (Garcia and Lovink 1997; Raley 2009).  De 
Certeau (1984) argues that tactics are the myriad everyday ways in which users 
temporarily exploit for their own purposes strategies, or rationalizing structures of power 
(types of ensembles of representation).  Culture jamming can be described as a set of 
tactics in that it also exploits some manifestation of a dominant ensemble.  For de Certeau, 
tactics are primarily temporal in that they must operate within the space of strategies.  For 
theorists and practitioners, tactical media has a ‘hit-and-run’ quality.  For example, Raley 
(2009) and Garcia and Lovink (1997) identify its unique temporality (swift and temporary) 
as one of its core characteristics.  However, this does not distinguish tactical media from 
culture jamming.  First, some prominent tactical media actions do not bear out this 
temporal structure; Ubermorgen’s Google Will Eat Itself (n.d.), though invasive and covert, 
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had a more sustained temporality.  Second, culture jamming can be as swift and temporal 
as any tactical media action.   
 Even the emphasis on media does not capture the full range of actions often 
described by tactical media practitioners.  The Critical Art Ensemble, self-professed tactical 
media artists and likely the single most cited example of the practice, employ a wider 
tactical repertoire than an emphasis on media would suggest.  Thus, I argue that under 
definition (D.2), culture jamming encompasses tactical media.   
 Next, I consider the relation between culture jamming, protest art, and artistic 
appropriation.  To be succinct, protest art is the use of artistic practices and works to 
convey an intentional political message of opposition.  However, defining the concept of art, 
or defining particular works as art, is a highly contentious affair in the field of aesthetics 
and among artists (Carroll 2000; Davies 1991).  There is little value in reviewing the 
myriad approaches to defining this most contested of concepts.  However, what is clear is 
that the process of definition is contested.  Defining art in general and categorizing specific 
works as art is always a rolling confrontation and a staking of positions.  Attempts to define 
art are, in this understanding, boundaries that beg transgression.  Thus, it is clear that 
defining art is a social process.  For the purposes of this work, I argue that the conferral of 
the status of artwork on specific objects, practices, and discourses is essentially contestable.  
The object, practice, or discourse is thus always potentially artistic.  Empirically, I rely on 
the framing of the practices and products of culture jammers; they may identify an action 
or such as artistic or aesthetic, or they may not.  Particular culture jams are, as a tactic of 
oppositional representations, only an instance of (potential) protest art if they are 
recognized as art by practitioners or observers.   
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 I make the same claim with respect to artistic appropriation.  This artistic method 
shares an important structural affinity with culture jamming; it re-contextualizes an 
existing representation.  However, artistic appropriation need not be oppositional.  Thus, if 
we consider oppositional artistic appropriation, we consider a specific class of protest art. 
 Finally, other terms are frequently cited as synonyms of culture jamming. Umberto 
Eco (1986, 138, 140, 143) proposes “semiological guerrilla warfare,” the use of the 
“residual freedom” abundant in the ambiguity of mass communication to “control the 
message and its multiple possibilities of interpretation.”  Activist organization Autonome 
A.F.R.I.K.A. (1999, 310) describes guerrilla communication thus:  
 It is direct action in the space of social communication. But different from other militant 
 positions (stone meets shop window), it doesn't aim to destroy the codes and signs of 
 power and control, but to distort and disfigure their meanings as a means of counteracting 
 the omnipotent prattling of power. Communication guerrillas do not intend to occupy, 
 interrupt or destroy the dominant channels of communication, but to detourn and subvert 
 the messages transported.   
 
Indeed, Dery (1993) defines culture jamming as “guerrilla semiotics.”  The emphasis on the 
channels of (mass) communication (in other words, mass media) is criticized above, though 
both concepts, if extended to other means of organizing and projecting ensembles of 
representation, speaks to an assumption within culture jamming that all particular objects, 
practices, and discourses can tell multiple tales, including critical ones.  
1.3.5. Ironic Framing 
 As I noted above, culture jamming is a framing process in which two competing 
frames are made to speak to each other directly.  In particular, under definition (D.2) the 
original frame is made to “speak” its own damnation.  This structure bears a striking 
resemblance to that of irony.   This opens the question: what is the relation of culture 
jamming to irony? 
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Attention to frames and framing processes in the study of social movements has 
grown dramatically and is today a staple of the field (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 
2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986).  A frame is a cognitive schema of 
interpretation that selectively represents a social situation.  Frames are the practical means 
of organizing experience and perception in a complex social reality such that we can 
capably navigate this reality.  As in everyday life, frames are put into play in the course of 
contentious collective interaction in texts, images, speeches, and even actions (McAdam 
1996).  Whether in discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in 
such contentious frames can define a social situation as unjust, attribute blame and 
responsibility, identify victims, clarify threats and urgency, suggest courses of action, and 
motivate individuals to engage in action, among others.  Framing is thus a significant part 
of the ‘meaning work’ involved in generating and sustaining a sense of common interest in 
particular courses of collective action. 
 Frames are often couched in rhetorical appeals in order to persuade actors to adopt 
some definition of reality.  Actors can employ different rhetorical devices like metaphor 
and irony.  However, little research has focused on strategies of rhetorical appeal in 
collective action framing.  A number of scholars have noted that the repressive opportunity 
structure in authoritarian regimes makes more overt contentious frames too risky 
(Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999).  Instead, activists in these situations often use more subtle 
rhetorical devices involving irony and ambiguity.  Some works have explored the use of 
irony in more democratic contexts.  Without referring to framing, Stewart, Smith, and 
Denton Jr. (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social movements that contribute to 
the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony.  Some works consider the role of 
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irony in culture jamming.  Day (2008; 2011) argues that irony helps to create stronger 
feelings of collective identity by appealing to a sympathizer’s sense of humor.  Wettergren 
(2005) finds that most culture jammers do not define their activities as ironic.  Instead, 
they define it as a persuasive use of humor, because for them it breaks down barriers to 
communication.  Irony, as they define it, can generate significant negative emotional 
reactions.  Harold (2004; 2007) explores the rhetorical strategies utilized in three forms of 
culture jamming:  subvertisements, pranks, and appropriation.  The first emphasizes what 
she describes as the negating impulse of the parodist, while the latter two are more 
affirmative.   
   As Dery’s conceptualization suggests, many people argue that culture jamming is 
inherently humorous or playful in its reliance on rhetorical techniques of irony.  Indeed, to 
disruptively re-contextualize a representation in such a way as to simultaneously present 
prior and new meanings does suggest irony.  As Linda Hutcheon (1994, 30) observes, “It is 
the superimposition or rubbing created by a difference of context that makes irony 
happen.”  It speaks with two voices though one mouth, expressing beyond expected or 
obvious intention.  Irony in this sense is characterized by a certain semantic structure, one 
of difference, or as I call it, disruptive re-contextualization.   
 Culture jamming as defined in both (D.1) and (D.2) is thus a rhetorical (including 
performative) strategy of irony.  Though Wettergren (2005, 123) initially agreed with her 
interviewees that culture jammers relied more on humor than irony, she eventually 
distinguishes between the means and ends of culture jamming in this elaboration.  Here, 
she notes that while culture jammer’s unease with irony is rooted in the goals of action, it 
nonetheless characterizes their actions. 
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 What is common to…[culture jammer’s] accounts of irony is that irony seems to be 
 connected to the telos of an action, rather than considered as a means to an end.  If 
 something is intentionally ironic, it is also not sincere.  The sincerity of the cause of culture 
 jammers notwithstanding, irony seems to be an outcome of the “hide-and-seek” character of 
 culture jamming, which often appears from the inside of a discourse but reveals itself as a 
 critique of the very same discourse.  In doing what the opponents do, just doing it a little bit 
 more extreme, irony is produced as an unintended effect (original emphasis, Wettergren 
 2005, 123) 
 
Irony is thus the means, however subtle or unintended, of drawing a discourse or 
representation into conversation with itself in order to critique itself.   
1.4. Conclusion 
 
 Culture jamming is a concept that prior to this work had undergone little systematic 
conceptual analysis.  This chapter both reviews the academic literature on culture jamming 
and endeavors to craft a relatively rigorous conceptualization for the purposes of social 
science research.  To advance the goals of this chapter, I collect samples of definitions from 
academic and activists sources, provide a broad definition (D.1) and a working definition 
(D.2) for this project, probe the analytic properties of these definitions, draw out the 
semantic field within which culture jamming relates to other concepts, and consider 










CHAPTER 2. TILLY AND BOURDIEU 
 This chapter and the following have as their central purpose the elaboration of a 
theoretical explanation of both repertoire change and tactical choice.  This focus calls for 
three successive discussions.  The first involves a concise review of the major approaches 
to explaining tactical change.  Chapter Eleven provides the occasion for a thorough review 
of the theoretical approaches to explaining tactical choice.  The second involves the 
presentation of the general argument of this dissertation.  Third, I develop theoretical 
instruments that contribute to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice.   
This latter effort is broken down into two tasks.  First, I consider the basic 
contributions of the sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu to an analysis of 
contentious politics.  While the former is renowned for his work in the field, the latter is 
primarily regarded as a scholar of culture and social stratification.  I thus conclude this 
chapter with a dialogue between these two eminent scholars and develop a robust 
conception of everyday social organization in the process.  Chapter Three considers the 
relation between the socializing structures of everyday social organization and tactical 
behavior through the lens of collective action theory.  Parts II and III of this dissertation 
utilize these theoretical developments in an exploration of culture jamming as an 
oppositional tactical approach.  More specific theoretical instruments are developed in 
later chapters.   
2.1. Repertoire Change 
 Studies of tactics rely on at least one of three broad approaches to explaining change 
in the available means of protest among populations over time: Tilly’s relatively general 
model, cycles of protest, and NSM theory.  One of Tilly’s driving concerns is the question of 
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repertoire change (1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 1995b; 2006a; 2008).  Much of this work has 
focused especially on Great Britain, though he has also applied his insights to the United 
States and France, among others.  In particular, he identifies and aims to explain a shift in 
the means of collective action from the 1750s into the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century, in which localized direct actions gave way to more modular campaigns directed at 
national political institutions. 
 Although the particular specifications have changed over the years, in general he 
attributes the shape of a repertoire in a particular society to three broad factors (Tilly, 
2006a).  The first, the everyday social organization of a given population, refers to the array 
of collective identities, social networks, and organizational forms that organize the rhythms 
of daily life.  Together, these inform the claims and house the resources for potential 
collective action.  The second, the cumulative experience of contention, emphasizes that the 
history of contention in a given population shapes conflict by providing important 
examples or representations of actions, issues, goals, and frames.  This history shapes the 
expectations that activists have in contention by generating a signaling system actors use to 
make sense of claims.  Finally, the intervention of the political regime specifies the 
arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by the various actors in a political 
regime, including the government, political parties, labor unions, corporations, media 
organizations, and religious organizations, among others.  These actors are especially 
important insofar as they contribute to the degree of access, facilitation, and repression 
meted out to challengers. 
 The development of new forms of collective action is a gradual process that occurs 
at the margins of established forms as a result of changes in these three factors and their 
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interactions.  For example, shifts in demographic patterns and the nature of the economy 
can alter such factors as: communication and transportation systems, the distribution of 
resources, the relationship between domestic and occupational life, etc.  Such changes 
reconfigure the relations of power in society and the organizational bases of collective 
action by shifting populations and resources.  Changes in the political regime, such as a 
transition from dictatorship to democracy or the incorporation of the working class into 
the political process, can also dramatically reshape the nature of conflict by redistributing 
resources and power.  The contentious interactions that unfold under these conditions thus 
diffuse new forms of contentious politics and regime responses.   
 The change that Tilly identifies in his model is gradual and cumulative in nature; 
innovations form at the margins of established actions.  In contrast, scholars have 
developed conceptions and mechanisms of repertoire change involving much more rapid 
innovation and diffusion.  Sewell (1996) argues that transformative events like the 
storming of the Bastille can quickly reshape prevailing conceptions of collective action.  
Zolberg (1972) argues that the effervescence of sudden and widespread social unrest 
weakens previous constraints on contentious action and thus contributes to widespread 
experimentation.  Tarrow (1989; 1998) provides a more refined variant of this approach of 
this explanation: cycles of protest.  Protest cycles form when movement activities and 
successes generate externalities that indicate to other movements and activists an unusual 
degree of responsiveness in the political system.  He refers to this phenomenon as a shift in 
political opportunities.  Activists mobilize to take advantage of these newfound 
opportunities.  The ensuing escalation of interactions between activists and political 
authorities involves the mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of society as political 
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entrepreneurs anticipate decreased risks for protest organization and collective action.  
These conditions facilitate the increased development of tactical, framing, and 
organizational innovations and thus the diffusion of collective action.  In this sense, 
Tarrow’s protest cycle differs from Tilly’s general model only in its temporality; rapid 
changes in the strategies utilized by political authorities and the mobilization of everyday 
networks, identities, and organizations together produce a relatively rapid change in 
repertoires of contention.  
 Though diverse, NSM theorists share a common observation: a significant change in 
the repertoire associated with the arrival of new movements like the women’s, 
environmental, and gay rights movements over the last half of the twentieth century 
(Barnes and Kaase 1979; Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; 
Touraine 1981; 1985).   In order to explain this shift in tactics, they turn to what many 
sociologists have identified as a fundamental shift in the nature of social organization.  The 
most popular of these conceptions concerns differences between industrial and post-
industrial society.  Characterized by tremendous social changes like industrialization, 
urbanization, and glaring inequality, industrial society is split by the industrial cleavage 
between workers and employers.  Forged on the basis of established solidarities like class, 
forms of collective action like the labor movement addressed central issues of economic 
well-being and physical security.   
 NSM theorists argue that contemporary forms of collective action developed in 
response to the emergence of new patterns of organization in post-industrial society.  With 
the general prosperity of postwar democracies, material considerations receded in 
significance.  New or modified mechanisms of control – a growing state tasked with 
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extensive regulatory and social insurance imperatives alongside a global market eroding 
the state’s capacity and will to meet these imperatives – increase the depth of intervention 
of political and economic interests into private everyday life.  Such developments facilitate 
new conflicts over self-determination, the environment, identity, and other post-materialist 
issues.  Unlike the movements of industrial society, new social movements forge new 
solidarities based on values and lifestyles, while they engage in collective actions oriented 
towards shaping autonomous institution and practices.  The repertoire that unfolds in such 
struggles, including efforts to fashion identities and achieve novel goals, are specific to the 
conditions of postindustrial society.   
 The approach taken in this dissertation is primarily informed by Tilly’s general 
approach to explaining repertoire change.  Below I develop my argument and situate the 
primary theses of this dissertation in relation to the approaches to repertoire change. 
2.2. Summary 
2.2.1. Integrated Theory 
 Efforts in the social movement literature to synthesize, integrate, or otherwise bring 
together in ad hoc fashion various theoretical perspectives are numerous (Dalton 1994; 
Klandermans 1997; Jasper 1997; Lichbach 1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; 
McAdam et al 2001; Opp 2009; Passy 2001; Tarrow 1998).  The approach adopted here 
contributes to an explanation of repertoire change and tactical choice by integrating the 
major theoretical perspectives prevalent not only in the study of protest, but in sociology 
and political science in general.  Considering structural, cultural, and rational approaches 
together involves attention to the role of institutions and networks, resources and 
incentives, and collective identities in shaping social conflict.  The primary theoretical 
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imperatives of this  dissertation are to identify the sets of relationships between the core 
endogenous variables of a rational choice approach and exogenous variables like 
opportunities and identities.  An example of this model is Opp’s (2009, 328) structural-
cognitive model of social movement mobilization (see Figure 2.1).  A brief description will 
suffice.  The model is synthetic; it develops a causal argument by linking the macro to the 
micro level and integrating the relevant insights of various theoretical approaches.  
Analysis begins by identifying the cognitive structures of actors: their beliefs, values, and 
frames.  Next, an array of explanatory variables  are identified: macro-level variables, such 
as changes in state repression, or economic prosperity, meso-level factors such as 
organizational structures and group characteristics, and finally micro-level variables such 
as social interaction.  These factors are considered principally for their relation to changes 
in these cognitions.  The key mechanism in the model is the relation of these cognitions to 
incentives; changed cognitions result in changes in incentives.  From Opp’s perspective, 
shifts in costs and benefits lead to the decision to protest or to remain inactive.  Collective 
action is ultimately an aggregation of these individual decisions.  In other words, only those 
conditions that systematically affect subjective perceptions alter the rate of protest.  
As Opp repeatedly notes, none of the existing social movement theories, including 
the foundation of his approach, collective action theory, have a well-developed theory of 
 
 Macro Factors  Macro Protest 
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Other Factors  
 
Figure 2.1. Opp’s Structural-Cognitive Model of Mobilization 
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tactical choice.  Neither does he offer such a theory.   This study is thus a tentative and 
exploratory effort to gather the relevant explanatory variables into a single model.  While 
Opp’s model of mobilization and the partial model presented in this chapter and the next 
are causal models, this study is modest in that it primarily seeks to explore the utility of the 
constituent explanatory instruments with respect to a sample of positive cases of CJOs.  It 
thus has a strong illustrative character.  I begin with a concise presentation of the central 
argument and theses of this dissertation. 
2.2.2. Basic Argument 
 This project is oriented by two basic concerns: 1) a problem-driven effort to explain 
culture jamming as a set of oppositional tactics, and 2) a theory-driven effort to develop a 
more robust synthetic approach to explaining repertoire change and tactical choice.   This 
chapter and the following are concerned primarily with developing more refined 
theoretical instruments.  It is important, however, to briefly consider the nexus of these 
complementary priorities in order to anchor the remaining more abstract considerations.    
The primary argument of this dissertation is that a close relation exists between the 
development of twentieth century art in advanced Western democracies and certain novel 
forms of collective action called culture jamming.  Figure 2.2 schematizes the basic but 
incomplete argument.  I consider art as a property of everyday social organization: a 1) 
social field or institution, 2) situated within networks of durable social interaction, and 3) 
generative of sets of identities.  These generate the incentives for various forms of collective 
action, here considered as a 1) repertoire of contention available to a population at a given 
time and as 2) contentious performances specific to certain organizations.  I reduce the 
basic relation between art and contentious politics to at least three key arguments.   
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Figure 2.2. General Argument: Art and Protest 
 
1. The development of art as a social field is a gradual development in the everyday 
 social organization of advanced Western democracies.   
 
2. Culture jamming organizations are associated with the social fields, social 
 networks, and collective identities of artistic production. 
 
3. These social fields, social networks, and collective identities shape the 
 preferences and incentives for contentious performances. 
 
This set of theses involves movement from the macro to the meso-level (1 and 2) as well as 
a series of relations between structural, cultural, and rational variables in an effort to 
explain the culture jamming repertoire of contention (2 and 3).    
 This argument can be fleshed out in a number of preliminary but essential ways.  
First, I utilize the basic framework of Tilly’s explanation of repertoire change with special 
attention to the concept of everyday social organization.  I consider the remaining two 
approaches to repertoire change, once broken into their constituent parts, partially 
reducible to Tilly’s basic model.  In contrast to Tilly, NSM theorists rely on holistic 
conceptualizations of social systems to posit changes in repertoires over time.  Focusing on 
changes in the everyday social organization, political regimes, and signaling systems of 
advanced Western democracies over time should offer a more rigorous and empirical 
approach to considering whether new forms of domination and resistance have emerged.  
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Additionally, the cycles of protest thesis is fundamentally compatible with a focus on 
change in everyday social organization, political regimes, and/or signaling systems (Tilly 
2006a).  Specifically, the cycle of protest is the result of shifting opportunities as well as the 
mobilization of previously quiescent sectors of everyday social organization.   
 A second point involves the temporality of change.  I am not trying to distinguish 
between whether or not the set of contentious performances I am focusing on were 
developed in a relatively brief period of heightened conflict (cycle of protest) or gradually 
over the longue durée of the twentieth century.  Teune (2005) argues that these tactics and 
other related sets of tactics, germinated by various avant-garde groups, diffused in the 
ferment of the 1960s and appeared again in the anti-globalization movements of the 1990s 
and 2000s.  My argument is more modest, yet supplementary.  I emphasize changes in 
everyday social organization and a novel history of collective action to explain repertoire 
change in the advanced Western democracies over the second half of the twentieth century.   
Third, the concepts presented in Figure 2.2 concern relations among different levels 
of analysis.  At the macro-level are fields and repertoires; at the meso-level are networks, 
identities, incentives, and contentious performances.   This argument thus attempts to 
relate macro- and meso-level structures to meso-level phenomena.  This exclusion of the 
micro-level contrasts with Opp’s macro-to micro-level model in which objective structural 
features and processes shape individual perceptions and evaluations of action.  The 
primary reason for this truncation of the model is the assumption that the collective action 
problem has already been solved.  In Chapter One I define culture jamming (D.2) as a 
collective action.  Chapter Four concludes this consideration by specifying the CJO as the 
principal focus of this study.  Because the question here is strategy and not mobilization, 
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the micro-level recedes into the meso-level under the assumption that individuals in CJOs 
are sufficiently organized to operate as a unit.5  When appropriate, differences in 
distributions of characteristics are treated as meso-level group characteristics. 
 In order to flesh out these arguments, I first clarify the concept of a repertoire of 
contention and its relation to performances in Tilly’s work.  Second, I consider the concepts 
of field, capital, and habitus in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.  Third, in order to approach 
a fuller conceptualization of everyday social organization I compare and contrast these 
approaches.  Fourth, in the following chapter I develop an approach translating the 
socialization effects of these macro- and meso-level structures into a rational choice 
perspective.  In so doing, I detail two socialization factors relating everyday life to tactical 
choice: identity and familiarity.  Together, these shape the preferences for certain forms of 
action, reduce the costs of some actions but not others, and reduce the uncertainties 
associated with some actions but not others.  These processes form the core of a synthetic 
approach: I relate the structures and cognitions of everyday life to choices in contentious 
performances through an analysis of the preferences and incentives for tactics. 
2.3. Tilly and Bourdieu 
2.3.1. Tillyian Repertoires and Performances 
 Charles Tilly’s concept of a repertoire of contention has drawn significant attention 
as a useful device for analyzing the diversity of forms of contentious behavior.67  Since its 
                                                          
5 This is not to argue that the question of strategy must operate at the organizational level of analysis.  Rather, 
important questions regarding intra-organizational dynamics, inter-organizational relations, and tactical 
repertoires are simply not covered here. 
6See Auyero 2004; Beissinger 1998; Biggs 2005; Chabot 2001; Chabot and Duyvendak 2002; Crossley 2002a; 
Ennis 1987; Hayes 2006; Johnston and Mueller 2001; McCammon 2003; Mueller 1999; Munro 2005; O’Brien 
and Lianjiang 2006; Plows, Wall, and Doherty 2004; Rucht 1990; Steinberg 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; Szabó 
1996; Tarrow 1998; Traugott 1995.  This review draws primarily from Tilly (1977; 1978; 1986; 1995a; 
1995b; 2006a; 2008). 
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inception, the core of most conceptualizations has been the totality of available forms of 
contention, described as a set of well-defined and familiar forms of collective action (Tilly 
1978, 143), “the ways that people act together in pursuit of shared interests” (Tilly 1995b, 
41) and, more recently, as “ensembles of mutual claim-making routines available to 
particular pairs of identities” (McAdam et al 2001, 138).  At a given time and place a 
population makes use of a limited set of means in its efforts to project contentious claims.   
Though they do diverge on some points, in general these definitions and others 
stress at least three key points.  First, the repertoire is Tilly’s most celebrated cultural 
concept; it is conceived as a cultural creation with structural constraints, for “at any 
particular point in history… [people] learn only a rather small number of alternative ways 
to act collectively” (Tilly 1995a, 26).  While theoretically actors may choose to utilize any 
potentially conceivable tactic, the number of observable types of collective actions is 
relatively limited and exhibits significant continuity across time.  The means that actors 
find most familiar, feasible, and efficacious are the tactics most likely to find repeated and 
diffuse use and thus form a repertoire.  Such actions are “learned, understood, sometimes 
planned and rehearsed by the participants” (Tilly 1986, 207).  As Crossley notes (2002a, 
48-9), an implicit assumption of moral economy informs much of this work.  Cognitive 
skills and shared understandings are essential for actors to act and make sense of their 
action and the action of others.  The limits of these cognitions and understandings 
constitute constraints on the forms of action available to potential actors. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
7 All of this despite his claim made roughly a decade ago that the concept has not been a resounding success. 
Although it is frequently used as a heuristic device, Tilly (1995a) bemoaned the lack of efforts to empirically 
test the hypothesis of a repertoire of contention.  At its most general and rigorous, this dissertation cannot 
contribute such a test. 
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Second, the theatrical metaphor is instructive.  Tilly identifies contentious 
interactions as performances, as expressive actions that communicate the claims, demands, 
or grievances of collective actors.  In their discussion of repertoires, McAdam et al (2001, 
138, 49) refer to “adopting scripts,” “ritual,” and the limits to feasibility and intelligibility. 
The analogy serves to illustrate the relational core of the concept; actors are not only 
constrained by their cognitive capacities, but also by the cognitive capacities and 
understandings of their audiences.  Performances must be interpreted by multiple parties 
in order to convey the claims of each party.  Furthermore, it highlights the “learned 
character of the performance and the limits of that learning, yet allows for variation and 
even continuous change from one performance to the next…[It] typically leaves plenty of 
room for improvisation, innovation, and unexpected endings” (Tilly 1986, 307).  Themes 
like drama, symbolism, innovation, bargaining, and deliberation are common throughout 
Tilly’s discussion of the repertoire.  In general, repertoires of contention are the available 
sets of performances that actors enact and improvise in their contentious interactions. 
Third, repertoires are distinct from everyday life.  Everyday life is social structure, 
the rhythms of quotidian existence organized by work, education, family, and other 
mundane concerns and pursuits.  Of particular importance are the formal and informal 
social networks, or sets of durable social ties, that house the identities and resources of 
populations (Tilly 1991; 2005; 2008).  These social ties are the products of repeated social 
transactions, abiding interactions between actors.  Unlike episodes of contentious politics, 
networks maintain an enduring temporal structure that provides valuable predictability in 
social life.  Such durable relations are the foundations of larger social processes and 
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structures.  For Tilly the individual is not the fundamental unit in social inquiry because 
individuals, like structures, are an emergent property of interactions. 
In order to navigate this everyday social milieu, people draw on scripts (Tilly 2005) 
or repertoires of everyday life (McAdam et al 2001, 140).8  Social interactions vary along 
two dimensions; performances are both scripted and improvised.  Scripts draw on general 
and available models of action specific to certain relations and situations.  They are the 
sedimented result of prior social transactions.  Because few situations are repeated 
perfectly, scripts cannot perfectly anticipate the consequences of action.  Interaction also 
relies on local working knowledge that supplements the gaps between scripts and actual 
unfolding interactions.  This allows for degrees of improvisation and learning in order to 
grapple with the exigencies of situations (Tilly 2005).   Though inevitable, errors and 
unintended consequences are often opportunities for learning and correction, and thus 
accumulations of local knowledge and, over time, the refinement of scripts (Tilly 1996).  
Performances are the scripts or repertoires enacted and improvised in context; they are the 
structured but situational relationship between various actors and their environment. 
2.3.2. Bourdieusian Fields and Habitus 
Of critical importance in any effort to grapple with Bourdieu are the concepts of 
field, capital, and habitus.9  Fields are plural; they presume the internal differentiation of a 
society into various institutionalized spheres of social activity.  They distinguish a level of 
analysis above that of organizations or networks and below that of the whole social 
                                                          
8
 Descriptions of these sets of non-contentious performances are reminiscent of the rich analyses of everyday 
behavior offered by Erving Goffman (Collins 2010).    
9
 This review draws primarily from Bourdieu (1997; 1984; 1990; 1993; 1996; 1998; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992). 
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arena.10  The characteristics of fields induce independent constraining effects on individual 
or organizational behavior.  These effects typically involve the socialization of attitudes, 
values, and preferences, as well as the structuring of incentives and resource endowments.  
Some describe these effects as governed by a central orienting or “institutional logic” that 
guides this social activity within the field (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton 2004).  
Bourdieu’s approach to field theory has found favor in a number of studies of social 
movement activity (Auyero 2003; Bilic 2010; Crossley 2001; 2002a; 2003; 2006; Edelman, 
Leachman, and McAdam 2010; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Epstein 1996; Haluza-Daley 
2008; Jasper 1997; Ray 1999).  This study contributes to this growing literature by 
considering how Bourdieu’s sociology, specifically his sociology of art, provides a robust 
supplement to Tilly’s emphasis on everyday social organization.  
For Bourdieu, modern industrial societies are characterized by numerous relatively 
autonomous and highly distinct fields, or “social microcosms,” e.g. the literary, political, 
religious, etc (Bourdieu 1998, 83; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97).  Through successive 
struggles to mark off social terrain distinct from the dominant field of power and economy, 
fields accrue their own resources and practices that institutionalize these struggles.  Fields 
are thus delineated cultural and structural contexts, institutionalized spheres of social 
activity that shape behavior through the construction of ways of seeing and acting, of 
behaving, but most importantly, of classifying and differentiating.  Such organization is not 
neutral, however, for fields are the products of power, or inequalities in resources.  Indeed, 
                                                          
10 Similar concepts are not alien to social movement theory.  Early efforts in resource mobilization theory 
specified the organizational structure of a movement as a social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 
1977; 1987b).  Others defined multi-organizational fields as the population of organizations relevant to a 
social movement (Curtis and Zurcher 1973; Klandermans 1997).  Today, work in organizational ecology 
approaches has blossomed (Minkoff 1995; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Soule and King 2008).   
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Bourdieu uses two metaphors to capture the general concept of fields: games and markets.  
Like a game, fields are sites of struggle, with the caveat that even the rules themselves are 
ultimately stakes in the game.  Like a market, fields are sites of the production and 
consumption of products (services, goods, knowledge, status) where agents struggle over 
profits (different forms of capital).  Capital is any resource which is the object of action in a 
social field.  It includes material or economic capital (money and material assets), cultural 
capital (knowledge, skills), social capital (networks and influence), and symbolic capital 
(status, prestige) (Bourdieu 1986).  One’s endowment of capital is a marker of one’s 
position in social space.  The unequal distribution of the different forms of capital 
structures society, or the universe of social fields, as well as each distinct field.  Fields are 
thus the durable organization of power in each sphere of social activity. 
In this struggle, agents occupy positions.  The concept of positions points to the 
relational core of Bourdieu’s theory of practice; positions in a field are constituted by their 
relationship to other positions.  Actors occupy positions by virtue of the structure of the 
field, which is structured as such by the unequal distribution of capital.  Thus, the 
distribution of capital and the positions of other actors determine particular positions in 
social space.  Bourdieu’s favored method of graphically representing fields and their 
positions is correspondence analysis, which plots positions along indicators of capital in n-
dimensional space, though the space is usually organized by two variables: the total 
amount of capital and the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital.11  Concrete social 
interaction is secondary in this analysis; capital defines position, and thus social meaning 
and resource endowments, not the networks of relations among actors.  Networks are 
                                                          
11 Chapter Five presents a fuller analysis of the structure of fields, specifically the field of cultural production. 
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merely a social resource for the acquisition, preservation, and deployment of other forms 
of capital, strategies that are structured by the field.  In addition, fields are dynamic; 
positions are constantly in flux as actors employ strategies to acquire, utilize, or conserve 
the capital relevant to the field, new actors emerge in the field, and other actors recede 
from the field, thereby redefining every position.  Hence, fields are sites of struggle where 
actors pursue the maximization of capital in order to improve their position in the field.  
At the micro-level, Bourdieu (1998, 25) conceives of individuals as, “active and 
knowing agents endowed with a practical sense.”  This sense: 
which does not burden itself with rules or principles…still less with calculations or 
deductions, which are in any case excluded by the urgency of action ‘which brooks no delay,’ 
is what makes it possible to appreciate the meaning of the situation instantly, at a glance, in 
the heat of the  action, and to produce at once the opportune response 
 
is characteristic of the relation between habitus and field (Bourdieu 1990, 103-4).   It is 
what allows us to navigate the highly complex but seemingly simple rhythms of everyday 
life.  This instantaneous and non-calculative sense of an unfolding situation is pre-reflexive 
and non-intentional.  Action is a structured phenomenon; it is habitual and unconscious, 
yet it follows a logic that is contextual and situational, not universal and abstract.  In 
addition, action is practical and directional.  Actors are always interested and strategic; 
“practices never cease to comply with an economic logic” in the pursuit of clear objectives 
(Bourdieu 1990, 123).   Talk, walking, tastes in dress and arts: all of these actions and more 
are actions of impression management, of a constant and unfolding process of locating 
oneself and others in a social space organized by power. 
 Habitus refers to the matrices of dispositions, structures of schemas, habits, and 
know-how which actors acquire in the navigation of social fields.  Through action in the 
social world - what Bourdieu variously calls one’s social trajectory or individual history - 
55 
agents acquire dispositions.  The dispositions generated through this process together 
constitute the habitus.  Dispositions structure the ability to practically (unconsciously) 
perceive a situation and its distinct attributes, classify and render meaningful each 
attribute and the situation in general, and act on the perception and appreciation of the 
situation in a manner that furthers one’s practical objectives.  Dispositions refer to the tacit 
knowledge and skills embodied and applied in the practical movement of an actor through 
social interactions.  Habitus are thus the incorporated structures of social life, of ways of 
judging and acting prescribed and proscribed by the field.   
The sense of the game that animates practical action and thus the habitus is a 
practical sense of the lines, means, and stakes of conflict specific to each field.  Conflict is 
symbolic in Bourdieu’s sociology; habitus is a set of classificatory schemas that both judges 
the actions of others and allows one to anticipate the perception and judgment of one’s 
own actions by others.  When employed in social relations, these incorporated structures of 
symbolic differentiation confer on forms of capital (social, cultural, economic) an additional 
element of prestige or status.  Like all species of power, this symbolic capital is unequally 
distributed; some actors are able to draw on their resource endowments in order to define 
the struggle and its objects in their interest.  Symbolic capital thus allows for the definition 
of what constitutes cultural capital in a field, and thus confers the power to define the social 
world through categories of perception and action.  Practices are the production and 
consumption of these sets of symbolic classifications, all of which are organized by the field 
and habitus in concrete social interaction.   In other words, action is subordinated to the 
logic of dominant social classifications that identify objects and actors as good/evil, 
profane/sacred, ugly/beautiful, efficient/wasteful, clean/dirty, etc.  Even subversive or 
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heterodox action within the field often merely inverts the dominant classification schemes.  
Social identity itself is the position of an actor in social space, the set of representations 
that classify and position them.  It is through strategies of distinction, the carving of 
identity through symbolic conflict, that actors strive to maximize their resource 
endowments in order to authoritatively define social reality (Bourdieu 1984). 
Social fields contribute to the accomplishment of the habitus, and thus the structure 
of its dispositions, through their distribution of capital and the position of the actor.  Fields 
require actors to acquire different skills, competencies, and resources or capital specific to 
the field in order to maximize their standing.  These acquisitions are classified and 
classifying actions, practices generated by the habitus.  In other words, the friction between 
habitus and field is generally minimal, because practical action acquires a “feel for the 
game,” the subtle sense of the contours of the field that ensures an investment in the stakes.   
This sense of the conflict is a practical sense of the possibilities of action within the field, of 
the threats, opportunities, and constraints offered at any given time.  Such a sense of the 
field is conditioned by one’s position in the field and the nature of the conflicts endemic to 
the field.  For example, the artistic field operates according to the conflict between the logic 
of its fundamental law, “art for art’s sake,” for which the acquisition of material or 
economic capital is anathema, and the logic of the market, for which financial and popular 
success are lauded.  The acquisition of field-specific attributes - the “internalization of an 
objectively selected system of signs, indices, and sanctions,” of systems of classification - is 
the process of socialization to this conflict of values (Bourdieu 1993, 133).   
 Deposited practical infra-conscious schemes or dispositions - the sets of symbolic 
classifications that actors use to name the social world - are the source of social structure 
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as well.  As noted in the right side of Figure 2.2 above, while agents continually perform a 
process of acquisition, they simultaneously perform a process of reproduction.  This 
process is the key to understanding the continuity of social relations and structures.  
Individual actions are in truth collective or relational efforts reconstructing or reactivating 
the social fields that in turn generate and reinforce the habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 73).    
2.3.3. Bourdieu and Social Movements 
Though Bourdieu himself was active in the various movements against global 
capitalism in France, his theoretical writings on protest are minimal.  His most noted 
concept of relevance is crisis (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992, 131).  He describes it thus:  
 The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into 
 formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in 
 breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective 
 structures, destroys self-evidence practically (Bourdieu 1977, 169).   
 
At its most essential, crisis is a moment of reflexivity.  Reflexivity refers generally to the 
ability to think about the conditions of thought and action (Bourdieu and Wacquiant 1992, 
40).  If the reproduction of social structures is a pre-reflexive loop of habitus and field, 
crises are breaks in the loop, disjunctures between the habitus and its social field.  When 
one’s expectations or one’s sense of the game is dashed by unfolding events, the flow of 
action is interrupted.  Bourdieu seems to suggest that reflexivity and deliberation 
substantially shape practice when pre-reflexive practical sense is unable to adequately 
navigate such dissonant situations.   
 Bourdieu’s (1998) polemical work argues that reflexivity figures decisively into the 
importance of intellectuals for the progress of social movements.  For him, some fields, 
specially the scientific fields, socialize agents through the incorporation of dispositions of 
reflexivity; reflexivity then becomes another element of pre-conscious practical sense.  
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Social scientists, for example, through practical pre-reflective strategies must acquire the 
cultural capital associated with reflexivity to advance their positions in their native field.  
As a scientist, the reflexive agent par excellence, Bourdieu has incorporated through action 
the particular conditions of the French field of academia, one of which is the habitual 
capacity to reflect on these very conditions and those of other fields.   
In contrast to the dominant emphasis on supply theories and their focus on the 
capacities for mobilization (opportunities, resources, etc), Bourdieu’s implicit theory of 
social movements is a demand theory of mobilization.  It focuses on the conditions for the 
emergence of a consciousness of injustice, for “cognitive liberation,” the recognition or 
realization that collective actions can shape outcomes in a group’s favor (McAdam 1999).12  
However, this study focuses on the question of strategy and tactics.  Below, I explore how 
Bourdieu can contribute to an explanation of strategic and tactical choice. 
2.4. Dialogue 
2.4.1. Networks and Fields 
The core of the argument guiding this dissertation is the notion of everyday social 
organization.  Tilly’s unpacking of the concept into identities, networks, and resources is in 
part a recognition of the voluminous and cumulative work done in the study of social 
movements to specify the most important causal variables outside of political institutions.   
Bourdieu’s sociology offers a somewhat different conception of everyday life and social 
organization that privileges the influence of social fields, habitus, and capital in the shaping 
of social interaction.  The following engagement with Tilly and Bourdieu is not exhaustive; 
                                                          
12 Bourdieu (1998, 11) does suggest the hint of a supply theory when he briefly discusses the preconditions 
for group mobilization: proximity in social space.   However, this is not much of an advance over existing 
social movement theory. 
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it is guided by their contributions to the study of everyday life and contentious politics.  I 
do not consider resources here, though they are certainly important for an understanding 
of everyday social organization.  Instead, I take them up in Chapter Eight. 
 The key theoretical disagreement between these eminent sociologists lies in their 
differing emphases on structure and interaction (Emirbayer 2010).  Bourdieu prioritizes 
the social field in explaining social life.  Objective relations among actors are mutually 
constitutive and determinative of patterns of social behavior and meaning.  Interactions 
among discrete units or actors are not causally significant.  More significantly, he regards a 
focus on interaction without pre-eminent attention to objective relations as misguided; 
social ties are an effect of position-takings within the field, and thus more broadly of the 
structure of power in society (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
113-114; Nooy 2003).  Structure is thus prior to interaction.  In contrast, for Tilly, patterns 
of social transactions are at the core of social life.  Structures and individuals are an 
emergent property of durable social relations. 
Whatever a strict interpretation of Bourdieu may entail, fields, social interaction, 
and agents are not locked in a simple reproductive process in which only exogenous factors 
modify the structure of the field.  Several authors have noted that while he espoused a 
structural as opposed to an interactional relationalism, Bourdieu was inconsistent in his 
empirical work (Bottero and Crossley 2011; Nooy 2003).13  The chorus of criticisms 
especially problematizes the assumption that dispositions are internally consistent.  
Bottero (2009) argues that Bourdieu’s assumption of homophily in social relations – the 
tendency for people to associate with others most like themselves – can be relaxed in favor 
                                                          
13 A critical defense of Bourdieu, beyond the scope of this chapter, would charge that Bourdieu’s theoretical 
developments are always derived from, and subordinate to, the play in the data. 
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of variable network structures.  While a homophilous structure is likely to generate a 
strong social reproductive process between field and habitus, more diverse networks are 
more likely to problematize simple social reproduction over time by producing potentially 
contrasting or novel ways of seeing and acting. Nooy (2003) and King (2000) argue that 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice is distinct from his theory of habitus.  In essence, practical 
theory stresses the strategic and virtuosic interactions of individuals and groups, while 
habitus emphasizes the structures of the social world and their incorporation into the 
bodily dispositions of actors.  At the core of Nooy’s argument is the assumption that the 
structure of a field is partly constituted by unfolding practices.  Practice is not entirely 
determined by fields as a rigidly structuralist rendering of habitus would suggest.  
Considering these criticisms, social interaction can lead to the systematic production of 
dispositions that are imperfectly tuned to their field, thus introducing elements of 
improvisation and error into the social reproductive process.  This study thus presupposes 
that fields, networks, and identities (to be elaborated in relation to Bourdieu below) are 
mutually constitutive, while each produces independent effects.    
2.4.2. Identities 
 Conspicuously absent from Figure 2.2 is the concept of habitus.   Instead, the model 
relates identities to networks and fields.   Both Tilly and Bourdieu work with conceptions 
of collective or social identity.  For Bourdieu, habitus is social identity, the sense of 
positioning that an actor develops through immersion in a field, meaning participation in 
symbolic conflict.   Identity is established through the struggle to confer classifications on 
objects and actors in the field.  These sets of classifications are both constitutive of the 
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dispositions that form the habitus and made sensible as a property of the social field they 
reproduce through classifying and classifiable practices. 
For Tilly (2002, 2006b), social identity is grounded in social relations.  Through 
concrete and durable social transactions among pairs of actors, the rights, obligations, 
expectations, and other binding and shared understandings that animate social interaction 
are forged.  Such relations are characterized by a particular structural characteristic: 
boundaries.  All actors or entities erect boundaries in order to distinguish themselves from 
others.  However, the process is uneven.  Some are able to employ their definitions more 
effectively than others.  Political authorities in particular are prone to crafting and 
imposing identities upon previously heterogeneous groups.  In this sense, some actors can 
be routinely ‘called out’ or ‘called to’ by the organization of their everyday experience 
(repression, institutional forms of identification, etc.)  Such boundaries are constructed 
discursively in a social process involving the adoption, elaboration, and modification of 
what he calls shared stories.  Shared stories are explanatory accounts of human action that 
represent social relations and their binding understandings of these relations in the 
construction of actors.  Such stories “typically include names for the sites [actors or 
entities] on either side of the line, accounts of where they came from and imputations of 
shared attributes to the entities on each side of the line” (Tilly 2002, 11).   Stories represent 
the cultural content of relationships by classifying actors across and within boundaries.  
Social identities are thus composed of relations, boundaries, and stories.  They are the 
social experience of these relations and the public representation of these experiences in 
the form of boundary stories (Tilly 2002, 49).   
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First, I note a point of convergence.  Both Tilly and Bourdieu describe identity as a 
contested and unequal social process of classification.  Tilly (2005, 61), for example, 
identifies, though not exhaustively,  “contested representations of crucial actors as worthy 
or unworthy, unified or fragmented, large or small, committed or uncommitted, powerful 
or weak, well connected or isolated, durable or evanescent, reasonable or irrational, greedy 
or generous.”   Stories narrate these properties often as intrinsic characteristics of entities.  
Actors are thus constructed with positive or negative attributes.  Bourdieu’s entire 
sociology rests on the importance of schemas of appreciation, perception, and action in the 
classification of actors and actions to the advantage of the classifying agent.   Like Tilly, 
identity is a contested process, because “only in and through the struggle do the 
internalized limits become boundaries, barriers that have to be moved” (Bourdieu 1984, 
480).   The symbolic conflict that organizes the activity of each field is thus, in effect, a 
struggle over the means or resources to establish the classificatory schemas most 
advantageous to each group’s interests. 
Tilly and Bourdieu differ ultimately on the grounding of identity: interaction or 
structure.  This is particularly notable with respect to the origins of schemas of 
classification.  For Bourdieu, they are the distinguishing features of social fields, the unique 
products of accumulated, and thus historical, symbolic struggles over various definitions of 
religion, art, politics, etc.  For Tilly (2002, 49), the materials of identity are specific to each 
actor’s sets of social relations, though constrained by collective memory and available 
cultural means.14  
                                                          
14 In part, this difference of approach with respect to the origins of cultural distinctions is a consequence of 
their attitudes towards Durkheim.  Durkheim’s emphasis on social forces in the formation of categories is 
clearly relevant to Bourdieu.  Tilly (1981) has openly expressed his disdain for Durkheim’s sociology. 
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2.4.3. Performances 
 Both Tilly and Bourdieu stress conceptions of action that aim to balance constraints 
and agency.  As noted above, Tilly identifies a repertoire of everyday life.  Like repertoires 
of contention, these available performances differentiate along sets of social relations; pairs 
of actors with durable relations obtain their own routine sets of interactions that 
accumulate shared understandings.  Such routine performances, or scripts, vary in the 
degree to which local knowledge can empower improvisation.  Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus likewise aims to captures the available means of action, the schemas of perception, 
appreciation and action acquired in social fields, and like Tilly, the employment of these 
schemas is situational, constantly assessing the environment and relations in order to 
determine proper (advantageous) action.   This analogy between repertoires of everyday 
life and habitus may seem strained unless one considers the importance of Erving Goffman 
for both accounts.  As Collins (2010) notes, despite Tilly’s distance from symbolic 
interactionism, the last decade of his life was marked by a Goffmanesque concern for 
performances and interactions.  In Why? (2006b), Tilly addresses Goffman on affable terms, 
appropriating his analyses and identifying him as a fellow relational sociologist.  For his 
part, Bourdieu makes frequent references to Goffman, to the point of describing his 
analysis of strategies in social fields as Goffman applied in the context of struggles over the 
power to impose definitions of reality (Bourdieu 2000, 187). 
 The essential difference in relation to their conceptions of action is the importance 
for Bourdieu of the social field.  Habitus are always more or less tuned to the contours of 
the field of their making, while for Tilly repertoires or scripts and local knowledge are 
acquired in social contexts determined more by social interaction than by objective 
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structures of power.  It is my argument that Bourdieu offers a significantly richer analysis 
of everyday behavior than Tilly offers in nearly all of his works.   This is likely a reflection of 
not only his interest in pragmatism, which Tilly shares, but also phenomenology and 
psychology, which Tilly does not.  However, as Nooy (2003) observes an insistent emphasis 
on Bourdieu’s theory of practical action provides a more robust model of action.  Such a 
conception puts a stronger premium on interaction as an independent level of analysis, 
while suggesting that action involves confronting multiple possible courses of action with 
variable outcomes, all of which are constrained by the social context.  Throughout this 
dissertation, I employ an understanding of agency along these lines using the language of 
performances so amenable to both Bourdieu and Tilly. 
2.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I present my general argument and lay the groundwork for 
theoretical development by interrogating some of the similarities and differences between 
Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu.  The ultimate goal of this development is to elaborate a 
conception of everyday social organization and its relation to contentious performances.  
The following chapter utilizes collective action theory to clarify the relation between 








CHAPTER 3: SOCIALIZATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY 
The principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for 
explaining tactical choice.  In Chapter Two I discuss the contributions of Charles Tilly and 
Pierre Bourdieu to a model incorporating social fields, social networks, identities, and 
models of action as key constraints on action.  In this chapter this model is supplemented 
with the incorporation of collective action theory and bounded rationality.  I focus on two 
basic effects derived from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members.  
First, I consider the importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on 
the expectations generated for a set of tactics.  Special attention is given to the evaluation of 
tactics on a scale of effectiveness.  Second, I consider how these expectations may vary in 
the degree of confidence with which they are held by an SMO.  I suggest that this variation 
can be explained as a consequence of their familiarity with the everyday correlates of 
tactics.  In general, the two chapters together argue that the effects of the socializing 
structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize activities and the shared 
understandings that they generate – can be translated into a consideration of the effects of 
a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of tactics.   
3.1. Socialization 
This chapter further explicates the relationship between everyday life ad 
contentious politics by turning to a revealing analogy: 
Just as thoroughly bilingual friends often switch from one language to the other when 
 signaling a shift of mood, subject, or context, they move into an alternative mode of 
 communication.  They do so because the social networks and shared understandings at 
 hand channel participants into available definitions of what is happening, available means 
 of communication and cooperation, available practices of conflict resolution, and available 





The means are provided by existing social infrastructure - durable sets of social relations 
and their attendant shared understandings but also material conditions that facilitate 
communication and render resources available.  The available models and practices are the 
scripts of everyday life and previous collective performances.  It is precisely this availability 
I hope to consider below.   
In order to specify this relationship between everyday social organization and 
contentious performances, I consider two basic sets of socialization effects on the process 
of selecting tactics.  Figure 3.1 schematizes these processes.  The first process involves 
collective identities.  The shared understandings of social relations contribute to the 
definition of the salient properties of actions, including the effectiveness of tactics.  Such 
properties contribute towards the estimation of expected outcomes and utilities among a 
choice set of tactics.  The second process involves the distribution of familiarity that actors 
have with certain ways of acting and seeing.  Such a distribution contributes a variety of 
effects to tactical choice, particularly the management of complexity through the reduction 
of uncertainty and transaction costs.  
In explaining choices in organizational practices, Polletta (2002, 19-20) argues that 
identity and familiarity explanations are distinct (though she does not then argue that they 
are strictly exclusive).  Identity aligns what one chooses with what one believes about 
oneself; actions are thus expressions of oneself.  Familiarity refers to making choices based 
on one’s sets of routine experiences.  I approach familairity from two perspectives.  First, I 
argue that familiarity and identity are not as exclusive as this may suggest.  Our shared 
understandings and public representations of our social relationships, including the 
everyday practices that reinforce them, are in fact what are most familiar to us.  These help  
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Figure 3.1. Two Socialization Effects: Identity and Familiarity 
 
activists recognize and evaluate the opportunities and constraints offered by social 
environments and situations, thus reducing uncertainties and shaping our choice set.  As 
Polletta (2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic, 
efficient…are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.”   
Second, however, this distinction between identity and familiarity, between our 
sense of self and our daily routines, brings the discussion to a crucial point.  The argument 
here is that familiarity breeds relative certainty and predictability.  How can we explain 
choices that deviate from what is most familiar?15  Why would anyone move from a 
decision of relative certainty into the area of uncertainty and risk?  In order to answer 
these questions and others, I turn to a third but crucial theoretical approach. 
3.2. Collective Action Theory 
3.2.1. Bourdieu, Tilly, and Rational Choice 
 Perhaps controversially, I enlist collective action theory to complete this account of 
repertoire change and tactical choice.  Both Bourdieu and Tilly were famously critical of the 
                                                          
15 These two concepts point to a possible strategic dilemma:  while decreasing uncertainty may lead to 
strategic moves in which one has a better ex ante estimate of the situation, in strategic interactions it may 
provide one’s opponents with better information about one’s future strategic moves.  The safety of relative 
certainty may thus be illusory; opponents may strategically utilize your predictability by being themselves 
unpredictable.  McAdam (1983) famously argued that even innovative and effective tactics can be neutralized 
by the tactical responses of opponents.  Advantages may be thus always tentative.  This possibility provides 
one compelling reason for tactical deviations from that which is most familiar.  In this dissertation, especially 
this chapter and Chapter Twelve, I aim to provide a more generalized explanation inclusive of this argument. 
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broader theoretical approach inclusive of collection action theory, rational choice theory.  
For example, Bourdieu (1990, 49) regards rational choice as one of the more pernicious 
manifestations of the scholastic fallacy, the tendency of academics to impute “the things of 
logic to the logic of things.”  Tilly (1991; 2002) is critical of the reductionism to the 
individual. Most objections are leveled at the thin psychology of homo economicus.  
Particularly scorned is the assumption that individuals exhaustively calculate the costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action in order to determine which option maximizes 
their utility.  In part this involves the expected utility hypothesis, in which individuals 
assess the probability of securing future states of the world resulting from their actions.   A 
second criticism involves the assumption that actors take into account more than the 
material incentives of income or physical well-being when they make decisions (Fireman 
and Gamson 1979).   
 None of these assumptions are integral to a collective action theory account of 
tactical choice (Opp 1989; 2009).  First, wider versions of the theory incorporating 
bounded rationality make more relaxed assumptions about the decision-making process. 
In contrast to classical or unbounded rationality, bounded rationality begins with the basic 
observation that humans lack the cognitive capacities to exhaustively evaluate complex 
environments.16  Consequently, it employs a basic strategy of satisficing in which choice is 
governed by the achievement of an acceptable or appropriate threshold of satisfaction. 
Second, contra Olson (1965) non-economic incentives can be incorporated into rational 
                                                          
16
 Tilly and Bourdieu have commented on the utility of bounded rationality.  In one essay, Tilly (1996, 543) 
endorses the view that humans are satisficers.  In his discussions on repertoires, however, he regards 
bounded rationality as a rationalist innovation that remains hamstrung by an inability to model history, 
culture, and social relations (Tilly 2006a, 41).  Bourdieu (2005, 211) likewise acknowledges the contribution 
of the concept, but like Tilly stresses the lack of social constraints in the model (which for Bourdieu include 
culture and history by definition).   
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choice models.  Such intangible costs and benefits can include psychological, solidarity, and 
moral incentives like pleasure, love, a sense of justice, and social interactions (Clark and 
Wilson (1961). 
It is my contention that Tilly and Bourdieu’s unease with rational choice theory is 
borne of a focus on classical or unbounded models.17  Opp’s (2009) structural-cognitive 
model, partially reproduced in Chapter Two, serves as a starting point for this study in that 
it integrates structural, cultural, and interactional variables into a rationalist account of the 
constitution of collective action.  Likewise, Tilly (2001; McAdam et al 2001) argues that a 
full accounting of social life must integrate three varieties of causal mechanisms.  These 
include, first, environmental mechanisms, or structural factors that are external to actors 
and action such as political structures, resource distributions, etc.  Second, analysis must 
turn to cognitive mechanisms, or alterations in the mental states and perceptions of 
individuals.  Finally, he identifies relational mechanisms as shifts in the relations among 
individuals and groups.18  Tilly suggests that these classes of mechanisms basically exhaust 
the range of causal factors available to analysts.  My suggestion is that these mechanisms 
are in essence no different from Opp’s range of causal variables.   
Such synthetic efforts are not uncommon in the literature.  New institutionalism 
integrates decision theory into hybrid structural/rational analyses, while game theory 
formalizes dynamic interactions and provides partial explanations for cultural phenomena 
like norms of reciprocity, trust, and reputation.19  Though individuals are often the singular 
                                                          
17 Of course, both are often criticized for standing too close to the economist’s fire (Calhoun 1993a; Rule 
1989).  
18 However, he argues, in contrast to Opp (1989; 2009), that environmental and relational mechanisms can 
have direct effects on collective action.  This seems to be the real point of contention.   
19 For an example of thicker game theoretic accounts of collective action, see Chong (1991) and Gould (2003). 
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actors, there is no inherent assumption that they are asocial egoists.  For the purposes of 
analysis, organizations can be said to behave rationality as well.  Additionally, models of 
interaction can include solidarity incentives (Chong 1991) and constraints like norms (Opp 
1989).  The most heated animosity remains between rational choice and social 
psychological approaches despite impressive synthetic work (Chong 1991; Klandermans 
1997; Scott 1978).  Finally, in contrast to Tilly’s (2006a) insistence that history cannot be 
modeled with an individualist ontology (despite a not infrequent emphasis on 
organizations), bounded rationality conceives of behavior as an adaptive process 
(Gigerenzer and Selten 2002a).  In this view, choice is weighted by the experiences of 
actors.  I thus argue that Tilly and Bourdieu are in fact compatible with models of individual 
behavior so long as care is taken to incorporate the contextual dimensions of social life. 
3.2.2. Rational Choice Theory 
 This collective action theory account of tactical choice includes the fundamental 
architecture of rational choice models.  At the core of this approach is the basic hypothesis 
that actors are goal-directed.  At the least, to be rational is to utilize efficient means in 
pursuit of ends.  Specifying this very general hypothesis, however, has led to a variety of 
approaches.  At least two conceptions of rationality are considered here: classic and 
bounded.  According to Opp (1999, 171; 1989; 2009), the minimal assumptions of the 
theory common to both spring from three basic propositions: 
1. PREFERENCE PROPOSITION: Individual preferences (or goals) are conditions of 
behaviors which are instrumental in satisfying the respective preferences. 
 
2. CONSTRAINTS PROPOSITION: Anything that increases or decreases the possibilities 
of an individual to be able to satisfy his or her preferences by performing certain 
actions (i.e., opportunities or constraints) is a condition for performing these actions. 
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3. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROPOSITION: Individuals choose those actions that satisfy 
their preferences to the greatest extent, taking into account the constraints. 
 
Rational choice analysis (in this case decision theory: single actor decision-making) first 
involves the identification of the preferences and constraints that determine the utilities 
for each option among the set of behavioral alternatives.  Preferences and constraints offer 
incentives for or against certain courses of action.  Incentives are the intervening 
motivational variables between constraints and decision that make particular actions more 
or less attractive.  Increases in costs make an option less attractive and vice versa, while 
increases or decreases in benefits make an option more or less attractive.  In accordance 
with the utility maximization proposition, actors choose the alternative with the most 
benefits at the least cost from among the range of options. 
Incentives vary also in their relation to the locus of action.20  Extrinsic or 
prospective incentives refer to the costs and benefits associated with the consequences of 
action.  From this perspective, actions have anticipated repercussions on the environment 
that make the action more or less attractive.  Such actions may yield negative 
consequences: decreased public support, repression, decreased membership, etc.  They 
may also yield corresponding positive consequences.  Some of these effects may constitute 
the goal of a SMO, as I will discuss below with respect to extrinsic goals.  However, even 
when an SMO seeks to change some aspect of the environment, such as public policy, 
aspects of the environment may respond (SMOs, governments, media, etc.) in such a way 
that they generate incentives distinct from the investment in changing public policy.  
Intrinsic, participation, or transaction incentives refer to the costs and benefits derived 
                                                          
20 This distinction does not necessarily correspond with the well-known distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation in psychology.  The latter distinction functions at the individual level, while the former 
operates at the organizational level.   
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from the act of protesting.  The costs of such social exchanges are many: the effects of intra-
organizational bargaining and negotiating in the selection and preparation of actions; the 
information and search costs involved in conceiving and evaluating possible outcomes and 
utilities; and the surveillance and enforcement costs relating to the various stages of 
cooperation within the SMO.  The benefits may include the various joys of social 
interaction, edification, building reputation and character, and a sense of efficacy.   
Choice is thus governed by the arrangement of costs and benefits associated with 
the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of each course of action.  In Figure 3.1 familiarity and 
identity affect contentious performances through the reduction of costs and uncertainty 
and the specification of expected outcomes and utilities.  As I will show below, both involve 
incentives: familiarity reduces both transaction costs and the costs associated with 
uncertainty (ambiguity aversion), while identity specifies the expected consequences of 
actions and their related costs and benefits. 
Three considerations follow from this presentation.  First, there are several 
assumptions embedded in most versions of rational choice theory.  Establishing a rational 
preference ordering, for example, requires that the preference relations satisfy sets of 
axioms including, but not limited to completeness, continuity, reflexivity, and transitivity.  
However, the approach taken here is not axiomatic. 
Second, the final proposition of utility maximization is controversial.  Maximization 
or optimization is often contrasted with satisficing.  Gigerenzer and Selten (2002b) are 
particularly critical of the tendency to assume that bounded rationality is in essence 
‘optimization under constraints.‘  Other interpretations are available.  Recall that the search 
for more complete information is aborted when an option hits a threshold of utility 
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provision, not necessarily when the search yields the highest utility of all possible options.  
However, within the set of searched options, choice is guided by utility maximization.  
From this perspective, the primary distinction between maximization and satisficing is the 
fullness of the choice set as defined by the decision-maker.   
 Third, the nature of the question facing decision-makers in this dissertation strongly 
suggests that bounded rationality offers a better set of underlying assumptions.  The 
question of mobilization generally involves the modeling of a dichotomous choice: to 
engage in political action or not.21  If we are to study tactical choice with any level of 
specificity, however, the potential range of strategies and tactics does not yield a 
dichotomous choice.  Tactical choice is a more cognitively demanding choice problem.  
Thus, bounded rationality looks like a more useful conception of decision-making.   
3.2.3. Bounded Rationality 
There is no singular general theory of bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Selten 
2002a).  However, some important points are available to guide the approach taken in this 
dissertation.  In his most celebrated presentation of the concept of bounded rationality, 
Simon (1997) builds three key criticisms of classical economic rationality.22  This assault is 
founded on the assumption (and empirical evidence) that finite cognitive capacities and 
environmental complexities constrain decision-making.  First, knowledge about the nature 
and probability of outcomes regarding each action is incomplete.  Instead, possible 
                                                          
21 Despite the fact that participation in protest often involves various levels of contribution (Klandermans 
2004; for an exception in the collective action literature see Marwell and Oliver 1993).  
22
 “(1) Rationality requires complete knowledge and anticipation of the consequences that will follow on each 
choice. In fact, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary.  (2) Since these questions lie in the future, 
imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can be only 
imperfectly anticipated.  3. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual 
behavior, only a very few of all these possible alternatives come to mind” (Simon 1997, 93-94). 
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outcomes are weighted heavily by previous outcomes.  In other words, we tend to repeat 
actions that ourselves and others define as previously successful and drop actions that 
ourselves and others define as previously unsuccessful.  Thus, action is adaptive; it 
develops in a trial-and-error process of exploration and evaluation. 
Second, knowledge about the utilities of these outcomes is incomplete.  Put another 
way, the evaluation of alternatives is an imperfect process, because individuals lack the 
information and the capacity to accurately determine the relevant costs and benefits of 
various courses of action.  However, as Opp (2009) notes, subjective evaluations of costs 
and benefits need not be objectively accurate in order to constrain action.  They need only 
conform to a pattern in which the choice set is represented as sets of relative values 
arranged from best to worst.  
Third - assuming a medium-to large-n choice set - knowledge about the range of 
options is incomplete.  Bounded rationality is characterized not by perfect information of 
all possible courses of action, but by a limited search among options.  While the previous 
points leave open the assumption that the choice set is complete, this final criticism 
suggests that at some point in the process of searching - depending on the possible breadth 
of the choice set - a point is reached at which wide swaths of possibilities are left 
unexplored or underexplored.  Together with the second point, this insight has the 
consequence that preferences may also be incomplete, precisely because unknown options 
yield unknown utilities.   
3.3. Theoretical Development 
 In order to reduce the friction between Bourdieu, Tilly, and collective action theory, 
I focus on a specific area of agreement by extracting some of the crucial elements from each 
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regarding the process of decision-making. Before doing so, I establish some basic 
assumptions about the objects of inquiry. 
3.3.1. Preliminaries 
  The theoretical approach taken here is organized around an ideal situation in 
which, once a CJO has formed (solved the collective action problem), it is faced with a series 
of questions about how best to achieve the goals of the collective.  The first basic question, 
addressed in Chapter Nine, concerns the establishment of an overarching strategic 
orientation.  The second question, and the orienting concern for this dissertation, is the 
identification and elaboration of the conditions and mechanisms of tactical choice.  The 
primary dependent variable is thus the choice an organization makes among a set of tactics.  
Likely, the soon-to-be-members of actual SMOs are engaged in the question of strategy 
before the act of organization.  This approach is thus a highly stylized effort to isolate a 
central problematic.   
The dependent variable, at least for the majority of the study, does not vary.  
Nonetheless, this chapter treats it as an explicit variable in accordance with the general 
theoretical concerns of this project.  Further below I distinguish between different sets of 
tactics.  For now, I assume for the sake of simplicity that the range of tactics available to the 
SMO is a finite set of all possible tactics, X.  For now I assume that these tactics vary 
continuously and not discretely. 
3.3.2. Schemas and Information 
One of the basic implications of Chapter Two is that, though they differ in specifics, 
Tilly and Bourdieu utilize a similar and very general model of action.  For both, actions or 
performances are a function of the interaction of environments (or situations) and 
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behavioral structures.  I utilize the same model in order to lay the foundation for an 
analysis of the relation of socialization to tactical choice. 
When confronting a decision context (a situation that yields more than one possible 
payoff) characterized by uncertainty, actors utilize both schemas and information to 
produce a reasonable choice.  As described in Chapter Two, schemas are durable, organized 
structures of information that produce relatively efficient interpretations of situations or 
interactions and thus appropriate action.  These structures are at once cognitive-behavioral 
(they endow individuals with means of perception and action) and communicative (they 
are shared such that they cue our meanings and expectations to others).23  Information is 
the data pertaining to the situation or interaction, whether ex ante (to cue a relevant 
schema) or ex post (feedback).  It varies in degrees of organization that range from 
unstructured data (information bits as Downs called them) to highly organized and 
structured frames.24  In order to provide guidance for actors, information (including 
frames) must be integrated into the schemas of actors.   
 The decision context demands of the organization the evaluation of multiple 
possible courses of action.  These evaluations can be summarized as expectations.  These 
expectations involve three basic elements: outcomes, utilities, and probabilities.  Outcomes 
                                                          
23 Notice my emphasis on cognition and behavior, while above I regarded Bourdieu and Tilly’s commensurate 
emphases on ‘behavioral structures.’  Bourdieu’s anti-representationalism emphasizes bodily dispositions as 
opposed to mental structures, while Tilly is prone to regard consciousness as a black box.  I preserve a 
cognition-behavior distinction primarily for analytic purposes. 
24 It also varies in at least three other ways: 1) in terms of the salience of the information (trivial or crucial 
depending on whether it contributes towards a more robust sense of the decision context); 2), in terms of the 
accuracy of the information (accurate or inaccurate); and (3) in terms of its intent (whether it is strategic or 
inert; an example of the former being an effort by a countermovement organization to frame an issue; an 
example of the latter being datasets on employment produced by parties not implicated in the conflict).  For 
now, I assume that information is only problematic in terms of quantity, not quality, meaning information is 
crucial, accurate, and inert.  Of course, one of the more interesting aspects of real-world uncertainty is the 
quality of information.  For example, consider the implications of a distinction between knowledge, 
misinformation, and disinformation.   
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are those states of the world (including the organization, but also other actors, resources, 
institutions, etc.) resulting directly or indirectly from organizational action.  Utilities are the 
net value of these outcomes for the organization, a consequence of the preferences for 
certain actions, constraints imposed on each choice, and the incentives they offer.  
Probabilities are the subjective degrees of uncertainty (or confidence) attached to each 
outcome.  Here, I focus on schemas as inferred knowledge of the actors, constraints, 
incentives, outcomes, utilities, and probabilities pertaining to a decision context.   It follows 
that schemas are generative of future expectations based on previous decisions.  
A point of objection arises at this juncture.  Frames generally denote schemas of 
interpretation.25  A common though contentious distinction in the framing literature 
identifies frames and framing as either cognitive structures or as interactive processes.  
Snow and Benford (2000b) are particularly keen on conceptualizing framing as a social 
process, at least so far as explaining social movement participation is concerned.  Perhaps 
the most important concept in their approach is frame resonance.  Frame resonance refers 
to the degree to which an SMO’s frame resonates with an audience.  Resonance here 
signifies commensurate and congruent interpretations; the tighter the fit between an 
SMO’s frame and an individual, the higher the likelihood of participation.  However, as a 
consequence, any theory of framing as a theory of mobilization must attend to two different 
conceptualizations of frames: first, to the discursive and strategic processes that generate 
and distribute frames (Snow and Benford 2000a), and second, to the cognitive structures 
within audiences that translate frames into incentives for or against collective action.   A 
simultaneous distinction is implicitly made between SMOs and audiences: the former are 
                                                          
25
 Frames are “schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large” (Snow et al 1986, 464). 
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strategic actors that choose among sets of tactics in order to appeal to audiences, while 
audiences are comparatively inert actors with the potential for mobilization once an appeal 
to them has been made.26  The degree to which strategic actors are themselves cognitively 
constrained is not plainly considered.  While a similar distinction is sometimes made in the 
voter turnout literature (Aldrich 1993), the basic question of this study is not a question of 
mobilization, but a question of strategy.27  For my purposes, I regard frames as schemas in 
contentious play, as strategic communicative processes.   Thus, while schemas in general 
are cognitive-behavioral and communicative, further usage of the term schema will refer 
primarily to their cognitive-behavioral aspect, while the usage of frames will refer to the 
strategic communicative aspect.  Thus, SMOs produce and distribute frames that they hope 
will be congruent and commensurate with the schemas of their audiences. 
Figure 3.2 presents the relation between the shared schemas within an organization 
and information.28  First, organizational actors develop perceptions of the decision context 
that are shaped both by schemas and information derived from the actual situation.  This 
initial Information animates those schema(s) that are most congruent with this initial 
stimulus.  Second, with even low information, the activated schemas produce a generally 
robust sense of the situation, thereby generating choice sets and expected outcomes 
pertaining to each choice.  Finally, once an action is chosen – necessitating action within  
 
                                                          
26 This is not to say that audiences are not strategic or that they do not weigh the costs and benefits of 
different courses of action.   
27 This distinction is important with respect to explaining mobilization.  While voting is likely to be a marginal 
activity with low cost, activism can range from marginal to significant costs.   
28
 The model adapted and modified in Figure 4.2 differs in some crucial ways from the original (North and 
Denzau 1994, 17-18; Ostrom 2005, 105).  First, the original model focuses on individual, not organizational 
decision-making.  Second, in the original, while expected outcomes are internal to the participant in the action 
situation, chosen actions and actual outcomes are found in the external action situation, outside of the 

























Source: Adapted with modifications from North and Denzau (1994, 17-18) and Ostrom (2005, 105). 
 
Figure 3.2. Schemas, Information, and Decision-Making 
 
and without the organization – it produces outcomes that generate feedback processes 
from the environment and internal to the organization.  
Through these basic insights, I suggest that socialization shapes the preferences for 
certain forms of action over others, reduces the costs of some actions but not others, and 
reduces the uncertainties associated with some actions but not others.   
3.4. Identity and Preferences 
Figure 3.3 represents the relation between identity and action.  First, this model is a 
partial reproduction of Figure 2.2.  Both social networks and fields are mutually 
constitutive and determinative.  Second, it unpacks the concept of identity as a social 







































Figure 3.3. Everyday Social Organization, Socialization, and Contentious Performances 
 
ideologies, including the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors and 
institutions and the normative evaluations of each, and thus of the salient properties of 
available means of action, especially their perceived effectiveness. 
3.4.1. Socialization and Identity  
If we consider Figure 3.3 in the context of Figure 2.2, we can begin to elaborate on 
the relation of everyday social organization to the contentious performances of interest in 
this study.  The conception of collective identity utilized in this dissertation concerns an 
individual’s mutually constituted sense of his or her’s particular categorical membership 
encompassing the shared understandings and public representations that define the 
boundaries and the relations among social categories.  The content of these identities is 
organized by social classifications that are differentially distributed across various social 
groups.  These classifications identify the properties of actors, institutions, environments, 
and objects and evaluate their utility in establishing valued social positions.  Through this 
process of selective categorization, employed and recognized classifications identify the 
locations of actors in social space by betraying the strategies that they utilize to mark 
others and themselves in a manner that furthers their interests.  Thus, identification as an 
experience and as a representation entails cognitive and evaluative processes – the 











These constructions of good/bad, friend/enemy, moral/immoral, etc. are not simply 
constructions of actors, however.   Identity is a social process of defining actions with 
respect to audiences and targets.  In other words, the field of actors and institutions is not 
neutral in its implications for action; each construction of an actor closes off some options 
and opens up others by defining their relative strengths and weaknesses.  For our 
purposes, these shared understandings that undergird and constitute identities help define 
ideologies.  Ideologies are relatively sophisticated and coherent organizations of shared 
schemas that construct a group’s position in social space.  In this sense they identify the 
strategic significance of social relations.  They thus  refer to the array of “opportunities, 
threats, available means of action, likely consequences of those actions, evaluations of 
those consequences, capacities to act, memories of previous contention, and inventories of 
likely parties to any action” recognized by SMOs and other parties to the conflict (Tilly 
2005, 61).   Such constructions define the vulnerabilities that different relations offer for 
influence by the protagonist(s), as in the extraction or control of resources, in the 
solicitation of cooperation, etc.  They also denote the motivations of other relations, 
including their perceived interests and constraints, in order that protagonists may exploit 
the interests of actors.  Moreover, they express the generalized capacities that actors and 
institutions possess to influence the protagonist(s), whether in the degree and efficiency of 
force and coercion, in their capacity for subterfuge, their legitimacy and means of 
persuasion, their financial and material assets, etc.  Thus, the field of actors that identities 
construct is a field strewn with possibilities for action.  These evaluations are not merely 
cognitive, but affective and normative as well, thus providing a general capacity and 
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motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of social 
relations.  I consider ideologies in more detail in Chapter Ten. 
3.4.2. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Goals 
Defining these possibilities, however, requires prior assessments of the actions in 
relation to their targets.  Actions can have variable significance for different individuals and 
groups because actions, like all social phenomena, come to sense as social constructions.  
No potential action has content separate from perceived targets and audiences (though 
these can be highly generalized); they possess no universal and strategic value, even 
though to activists they are likely to feel this way.  It is, in part, the orientations or attitudes 
towards actions, the comparative properties of possibility, desirability, acceptability, 
among others, which shape choices in regular social interactions as well as episodic 
contentious collective actions.  They confer a degree of strategic sense to possible courses 
of action and their outcomes.  In this sense, they involve the processes of identification and 
evaluation of possible courses of action and outcomes, processes implicit in the ideologies 
defined by shared understandings and constrained by the opportunity structures available 
to activists.  Such attitudes define the meaning structure of a repertoire (Ennis 1987).   
In order to translate this insight into a useful consideration for tactical choice, I 
focus on a particularly salient attitude towards actions: the perception of the effectiveness 
of a tactic.  I argue that the appropriate way to consider effectiveness is as a function of 
goals and objectives.  Of course, it is not logically necessary that defining how appropriate a 
tactic is for a situation entails specifying a relation between actions and goals.  For example, 
tactics may have intrinsic value (Jasper 1997).  In their study of protest potential (attitudes 
towards participating in protest), Barnes and Kaase (1979, 67) find that, when asked to 
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evaluate a variety of protest tactics in particular issue contexts, survey respondents 
expressed attitudes more generalized than context-dependent.  In other words, tactics 
were judged in an apparently abstract sense devoid of a reference to issues or goals.   
This does not necessarily contradict my charge of the relation of effectiveness to 
goals, however.  It seems plausible to assume that the generalized attitudes about protest 
tactics are at least constrained by the general goals of (extrinsic) influence or (intrinsic) 
development, especially considering the issue stimuli broadly framing the survey 
questions.  In addition, the ideal situation sketched in section 3.3 of this study stresses the 
organizational level, not the individual level of Barnes and Kaase’s study.  Presumably, the 
act of organization itself involves a discussion of the interests and goods common to the 
individuals involved and thus the goals of the organization. 
Goals presuppose a basic type of relation between means and actions.  I distinguish 
between two goal types by clarifying their expected action-outcome linkage.  Some points 
of clarity to begin.  First, I do not consider the literature on goals, logics, and orientations 
until Chapter Nine.  Second, I assume that all evaluations are prospective, meaning that 
they function as prior estimates of future actions and outcomes.  Above, Figure 3.2 situates 
an organizational actor within a decision context.  As noted already, expected outcomes are 
produced through a comparative process informed by shared schemas and information.  
Chosen actions, which unfold internal and external to the SMO, produce outcomes both 
intrinsic and extrinsic to the SMO.  Information about these outcomes is then produced 
internal and external to the SMO as a result of intrinsic and extrinsic outcomes.  This 
information is then utilized to revise the shared schemas.  
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Both of the goal types discussed here conform to the model presented in Figure 3.2: 
schemas and information produce expectations about future actions.  However, they differ 
along two crucial dimensions: temporality and extrinsicality.  Table 3.1 presents the 
relations between action-outcome structure (time, the utility of the SMO, and the state of 
affairs) and goal type.  Three time periods are relevant: the point at which expectations are 
developed, represented as t-1; the period during which the action unfolds, represented as t; 
and the period following the action in which information about outcomes is provided, 
which is represented as t+1.29  Extrinsicality is expressed as the relation between changes 
in utilities and states of affairs.  U represents the utility of an SMO at a given period of time.   
U’ specifies a change in the utility of the SMO.  The state of affairs at a given moment, or the 
world external to the SMO, including the utility of opponents, resource availability, public 
support, etc., is specified as Ω.  Ω’ represents a change in the state of affairs.  
To continue requires an analysis of temporality.  Time, t-1, represents the baseline: Ut-1 and 
Ωt-1 are stable.  As I will show below, U’ and Ω’ are further defined only temporally.   
 
Table 3.1 Goals: Expected Action-Outcome Structures 
 Time Utility of SMO State of Affairs 
Extrinsic Goal   
 t-1 U Ω 
 t U Ω 
 t+1 U’ Ω’ 
Intrinsic Goal    
 t-1 U Ω 
 t U’ Ω 
 t+1 U’ Ω 
 
                                                          
29 It is important to note that all of these time periods are subjective evaluations of future intrinsic and 
extrinsic outcomes.  In other words, {t-1, t, t+1) occurs at the point, t-1, in which expected outcomes are 
generated in Figure 3.2.  Thus, chosen actions and outcomes in Figure 3.2 are not included in this discussion; 
only the temporal structure of expectations is involved in this analysis. 
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Changes in utility are derived from the link that SMOs make between their actions and 
outcomes.  Outcomes include intrinsic outcomes, U’, and extrinsic changes in the state of 
affairs, Ω’.  While the nature of intrinsicality allows U’t, Ω’ only succeeds action: Ω’t+1.     
An extrinsic goal refers to a goal that presupposes a conceptual link between SMO 
actions and extrinsic outcomes.  At first glance, this conforms to what several scholars 
regard as the instrumental or strategic logic that conceptually relates actions to outcomes: 
actions oriented towards the change or maintenance of political or economic institutions 
and policies (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Kriesi et al1995; Rucht 1990).  
Effectiveness is often defined solely as the ability to achieve this type of goal.  McAdam 
(1983) argues, for example, that tactical interaction involves a process in which activists 
utilize tactics in order to yield political advantages.  However, consider an SMO whose 
stated goal is to challenge social norms (for example, patterns of everyday waste disposal) 
in order to increase awareness of the implications of individual behavior on the 
environment.  While such a goal is not directed at changing political or economic 
institutions and policies, it still involves an outcome extrinsic to the action itself insofar as 
the changing of behavior outside of the SMO is expected to lead to an increased probability 
of behavioral change.  To briefly clarify, Table 3.1 yields the conclusion that expected utility 
derived from this action is wholly extrinsic. 
An intrinsic goal refers to a goal that assumes a conceptual link between SMO 
actions and intrinsic outcomes.   Intrinsic outcomes refer to outcomes that are internal to 
the group, such as the growth of moral character or the establishment of a space or 
experience free from political, cultural, or economic interference.   Referring again to 
Figure 3.2, chosen actions occur both within and without the SMO, because intra-
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organizational processes are essential to engaging in extrinsically oriented actions, and 
because actions oriented internally always affect the environment in some way, even 
minimally by disrupting the available resources of members of the SMO.  However, intrinsic 
goals define extrinsic outcomes as constraints, while they rank some intrinsic outcomes as 
preferences and others as constraints.30  With respect to intrinsic goals, Table 3.1 yields the 
conclusion that the expected utility derived from this action is wholly intrinsic. 
But an objection may arise when one considers the possibility that intrinsic goals 
may necessitate sub-goals or objectives that are extrinsically oriented.  While certainly 
actions that are oriented towards extrinsic goals can yield intrinsic incentives, I sense no 
reason to object to the argument that indeed some tactics oriented by intrinsic goals can 
also exhibit non-zero estimates of extrinsic efficacy.  In other words, the pursuit of intrinsic 
goals is potentially constrained by the production of Ω’.  To clarify, it is important to make 
three assumptions.  First, I assume that each SMO pursues one primary goal.  Obviously, 
SMOs pursue a variety of goals, but preliminary analysis is greatly aided by this simplifying 
assumption.  Second, despite the interesting implications of relaxing it, I assume that 
organizational maintenance is subordinate to the primary goal. 
An auxiliary assumption specifies the goal structure of an SMO – the sets of goals 
and objectives that orient its choices – as perfectly hierarchical and subordinate to the 
primary goal, as well as potentially heterogeneous.  Hierarchy and subordinate are 
relatively clear, but the latter needs some elaboration.  I define heterogeneity in a goal 
structure as a plurality of expected action-outcome structures.  In other words, while an 
SMO may pursue a goal with the object of intrinsic change, it may also possess a series of 
                                                          
30 Further below I consider the inverse: extrinsic goals define intrinsic outcomes as constraints (transaction 
costs and benefits), while they rank extrinsic outcomes as preferences and constraints.   
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objectives that include the acquisition of resources or a change in laws (Ω’) necessary to 
achieve this goal.  The only assumption here is that these objectives are entirely 
subordinate to the goal.  Figure 3.4 illustrates distinctions between homogenous and 
heterogeneous hierarchical goal structures as well as a non-hierarchical structure.  Here, 
differences lie not only in the nature of objectives (secondary goals), but also in the relation 
of objectives to goals.  It is thus no contradiction to suggest that an SMO that pursues 
intrinsic goals may nonetheless pursue extrinsic outcomes.  
3.4.3. Effectiveness and Goals 
With these concepts in tow, I begin with a set of assumptions that contribute to a 
fuller specification of the relationship of effectiveness to goals.  First, I assume that SMOs 
want to maximize their chances of achieving their goals and objectives.  Additionally, SMOs 
derive utility from these achievements such that this process of pursuing goals can be 
interpreted as a utility maximizing process.  In order to maximize utility, they must engage 
in a variety of actions, or tactics.  In choosing tactics, SMOs select from a finite set of all 
possible tactics.  While they may use a variety of criteria to determine which tactics are 
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Figure 3.4. Goal Structures 
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most appropriate, the working assumption of this study is that SMOs seek to achieve their 
goals by choosing the most effective tactics (Klandermans 1984).   
I define effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and 
objectives of an SMO.31  Conceptually, effectiveness can extend from highly effective to 
counter-effective.  It seems reasonable to conjecture that activists will avoid actions that 
they believe will not contribute to the achievement of their goals, and that they will avoid 
actions that they believe will make it harder for them to achieve their goals and objectives.  
If I accordingly conceive of the effectiveness of a tactic as a continuous variable ranging 
from negative to positive, I can additionally assume that SMOs will not choose tactics that 
they believe have non-positive effectiveness.  For now, I avoid the difficulties arising from a 
set of tactics that yield only non-positive effectiveness by assuming that the set of possible 
tactics always includes some tactics with positive effectiveness. 
Additional points arise from this preliminary discussion of effectiveness.  First, I do 
not consider targets as actors; they do not enjoy strategic agency.  Thus, this analysis is not 
game theoretic.  Second, while a given SMO seeks to achieve goals or objectives and thus 
maximize utility by choosing tactics that increase their ability to achieve their goals (i.e., 
effectiveness), they nonetheless choose tactics under constraints.  Some have been noted 
already.  With an extrinsic goal, an SMO incurs both extrinsic constraints and transaction 
costs or benefits, whereas with an intrinsic goal, extrinsic outcomes can produce 
constraints, including repression, facilitation, and variation in public support.  Below, I 
introduce sets of constraints on the preference for effectiveness among the set of tactics. 
 
                                                          
31 This translates to the perception of a tactic’s contribution to the production of a public or club good. 
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3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty 
3.5.1. Uncertainty in Contentious Politics 
 A realistic assessment of the information endowments of actors involved in 
contentious politics – indeed politics in general - would identify significant uncertainties.  
Decision making under uncertainty is typically cast as the maximization of expected utility, 
which involves the assignment of definite probabilities to future alternative states of 
affairs.  A more radical notion of uncertainty developed especially by economist Frank 
Knight (1921) involves the inability of actors to estimate the probability that future states 
of affairs will come to pass.  Between definite and unquantifiable uncertainty lie a range of 
conditions in which information is incomplete such that expectations are better 
represented by imprecise probabilities, often denoted by intervals of probability instead of 
singular probabilities (Walley 1991).32 
 What level of uncertainty - represented by the specificity of probabilities of future 
states of affairs (from a singular probability [say, 0.4] to an interval 0 to 1 under Knightian 
uncertainty) - characterizes contentious politics?  A variety of responses are possible.  First, 
a natural response to such an inquiry is that because contentious politics can occur in a 
range of environments, it is an empirical question as to which degree of uncertainty 
plagues which specific type of contentious interactions.  A second response is that 
deductions from specific theories should provide testable hypotheses about degrees of 
uncertainty.  Variations in determinant conditions would be endogenous to whatever 
theory is relevant.  A third response is an educated ad hoc approach in which researchers 
                                                          
32
 These can also be represented by ordinal probabilities such that one can determine rankings but not 
degrees of probability (Keynes 2004 [1921]).   Of course, the question of how to incorporate uncertainty into 
models of choice remains a problematic area of decision theory.  This is a generic attempt to consider the 
relation between provisions of information and uncertainty. 
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weigh the body of empirical evidence and theoretical work on a particular research 
question.  While the most preferable means of specification is the second approach, it 
seems evident that the third approach is not only the most common and the least costly 
operation, but also the most feasible considering the lack of specificity in social movement 
theory.  Considering existing research and frequent anecdotal empirical observations, the 
most defensible option is to assume that SMOs in general operate under a condition of 
uncertainty such that imprecise probabilities are the best that they can assign to the range 
of options before them.   The remaining analysis of familiarity will specify more clearly the 
importance of information and the assignment of interval probabilities. 
3.5.2. The Distribution of Familiarity 
In order to relax the assumption of perfect information, it is important to consider 
the concept of familiarity.  Familiarity involves means that are “ready-at-hand” in the 
Heideggerian sense, a contextual and immersive involvement with the tasks we are often 
engaged in and the materials we employ in their achievement.  From a more sociological 
perspective, Bourdieu identifies this immersive but attentive practice as the “practical 
sense” that we utilize in order to navigate the various constraints (opportunities, threats, 
etc.) offered by our positioning within various social fields.  Situations and their 
accoutrements are most familiar when action is characterized by a practical mastery of its 
utility in particular situations.  Familiarity is always a feel for a situation, for a context such 
that its constraints can be exploited and avoided.  Like Bourdieu, I use the concept of 
schemas and their relation to action as a basic unit of organized information.   
I contend that a tentative but useful way of thinking of the notion of bounded 
rationality with the theoretical developments thus far elucidated involves the relation of 
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information to schemas.  Familiarity can be described as the relationship between 1) the 
information required to navigate a situation, and 2) an individual or group’s endowment of 
schemas, or dispositions.  If the information is a generally good fit for some of the schemas 
in a disposition - if it cues a basically confident sketch of the situation (actors, constraints, 
incentives, outcomes, and utilities) - then the actor is familiar with the situation.  This fit 
between schemas and initial information can be construed as a continuous variable ranging 
from 0 (absolutely no fit and no familiarity) to 1 (a perfect fit and total familiarity).    
Intuitively, the concept of familiarity appears synonymous with information.  If we 
think of a complete lack of information about some phenomenon, we define it as a state of 
pure ignorance.   It is an unknown unknown.  There can be no familiarity with such an 
object.  Once the amount of information is increased, however, we can begin to make sense 
of the object by linking it to other objects about which we possess more information.  At the 
height of information saturation, it is an understatement to say that one is familiar with the 
object.  Strictly speaking, however, familiarity is not a perfect function of information.  Even 
extensive amounts of information cannot by themselves provide a robust sense of a 
situation, as anyone reading a novel in a foreign language that they do not understand will 
attest.  Such information requires schemas – themselves organized structures of 
information - to simplify the process of interpretation, for example, by endowing an actor 
with knowledge of the language.   
The endowment of schemas or dispositions varies in at least two important ways.  
First, most sets of skills and knowledge are specialized and thus unevenly distributed 
across a population.  Familiarity is not only potentially variable for a particular object or 
situation (we may learn more about some phenomenon, for example, thus increasing 
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familiarity, or we may fail to reinforce our experience with an object, thus decaying our 
familiarity with the object), it also varies across objects.  To state the obvious, we are more 
or less familiar with some objects than others.  For example, the capacity to engage the 
legal system competently, to understand it and to utilize it to one’s advantage, is 
distributed primarily to people and groups that have extensive knowledge and experience 
with the system, especially lawyers.  Everyday life is thus a mosaic of individuals and 
groups with variable competencies with respect to variable tasks.  In other words, due to 
the different tasks and routines they engage in on a relatively regular basis, some are 
familiar with different sets of tasks and routines than others.  They obtain, maintain, and 
employ more information and thus, over time, schemas on certain actions than other 
people.  If schemas and information yield familiarity, a social life invariably yields 
familiarity with certain ways of seeing and acting.33 
Second, skills and knowledge range from highly specialized and scarce (media, legal, 
military, etc.) to highly generalized and abundant.  As Downs (1957) argued with respect to 
the search costs of voting, everyday forms of activity like consuming mass media and 
interpersonal contact produce a free and abundant stream of information.  Some studies 
characterize the act of voting as an instance of low information rationality, in which the 
everyday lives of citizens provide them with bits of information that they use to determine 
their vote (Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  In the long-term, this stream is a 
source of socialization about politics, history, economics, psychology, and various other 
                                                          
33
 Within rational choice theory, Downs (1957, 79) similarly describes contextual knowledge as a “grasp of 
the relations among the fundamental variables in some area” of knowledge, the set of specializations that 
characterize an advanced division of labor.  He does not explicitly include practices, but the concept of 
practice employed by Bourdieu abrogates the distinction between cognition and action, because both 
ultimately require the deployment of schemas of classification in social activity.  Again, for analytic purposes, 
I distinguish the behavioral-cognitive aspect of schemas from their communicative or framing aspects. 
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areas of concern.  Unlike the heterogeneous distribution of schemas associated with 
specialized sets of skills and knowledge, this free stream produces a comparatively flat 
distribution of schemas, because they are forged from abundant information.   
3.5.3. Familiarity and Tactics 
In describing the relation between the performances of everyday life and 
contentious performances, McAdam et al (2001, 140) state, “the social networks and 
shared understandings at hand channel participants into available definitions of what is 
happening, available means of communication and cooperation, available practices of 
conflict resolution, and available cultural idioms.”  I argue that an essential mechanism in 
this channeling process is the role of familiarity in evaluating decision contexts, including 
expected outcomes, utilities, and incentives, as well as the scope of choice sets.   
The core of my concern lies in the relation between the degree of familiarity with 
some subject, action, or situation in everyday life and the range of expectations regarding 
tactical alternatives in contentious politics.  In other words, it concerns the degree of 
congruence between two apparently different decision contexts, one in everyday life and 
another in contentious politics.  Familiarity involves an interaction between environments 
(or, alternatively, the information they give off and give up) and schemas.  This channeling 
mechanism concerns variation in the former while holding the latter constant.  In this 
sense, it is a process involving the transposition of schemas developed in one decision 
context to another.  This process occurs in everyday life, wherein we apply our experience 
with some phenomenon to others, typically because 1) our experience with and knowledge 
of the old experience exceeds our experience with and knowledge of the new experience, 
and/or 2) the available information suggests the schema is appropriate for this experience.  
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My argument is that this process likewise occurs in contentious politics; schemas 
developed in everyday life are applied to contentious politics, because they reduce 
uncertainties and transaction costs. 
I clarify the concept of familiarity further by distinguishing among the everyday 
correlates of contentious politics.  Everyday correlates refer to those socializing sources 
(decision contexts) and the schemas they generate that are potentially applicable to 
contentious political activity.  First, direct everyday correlates refer to imminent and 
concrete experiences.  For example, driving, talking, reading, walking, and hammering: all 
of these represent experiences that over time impart deep senses of familiarity such that 
they become second nature.  Direct everyday correlates can range from extremely 
abundant to extremely scarce: from talking and walking to organization and public 
speaking and persuasion to military, scientific, and legal training.  The concept also 
encompasses experience with actual contentious politics.  Like any form of social activity, 
activism is potentially a habit-forming activity (Crossley 2003).   
Indirect everyday correlates of contentious politics refer to those socializing sources 
and the schemas they generate that are independent of actual or concrete experience.  
These include those schemas generated by impersonal forms of information distribution, 
especially the mass media.  Downs’ stream of free information partially captures this flow 
of distant experience.  Importantly, indirect everyday correlates include schemas about the 
history of contentious interaction, basic knowledge about the forms of protest and 
resistance available to individuals and groups.  Even without direct experience of strikes, 
riots, bombings, or petitions, many people encounter some information in their daily lives 
that provides them with basic sketches of what these concepts constitute and implicate.  I 
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assume that this stream of information is such that a given population of SMOs can produce 
expectations for a set of tactics, Y (defined in Section 3.5.5).  Additionally, I assume that 
every SMO is likely to have an endowment of schemas such that they can produce 
minimally confident expectations for a range of tactics, Yj (defined in Section 3.5.5).  SMOs 
may also simultaneously be endowed with scarce schemas such that they can produce 
more confident expectations regarding a smaller range of tactics.34 
An obvious implication of this analysis involves the relation between tactics and the 
distribution of schemas.  Familiarity with everyday correlates of contentious politics is 
abundant for some tactics, while familiarity is scarce for others.  In other words, tactics 
vary in the degree of skill specialization that they require.  Some notable examples of scarce 
schemas with tactical implications include legal tactics, military training, and relationships 
with the media.  Somewhat less scarce but still not abundant schemas might involve basic 
organizational and communication skills.  Obvious examples of abundant schemas with 
tactical implications may include shared understandings of pickets, petitions, rallies, and 
strikes.    
To further clarify, the (implicit) process of estimating expectations is not specific to 
contentious politics.  Familiarity is a product of the history of navigating similar sets of 
situations and interactions involving generally similar people, equipment, language, and 
practices.  This process of socialization – an accumulation of choices and feedback -  
                                                          
34 One object of schemas requires further discussion.  Consider a city with its defining terrain: roads, bridges, 
signs, parks, buildings, etc., as well as its cultural features: specific places, history, etc.  Local residents have 
abundant schemas about this environment, all of which can contribute to more confident estimates of utilities 
and outcomes.  However, such schemas may also be regarded as scarce outside of the local population.  The 
simplest solution to this difficulty is to note that, again, the nature of the conflict determines the particular 
parameters within a general model.  Thus, the actual content of abundant and scarce schemas is determined 
by the conflict structure, though they are still distinguished by their degree of dispersion across the 
population. 
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involves the implicit engraving of expectations within schemas such that Bourdieu (1990, 
103-4) can describe the ‘practical sense’ as an “urgency of action” that “makes it possible to 
appreciate the meaning of the situation…and to produce at once the opportune response” 
without deduction or calculation.  This opportune response is precisely the accumulation of 
repeated experiences such that estimation becomes an implicit practical process.35  The 
process of generating expectations is thus a sort of meta-schema transposed from the 
everyday to the contentious. 
3.5.4. Confidence and Transaction Costs 
The familiar is attractive for a number of reasons.  First, it reduces levels of 
uncertainty about the consequences of action.  If we take a classical rationalist perspective, 
all possible courses of action produce finite numbers of different outcomes, all of which are 
known by the actor (or they behave as if they know).  A boundedly rational actor is likely to 
have more information and a better understanding of the possible outcomes of some 
actions as opposed to the outcomes of other possible actions.  At the least, the former 
should include those actions and their conditions that an actor is most familiar with, such 
as actions that the actor engages in everyday with a generally predictable set of outcomes.  
The latter should include actions which the actor is generally unfamiliar with, such as 
actions that the actor has never experienced with little to no information regarding 
possible outcomes.  Of course, this act of transposition is generally not totally congruous 
(everyday life is mostly not contentious politics), but it nonetheless provides some minimal 
guidance.  The hypothesis here is that familiarity reduces the uncertainty of (or increases 
the confidence in) expectations about future outcomes. 
                                                          
35
 Crossley (2001) describes a somewhat similar process in his effort to reconcile purposive habit-forming 
choices with the habitus.   
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Two, through the same process familiarity reduces levels of uncertainty with 
respect to the estimation of expected costs and benefits.  Again, because of an actor’s 
familiarity with some courses of action as opposed to others, the relevant values of the 
former are more firmly grasped than the latter.  The less familiar courses of action (and 
outcomes) are burdened with higher relative uncertainty. 
A third effect of familiarity is to reduce learning and cooperation costs.  All forms of 
exchange and collective action involve transaction costs.  With contentious collective 
action, for example, there are intra-organizational bargaining and negotiating costs in 
selecting and preparing actions, information costs involving assessments of outcomes, 
incentives, and choice sets, and surveillance and enforcement costs relating to various 
stages of cooperation.  Shared understandings and social relations provide an existing 
infrastructure that actors can utilize with less effort than if action was to involve strangers, 
unknown technologies, or new actions. Thus, ceteris paribus, familiarity is inversely related 
to transaction costs. 
Fourth, familiarity provides pre-existing awareness of some behavioral options in 
the choice set.  Those courses of action already privileged with familiarity regarding 
outcomes and incentives are more likely to ‘come to mind’ when faced with the task of 
decision.  Depending on the search, stopping, and decision rules (Gigerenzer and Selton 
2002b), the extent to which individuals rely on this initial set of familiar options varies. 
But what does higher or lower uncertainty mean in this context?  Above I briefly 
considered a continuum of levels of uncertainty.  I can further flesh out my position of 
imprecise probabilities by referring to Figure 3.5.  Familiarity’s function thus far elucidated 
is to contribute to a partial reduction in uncertainty by endowing actors with schemas that 
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can serve as models or materials for contentious actions.  In order to represent this 
relation, Figure 3.5 presents an idealized schema of three tactics (x1, x2, x3) with variable 
levels of familiarity.  For each tactic, represented as a quadrilateral, probabilities for the 
realization of future states of affairs run from left to right, 0 to 1, as clearly demonstrated 
with x1.  The most important aspect is the set of variable interval probabilities represented 
as dotted lines; here, p and p  represent the lower and upper probabilities.  Clearly, as 
familiarity increases the difference between p and p  contracts.  If we take the span of an 
interval probability as a measure of uncertainty regarding Ω’ and U’, then we can develop a 
set of relations from Figure 3.5: if |p - p   = Δp, then Δp1 > Δp2 > Δp3.  Thus, there is an 
inverse relation between familiarity and uncertainty, or if we want to use a different 
terminology, a positive relation between familiarity and confidence (Downs 1957, 77).36 
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Figure 3.5. Familiarity and Uncertainty 
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 Of course, as Downs (1957, 77) notes, some information can create more uncertainty by contradicting 
already held information.  This objection seems less pertinent to the use of schemas in this context, although 









Four points are worth considering following this discussion.  First, schemas are not 
necessarily specific to one tactic.  Familiarity is the degree of fit between initial information 
and schemas such that an everyday decision context is implicitly grasped.  In the 
transposition of this process to contentious politics, schemas are potentially applicable to 
wide ranges of tactics.  Skills like holding signs, walking, or joining a boycott are widely 
applicable.  Organizational skills, for example, can be utilized in a significant variety of 
contentious contexts.  Even scarce legal skills can be used not only for crafting and 
implementing legal strategies and tactics, but also for educating others about their rights, 
avoiding provocative tactics by the opposition through knowledge of the law, creating 
provocations that can legally support the SMO, endowing the SMO with various legal 
paraphernalia, and providing legitimacy and authority in a media campaign, among others.  
Art skills, to foreshadow, can be used in a wide array of activities: varieties of protest art 
useful in fundraising, designing signs for marches and rallies, and designing websites.  
 Second, schemas are not the only means that SMOs utilize in order to generate 
expectations.  Current information about the situation is crucial in reducing uncertainties 
and filling in the gaps between the schemas developed in previous everyday interactions 
and unfolding contentious interactions 
Finally, I incorporate the hypothesis that SMOs are ambiguity averse (Epstein 1999).  
Ambiguity aversion refers to a basic preference for known risks over more ambiguous 
risks.  In other words, SMOs will tend to prefer definite probabilities to more imprecise 
probabilities and smaller interval probabilities to wider interval probabilities.  Figure 3.6 
below can be interpreted as the effect of ambiguity aversion.  
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Figures 3.6 and 3.7 graphically represent the relationships between familiarity, 
transaction costs, and the probability that a particular tactic is adopted by an SMO.  Figure 
3.6 focuses on the importance of familiarity.  Here, the probability of a tactic being adopted 
within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that actors have with the 
everyday correlates of action and the percentage of the population that possesses these 
schemas.  These latter two variables together specify the scarcity of schemas in a 
population, the range of which is captured in the grey zone.  Moving diagonal from the 
lower left to the upper right is thus an increase in the abundance of schemas across the 
population. Tactics can be placed anywhere within the grey zone.  Both familiarity and the 
probability of adoption are continuous and range from 0 to 1, while the percentage of the 
population ranges from 0 to 100.  It is worth noting that this should not be interpreted as a 
precise indicator of probability, but rather as an ordinal ranking in terms of the probability 
of tactical adoption.   
In general, this probability is here presented in a perfect positive correlation with 
familiarity (though note again the preceding paragraph): an increase in a unit of familiarity 
with the everyday correlates of tactics increases the probability that that tactic will be 
adopted by a corresponding degree of probability.  However, as noted, familiarity can be 
distinguished by its degree of scarcity or abundance in a population.  First, I consider 
tactical adoption as a negatively decelerating function of scarce schemas (specialized skills 
and knowledge).  With very low levels of familiarity (whether scarce or abundant), actions 
are highly unlikely to find favor with activists.  In fact, activists are likely to never be aware 
of them as even remote possibilities.  In this way, they are excluded from the choice set.  

















Figure 3.7. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption 
 
familiarity and adoption are marginal until the population possessing the skills and 
knowledge pertaining to the everyday correlates of contentious politics is represented in 
the lower percentiles.  Second, I consider tactical adoption as a positively decelerating 
function of abundant schemas.  Again, low familiarity yields a low probability of adoption.  






































Percentage of Population 
 
      
 





















































space that represents that small part of the population that is generally ignorant of 
common everyday routines and tasks with contentious correlates) yields extensive 
increases in the probability of adoption.  Here, the general abundance of familiarity 
sustains a high probability across the remaining population.    
Familiarity provides a second set of incentives for or against certain courses of 
action: transaction costs.  Figure 3.7 concerns the relation between familiarity, transaction 
costs, and the probability of tactical adoption.  Here, I focus on scarce schemas.  For the rest 
of the analysis I assume that abundant schemas are constant.  Such a distribution has 
uninteresting effects on transaction costs.  Additionally, transaction costs are represented 
as decreasing as opposed to a more standard presentation of increasing costs.  Thus, 
movement up the y-axis yields lower costs and thus a lower probability of tactical adoption.  
As noted above, the degree of familiarity is inversely related to the costs of transacting with 
others.  Thus, more familiarity yields lower costs.   However, the relation takes the form of 
a positively decelerating curve.  At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity 
engender significant decreases in transaction costs.  As familiarity continues to increase, 
however, it yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible 
situation comes into view.  Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in 
familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption.  The 
relation between costs and probability of adoption is strictly negative according to rational 
choice theory.  Ceteris paribus, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of 
tactical alternatives, differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in 
the probability of the adoption of the tactic.   
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A broader way of looking at Figures 4.6 and 4.7 is as a static portrait of the relation 
of everyday life to contentious politics.  The closer a contentious performance relates to a 
non-contentious performance, meaning the degree to which the conditions of actions in 
everyday life inform the contentious performance, the more likely the tactic is to be chosen.  
Thus, Figure 3.6 is a formal representation of channeling.  It suggests that everyday life 
constrains contentious politics through the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs.  
This is not to suggest that factors like social networks and resources are not part of the 
channeling dynamic.  What it means is that the familiarity with people and the means to act 
can be expressed as variable provisions of schemas.   
 An additional point begs for discussion.  In their revision of the renowned SES 
model for explaining political participation, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995; Brady, 
Verba, and Schlozman 1995) focus on the sets of organizational and communicative skills 
that mediate between the effects of socioeconomic variables and political behavior.  They 
hypothesize a close relation between three organizational settings (school, work, and 
religious organization) and the development of these skills.  Descriptively, they find that 
these skills are not purely abundant nor are they strictly scarce according to the model 
developed above.  Instead, they occupy the middle of the grey zone of Figure 3.6.  The 
approach taken in this chapter regarding familiarity can be seen as a generalization of this 
SES-resource model.  The skills developed in particular network settings (themselves 
shaped by broader field forces in, for example, education, occupations, and religion) 
generate particular competencies and knowledge that can be transposed into other 
settings, such as activism.  This relation between the SES-resource model and the approach 
taken in this dissertation will be further considered in Chapter Eight. 
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3.5.5. Defining Sets of Tactics 
Familiarity is operative on only a subset of all possible tactics, however.  To clarify, it 
is useful to first define possible, recognized, and probable tactics.  A possible tactic is a 
purely abstract construction denoting an action that can occur, even if it has not been or 
ever will be.  A complete set of possible tactics does not include impossible tactics nor does 
it involve probabilities; possible tactics defined solely as possible have no more probability 
of selection than any other possible tactic (unless the latter are included in the sets of 
recognized or probable tactics).  Generally speaking, this conception of possibility is 
irreducible to specific situations and interactions.  Recognized tactics are any tactics that 
obtain a minimally confident set of expectations such that their probability of adoption 
among a population of SMOs is less than an interval probability of 0 to 1.  Probable tactics 
are any tactics that possess a reasonable chance of being employed across the population at 
a given time.   Using the notation developed in the discussion of effectiveness and goals, the 
set of possible tactics is represented as X.  Y denotes the set of recognized tactics, while R 
specifies the set of probable tactics.  Considering these definitions, we can logically state 
that, X ⊇ Y ⊇ R.   
An important consideration is left unattended: the choice sets specific to a given 
SMO.  Recall the marker of membership for a tactic in Y: a minimally confident set of 
expectations.  I assume for convenience that the set of tactics in Y is constant across all 
SMOs in a given society.  I justify this assumption on the basis of two arguments.  First, 
recall Downs’ (1957) notion of a free stream of information.  At a minimum, such a 
distribution of information should allow for a given population to produce expectations for 
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a range of tactics.37  Although the distribution is not perfectly flat (see Figure 3.6), for this 
analysis I assume that variations in the distribution do not correlate with SMO estimates of 
utility.  Second, I assume - as a means to decrease the search costs for effective tactics – that 
SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a smaller number of categories of tactics and produce 
expectations for these clusters.  For example, instead of listing all of the tactical variations 
of the street demonstration and producing estimates for each one, SMOs instead lump them 
together in a category like ‘street demonstration.’   
However, though I assume a constancy of tactics, each SMO obtains its own set of 
tactics, Yj, because SMOs assign different expectations to each tactic in the set, Y.  I define a 
fourth set, K, as the set of possible but unrecognized tactics.  Because I am most concerned 
with Y, I can define their relations formally.  If Y ⊆ X, then X / Y = K such that K ⊆ X.  Thus, 
below a certain threshold of familiarity, the probability of tactical adoption is effectively 
zero, because there is no information relating the accoutrements of everyday situations to 
the outcomes or utilities of contentious action.  Unlike Y, K is not defined heterogeneously 
across SMOs, because by definition tactics in K do not obtain interval probabilities. 
The third subset of X, denoted R, is the repertoire of contention.  R is defined by the 
population of SMOs at a given time.   While a given SMO defines their set Yj as the set of 
recognized tactics with their unique (to the SMO) set of expectations, set R constitutes the 
array of tactics that all groups recognize as reasonably probable.  Thus, like Y, R is a set of 
                                                          
37 Partial empirical support for this assumption is available:  
 
Respondents…were asked to indicate whether there were any [protest] items they failed to 
recognize…Only the boycott item drew more than a few ‘Don’t recognize” responses, and this mostly  
in mainland Europe where they averaged about 7 percent of each national sample.  This result, 
simple enough in itself, is of more than methodological interest.  It indicates support for our basic 
idea that a substantial level of consciousness about protest behavior has indeed permeated the wider 
political community.  Everyone knows what protest behavior is, though not everyone will necessarily 
recognize it by that name (original emphasis, Barnes and Kaase 1979, 70). 
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tactics constant across a population of SMOs.  Similarly, like Y, R is heterogeneous with 
respect to expectations.  Reasonable probability is thus a property of a tactic (and the set, 
R) in relation to the entire population of SMOs, not a property with respect to a specific 
SMO.  This last qualifier is significant, because while the population of SMOs may regard a 
tactic (say r1) as obtaining a reasonable probability of being adopted (it is part of the 
repertoire of contention), within the set Rj the same tactic may obtain an extremely low 
probability of adoption.  Thus, reasonable probability is not an organizational-level 
variable, though by definition a tactic in the repertoire must possess a relatively high 
probability of adoption for at least some minimal number of SMOs.   
To give this distinction some concreteness I consider two tactics: suicide car 
bombing and picketing.  Both tactics are recognizable in the United States in the sense that 
some basic expectations can be generated by the general population.  However, for a vast 
majority of SMOs, suicide car bombing is given a fairly definite improbability of adoption 
(some possible reasons: it likely rates as counter-effective and normatively unacceptable 
and those SMOs that would use the tactic would find immediate and overwhelming 
repression).  Picketing, on the other hand, may find significant favor among some SMOs.  
The latter, of course, is a well-known member of set R, the repertoire of contention, 
whereas suicide car bombing, though well-known, does not obtain a reasonable probability 
of adoption, and thus lacks membership in R, though it is a member of Y. 
3.6. Familiarity, Effectiveness, and Incentives 
 I continue a sketch of an uncertain world by considering the relation between 
familiarity and effectiveness.  Familiarity produces at least three basic effects: a reduction 
of uncertainty, lowered transaction costs, and a more manageable choice set.  Effectiveness 
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defines alternatives within a set of tactics in terms of their utility as preferences and 
constraints.  Thus, we can say that while the above analysis of effectiveness assumes 
perfect information, uncertainty implies: 1) some tactics (K) possess no expectations, and 
2) the expectations of recognized tactics vary in their degree of uncertainty. 
 Additionally, recall that recognition is defined as the attainment of minimally 
confident expectations, or, in other words it achieves a minimal level of confidence without 
falling into complete Knightian uncertainty.  With respect to effectiveness, it is important to 
consider the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic goals.  It seems safe to assume that 
the representation of uncertainty (or confidence) as interval probabilities is primarily a 
property of the relation between an SMO and the world.  If this is a safe assumption then 
the assignment of interval probabilities falls primarily on the property of extrinsic efficacy.  
However, intrinsic goals can concern the relation between an SMO and the world.  For 
example, Kriesi et al (1995) argues that some movements seek to craft identity through 
highly disruptive contentious interactions.  I thus assume for the purposes of analysis that 
SMOs with either intrinsic or extrinsic goals face uncertainty. 
3.6.1. Ambiguity Aversion and Effectiveness 
 Tactics vary for an SMO both in their perceived effectiveness and the confidence 
with which this perception is held.  If these vary independently, important consequences 
follow.  Familiar tactics may not be perceived as particularly effective, while tactics that are 
not as familiar may be perceived as effective.  Figure 3.8 presents a hypothetical scenario 
involving three tactics: y1, y2, y3.  Each tactic is assigned an effectiveness score and an 













Figure 3.8. Uncertainty and Effectiveness: A Scenario 
 
or certainty (and, conversely, the degree of uncertainty) attributed to the effectiveness 
score by virtue of the familiarity that the SMO has with everyday correlates of these tactics. 
A first crack at a preference relation for this set of tactics might look something like 
this: y3 ≻ y2 ≻ y1.  However, variation in confidence problematizes this initial structure.  
Consider the relation, y3 ≻ y2.  A significant overlap persists between the range of 
probabilities assigned to both y2 and y3.  Under this condition, the actual probability of y2 
may yield a higher effectiveness score than y3.  Aware of this possibility, an SMO may find 
no decision rule to rationally distinguish between the two options.38  Sadly, despite 
numerous efforts to solve this problem (Walley 1991), none has yet proven generally 
acceptable.  Even more complicating is the effect of ambiguity aversion (Epstein 1999).  
Above, I assume that SMOs have a preference for tighter interval probabilities, meaning a 
generalized aversion to more uncertain outcomes relative to more certain outcomes. 
3.6.2. Searching and Information Costs 
 I consider one general means by which an SMO may cope with these difficulties: the 
acquisition of information.  The preceding analysis involves a sequential process in which 
                                                          
38
 Obviously, a fuller consideration of the question of when a reasonable decision can be made requires a 
deeper rendering of the question of incentives.  This discussion assumes that all costs and benefits (excepting 





initial information activates schemas that construct various tactical alternatives such that a 
reasonable decision can be made.  The following analysis extends this process by allowing 
the search for information after an initial sketch does not provide the conditions for a 
reasonable decision.  A great deal has been written on information search, especially in 
economics (Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright 2005).  As far as I am aware, nothing comparable 
has been published on the question of tactical choice in contentious politics.  The effort will 
be very cursory. 
 A basic assumption of rational choice theory is that costs reduce the attractiveness 
or utility of options.  Tactics vary for an SMO in how much they are expected to cost.    
Above, I discussed variation in transaction costs.  I assume that a notable component of the 
search process is the incurring of specific types of transaction or intrinsic costs: search and 
information costs.  Of course, the decision to search is made only when the expected 
benefits of searching exceed the expected costs.39  At the least, the benefits of searching 
include the reduction of uncertainty (Downs 1957, 77).  Thus, searching entails the 
acquisition and processing of information in order to reduce the costs of uncertainty.  
Search is concluded whenever the costs of search equal or exceed the marginal returns.   
 One aspect of searching deserves extensive comment here.  Above I assumed that 
the population of SMOs possesses minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, Y.  
Recall that set Y is the set of recognized tactics, and not the repertoire of contention, or R, 
                                                          
39 But how can an SMO know that search will yield crucial information (see footnote 9 and Downs 1957,77 ) 
such that confidence is increased?  Can an SMO assign a probability to the expected benefits of search?  
Should an SMO weigh this probability against the probability that the effectiveness of y2 exceeds that of y3?  If 
the probability of reducing uncertainty through search is lower than the probability that the effectiveness of 
y2 exceeds that of y3, does the SMO choose y3 because the highest probable effectiveness of y3 exceeds the 
highest probable effectiveness of y2, while the lowest probable effectiveness of y2 is lower than the lowest 
probable effectiveness of y3?   Though these are important questions, for now I assume that the expected 
benefits are minimally sufficient to generate a search decision. 
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the set of tactics with a reasonable probability of being utilized.  Recall as well that 
familiarity with some everyday correlates of tactics can vary from an abundant distribution 
across a population to a scarce distribution.  Again, the latter implies that while some 
tactics require a basic level of cognitive awareness that is widely distributed, others are 
more specialized in the means by which they are practiced.  Consequently, confidence 
regarding the expected estimates of outcomes and utilities for the former should be high 
relative to the latter.   
 Under these assumptions, how is it that tactics requiring some specialized 
awareness can also be given minimally confident expectations by the entire population of 
SMOs?  In other words, if they require scarce schemas, how can those lacking these 
schemas recognize them?  One solution has already been described.  In a classic study of 
attitudes towards protest, almost all respondents in surveys administered over five 
advanced industrial democracies were able to recognize sets of tactics ranging from 
petitioning and writing a letter to newspapers to various legal, illegal, and violent tactics 
like demonstrations, occupation of buildings, and damage to property (Barnes and Kaase 
1979, 70).   Such a list is not exhaustive, but it does suggest an interesting approach to 
explaining the process of search.  Most of the items in the survey were general terms that, 
though perfectly valid as categories, nonetheless covered significant heterogeneity in 
tactics.  The blocking of traffic, for example, can come in numerous variations: terrain 
(roads, footpaths, trains, ports, and now, the Internet), materials (barricades, human 
chains, vehicles, disruption of existing traffic), modes (street theater, confrontations, etc.), 
etc.  In order to navigate this complexity, I assume that SMOs cluster sets of tactics into a 
smaller number of categories and produce expectations for these clusters.  Each cluster is 
111 
thus characterized by a singular bundled estimate of expected outcomes, utilities, and 
probabilities; all of the tactics included in a cluster possess these sets of values for the SMO.   
Categories or tactical clusters with high familiarity are susceptible to 
decomposition; in other words, the more familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of 
a tactical cluster, the more likely an SMO is to make subtler distinctions within the cluster 
and thus to introduce variation in expectations.  An opposing proposition thus holds that 
the less familiar an SMO is with a tactical cluster, the more extensive and potentially 
heterogeneous is the set of tactics included in the cluster.  An example may be the very 
wide range of tactics available on the Internet.  Those unfamiliar with the Internet may 
cluster all of these tactics together and generate a set of expectations despite the variety of 
this online repertoire.  A similar process occurs with respect to clusters with high 
effectiveness, though with an important caveat: ceteris paribus, perceived higher 
effectiveness is more likely to lead to the expenditure of resources (costs) in order to 
decompose the cluster into finer distinctions. Information is usually sought regarding the 
set of tactics with the highest perceived effectiveness in order to make more careful 
distinctions among more attractive options.  Of course, this process occurs only under 
conditions of search, itself a consequence of uncertainty.   
There are at least two important exceptions to the transaction costs of searching 
that posit basically non-negative incentives.  First, recall my Downsian assumption that a 
free stream of information affords the population of SMOs in a society (through 
socialization) the ability to produce minimally confident expectations for a set of tactics, Y.  
This free stream of information also provides current information on actual interactions or 
situations. These streams (which may vary systematically across contexts in terms of the 
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quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity 
structures that activists face - sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-to-date 
contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and 
threats.  The initial stimulus that activates schemas may or may not derive from this stream 
of information, but subsequent search by the SMO draws on this diffuse stream in order to 
provide more confidence in the estimates of expected outcomes and utilities.  The search of 
the stream includes incidental acquisitions of information (a generic property of social 
interaction and media) and intentional acquisitions by the SMO.  The latter involves both 
the mining of the stream by the SMO and the efforts by actors outside of the SMO to provide 
information to it, including family, friends, other SMOs, interest groups, and even 
government and media sources. 
Additionally, it seems reasonable to suggest that members of SMOs in general may 
have larger streams of free information.  Studies are consistent in showing that, like those 
who engage in other forms of political participation, activists are relatively high in 
motivational attitudes and behaviors like political interest and political discussion 
(Jennings and Anderson 2003; Norris 2002; Schussman and Soule 2005).  Interest in 
politics involves an intrinsic motivation to acquire political information.  Activists may thus 
be more inclined to enjoy the process of acquiring and processing the information that they 
encounter in their daily lives as well as the information that they actively pursue outside of 
this stream, even if it is costly. 
Taken to the extreme, these qualifications suggest that some activists are prone to 
acquire information such that uncertainty is reduced to certainty.  However, at least two 
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objections are relevant.40  First, uncertainty is a generic property of contentious politics.  
Considering even the intrinsic benefits of acquiring information, the search process 
inevitably yields increasingly marginal returns in the reduction of uncertainty.  Second, 
uncertainty is reduced until a reasonable decision can be made.  In the example provided 
by Figure 3.8, a reasonable decision could be made once the overlap between y2 and y3 
dissolves.  Further search may yield continued intrinsic benefits, but this search is not 
motivated by the desire to reduce uncertainty in the particular decision context.  Thus, a 
terminal decision to act is made even though information acquisition continues. 
3.6.3. Other Intrinsic Incentives 
 Other intrinsic costs and benefits are potentially relevant in determining the 
attractiveness of tactics.41  Expenses incurred in social exchanges include, as noted before, 
1) bargaining and negotiation costs, and 2) surveillance and enforcement costs.  
Individually and additively, these costs should negatively correlate with the probability of 
tactical adoption.  As demonstrated in Figure 3.7, a more complex relation emerges with 
the consideration of familiarity.   
 Does the theoretical discussion above suggest a corresponding relation between 
familiarity, intrinsic benefits, and the probability of tactical adoption?  Rational choice 
theory is unequivocal on one point: ceteris paribus, an increase in benefits should be 
associated with an increase in the probability of tactical adoption.  Some scholars 
incorporate various intrinsic constraints and their corresponding incentives, including 
                                                          
40 Other important objections involve the relaxation of certain information assumptions, including the 
assumptions of crucial, accurate, and inert information. 
41
 These incentives should primarily be consequential insofar as they discriminate among tactics.  Any costs 
or benefits that are generic to the act of choosing and engaging in tactics such that the costs are constant 
across all options are inconsequential in this analysis.  
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conforming to norms against violence, the thrill of action, and enjoying the company of 
others (Jasper 1997; Opp 1989).  My contribution is to suggest that whatever the 
expectations, increases in familiarity should be associated with increases in confidence in 
these expectations.  I consider intrinsic incentives in Chapter Twelve. 
3.6.4. Other Extrinsic Incentives 
 Above, the concept of an ideology established an interface between shared 
understandings and the opportunity structures that will be considered more in depth in 
Chapter Ten.  This relationship is essentially a relation between schemas and information: 
shared understandings are durable structures of information, while structures of 
opportunity produce more contextual updates on the opportunities and threats facing 
actors.  The durability of many aspects of opportunity structures (institutional frameworks 
like electoral systems and federalism as well as the persistence of specific organizational 
relations like political parties, militaries, religious bodies, media organizations, and the 
police) is thus supportive of the generation of shared understandings regarding the 
vulnerabilities, motivation, and capacities offered by these structures. 
 Recall that familiarity reduces the uncertainties associated with the expectations of 
action regarding both intrinsic and extrinsic processes.  It follows that expected extrinsic 
outcomes and incentives are derived in part from this prior sketch of the field of action: the 
sets of vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities offered by the arrangement of actors, 
institutions, and resources.  Importantly, as suggested by Figure 3.2, an SMO with an 
intrinsic goal must nevertheless engage in actions that can produce extrinsic outcomes like 
repression or increased public support.  This is so not only because of the possibility of a 
heterogeneous hierarchical goal structure (intrinsic goals can nevertheless produce 
115 
objectives that require extrinsically-oriented actions), but also because of the tendency for 
oppositional practices, intrinsically oriented or otherwise, to generate dynamics of 
opposition and support. 
3.7. Conclusion 
 This principle goal of this chapter is to present a set of theoretical instruments for 
explaining tactical choice.  In this chapter I supplement the discussion from Chapter Two 
with collective action theory and bounded rationality.  I focus on two basic effects derived 
from variation in socialization across a population of SMO members.  First, I consider the 
importance of collective identity in establishing basic constraints on the expectations 
generated for a set of tactics, including the attribution of effectiveness.  Second, I consider 
how an SMO’s familiarity with the everyday correlates of tactics may affect the degree of 
confidence in these expectations.  In general, the two chapters together argue that the 
effects of the socializing structures of everyday life – the networks and fields that organize 
activities and the shared understandings that they generate – can be translated into a 
consideration of the effects of a variety of costs and benefits on choice among a variety of 









CHAPTER 4. DATA 
 In order to navigate the encounter between theoretical reflection and empirical 
scrutiny, means of research must be devised that both maximize the risks to the 
multiplicity of theories involved and minimize the uncertainties associated with faithfully 
interpreting empirical results.  Such conditions are seldom satisfactorily met in any 
research project in the natural or social sciences.  Consequently, a critical responsibility for 
any researcher is to acknowledge, enumerate, and explore the limitations and constraints 
of research as well as to identify the scope of, and opportunities for, knowledge claims. 
The core task of this chapter is to present the foundations of the methodological 
approach of this dissertation and its attendant responsibilities.  First, I situate this 
approach within the field of social movement studies, especially with respect to advanced 
quantitative methods such as protest event analysis.  Second, I detail the procedures 
pertaining to the design of the sample utilized in this study and its constraints, especially 
selection bias and the lack of representativeness.  Third, I explore the means and methods 
of data collection used in this study ranging from the use of primary and secondary textual 
sources to semi-structured interviews.  Fourth, I present brief descriptions of the twelve 
cases that constitute the sample in this study.   
4.1. Research Constraints 
4.1.1. Methods and Data in Social Movements Studies 
 With the exception of experimental methods, the field of social movement and 
protest studies is methodologically pluralist (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002).  As 
noted in Chapter One, the principal means of quantitative research is protest event 
analysis, or the content coding of collective action events reported in newspapers, though 
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police and organizational archives have also been used as supplemental or even primary 
sources (Kriesi et al 1995; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McAdam 1983; 1999; Olzak 1992; 
Tilly 1995; 2008; Tilly et al 1975).  This approach to quantifying the character and 
frequency of protest has yielded significant progress by providing the field with a firm 
empirical foundation for testing explanations of protest behavior.  It has also garnered a 
great deal of criticism (Davenport 2009; McCarthy,  McPhail, and Smith 1996; Oliver and 
Maney 2000).  While this debate is extensive and informative, I focus on two critical points 
of contention for this dissertation related to source constraints. 
Event analysis systematically over-represents contentious phenomena like strikes 
and demonstrations and under-represents less conspicuous tactics like small symbolic 
actions (McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004).  
First, the criteria for coding events often include publicity.  Publicity is operationalized as 
reported and newsworthy events or actions deemed significant by the political and legal 
authorities, hence the utility of newspapers and government documents as the sources of 
event data.  Such an operationalization (and conceptualization) excludes most instances of 
culture jamming.  Although some culture jamming events, especially Reclaim the Streets! 
actions, create newsworthy spectacles, most culture jamming is public in a general sense 
yet lacks newsworthiness. 
Second, protest events are conceptualized as collective actions.  This criterion is 
generally operationalized as the reporting of some action involving at least ten or twenty 
individuals.  Though the definition of culture jamming utilized in this dissertation stresses 
culture jamming as collective action, the number of individuals involved ranges from two to 
thousands.  As a consequence, unlike other protest phenomena like riots, petitions, 
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demonstrations, or strikes, culture jams do not generally receive frequent or systematic 
mass media coverage.  Despite the fact that the definition of culture jamming used in this 
study defines it as a form of action, I conclude that no sources of systematic event data are 
currently available and that compiling such a dataset is unrealistic. 
Another quantitative approach in the field, especially in organizational ecology 
studies, focuses on a different unit of analysis: the SMO (Edwards and Foley 2002; Everett 
1992; Gamson 1990; Lofland 1996; Minkoff 1995; Soule and King 2008).  In order to 
compile a sample frame of SMOs in a given territory at a given time, scholars typically 
utilize directories of organizations, especially the Encyclopedia of Associations in studies of 
American social movements (Minkoff 1995).  After a sample is extracted, information on 
each SMO is collected through various methods on topics ranging from organizational 
structure and resources to tactics and alliances.  Variables are then coded, thus enabling 
the exercise of a range of statistical techniques.   
4.1.2. Unit of Analysis 
 The protest event and the SMO do not exhaust the many possible units of analysis.  
Others include the individual in survey research and ethnographic studies as well as frames 
or discourses in qualitative textual and quantitative content analyses.  The primary unit of 
analysis in this study is the CJO.  In part, this follows from the research definition (D.2) of 
culture jamming utilized in this study, which distinguishes collective from individual 
actions.  Only collective actions constitute culture jams under this conception, and thus 
those groups of individuals who come together to perform such collective actions are a 
more suitable unit of analysis than individuals who engage in culture jamming.  Thus, while 
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this study tends to speak broadly of culture jamming, more constrained generalizations are 
made based on the population of CJOs.    
 However, another approach to the individual as the unit of analysis is available.  
CJOs are composed of individuals and, as the discussion below will suggest, variation 
among individuals on key variables within such groups may arise in the collection and 
analysis of data.  Indeed, some criticisms of Bourdieusian concepts like habitus and field 
insist on their intractable individualism (Bottero and Crossley 2011).  In my judgment, the 
generally small size of culture jamming groups affords this study the opportunity to 
assume, in general, that an analysis at the level of the organization sacrifices little in the 
way of empirical leverage over my research questions.  Moreover, the data acquired in this 
study allows me to identify intra-organizational variation at the individual level as an 
organizational variable whenever such a procedure is necessary or productive.   
4.1.2. Sampling Constraints 
 The ability or inability to compile an adequate sampling frame of SMOs has 
significant consequences for research.  First, without something approximating a 
population list, the degree to which a sample is representative of the population of cases is 
uncertain.  Consequently, inferences and generalizations about populations are 
substantially more problematic.  Although the sampling frame is always a difficult issue in 
social movement studies (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 14), obtaining a population list of 
culture jamming organizations is still more laden with difficulties due to the lack of 
directories or reliable substitutes.  In studies with complete or adequate sampling frames 
in which samples are drawn from the population (as opposed to an analysis of the entire 
population in a census), the problem of obtaining a representative sample is generally 
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tackled through the random selection of cases.  Case selection in this study is thus by 
necessity nonrandom.     
 Second, all of the cases included in the sample for this study are positive cases of 
culture jamming.  Sample designs that select on the dependent variable severely constrain 
the range of possible knowledge claims that a study offers (King et al 1994).  Still, a variety 
of claims are available in such circumstances, such as descriptive inferences, identification 
of necessary and/or sufficient conditions, and theory and hypothesis development (George 
and Bennett 2005).  In addition, whenever possible, variation will be introduced into the 
dependent variable. 
Third, the number of cases may affect the degree to which results are generalizable 
or inferences are sound.  Other research strategies, such as case studies, enable confident 
inferences and generalizations based on smaller numbers of cases though under more 
constraints (Gerring 2006).  Previous research on culture jamming includes the two case 
studies performed by Sandlin and Callahan (2009), three culture jamming groups studied 
by Nomai (2008), and the seven organizations engaged by Wettergren (2005).  While these 
studies generate important insights into their specific cases as well as culture jamming in 
general, it is my intention to expand the number of cases normally studied in works on 
culture jamming in order to maximize the generality of my argument to culture jamming in 
general as defined by the more restricted research definition (D.2).    
4.2. Sample Design 
4.2.1. Case Selection Criteria 
Obtaining a sample of CJOs first requires that we translate the definition of culture 
jamming utilized in this study into an operational definition capable of specifying a 
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negative or positive case.  For this study, a positive instance of culture jamming occurs 
when a collection of individuals durably self-identify as a formal or informal actor whose set 
of public actions include a significant subset of actions identified as (D.2) culture jamming.  
This operationalization and other considerations yield a set of case selection 
criteria: organization, contentious claims-making, ironic structure, location, and activity.42  
Most lack the determinist assumptions common in many quantitative selection criteria. 
Case selection is thus a messier process than desired.  First, it emphasizes the actor as the 
unit of analysis.  Although included under the broad conception of culture jamming (D.1), 
the research definition (D.2) excludes individuals.  At a minimum, individuals identify 
themselves as engaging in collective actions attributed to themselves and others as a 
durable collective actor with formal or informal organizational properties including 
especially decision-making procedures.  Thus, individuals like Ron English or Banksy do 
not qualify as cases in this analysis, because they lack this essential element of durable 
collective organization. 
Filling out some of the remaining criteria requires an operationalization of the 
definition of culture jamming utilized in this study.43  While any SMO may engage in a range 
of public actions, this definition focuses on culture jams.  The second criterion involves the 
claims-making process in culture jamming that implicates an identity or subject in a 
                                                          
42 An implicit criterion is publicity.  The operationalization stresses those actions that are public.  For 
McAdam et al (2001, 5), this defines a scope of activity that excludes intra-organizational action.  In Goffman’s 
(1974) terminology, this excluded set of actions refers to the ‘back stage’ of organizational presentation.  
Humorous office memos do not suffice.  However, this criterion did not prove particularly discriminatory in 
selecting cases. 
43
 (D.2) A contentious collective act involving the disruptive re-contextualization of a particular practice, 
object, or discourse of a dominant ensemble of representation that is constrained by the elements of that 
particular representation. 
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contentious relation to another identity or object.44  Thus, the claims of one actor should be 
identified as contentious, meaning if they were realized they would affect the interests of 
the object, though the criterion of mutual recognition implicit in McAdam et al (2001) is 
relaxed in favor of an intention of recognition (see Chapter Two).  Thus, positive cases of 
culture jamming involve the intentional aspiration to realize interests potentially 
detrimental to some object.  This criterion effectively excludes a great deal of culture 
jamming from the analysis.  For example, the Hypothetical Development Organization, a 
New Orleans based group of culture jammers that creates practically impossible 
architectural designs for derelict urban structures and presents them both on-site and in 
institutional settings (art galleries), fails to register as a positive case of culture jamming, 
because they do not regard their actions as contentious.45  
Third, a significant component of the action is its symbolic nature.  Culture jams are 
relatively sophisticated symbolic statements.  Thus, while all actions express some 
meanings, and many contentious collective actions express relatively simple meanings such 
as threat, culture jams involve an ironic structure and thus a subtly more complex 
representation.  As noted in Chapter One, this ironic structure is dominated by the form of 
the dominant representation.  This criterion is critical in that ideally it excludes culture 
jammers from other acts of symbolic politics. For example, while a group like Negativland 
re-assembles the sonic fragments of consumer culture into critical music tracks, groups like 
                                                          
44
 A second implicit criterion is opposition.  When this contentious relation is identified as involving the 
perception of asymmetric power relations and the pressing of claims upon a dominant object, it is classified 
as culture jamming.  In other words, positive cases of culture jamming for this study are identified by their 
opposition to perceived dominant representations.  However, like publicity, this criterion failed to provide 
additional leverage in identifying positive cases of culture jamming. 
45 More accurately, they do not regard a political interpretation of their actions as especially illuminating 
(Hypothetical Development Organization 2011). 
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Public Enemy launch largely direct social and political criticism within sonic structures 
assembled from elements themselves largely immune to these criticisms.   
Fourth, I chose to restrict my analysis to CJOs that locate themselves within the 
United States or Canada.  While a more thorough study would certainly include the large 
number of well-known groups in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and France, and 
many other countries, resource constraints necessitated a narrower and more practical 
focus.  
Finally, organizations that are currently active or that have engaged in collective 
actions within the last five years are included.  Older organizations are excluded. 
4.2.2. Sampling Procedures 
 The sampling strategy adopted for this dissertation has two phases.  During Phase   I 
an initial list of CJOs was gathered from various sources.  The closest approximation to a 
directory of culture jammers is the website Sniggle.net (Gross n.d.), an unofficial 
‘encyclopedia’ of culture jamming events, texts, individuals, and groups.  Sniggle.net is a 
website created and maintained by Dave Gross and supplied with content on a wide array 
of subversive or irreverent cultural activities by various contributors from across the 
Internet.  The content is typically arranged in the form of short descriptions with 
hyperlinks to relevant sites. 
However, Sniggle.net is not an ideal source.  There are no means to verify whether 
the website’s content is comprehensive or the degree to which its content represents 
culture jamming as a whole.  The procedures for identifying culture jamming content are 
less than explicit or systematic.  Voluntary contributions are the primary source of content; 
however, Gross does not explain his criteria for acceptance or rejection, though it seems 
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fairly relaxed.  Perhaps more telling is the disclaimer: “The Culture Jammer’s Encyclopedia 
isn’t meant to be an encyclopedia of culture jammers, so much as an encyclopedia for 
culture jammers” (original emphasis, Gross n.d.)  However, Sniggle.net offers the best 
starting point for compiling a sample of culture jammers.  Case selection thus began by 
compiling a list of positive cases of culture jammers from Sniggle.net.  This list was 
supplemented by the inclusion of a small number of other sources, including the Wikipedia 
article on culture jamming (Wikipedia contributors 2012), various culture jamming texts 
(Klein 2000; Lasn 1999), and finally the cases analyzed by Wettergren (2005).  There was a 
high degree of overlap among these sources, though Wikipedia and especially Sniggle.net 
were the most extensive.  It is worth noting that in the case of the Wikipedia page, the 
selection process is similar to Sniggle.net’s process in that it involves contributions. A 
difference is noteworthy as well; contributions are not selected by a single individual, but 
are the result of a cooperative equilibrium established by multiple contributors.  
Phase II trimmed this initially messy list down to the twelve cases identified in 
Table 4.1.  Groups like newmindspace, ®™ark, Evolution Control Committee, and California 
Department of Corrections were excluded from the sample principally as a consequence of 
resource constraints, the paucity of data, and/or a lack of overt opposition.  Analyzing 
twelve cases does present numerous difficulties somewhat alien to case studies of one to 
three cases or large N-studies.  In particular, the depth of analysis is in part constrained by 
the time and space available.  Each chapter handles this difficulty in its own way. 
4.3. Data Collection 
Within the constraints described above, studies of culture jamming utilize two basic 
methodological strategies.  Some studies rely on existing data (Cammaerts 2007; Harold  
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Table 4.1. Sample of Culture Jamming Organizations 
Culture Jamming Organization Acronym 
Adbusters Media Foundation AMF 
Anti-Advertising Agency AAA 
Billboard Liberation Front BLF 
The Billionaires BIL 
Center for Tactical Magic CTM 
Critical Art Ensemble CAE 
Institute for Applied Autonomy IAA 
Institute for Infinitely Small Things IST 
Negativland NVL 
Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah! RBC 
Surveillance Camera Players SCP 
The Yes Men YM 
 
 
2007; Jordan 2002; Meikle 2002; Sandlin and Callahan 2009; Strangelove 2005).  This 
includes primary sources such as the websites, organizational documents, and interviews 
of CJOs and individuals as well as secondary materials such as Mark Dery’s (1993) 
pamphlet or Naomi Klein’s (2000) No Logo.  Others supplement these data with interviews 
with culture jammers (Nomai 2008; Wettergren 2005; Woodside 2001).  This dissertation 
employs the latter strategy. 
4.3.1. Primary and Secondary Sources 
For this work I gathered data from a diverse array of primary and secondary 
sources.  Chapter’s Seven through Twelve focus on my sample of CJOs and rely primarily on 
the former including group websites, published group texts, interviews, news and journal 
articles, and a number of video and audio resources, all of which are cited in the Case 
References section of this work.  I also utilize an array of secondary sources including 
commentaries and research on culture jamming groups and activities.   
Selecting these sources was a relatively unsystematic process aside from a guiding 
principle akin to a kitchen sink approach: grab anything of potential relevance.  The 
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sources were obtained in four ways: through repeated searches over the Internet from 
roughly 2010-2013, various sites like Wikipedia and Sniggle.net, Lexis Nexis searches for 
relevant newspaper and magazine articles, and citation tracing in both academic and 
activist texts.  More often than not problems stemmed from sparse data.  Only Adbusters 
Media Foundation, the Yes Men, Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah!, and the 
Billionaires generated enough sources to make this process unwieldy.  For example, Lexis 
Nexis searches from 1980 to 2013 yielded 422 results for Reverend Billy, a figure that does 
not include the highly prolific blog posts of Reverend Billy.  Haugerud (2013, 175) 
observed the publication of 550 articles concerning the Billionaires between January 2000 
and June 2007.  Adbusters in particular presents problems of data saturation.  First, a Lexis 
Nexis search yields 995 results.  Second, its primary organ of action is a bi-monthly (since 
2001) magazine, Adbusters, which began publication in 1989.  From the summer of 1989 to 
the final issue of 2012, the organization has produced nearly a hundred issues.  In order to 
engage this latter mass of data, I generated a random sample of issues over a five year 
period, 2008-2012.  One issue was chosen out of every six issues in a year.  Along with 
Lasn’s (1999) Culture Jam and various interviews, these are the most essential sources for 
the Adbusters Media Foundation. 
In general, this type of data has a number of drawbacks.  Some sources are limited in 
scope, content, clarity, coherence, and analysis.  The bulk of the material is subjective and 
asystematic.  Much of this data provides a singular perspective, the self-presentation of the 
culture jammers themselves.  Some sources, particularly mainstream news articles but also 
community or activist journals, help to access a broader perspective within which the 
actions and discourses of culture jammers can be brought to intelligibility.  A notable 
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problem lies in the source of much of the data on the cases.  As a perusal through the Case 
References section reveals, much of the data on CJOS in this project derives from Internet 
sources.  While this is not crippling, such sources are at risk of relocating to other URLs or 
simply vanishing off-line.   The most significant constraint is the temporality of the data.  In 
order to maximize the coherence of data presentation, I ignore the chronology of sources in 
almost all cases.  This handicaps my capacity to make substantive claims about the causal 
relations between concepts like identities and tactics.  The primary focus of this 
dissertation is thus illustrative. 
Several chapters go beyond these data sources in order to consider specific research 
questions deviating from the direct focus on culture jamming organizations.  Data 
collection and construction in each instance is addressed in each chapter and any 
corresponding appendices. 
4.3.2. Interviews 
 Cognizant of the paucity of data for some groups, I supplement this initial set of 
sources with richer data derived directly from the Institute for Infinitely Small Things and 
the Surveillance Camera Players through a series of semi-structured in-depth interviews.  
An initial test interview was conducted with the group newmindspace in Toronto, but the 
group is excluded from the sample because of a lack of overt opposition.  Although he is not 
strictly a part of the sample (not a collective actor, but an individual identity that engages in 
collective actions with a shifting group of people), a short e-mail correspondence yielded a 
number of insights from Ron English, a notable culture jammer.  Requests for interviews 
with the AAA, members of three chapters of the Billionaires, CMT, the CAE, the IAA, 
Negativland, Reverend Billy, and the Yes Men failed due to either a lack of response, 
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overseas trips, my lack of funds, or a refusal to entertain academics with exclusive 
attention.  Nevertheless, both interviews provided invaluable data, especially the IST. 
The interviews draw from a basic question template reproduced in Appendix One.  
However, the construction of each interview took into account the information already 
available via other sources in order to avoid excessive repetition and to maximize the 
amount of new information.  In New York City, I interviewed Bill Brown of the SCP.  While 
they espoused an anarchist politics, Brown is the first to admit that the group was really 
centralized around his efforts.  Thus, while at any one time the group consisted of a dozen 
or so people, Brown was the consistent core of the group and thus provides a very useful 
vantage point on the SCP as a whole.  In Boston, I interviewed three members of the IST at 
once: Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic.  D’Ignazio and Rasovic are 
the co-founders of the IST, while Manning joined the group after its formation.  Each 
interview was audio recorded, transcribed, and returned to the individuals and groups for 
final comments or corrections.  No comments or corrections were provided.   
4.4. Case Descriptions 
 Below I give brief descriptions of each of the twelve groups in my sample.  When 
available, I use those provided by the group itself. 
The Adbusters Media Foundation is a non-profit organization founded in 1989 (and 
still active today) by Kalle Lasn and Bill Schmalz and based in Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada.  They describe themselves as “a global network of artists, activists, writers, 
pranksters, students, educators and entrepreneurs who want to advance the new social 
activist movement of the information age" (AMF n.d.(a))  Generally, they espouse an anti-
consumerist and pro-environmental politics.  The group is the most well-known case in this 
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study and the most well-known example of culture jamming, particularly for their flagship 
magazine, Adbusters.  They are the only Canadian case in this sample.   
The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between Steve Lambert and other 
artists from 2004 to 2010 and primarily based in San Francisco, California.  Sponsored by a 
non-profit arts organization, the group was concerned with issues of public space and 
advertising and typically engaged in acts of public artistry. 
The Billboard Liberation Front is a loose and secretive organization founded in 1977 
(and still active today despite several hiatuses) by members of the Suicide Club in San 
Francisco, California.  The group focuses on the ‘improvement’ of outdoor advertising.  
They are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming and directly inspired 
other groups like the California Department of Corrections and Artfux. 
The Billionaires is a loose network of performance activists founded in 1999 (and 
still active today) by Andrew Boyd of the non-profit United for a Fair Economy in Boston, 
Massachusetts.  The moniker of the group is malleable and shifts according to the action or 
campaign, i.e. the Billionaires for Forbes or the Billionaires for Wealthcare.  The group(s) 
focuses on two basic concerns: the role of money in politics and economic inequality.  They 
are one of the most prominent examples of culture jamming.  Dozens of chapters are active 
across the United States. 
The Center for Tactical Magic is an arts collective founded around 2003 (and still 
active today) by Aaron Gach and based in the San Francisco Bay Area.  The group pursues 
experimental means for generating discourses and practices critical of oppression and 
authority.   
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The Critical Art Ensemble (2000a, 136) is “five tactical media artists dedicated to 
exploring the intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism.”   
Founded in 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida by Steve Kurtz, Steve Barnes, and others, the group 
aims to develop pedagogical practices that open up spaces autonomous of authoritarian 
culture.  They are especially noted for their theoretical text, The Electronic Disturbance 
(1994) and the trial of founder Steve Kurtz concerning charges of bioterrorism. 
The Institute for Applied Autonomy is “a collective of engineers, artists, designers, 
theorists” founded in 1998 and disbanded in the late 2000s (Brusadin, Mattes, and Mattes 
n.d.).  The group seeks to develop technologies that invert power relationships between 
citizens and authorities. 
The Institute for Infinitely Small Things is a loose organization of artists founded in 
2004 in Boston, Massachusetts by Catherine D’Ignazio and Savic Rasovic.  As an extension 
of the non-profit arts organization Ikatun, the group “conducts creative, participatory 
research that aims to temporarily transform public spaces and instigate dialogue about 
democracy, spatial justice and everyday life” (IST 2012).   
Negativland is an experimental music and now arts group founded in 1979 that 
originated in the San Francisco Bay Area, though the members have since dispersed 
geographically.  Particularly critical of current U.S. copyright law and the ubiquity of 
advertising, they are noteworthy for their legal battles with U2 record label, Island Records, 
over copyright infringement.  In addition, they are one of the more well-known culture 
jamming outfits, in part because they basically coined the phrase in 1985  
The Reverend Billy and the Church of Earthalujah (formerly the Church of Stop 
Shopping) is a non-profit New York City-based performance collective and choir founded in 
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1999.  Originally a solo performance by Bill Talen as Reverend Billy, the group now pursues 
direct action in challenging consumerism and defending both public space and the 
environment.  They are one of the more well-known culture jamming groups in the sample. 
The Surveillance Camera Players was a performance group founded in 1996 and 
disbanded in the late 2000s/early 2010s in New York City.  For a brief time, numerous 
other chapters sprang up in the U.S. and Europe.  Led by Bill Brown, the group was 
concerned with the proliferation of surveillance cameras in public spaces. 
 The Yes Men is a loose network of activists founded in 1997 (and still active today) 
and fronted by members by Jacques Servin (a.k.a. Andy Bichlbaum) and Igor Vamos (a.k.a. 
Mike Bonanno).  They seek to “focus attention on the dangers of economic policies that 
place the rights of capital before the needs of people and the environment” (TYM n.d.(b)). 
The group is one of the more noteworthy culture jamming groups in the sample and are 
noted especially for their documentaries. 
4.5. Conclusion 
 This chapter concludes Part I of this study by specifying the basic methodological 
constraints and capacities of the project.  In particular, it considers issues of 
representativeness, selection bias, case selection criteria, sampling procedures, and data 
collection.  Finally, it briefly describes each of the twelve cases in the sample of CJOs that 































 CHAPTER 5. THE FIELD OF CULTURAL PRODUCTION  
The goal of this chapter is to briefly describe the history and structure of the field of 
cultural production in advanced Western industrial democracies.  Though this field 
includes a wide variety of activities, including news media, science, the arts, and literature, 
the primary focus here artistic production.  By necessity, this chapter is the least 
comprehensive presentation in this entire project.  In order to economize, description is 
primarily informed by the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Diana Crane.  The 
following chapter details sets of actors and networks that played pivotal roles in the 
structuring of the field of cultural production in the twentieth century.  Together, the two 
chapters begin to develop the argument that repertoire change can be productively studied 
as a consequence of changes in everyday social organization. 
This chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, utilizing the conceptual tools introduced 
in Chapter Two’s review of Bourdieu’s sociology I explore the origin and structure of the 
field of cultural production and the aesthetic disposition.  Second, I consider some relevant 
criticisms involving the application of Bourdieu’s model to contemporary postmodern 
society and to cases outside of France.  Third, I present some of the broad structural 
changes in the American field of artistic production in an effort to lay the groundwork for 
further chapters.  Special emphasis is placed on the formal institutionalization of the field.   
5.1. Bourdieu’s Sociology of Art 
5.1.1. Structure of the Field 
 As noted in Chapter Two, Bourdieu begins with the assumption that in the history of 
complex societies the agents of various types of activities (politics, economics, religion, art, 
etc.) sought to carve their own spheres of values, norms, rewards and sanctions apart from 
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political authorities and economic markets.   These contexts, or social fields, are constituted 
by sets of strategies, positions, and distributions of capital that organize the 
institutionalization and habituation of the field’s struggle for autonomy.  For Bourdieu, the 
field of cultural production provides one of the more interesting instances of the 
emergence of an autonomous field.46  Cultural production (and consumption) is a highly 
inclusive sphere of activity encompassing journalism, literature, film and television, visual 
and plastic arts, academia, and science  among others, produced and consumed by a wide 
variety of actors, including journalists, novelists, painters, actors, academics, critics, editors, 
publishers, media conglomerates, museum curators, universities, and others.  Below, I 
detail the essential dualistic structure of this field.   
 Every field is internally differentiated into a dualistic structure by the struggle for 
autonomy.  To make sense of this process and structure, however, one must begin at a 
further remove from the analysis of a single field.   Figure 5.1 provides a basic model of the 
relations of dominance between the field of cultural production and the fields it is 
embedded within.  The most comprehensive field is the field of social space (earlier 
referred to as the field of class relations [Bourdieu 1993, 38]).  This refers to the most 
general structure of relations among people at the national level.  As the diagram specifies, 
Bourdieu regards this field as composed of a dominated and a dominant pole.  In general, 
those possessing the most capital valued in society reside in the upper half or dominant 
section of social space.  Within the dominant sector resides the field of power: 
 
                                                          
46 Bourdieu’s two extensive studies of this phenomenon, The Field of Cultural Production (1993) and The Rules 
of Art (1996), as well as his focus on taste, Distinction (1984), engage in particular the French field of cultural 
production.  The former two deal primarily with the literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century. 
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+ = Dominant 
─ = Dominated 
 
Figure 5.1. Bourdieu’s (1993, 38) Model of Relations of Dominance Between Fields 
Source: Bourdieu (1993, 38). 
 
 
the space of relations between agents or between institutions having in common the 
 possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in different fields 
 (notably economic or cultural).  It is the site of struggles between holders of different 
 powers (or kinds of capital) (Bourdieu 1996, 26). 
 
To be more specific, the field of power is the “space of play in which holders of various 
forms of capital struggle in particular for…statist capital that grants power over the 
different species of capital” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 115).  The field of power is thus 
the struggle over the state, a struggle over the rules that govern all other fields. 
 The relation between the fields of cultural production and power is more closely 
illustrated in Figure 5.2.   As in Figure 5.1, the field of cultural production is situated at the 
dominated end of the field of power.  Here its bifurcated structure is clearly demonstrated.  




Figure 5.2. Combined Model of the French Literary Field of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century 
 
Source: Bourdieu (1993, 49; 1996, 124).
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volume of capital agents or organizations possess and are capable of deploying is 
represented vertically across all fields, thus distinguishing those with high levels of capital 
from those with low levels.  Second, horizontally represented and also structuring all fields 
is the ratio of cultural capital to economic capital.  This inverse relationship between 
species of power extends from the left, in which actors possess high levels of cultural 
capital but low levels of economic capital, to the right in which the reverse holds.  The 
relation between these variable constitutes in part the external structuring of the field of 
cultural production. 
 The specific relation of the field of cultural production to the field of power is 
expressed in the two opposing principles of hierarchization: autonomy and heteronomy.  
Both are institutionalized features of the struggle over the power to define the principles 
that legitimate artists and work of art by defining both what is (and is not) art and what is 
good (and bad) art. The heteronomous principle governs the agents and organizations of 
the field by rewarding strategies subordinate to the field of power.   Lacking autonomy, art 
and other forms of specific cultural production would be organized by market or political 
imperatives, an activity in which success is measured in terms of revenue and popular 
honors, among others.  These producers tend to possess the least amount of cultural capital 
and the greatest amount of economic capital.  The autonomous principle, in contrast, guides 
agents and organizations by rewarding strategies that seek distance from the economy or 
politics by inverting the field of power’s strategies of reward and sanction.  Autonomous 
cultural production inhabits a particular “economy of practices…a systematic inversion of 
the fundamental principles of all ordinary economies” in which success as defined by the 
heteronomous principle is a sign of compromise, of ‘selling-out’ (Bourdieu 1993, 39).  This 
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world, the subfield of restricted production or high culture, “is so ordered that those who 
enter it have an interest in disinterestedness,” in the disavowal of the economy of success 
(Bourdieu 1993, 40).47  The subfield is thus structured in part by its valuation of forms of 
capital distinct from the wider field of power.  Consequently, cultural capital is generally in 
great abundance for these producers, while they tend to lack economic capital.  The guiding 
logic of this alternative valuation in the art field is “art for art’s sake,” the production and 
distribution of works not for their role in generating wealth or affecting political change, 
but in their purity of aesthetic purpose and the artistic prestige they bestow.  Figure 5.2 
clearly expresses this antagonism between both principles of hierarchization.   
Of course, this basic dualistic structure is far more complex than Figure 5.2 teases.  
For example, each genre or area of cultural production from poetry to theatre to music to 
journalism to science has its own structure that roughly mirrors the broader field.  More 
importantly, the degree to which the field(s) is bifurcated between two opposing principles 
varies with the strength of the autonomous pole across time and space.   Again, fields are 
sites of struggle; only through struggles among actors and organizations do fields generate 
their own laws and logics, but it is also through struggles that the field of power can 
maintain or renew the force of its sanctions and the attraction of its rewards.  For Bourdieu, 
the French literary field of the second half of the nineteenth century is an exemplary 
instance of an autonomous field.  Other cultural fields such as journalism are almost 
entirely dominated by the field of power.  The degree of autonomy may be ascertained by 
                                                          
47 It is a subfield of restricted production, because the lack of extensive economic capital and the disregard for 
popular audiences tend to constrain the scale of the production of works.  In contrast, that space of the field of 
cultural production oriented toward heteronomy and endowed with extensive economic capital is composed 
in part of strategies of large-scale production such as Hollywood films. 
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the degree “to which the field is capable of functioning as a field of competition for cultural 
legitimacy” (Bourdieu 1996, 224).   
Finally, in Figure 5.2 the field of cultural production is bisected by the degree of 
consecration that actors and organizations obtain.  Consecration is a specific form of 
symbolic capital positively correlated with age and accruing to actors by virtue of their 
acceptance and recognition by ‘legitimate’ authorities.  Counterclockwise from the bottom 
right corner (also indicating a decline in the size of audiences) the extremely broad space of 
non-consecrated producers lacking in cultural capital and relatively lacking in economic 
capital includes popular culture such as journalism.  Here the guiding principle of 
legitimacy, in contrast to ‘art for art’s sake, is popularity.  In the heteronomous wing of the 
field of cultural production, consecrated producers (lacking in cultural capital but well-
endowed with economic capital) are those generally recognized as producers of academic 
or bourgeois art, for whom legitimacy is bestowed in the form of recognition by the 
dominant fraction of the dominant class.  In the subfield of restricted production, recent 
but not contemporary waves of the avant-garde lacking economic capital but well-endowed 
with cultural capital are consecrated by the organizations and authorities that hold sway 
over the subfield.  Lacking in both economic and symbolic capital, the contemporary and 
non-consecrated avant-garde generate strategies that produce their own cultural capital. 
5.1.2. Permanent Revolution 
 The totality of these relations of dominance and the strategies they favor produce a 
particular set of incentives for those entering the subfield of restricted production.  As 
noted, in order to compete, an effective strategy for new entrants (typically younger 
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generations) with low resources is to generate their own cultural capital or artistic 
prestige.  Bourdieu (original emphasis, 1993, 106) describes this process: 
 It is the continuous creation of a battle between those who have made their names and are 
 struggling to stay in view and those who cannot make their own names without relegating 
 to the past the established figures. …On one side are the dominant figures, who want 
 continuity, identity, reproduction; on the other, the newcomers, who seek discontinuity, 
 rupture, difference, revolution.  To ‘make one’s name’ means making one’s mark, achieving 
 recognition (in both senses) of one’s difference from other producers, especially the most 
 consecrated of them; at the same time, it means creating a new position beyond the 
 positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde. 
 
These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new modes of 
thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence are destined 
to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (hence their excessively small 
audience) (Bourdieu, 1996, 239-240).  New and hungry entrants thus generally have an 
interest in subversion, in equating the old guard, the custodians of the subfield, with the 
hierarchy of the field of power.  This challenge from below comes in the form of a 
redefinition of the field and its artifacts.  Because the incentive structure specific to the 
structure of the relations of the fields of dominance is maintained by the struggles it is a 
product of, and it produces, the process of innovation in the more autonomous fields of 
cultural production, such as art and literature, is perpetual.  Bourdieu christens this 
tumultuous process permanent revolution.  Each wave of innovation not only redefined art 
and the artist, but the entire history of art and, in some cases, the world around them.   
 This model of artistic revolution only hints at the history of art, however.  
Embedded in his discussion of the process of artistic revolution is the general notion that 
cultural innovation is increasingly determined by the history of the field itself.  The effect of 
the isolation of an autonomous field of art, for example, from the burdens and imperatives 
of politics and economics is that artistic practice was “accompanied by a sort of reflective 
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and critical return by the producers upon their productions” (Bourdieu 1993, 265-6; 1996, 
242).  This reflection increasingly determined cultural innovation through a logic particular 
to the field.  Duchamp’s Fountain, for example, as an act of distinction and rebellion, 
presupposes Duchamp as the artist with an acquired knowledge of the field of art and its 
history such that his position-takings are calculated with masterful precision.  Innovations 
like Duchamp’s ready-mades and many others are negatives of negatives of negatives, 
distinguishing classifications, a perpetual struggle of overturning prior modes of thought 
and expression and thus a struggle constrained by this history.  This deconstructive 
process culminates in the closure of fields, meaning the exhaustion of artistic forms 
(Bourdieu 1993, 119).  Bourdieu uses the example of painting to note that this effect of 
exhaustion leads to the questioning of the process of painting itself, a process mirrored in 
other genres and arts.  The notion of the closure of fields assumes agents in the field are 
endowed with the reflexivity and dispositions necessary to exhaust forms, as with 
Duchamp.  He seems to suggest, for example, that closure tends to be preceded by the 
fetishism of technicality (Bourdieu 1993, 119).   
5.1.3. The Aesthetic Disposition 
 As noted in Chapter Two, social fields and the habitus are involved in a dance of 
structuration in which the accumulation of struggles over certain goods strongly 
determines the unfolding strategies of contemporary agents and organizations, while these 
actors are nonetheless endowed with the capacity to play (and even in rare cases 
transform) the game with variable virtuosity.  The game itself favors certain strategies over 
others.  The sense of the game required to play is socialized in the form of the habitus of 
those actors that successfully enter the field.  Habitus is a matrix of dispositions, or sets of 
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schemas of perception, appreciation, and action.  The field of cultural production, 
specifically the fields of art and literature, endows it’s agents with an aesthetic disposition, 
the product, according to Bourdieu, of a nineteenth-century struggle. 
 The crucial moment for Bourdieu was, in literature, Gustave Flaubert, and in 
painting, Édouard Manet.  These two extraordinary individuals sought to impose a radical 
creativity on their respective mediums.  They developed what Bourdieu calls the “creative” 
or “pure gaze,” the revolutionary thrust that ultimately yielded the autonomy of artistic 
production, the institutionalization of the struggle over the irreducibility of art (Bourdieu 
1993, 265).  Buttressed by well-endowed agents and organizations, the contours of this 
new game ultimately favored the institutionalization of an aesthetic disposition.  Generally 
speaking, the aesthetic disposition is the capacity to locate oneself in this game of art and to 
assess the opportunities and constraints available for advancement in the field. 
Importantly, this disposition is not simply a practical knowledge of particular techniques of 
artistic production, such as painting murals, sculpting granite, or performing Shakespeare.  
It is composed of sets of knowledge and competency regarding the classificatory schemes 
and hierarchies that are both products of and constraining on the struggle.  It is thus a 
continuous variable ranging from a weak knowledge of the field to a virtuosic grip on the 
game, typically a product of education and participation. 
 In addition, the aesthetic disposition, of which the pure gaze is an attribute, 
connotes “the capacity to consider in and for themselves, as form rather than function, not 
only the works designated for such apprehension, but everything in the world, including 
cultural objects which are not yet consecrated… and natural objects” (Bourdieu 1984, 3).  
There are consequently no limits to what cultural producers can appropriate and 
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transform into an art object: a urinal, Brillo boxes, a cough in an auditorium, a stapler.  
Performance artist Allan Kaprow (1993, 219-221) offers a superb and extreme illustration 
of the creative gaze at work: 
 I decided to pay attention to brushing my teeth, to watch my elbow moving. I would be 
 alone in my bathroom, without art spectators. There would be no gallery, no critic to judge, 
 no publicity. This was the crucial shift that removed the performance of everyday life from 
 all but the memory of art. I could, of course, have said to myself, “Now I’m making art!!” But 
 in actual practice, I didn’t think much about it... 
 
 Brushing my teeth attentively for two weeks, I gradually became aware of the tension in my 
 elbow and fingers (was it there before?), the pressure of the brush on my gums, their slight 
 bleeding (should I visit the dentist?). I looked up once and saw, really saw, my face in the 
 mirror. I rarely looked at myself when I got up, perhaps because I wanted to avoid the puffy 
 face I’d see, at least until it could be washed and smoothed to match the public image I 
 prefer. (And how many times had I seen others do the same and believed I was different!) 
 
 This was an eye-opener to my privacy and to my humanity. An unremarkable picture of 
 myself was beginning to surface, an image I’d created but never examined. It colored the 
 images I made of the world and influenced how I dealt with my images of others. I saw this 
 little by little. 
 
 But if this wider domain of resonance, spreading from the mere process of brushing my 
 teeth, seems too far from its starting point, I should say immediately that it never left the 
 bathroom. The  physicality of brushing, the aromatic taste of toothpaste, rinsing my mouth 
 and the brush, the many small nuances such as right-handedness causing me to enter my 
 mouth with the loaded rush from that side and then move to the left side — these 
 particularities always stayed in the present.  The larger implications popped up from time 
 to time during the subsequent days. All this from toothbrushing. 
 
Through Kaprow’s analysis of his hygienic performance, one witnesses the gaze as it 
invests the movements and nuances of everyday life with not only their typical practical 
meaning but also an aesthetic detail.  Duchamp, Warhol, and Kaprow and many others are 
for Bourdieu the logical extension of Flaubert and Manet’s achievement.  This gaze, the 
pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition, the capacity to appropriate aesthetically literally 
anything, is now a legitimate schema of perception and appreciation in the field of art.   
 Bourdieu contrasts the pure gaze of the aesthetic disposition with the naïve gaze of 
the popular aesthetic.  The subordination of function to form, of life to art, is systematic; the 
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pure gaze is essentially agnostic and amoral, irreligious and apolitical.  If there is to be 
purity to art, art for art’s sake, then it must bleach its vision of external influence in the 
form especially of economics and politics.  The field of cultural production thus generates a 
peculiar way of seeing and doing in the world in which everything and anything can bear a 
new witness, a testament to the purity of creation.  Lacking the perceptual and appreciative 
schemas specific to the field of art, the naïve gaze applies the schemas that inform practical 
behavior in everyday life to artworks (Bourdieu 1984, 44).  These ethical dispositions, as 
Bourdieu is quick to call them, tend to subordinate form to function, art to life; through 
these schemes the ethical, moral, or political impose on contemporary art.   
5.2. Critical Analysis 
 While Bourdieu’s sociology of art and the research program it has spawned is 
generally regarded as the most productive and compelling synthesis of theory and evidence 
in the field, predictably it has its critics.  I briefly focus on two of these criticisms, the first is 
diachronic and the second, synchronic: postmodern critiques of aesthetic perception and 
the generalization of his conclusions beyond the French case.   
5.2.1. General Aestheticization and Cultural Omnivorism 
 Without inflicting too much violence to their diversity, strong postmodern critiques 
of Bourdieu’s sociology of art perception can be succinctly captured with a quotation from 
French philosopher Jean Baudrillard: “our society has given rise to a general aesthetic-
ization in the wake of the postmodern collapse of the domains of the economy, art, politics, 
and sexuality into each other” (emphasis added, 1993b, 16; see 1975; 1993a; 1994; 
Featherstone 1991; 1992).  Prior to this development, production and consumption were 
organized by the scarcity of material commodities.  The domains of social life were 
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governed by distinct hierarchies.  In the society described by Baudrillard and his 
contemporaries, commodification has crept into all spheres of activity; everyday life is 
saturated not with material commodities, but with endless streams of spectacular imagery 
and signs.  In such a consumer society subtended by the capacities of a truly mass visual 
media, everything is absorbed into the play of images.  Under these conditions of 
widespread spectacle, art de facto reigns.  More importantly, this condition of spectacular 
saturation entails an extreme shift in the modes of perception available to the inhabitants 
of such social conditions.   Culture is no longer a stable terrain but an accelerating stream of 
indiscrete simulations, a gratuitous instantaneity of experiences that dissolve the 
deliberative and classifying capacities so dear to Bourdieu’s social theory.  No longer can 
one speak coherently of an aesthetic disposition or a pure gaze; the aesthetic is diluted, the 
eye distracted and mesmerized by a parade of images that collapse all oppositions and 
hierarchies.  General aestheticization is thus a leveling process, a demolition of hierarchies 
of classification by indiscriminate flows.  Class, gender, and other forms of social 
stratification are no longer symbolically sustainable.   
The aesthetic disposition is a resource, a supply of cultural capital for both 
producers and consumers.  As such, Bourdieu’s basic model predicts that social 
stratification constrains the supply of cultural capital available to individuals, and thus the 
distribution of the aesthetic disposition.  This postmodern perspective predicts that there 
is no longer a proper correspondence between perceptual schemas and field positions.   In 
other words, if the aesthetic is now general, then anyone can be familiar with the game of 
art, precisely because, “[art] will…soon be gone, leaving behind an immense museum of 
artificial art and abandoning the field completely to advertising” (Baudrillard 1993b, 17).  
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Because his initial studies of consumption utilize data from the 1960s (1984), postmodern 
criticisms often suggest that Bourdieu missed the pattern of general aestheticization that 
followed.   
Weaker postmodern arguments suggest a similar outcome, though they still attach 
some strength to the relation between stratification and cultural capital.  The general 
pattern identified by these scholars is captured by the concept of the ‘cultural omnivore’ 
(Peterson 2002; 2005; Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1992; see also 
DiMaggio 1996).  Proponents of the omnivore thesis find evidence that previously 
differentiated consumption patterns reflective of socio-economic background have 
combined in postmodern society; the tastes of the cultural omnivore, typically of the higher 
class, span across a variety of cultural forms, including high art and popular culture.     
These arguments are not without their own critics.  Criticisms of strong postmodern 
social theory are so widespread it is hardly worth restating them here, except to note that 
they consistently lack empirical verification.  However, one important point of contention is 
the rigidity with which Bourdieu separates high art from popular art (Fowler 1997; Prior 
2005).  Transformations in the field(s) over the last century have dramatically re-organized 
the production and consumption of artistic practices and objects.  Developments in media, 
performance, and pop art, for example, have to some degree collapsed symbolic 
hierarchies.  Part of this argument will be addressed in the following chapter. 
Weaker postmodern arguments are vulnerable to the fact that Bourdieu argues 
quite clearly that the aesthetic disposition is not restricted to the consumption of fine arts; 
it is a generalized disposition available to those most capable of consuming fine arts but 
also including the “capacity to constitute aesthetically objects that are ordinary or even 
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‘common’ or to apply the principles of a ‘pure’ aesthetic in the most everyday choices of 
everyday life, in cooking, dress, or decoration, for example” (Bourdieu 1984, 40; Lizardo 
and Skiles 2008).  To be an omnivore is still to distinguish oneself.    
5.2.2. Beyond the French Case 
 Finally, some scholars question the degree to which Bourdieu’s model is applicable 
outside of its original context of France.  For example, Lamont and Lareau (1988) suggest 
that symbolic boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate cultures in the United States 
may be weaker due to a number of factors, including the importance of ethnicity and 
frequent cultural innovation.  Another variant of this argument is Lopes’ (2000) study of 
modern jazz in the United States in which he posits the need to integrate the concept of 
‘popular restricted art’ into the subfield of restricted production.  Additionally, the 
omnivore thesis was developed in the context of American studies of consumption, though 
whether it actually strikes a blow to Bourdieu’s model is debatable, as noted above.   
However, numerous studies of the United States find general support for Bourdieu’s 
model of cultural production and consumption (DiMaggio 1996; DiMaggio and Mukhtar 
2004; Holt 1997; 1998).  More generally, in their study of the reception of Bourdieu into 
American sociology, Sallaz and Zavisca (2007, 37) find that not only is he frequently cited 
in the major journals in the field, but that his “central theoretical concepts are increasingly 
used to design empirical research and to advance debates in core sociological subfields.” 
5.3. The United States 
5.3.1. Institutionalization  
 Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1996) posits a powerful link between educational 
achievement and cultural capital.  Specifically, he argues that the aesthetic disposition in 
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France is generated by a socially differentiated educational process.  This process favors 
those households possessing higher levels of capital (economic, cultural, etc.) by endowing 
their progeny with the means (cultural capital) to reproduce their social status.  Those with 
lower levels of capital are constrained by this same process; obtaining higher levels of 
capital than their households is more difficult.  Consequently, they likewise tend to 
reproduce their own social situation.   
One aspect of this process is the reproduction of culture itself, which amounts to the 
re-generation of sets of classificatory schemes that actors utilize in order to advance their 
social position.  The link between education and cultural capital that characterizes this 
relationship is stronger the more institutionalized and regulated the social activity.  
Bourdieu notes, for example, that the field of cultural production is uniquely characterized 
by a high degree of boundary permeability.  This means that the “conditions of entry that 
are tacitly and practically required (such as a certain cultural capital [i.e., knowledge] or 
explicitly codified and legally guaranteed [academic degrees, for example]” are insufficient 
to uniquely determine the social characteristics (dispositions, resources) that yield 
successful positions in the field (Bourdieu 1993, 43).  In other words, the field of cultural 
production, especially artistic production, is riven with conflict over basic principles 
(autonomy and heteronomy) in part because formal institutionalization (educational 
achievement) lacks a sufficient monopoly over the production of meaning (social 
classifications).   This means that embodied cultural capital like the aesthetic disposition 
does not strictly correlate with institutionalized cultural capital like educational degrees 
and awards (Bourdieu 1996).  Still, the stronger the institutionalization process the 
stronger the link between embodied and institutionalized capital.   
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While education may be significant for the generation of certain sets of skills and 
knowledge, I suggest that occupations are also important.  While Bourdieu’s claims 
regarding education are relatively clear, I argue that expansion in arts occupations should 
be also indicative of a process of institutionalization, because it may reflect the general 
recognition and appreciation of the institutionalized and embodied cultural capital 
generated by arts education, namely degrees and skills.  Demand for arts education should 
ultimately reflect expectations of future income.48  Arts education is a capital investment 
that more or less pays off with a corresponding occupation.  In other words, the cultural 
capital generated by education is recognized by a corresponding market. 
In their revision of the renowned SES model, Verba et al (1995; Brady et al1995) 
establish a set of relations between organizational contexts, skills, and political 
participation.  They hypothesize that extensive experience in each context (work, school, 
church) generates sets of organizational and communication skills that actors can utilize in 
political contexts like voting or campaigning.  Following the theoretical developments in 
Chapters Two and Three, I apply these arguments to artistic practice and political behavior 
specifically; experience in certain contexts should generate certain sets of skills that should 
in turn reduce the costs and uncertainties of political actions in which these skills are 
applicable.  In particular, educational and occupational contexts associated with artistic 
production and consumption should generate sets of skills and knowledge particular to the 
field of art.   
As a preliminary step, the remainder of this chapter aims to provide a general but 
cursory description of the American field of artistic production.  This chapter thus 
                                                          
48 Clearly, the human capital literature is relevant here, but this theoretical treatment is sufficient for my 
purposes. 
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establishes some of the content of everyday social organization.  While I focus on 
institutionalization, it is worth noting that the data presented below also pertains to the 
simple expansion of the field of art.  The relation to activism is considered in Part III.  
 If I anticipate the development of a set of protest practices as a consequence in part 
of a politicized aesthetic disposition (elaborated in the following chapter), and if this 
disposition is an institutionalized feature of the field of artistic production, then I should 
expect to find evidence of a process of institutionalization in the American field of artistic 
production.  In other words, I expect to find evidence of the development and growth of 
formal institutions like academic degrees and occupations.   Attention is thus focused here 
on the narrower fields of artistic production and consumption, especially basic structural 
trends in arts-related education and occupations in the United States over the twentieth 
century.  In her work on the avant-garde, Crane (1987) demonstrates the tremendous 
growth of an art world in the United States.  Increases in auction markets, galleries, 
museums, private collections, and government funding of artists all point towards an 
exceptional process of institutionalization.  However, her consideration of education and 
occupations is comparatively cursory (Crane 1987, 9-10).    
Following Crane’s general hypothesis of the growth of the art world, Bourdieu’s 
hypothesis of the relationship between education and capital, and the hypothesized 
process of institutionalization and the aesthetic disposition, I anticipate two general 
patterns in this analysis.  First, I expect an increase in formal arts education that outstrips 
population growth.  Second, I expect an increase in arts-related occupations that outstrips 
growth in the labor market.  Demonstrating such patterns would help lay the groundwork 
for the remainder of this project: an expanding institutionalizing art field is more likely to 
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generate sets of skills and knowledge characteristic of the aesthetic disposition.  In other 
words, it potentially tightens the link between social context and skill sets. 
5.3.2. Arts Education 
Crane (1997, 9-10) notes that from 1950 to 1980 the number of Master of Fine Arts 
degrees increased from 525 to 8,708.  The difference amounts to a 1,659% increase, a 
figure far exceeding the growth in population (67% from 1950 to 1980).  Such a higher 
growth rate of Master’s degrees relative to population likely indicates explosive growth in 
the sets of educational organizations, institutions, and resources relevant to the production 
and consumption of aesthetic objects.49   
Figure 5.3 pursues this line of inquiry further.50  I employ two measures of the 
growth in arts education (see Appendix Three for a full account of the construction of these 
measures).  The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the annual 
percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts minus 
degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts.  In other words, it is primarily focused on the 
visual arts.  The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure incorporating the Fine Arts 
(including Music and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture.  Finally, Population 
refers to the annual percentage change in the population of the United States.  While from 
1950 to 1982 the latter marginally decreases from highs never in excess of 2% and lows 
never below zero, the measures of arts education follow distinct trajectories.  The early to  
                                                          
49 This method is more effective at indicating growth than the percentage change in the proportion of the 
population obtaining arts-based degrees.  Because of the general scarcity of these degrees (a point I consider 
in depth in Chapter Seven), absolute population growth quickly outpaces absolute growth in degrees, thus 
falsely suggesting a shrinking art world. 
50 The relevant data is limited and incomplete.  Detailed Census data on specific degrees dates back to only 
1949.  Relevant categories begin to vanish after 1970.  Still, while ideal data would extend beyond the 
Roosevelt administration and the federal government’s generous support of the arts, the data are helpful 
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Figure 5.3. Arts Education and Population Growth 
 
mid-1950s provide mixed results, but a clear pattern of sizable sustained growth emerges 
from the late 1950s into at least the 1970s where the data cut off.  The chunks of data into 
the 1980s indicate a stalling of growth.  While the gist of Crane’s argument is intact, it is 
clear that the trajectory is slightly more nuanced.  In addition, this period of increasing arts 
degrees corresponds with the emergence of several groundbreaking art movements 
including Conceptual, Performance, and Pop Art and representative figures such as Warhol 
and Kaprow that heralded the institutionalization and popularization of the dissolution of 
the distinction between art and everyday life, a mark of the aesthetic disposition. 
5.3.3. Arts Occupations 
Crane (1987, 4) observes that the number of artists dramatically increased in the 














the number of self-identified artists from 1970 to 1980.  Like arts education, this figure 
clearly outstrips population growth.  However, unlike arts education, population growth is 
a misleading comparison.   The mid-to-late twentieth century saw a tremendous expansion 
in labor force participation.  Thus, as a function of this increase we should expect a 
corresponding increase in arts occupations beyond population growth.  This should not in 
itself point towards greater institutionalization in the field. 
 In order to counter this difficulty, I compare the percentage change in the number 
of arts occupations to the percentage change in the size of the labor force.  If there is little 
difference in the rates of growth, then change in the size of the workforce largely explains 
change in the number of arts occupations.   If arts occupations grow significantly faster 
than the labor force, then this supports the argument that increasing arts occupations 
indicates a significant expansion of the artistic labor market.  Coupled with increases in arts 
education, this would provide additional but marginal support for the charge that the field 
of artistic production increasingly institutionalized over this period of time.   
Before I begin, it is worth noting that the data on occupations is sparser and more 
scattershot than the data on degrees.  As a consequence, a plurality of measures is 
employed in order to capture variance over time in the two principal objects of interest: 
arts occupations and civilian labor force (see Appendix Three for a full account of the 
construction of these variables).  Table 5.1 presents three measures of arts occupations.  
The first (Artists, Actors, Architects, Musicians, Writers) is a composite variable for the 
years 1940 to 1960, while the second (Artists, Entertainers, and Writers) measuring artist 
occupations from 1960 to 1970 is lifted directly from the Census.  The third employs 
National Endowment for the Arts data on all artist occupations from 1970 to 1990.  The  
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Table 5.1. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force 
Occupations (in thousands) Civilian Labor Force 









  % Change  % Change  % Change  % Change 
1940 343 - - - - - 52,020 - 
1950 393 14.6 - - - - 58,999 13.4 
1960 495 26.1 536 - - - 67,991 15.2 
1970 - - 791 47.6 737 - 82,771 21.7 
1980 - - - - 1086 47.3 106940 29.2 
1990 - - - - 1671 53.9 124067 16.0 
a Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 1944; 1953; 1965; 1973; 1974; 1976; 1977; 1979; 1980; 1981; 
1982/83; 1984; 1985; 1986; 1987; 1988; 1989; 1991. Statistical Abstract of the United States. U. S. 
Census Bureau. accessed May 4, 2013 <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_ 
abstract.html> 
b Source: Ellis, Diane C. and John D. Beresford. 1994. Trends in Artist Occupation: 1970-1990. 
Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Arts.  National Endowment for the Arts. Accessed May 
8, 2013 <http://www.nea.gov/research/reports/NEA-Research-Report-29.pdf> 
 
Civilian Labor Force measure is straightforward.  Percentage change over each decade is 
calculated for each variable, and attention should fall here.  Comparing these changes yields 
the insight that growth in arts occupations significantly outpaces growth in the labor force.  
While the 1940s show a similar growth rate, over the 1960s arts occupations outstrip 
growth in the labor force by over 10%, while the 1960s witness a more dramatic difference 
of over 25%, a pattern that increases through 1990.  Figure 5.4 continues the analysis by 
joining the measures of percentage change in arts occupation together to generate a single 
measure of arts occupations change from 1950 to 1990.  The chart clearly presents a pace 
of growth in the arts labor market far exceeding the growth in the general labor market. 
5.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter briefly considers Bourdieu’s sociology of art.  First, the basic structure 
of the field of cultural production and it’s relation to the fields of power and of social space, 
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Source: See Table 5.1 
 
Figure 5.4. Arts Occupations and the Civilian Labor Force II 
 
which is shaped by the distributions of various forms of capital, is presented.  Second, I 
emphasize endogenous mechanisms of change in the form of aesthetic revolutions specific 
to the subfield of restricted production.  Third, I consider the the incorporation of the 
aesthetic disposition, the perceptual and actionable schemas of classification that favor 
certain strategies over others.  Fourth, a series of criticisms of Bourdieu’s sociology of art 
are discussed.  Finally, I consider evidence regarding the degree of institutionalization in 
the field of art.  Specifically, I present data on arts education and occupations that suggests 
a dramatic expansion of the field over the third quarter of the twentieth century.  The 
following chapter extends this broader set of analyses by considering, from the perspective 
of networks of agents in the form of the avant-garde, the politicization of the aesthetic 














CHAPTER 6. CRITICAL COMMUNITIES: THE AVANT-GARDE  
 There are two general defining characteristics of the aesthetic disposition that 
contribute towards the ability of players to play the game of art.  The first is the capacity 
and the tendency to view art as irreducible to moral, political, or economic valuations or 
functions.  The second is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything 
aesthetically, even the common accoutrements of daily life.  For Bourdieu, though the 
aesthetic disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or 
classificatory schemas are basically inseparable.  This chapter explores the relaxation of 
this first principle, the principle of autonomy, in the permanent process of artistic 
revolution across the twentieth century.  In so doing, analytic emphasis shifts from the 
structures of cultural production, the subject of the preceding chapter, to the strategies of 
the avant-garde. 
First, I review the literature on the relation between intellectual labor and 
contentious politics.  Second, I review the literature on the avant-garde art movements of 
the first half of the twentieth century.  Third, I establish a theoretical relation between the 
analysis of cultural production presented in Chapter Five and the politicization of the 
aesthetic disposition in the avant-garde.  With the assistance of Crane (1987), Teune 
(2005) and Bürger (1984), I argue that these art movements developed a specific 
oppositional practice and discourse on aesthetics and politics in reaction to the autonomy 
of the field, a practice and discourse that in turn came to inform the tactical behavior of 
protesters.  Along with other movements, they performed the critical intellectual labor of 
“critical communities,” discursive publics that generate oppositional ideas, values (Rochon 
1998) and practices (Teune 2005).  Finally, I analyze the Dada, Surrealist, and the 
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Situationist movements as critical communities, as collective efforts to politicize the field of 
cultural production. 
6.1. Review 
6.1.1. Intellectual Labor and Contention 
 Early work on forms of protest considered the relation of intellectual labor to 
contention from two normative directions.  Conservative approaches regarded the crafting 
of ideas as an essential component of the explanation of various forms of ‘collective 
behavior.’  An extreme version of this perspective is represented by Gustave LeBon’s 
(1896) work on the dynamics of crowds.  He argues that the critical ideas propagated by 
philosophers, intellectuals, and others constitute remote structural factors that broadly 
constrain crowd formation.   The corrosion of the esteem and wonder of authority as a 
consequence of these ideas lays the ground for civil disturbances.  Once these ideas 
propagate and gain a general sympathy, what remains is the instrumental work of leaders 
and orators.  These actors frame the ideas such that they excite people into mobilization. 
 Marxists regarded the generation and diffusion of critical ideas as either irrelevant 
(only economic factors are of any relevance) or of key importance to the struggle for 
socialism.  The most prominent representative of the latter school of thought is Antonio 
Gramsci (1971).  Gramsci argued that the coercive apparatus of the state was not sufficient 
to explain the persistence of capitalism.  He thus turned to cultural production as a 
necessary factor in capitalist hegemony.  For him, revolutionary activity under the 
capitalist mode of production must be preceded by consistent counter-hegemonic activities 
that not only corrode bourgeois ideology, but also provide an alternative culture and 
consciousness.  This cultural work is produced by a fraction of the traditional intellectuals - 
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those who perform the social function of thinking – and more importantly, organic 
intellectuals, those who develop ideas and practices organically from within their class.  For 
Gramsci, revolutionary protest is preceded by revolutionary culture, including art.   
 Despite their vast disagreements, conservatives and Marxists sketch an account of 
cultural change in which actors craft critical ideas that contribute to a shift in 
consciousness and values among wider audiences.   A contemporary version of this 
argument is presented by Rochon (1998).  He demonstrates that while structural 
conditions shape the context within which opposition develops, the process of relatively 
rapid cultural change begins with the creation of oppositional ideas.  These are formed and 
debated in discursive publics he calls “critical communities.”  Critical communities are not 
formally organized; rather, they are delimited by the networks of communication that 
critical thinkers use to define and elaborate problems and propose remedies.  Similar to 
LeBon’s emphasis on oratory, promoting these ideas requires framing efforts that resonate 
with audiences.  These collective action frames are fashioned out of the cloth of the ideas of 
critical communities.  Together, critical communities and their ideas constitute an 
important condition for the development of social movements. 
 Others have suggested similar concepts and processes.  Eyerman and Jamison 
(1991) argue that a necessary condition for the formation of major social movements is the 
development of ‘movement intellectuals.’  Movement intellectuals are a variety of actors – 
scientists and a host of other professionals, including engineers, lawyers, media specialists, 
and government employees - that develop critical ideas and disseminate them in a variety 
of contexts.  Once the movement begins, the lines between activist and intellectual, or 
between thinking and doing, blur.  Together, they engage in a continual process of identity 
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formation through the specification of the particular logic of the movement.  Critical of 
Rochon and Eyerman and Jamison, Tesh (2000) breaks down the critical community-
movement-audience distinction.  She argues that critical ideas are not only circulated by 
professionals and academics, but also by audiences that often directly interact with these 
critical thinkers. 
 The work of Rolfe (2005) and Teune (2005) highlights the role of small skilled 
groups in the formation of ideas and practices.  Rolfe suggests that “innovative hothouses,” 
small experimental groups, produce tactical innovations that social movements 
appropriate.  The groups he looks at are artist collectives heavily influenced – and self-
consciously so – by many other artist groups.  Teune looks at the role of art in protest from 
the 1960’s to the movements against global capitalism.  He suggests that various art 
movements performed the critical function of elaborating certain ideas and practices that 
were later absorbed into the protest activities of these periods.  In particular, he turns to 
the bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists by modifying Rochon’s initial 
understanding of a critical community.  Instead of limiting the conception of critical 
communities to the incubators of new ideas, Teune argues that we must also consider the 
development and elaboration of new oppositional practices as critical cultural production.  
Both Rolfe and Teune thus argue that certain artistic groups and movements generate 
innovative symbols and practices that were assimilated into contentious politics.   
6.1.2. The Avant-Garde 
 Originally a military term designating the front line of an advancing army, the avant-
garde took on new connotations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
signifying a relatively homogeneous group of artists, writers, and thinkers that seek to 
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produce works beyond the margins of what is defined as legitimate art, theatre, and 
literature.  By the turn of the century, the avant-garde was associated with perpetual 
innovation and experimentation in nearly every field of cultural production.   
 Early works on the avant-garde were generally couched within broader discussions 
regarding the nature of modernity.  Some of the more innovative work came from Marxists.  
From György Lukács (2001), Bertolt Brecht (1964), Walter Benjamin (1970 [1936])  to 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002), the interwar years were witness to a 
feverish attempt within the currents of historical materialism to found and articulate a 
revolutionary project for aesthetics.  Some of the fruit borne by these critical efforts was an 
early specification of the position of the avant-garde relative to economics and politics.  For 
example, Greenberg (1939) offered one of the first systematic analyses of this relation.  He 
argued that the avant-garde took its marginal commercial position by opposing itself to 
kitsch, what he described as both academic art and commercial art.  Although initially 
sympathetic to radical politics, the avant-garde eventually sought to create for art a 
position of transcendence and absolute value. 
In developing a specific theory of the avant-garde as opposed to a general theory of 
modernity, Poggioli (1968) defined the avant-garde as sets of oppositional arguments 
distinguishing some set of actors and groups from the wider society.  Vanguardism is an 
expression of the romantic reaction to the development of the mass audience, to the 
introduction of industrial production to cultural objects.  This manifests in opposition to 
older generations of artists, but especially to the vulgarity of popular or mass culture.  The 
avant-garde thus responds to a set of norms and motivations arising from the bohemian 
condition in which artistic production begins to separate itself from commerce.  This 
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complex of oppositions subtended by a vibrant cultural life is characterized by a set of 
durable norms and psychological motivations regarding cultural production that vary in 
their extremes.  These constraints are exceptional for their anti-conventionality; for 
Poggioli, the avant-garde is inherently nonconformist, anti-traditional, and experimental. 
 In contrast to Poggioli, Bürger’s (1984) theory of the avant-garde focuses on a 
narrower set of movements, specifically Dada, Surrealism, and the post-revolutionary 
Russian avant-garde.51  He argues that the key point of discontinuity in art history is not the 
rise of Aestheticism, the most potent expression of the autonomy of the institution of art 
(art for art’s sake).  Aestheticism is merely the culmination of a gradual separation of art 
from what he calls the ‘praxis of life,’ meaning everyday life and social and political 
concerns; it is the inevitable outcome of the bourgeois conception of art.  However, with the 
historical avant-garde, “the apartness from the praxis of life that had always constituted the 
institutional status of art in bourgeois society now becomes the content of works” (Bürger 
1984, 27).  Whereas previous art movements focused their critical energies against certain 
aesthetic practices and various concerns outside of the institution of art, the avant-garde 
that interests Bürger is a protest against the entire institution of art and it’s relation to the 
wider world.  Only when the purity of art reveals its inconsequentiality in the world does 
the vicious criticism of the avant-garde seek rectification.   
6.2. Theoretical Development 
6.2.1. Bürger and Bourdieu 
 There thus appears a tension between Bürger’s emphasis on the discontinuity of the 
historical avant-garde and Bourdieu’s emphasis on the development of an autonomous 
                                                          
51 This list also includes to some extent Futurism and German Expressionism. 
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field of cultural production.  The point of contention is the degree of (dis)continuity posited 
at two historical points: autonomy and self-critique.  This study is not concerned with 
determining whether the creation of an autonomous field of cultural production was a 
rupture or not, but rather with the critique that developed in reaction to the historical 
reality of a field of strategies structured in part by the ambition of an irreducible or pure 
aesthetic.  I consider two possible (but not mutually exclusive) Bourdieusian responses to 
Bürger’s argument: Dada as supreme art and Dada as heteronomy.   
For Bourdieu (1996, 257), Dada’s “refusal to separate life from art” is “an artistic act, 
even the supreme artistic act.”  Perhaps it is no accident that Bourdieu’s favorite subject in 
this context is Duchamp, the most enigmatic and likely apolitical individual involved in the 
Dada movement.  His deployment of a common manufactured urinal in the context of 
artistic appreciation shocked the art world.  Despite the shock value of the event, the Dada 
maneuver as exemplified by Duchamp is not in this sense a historical rupture; it is rather 
the most radical crystallization of an aesthetically pure appropriation of everyday life 
conceived up to that point.  Duchamp is thus the finest example of a virtuoso at the game of 
art. 
From another Bourdieusian perspective, Dada’s refusal is also another form of social 
art.   Bourdieu and Bürger define autonomy essentially the same: the freedom from 
demands that art be useful.  Bürger’s error, from this perspective, is in supposing that 
Dada’s critique of art is qualitatively new, whereas for Bourdieu it would represent merely 
the reassertion of demands for usefulness.  In other words, the criticism of art as an 
institution could be seen as a set of strategies appealing to the heteronomous principle, the 
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subordination of art to imperatives derived from beyond the field.  Dada’s radicalism can 
thus be interpreted as part of the traditional affinity of the avant-garde with leftist politics. 
Of course, Bürger has his own retort.  Until the early twentieth century, art itself was 
left unscathed by the vigorous attacks of the avant-garde.  With the arrival of the avant-
garde of the early twentieth century, the very idea of art as an institution came under 
attack.  Bourdieu’s model predicts that however actors and organizations behave, they do 
so in response to the objective conditions of the field in the form of position-takings in 
relation to contemporaries and previous generations and their resource endowments.  
Bürger’s model specifies that the historical avant-garde turned their critique upon art as a 
whole.  This self-critique can be understood as a potential set of strategies within the field.  
That Bourdieu does not emphasize self-critique as much as Bürger is likely in part a 
consequence of his focus on the nineteenth century as well as the two points made above.  
Thus, in principle, the basic arguments, despite their baggage, are compatible.  
6.2.2. Strategies of Distinction 
First, this argument – that the aesthetic disposition is politicized in a radical critique 
of the field of art - requires a more elaborate consideration of strategies of distinction 
within the subfield of restricted production.  Bourdieu’s discussion of the strategies 
available to the avant-garde is generally restricted to technical fetishism and his general 
argument that the avant-garde redefines the field of cultural production by selectively 
inverting or negating some of the core arguments of the consecrated avant-garde.  His 
emphasis is primarily focused on the development of an autonomous aesthetic.  This 
generally deters him from attributing significance to other innovations in the strategies of 
art movements (though see Bourdieu and Haacke 1995).   
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Crane (1987, 14-15) argues that avant-gardes differ not only in the extent to which 
they challenge existing conventions and institutions but also in the focus of their criticism.  
She argues that identifying an art movement as avant-garde requires attention to any one 
of three factors: the aesthetic content of art, the social content of art, and/or the norms 
surrounding the production and distribution of artworks.  From her elaboration of each 
point, one can devise a set of strategies that those staking positions in the field can utilize in 
order to accumulate cultural capital and aim to redefine the artistic field in their image.  
This list is presented in Table 6.1.   Like Bourdieu, most discussions of artistic revolution or 
the avant-garde involve changes in the aesthetic content of works.  One of the virtues of 
Crane’s effort is her identification of the range of issues beyond formal considerations that 
artists can take positions on in order to establish their credentials as avant-garde or 
innovators.  Moreover, she tends to refuse to lock in the direction of redefinition.   
This final consideration is a telling indicator of the importance of a contextual 
understanding of the exigencies of the field and the opportunities they offer.  For example,  
Table 6.1. Strategies of Distinction Available to the Avant-Garde 
Aesthetic Content of Art 
Redefinition of artistic conventions 
Utilization of new artistic tools and techniques 
Redefinition of the nature of the art object 
Social Content of Art 
Expression of social or political values that is critical of or 
different from the mainstream 
Redefinition of the relationship between high art and 
popular culture 
Criticism of artistic institutions 
Norms Surrounding the 
Production and 
Distribution of Artworks 
Redefinition of the social context for the production of art 
Redefinition of the organizational context for the production 
of art 
Redefinition of the nature of the artistic role  
Source: Crane (1987, 14-15)  
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Crane (1987, 14) argues that those movements that seek to resurrect prior 
conventions are unlikely to be identified as avant-garde.  However, a dramatic example of a 
set of strategies of resurrection is available with Stuckism.  The Stuckists are an art 
movement forged at the dawn of the twenty-first century in opposition to the more 
extreme variants of modern and especially postmodern art.  One manner of summarizing 
their position is a quotation from one manifesto: “Artists who don’t paint aren’t artists” 
(Childish and Thomson 1999).  Marxist literary critic Terry Eagleton (2011) argues that the 
Stuckist’s bombast is indeed subversive; “Today, rejecting the easel is as conventional as 
the iambic pentameter.”  In other words, when the subversive becomes conventional, the 
formerly conventional can be subversive.  Below, I argue that looking at the avant-garde in 
this chapter from this perspective helps us to see the politicization of art in the avant-garde 
as subversive. 
6.2.3. Politicizing the Aesthetic Disposition 
According to Bourdieu, there are two general defining characteristics of the 
aesthetic disposition.  The first is the capacity and the tendency to view art as irreducible to 
moral, political, or economic valuations or functions.  The second is the capacity and the 
tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically.  Together, these institutionalize the 
separation of a sphere of transcendent aesthetic experience.  Though the aesthetic 
disposition varies in degree across agents, these two characteristics or classificatory 
schemas are basically inseparable.   
 What Bürger adds to this account is the politicization of artistic production at the 
frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century.  In Bourdieu’s model, the avant-
garde is the bearer of autonomy, though the degree of autonomy characterizing the field is 
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variable across time.  Bürger emphasizes the focusing of the critical efforts of artists on the 
field itself as it relates to a broader social world.  Another manner of putting this argument 
is that the historical avant-garde acquired and crystallized the second characteristic of the 
aesthetic disposition while relaxing the first.  They employed the means to constitute the 
world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic materials, while 
simultaneously constituting them as political, as suffused and traversed with a dimension 
of power, of social significance.  Referring to Table 6.1, these avant-garde sought more or 
less to challenge existing conventions and practices utilizing at one time or another all of 
the available strategies.  This includes a marked emphasis on dramatically expanding the 
aesthetic frontiers of art, developing the most virulent opposition to existing social and 
political arrangements, including the institution of art itself, and finally, a critical focus on 
the context of artistic production and distribution, including the advancement of a 
decidedly militant role for the artist in social life. 
For Bourdieu, actors respond to the objective possibilities available in each field.  In 
the field of cultural production, this yields the particular dynamic of perpetual revolution.  
This process involves an incentive structure that rewards various strategies of distinction 
at various times.  Bürger’s argument can be translated thus: as the process of autonomy 
intensified, the objective possibilities open to an emerging avant-garde included a radical 
critique of cultural producers and the conditions of production in relation to the broader 
field of power.   The rallying cry of the subfield of restricted production is the autonomy of 
art against the fields of politics and economics.  But, like Eagleton’s characterization of 
Stuckism as subversive, the field ultimately incentivizes a turn against even this principle in 
order to subvert the field in a revolution against art, against a vision of society that seeks to 
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expunge the social responsibilities of artists.  Perpetual revolution thus ultimately yields 
institutional critique; there are precious few sacred cows in the butcher shop of revolution. 
6.2.4. Avant-Garde as Critical Communities 
I argue, like Teune (2005), that a modified version of Rochon’s (1998) model offers 
a meaningful way of approaching these critical art movements.  As noted in the review 
above, Rochon posits a basic two-phase process in which critical communities develop 
critical ideas that are then framed by movements in order to appeal to audiences.  Critical 
communities are informal networks of communication distinguished by their concern over 
some social problem(s).  Through discussion in published works, these networks develop 
innovative diagnoses and prognoses that are critical of existing practices and values.  For 
Rochon, “scientists, academics, and a variety of social analysts and commentators” are the 
primary producers of critical ideas (1998, 97).  This is clearly illustrated by his ideal 
example of a critical community: the philosophes that promoted the Enlightenment.   
Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) criticism expands the range of intellectual labor by 
including professionals of all types.  Still, the concept may be too exclusive.  Rochon’s ideal 
example provides a lead.  The philosophes included a wide range of public intellectuals that 
engaged in a variety of critical activities.  Their medium was not always that of academic or 
scientific analysis.  Voltaire’s biting satire provides an illustration of the aesthetic 
instruments utilized by some of the philosophes.  Moreover, the philosophes sought not 
just to cultivate and disseminate ideas, but also to disseminate practices, the most general 
of which was rational discourse itself.  Finally, the infrastructure of their ‘republic of letters’ 
was firmly embedded in more intimate forms of social intercourse.  In France, for example, 
the salons were especially significant in fostering climates of critical discourse (Kale 2004).  
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While Rochon’s analysis suggests a strictly cognitive, discursive, and academic definition of 
the activities of critical communities, a more appropriate conceptualization should include 
the practices promoted by critical actors (for example, recycling in the environmental 
movement), a wider range of actors, including but not limited to artists and others familiar 
to bohemian or countercultural networks and lifestyles (Teune 2005), and more direct 
forms of critical discourse (as in clubs, academic conferences, and think tanks). 
 Critical communities are defined primarily by the problems they address.  Rochon 
(1998, 22) identifies three key features of critical communities. 
1. Sensitivity: actors are in a condition of heightened awareness with respect to the 
conditions of a problem, whether as a result of some vulnerability or interest. 
 
2. Diagnosis: actors develop an analysis of the sources and the nature of the problem. 
 
3. Prognosis: actors develop prescriptions for solving the problem, including policies, 
strategies, and in some cases practices or tactics. 
 
The degree to which the discourse within a community coheres around a single diagnosis 
and a single prognosis is variable.  The early period of discussion is often confused and 
exploratory.  Over time, some communities narrow their sets of diagnoses and prognoses.  
 In accordance with the academic and rationalist bias his conception harbors, 
Rochon cites the importance of higher educational institutions in the formation of critical 
communities.  It seems plausible that the development of such communities can be 
analyzed as phenomena emerging from the incentive structures offered by social fields, 
including the academic field.  My argument is that the field of artistic production described 
in Chapter Five offers sets of opportunities that are exploited by the strategic acumen of 
various artists and organizations like art critics, galleries, museums, governments, etc.  The 
sensitivity of avant-garde artists to these opportunities is shaped by their endowments of 
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capital and the incentive structure of the field or fields that they occupy, which in turn is 
shaped in part by broader field dynamics and exogenous factors.  Much of Chapter Six 
focuses on the question of the sensitivity of actors to opportunities.  The process of 
perpetual revolution is particularly relevant in this context.  Others are important as well, 
however.  Technological change is a significant exogenous variable.  For example, during 
the period of the networks under study, artists were increasingly occupied by the concept 
and the reality of the machine and scientific advances in general.  The onset of World War I 
was a particularly potent force in the radicalism of Dada, including the acquiescence of the 
socialist parties of Europe in the struggle.  After the Second World War, the 
acknowledgement of a failed socialist experiment in the Soviet Union was important for the 
development of the Situationist International (SI). 
Exploiting these opportunities involved developing critical strategies (Table 7.1) 
that, first, diagnosed a social problem and, second, generated solutions to the problem, 
including appropriate tactics.  This entailed, as discussed above, the politicization of the 
aesthetic disposition and the field of artistic and cultural production as a whole.  In 
Bürger’s language, they criticized art as an institution for its relation to structures of 
domination outside of the world of art.  
 Teune (2005) turns to the Bohemian subcultures of the 1950’s and the Situationists 
through his modification of Rochon’s initial understanding of a critical community.  
Whereas Teune emphasizes and demonstrates the effects of the diffusion of these forms of 
criticism into social movements in the 1960’s and 1990’s and beyond, I turn to the art 
movements themselves to determine whether they perform the function of criticism. 
 
170 
6.3. Data and Method 
I employ three case studies of art movements: Dada, Surrealism, and the SI.  The 
primary objective in this chapter is to determine whether these movements can be 
identified as critical communities.  I explore the range of strategies that they utilized, 
especially the diagnoses and prescriptions that they offered through their activities.  These 
studies thus provide only a hint at the question of sensitivity.   
Primary and secondary sources are utilized in order to isolate each movement’s 
diagnoses and prognoses.  The object of primary significance is the public discourse the 
movement presents to the outside world in the form of manifestoes, artworks, interviews, 
periodicals, memoirs, etc.  Attention is focused on the actual practitioners and participants 
in the movements and whomever they directly respond to in their discourses.  Attempts by 
others to define the discourse of each movement and to situate it in a context the 
movement’s participants themselves do not address or explicitly disagree with are ignored.   
Bürger’s historical avant-garde includes Dada, Surrealism, the post-revolutionary 
Russian avant-garde, Futurism, and German Expressionism.  This chapter’s case selection 
yields disagreement with Bürger on one movement: the Situationist International.  The 
three movements of this study were chosen principally as a response to the literature on 
culture jamming.  Numerous authors recognize a debt to the historical avant-garde in 
contemporary culture jamming (Cammaerts 2007; Cox 2005; Klein 2000; Nomai 2008).  
The Situationists are the most commonly cited of these movements.  Other movements, 
such as Fluxus, are considered less central to the development of culture jamming.   
These three movements are not the only generators of critical practices and ideas of 
import in the first half of the twentieth century.  Their discourses are part of wider critical 
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discussions on aesthetics, politics and economics flowing from the nineteenth century.  In 
particular, Marxist analyses of cultural production addressed similar concerns.  However, 
in defining themselves, each movement addresses their specific sets of questions.  It is also 
worth stressing again that critical communities vary in the degree of pluralism in their 
diagnoses and prognoses.  The case studies below will not represent all veins of discussion 
particular to the movements.  Instead, the most salient and the most general diagnostic and 
prognostic discourses will be presented.  The cases are presented in chronological order. 
6.4. Dada! (1916 – 1923)52  
Dada began more or less independently in Zurich, Switzerland and New York City 
around 1916 in the milieu of various avant-garde and radical circles during World War I.  
Through lively discussions and provocative actions and pieces in the Cabaret Voltaire in 
Zurich and the apartment of the Arensbergs in New York, groups of artists and writers 
forged an increasingly confrontational aesthetic.  It spread quickly to Germany, the 
Netherlands, and many other urban areas, in part thanks to the efforts of Tristan Tzara.  His 
indefatigable networking and promotion pulled together a heterogeneous and far-flung set 
of individuals into the most radical movement of ‘art’ in the history of art.  By 1920, most of 
the major figures involved in Dada activities had immigrated to Paris.  After a brief period 
of external provocation and internal conflict, the movement gradually dissolved and by 
1923 was no longer a coherent force. 
6.4.1. Diagnosis 
A central problematic can be ascertained in the discourses of Dadaists: the role of 
cultural production in a world of false values and mass slaughter.  Much of the impetus for 
                                                          
52 My resources for the Dada movement include anthologies of Dada writings (Ades 2006; Lippard 1971, 
Motherwell 1981), memoirs (Richter 1997), and histories (Lewis 1988; Sanouillet 2009; Sheppard 1979). 
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this concern was World War I.   The Dadaists were resolutely anti-nationalist and anti-war.  
The values of the nation, of martial valor and honor were, for them, tools of manifest 
absurdity used to send millions to their deaths.  Moreover, the spectacle of the war 
furthered the perception that the pretenses of progress, rationality, science, religion, 
morality, even socialism (except in Germany) were hollow, though dangerous.  Ball (1916) 
asserted, “It is necessary to define the activity of this cabaret; its aim is to remind the world 
that there are independent men, men – beyond war and nationalism – who live for other 
ideals.”  In Germany, Grosz (2006, 308) expressed the alienation engendered by the war: “I 
could see that the individual freedom that I had enjoyed until then was being threatened… I 
viewed this war as a monstrous and denatured manifestation of the ugly struggle for 
ownership.”  Tzara (1981, 403) clarifies further: “Honor, Country, Morality, Family, Art, 
Religion, Liberty, Fraternity, etc. – all these notions had once answered to humans needs, 
now nothing remained of them but a skeleton of conventions.”  Aragon fumes: 
[N]o more religions, no more royalists, no more radicals, no more imperialists, no more 
 anarchists, no more socialists, no more communists, no more proletariat, no more 
 democrats, no more republicans, no more bourgeois, no more aristocrats, no more arms, no 
 more police, no more nations, an end at last to all this stupidity, nothing left, nothing at all, 
 nothing, nothing (Picabia et al 2006, 181). 
 
His final repetitions represent a common slur used by the Dadaists against practically the 
whole of Western civilization: nothing.  The 1918 Manifesto launches into another 
characteristic series of negations: 
Every product of disgust capable of becoming a negation of the family is Dada; a protest 
 with the fists of its whole being engaged in destructive action: Dada; knowledge of all the 
 means rejected up until now by the shamefaced sex of comfortable compromise and good 
 manners: Dada; abolition of logic, which is the dance of those impotent to create: Dada; of 
 every social hierarchy and equation set up for the sake of values by our valets: Dada; every 
 object, all objects, sentiments, obscurities, apparitions and the precise clash of parallel lines 
 are weapons for the fight: Dada; abolition of memory… (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42). 
 
Fighting and dying for such values could only be hideous meaninglessness. 
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 This savage and comprehensive destruction of values, especially ‘bourgeois’ values, 
was particularly pronounced in the rejection of art and aesthetic values such as beauty and 
genius as complicit in the façade.  Picabia et al (2006, 188) exclaims, “Essentially what’s 
behind the word BEAUTY is unthinking, visual convention.  Life bears no relation to what 
grammarians call beauty.”  He further states, “We don’t believe in God any more than we do 
in Art” (Picabia et al, 188).  Tzara (cited in Richter 1997, 35) casts more aspersions: “Art is 
a pretension, warmed by the diffidence of the urinary tract, hysteria born in a studio.”  Art 
in the classical sense is singled out for two interrelated reasons.  First, it represents the 
loftiest realm of absolutes and human achievements.  Second, like patriotism and other 
values, it was complicit in the maintenance of the entire artifice of a society that marched 
so many of its young men to senseless death.  In other words, it performed something of 
the function of ideology in Marxist terminology: a mechanism of justification.  Huelsenbeck 
(1971, 50) is straightforward: “The Dadaist considers it necessary to come out against art 
because he has seen through its fraud as a moral safety valve…[Art] (including culture, 
spirit, athletic club), regarded from a serious point of view, is a large-scale swindle.”   
 Though destructive, the Dadaists did affirm a number of general values.  At the least, 
there was basic agreement on values like individual freedom and spontaneity, though these 
were variously defined and never clarified.  “Dada was born of a need for independence, of 
a distrust toward unity.”  Tzara (2006, 37) continues, “Those who are with us preserve 
their freedom.”  At length, he declares: 
Dada; absolute and unquestionable faith in every god that is the immediate product of 
 spontaneity: …to respect all individuals in their folly of the moment: whether it be serious, 
 fearful, timid, ardent, vigorous, determined, enthusiastic; ...Freedom: Dada Dada Dada, a 
 roaring of tense colors, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, grotesques, 
 inconsistencies: LIFE. (original emphasis, Tzara 2006, 42). 
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As indicated above, a general and vague notion of life and/or nature was also frequently 
affirmed.  This is not to be confused with everyday life, which was anathema to Dada; the 
common and the ordinary were part of the suffocating detritus of bourgeois civilization.  
Picabia’s wife is clear: “Dada aspires to escape from everything that is common or ordinary 
or sensible” (cited in Coutts-Smith 1970, 23).  Spontaneous and irreducible to logic, life or 
nature (often summed up in the word Dada) was a sphere beyond sense or even awareness 
that captivated the Dadaists.  It is the positive valuation of life and freedom, variously 
defined, that seems to justify so much of the loathing expressed by the Dadaists.  Indeed, 
the problem with the war, with rationality and bourgeois values and institutions, was their 
infringement on the freedom of the individual and the spontaneity of life.  Arp (1971, 24) 
reasoned, “The confusion of our epoch results from [the] overestimation of reason.” 
6.4.2. Prognosis 
 To some extent, the answers that Dada provided for this problem of art are general 
and vague.  Tzara lays down the gauntlet: “There is a great task of destruction and negation 
to accomplish.  We must sweep and clean!”  The corroded values and institutions so 
inimical to freedom, spontaneity, and life had to come down.  The goal was total 
destruction.  Yet, there was little systematic in this cleaning.  Richter (1997, 49) goes far as 
to argue that while everyone else had a program, Dada was defined by its rejection of any 
and all programs.   
In truth, part of the tension in the group was the degree to which certain individuals 
were interested in developing a positive approach to the problem identified above.  While 
some, like Tzara, were more concerned with the destruction of language as a vehicle of 
sensemaking and thus values, others, like Richter and Breton, felt that Dada should forge a 
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balance between destruction and creation.  Janco (1971, 36) identified this distinction as 
the two ‘speeds’ of Dada: one negative and nihilistic; the other positive and primal.   
 This tension was apparently subtended by a general agreement regarding their 
principal means of protest: art.  As Richter (1997, 48) states, “we were looking for a way to 
make art a meaningful instrument of life.”  While existing art was complicit in the 
maintenance of false values, Dada was in the process of crafting a new art, not for art’s 
sake, but for the task of criticism.  Huelsenbeck (1971, 23) declares: “the highest art will be 
that in which in its conscious content presents the thousandfold problems of the day.”  Arp 
(1971, 24) reminisced, “We searched for an elementary art that would, we thought, save 
mankind from the furious folly of these times.”  Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 48) describes 
discussion in the nascent Zurich group thus:  
We discussed the theories of art current in the last few decades, always with reference to 
 the mysterious nature of art itself, its relationship with the public….It is true that for us art 
 is not an end in itself we have lost too many of our illusions for that.  Art is for us an 
 occasion for social criticism. 
 
This was especially pronounced in the promotion of ‘anti-art.’   
For Dada, anti-art was the willing and defiant rejection of the basic principle’s upon 
which bourgeois art was erected.  The concept was variably interpreted depending on the 
‘speed’ of Dada.  For some, it meant celebrating the end of art through the creation of 
defiant or primitive works, as in Tzara’s constant refrain: nothing.  For others, it signified 
the end of an empty art and the dawn of a new art that tapped into life and nature.  
However, most of the innovations of the movement were less ‘new’ than modifications and 
elaborations of prior practices.  Richter (1997, 217-8) argues that much of the movement’s 
repertoire derived at least formally from its predecessors, especially Cubism and Futurism.  
These include confrontational cabaret gatherings accompanied by shock effects and rioting, 
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the manifesto, posters and wall tags, phonetic poetry, photomontage, collage, grotesque 
costumes, and various techniques involving the use of color in painting.  The most notable 
innovation he does not mention, the ready-made, is in fact a Dadaist innovation.   
Instead, what distinguishes Dada and anti-art strategically is the cultivation of the 
virtues of chance, spontaneity, and the irrational in their performances, literature, and 
visual works.  Richter (1997, 51-52) relates how the concept of chance filled their 
conversations and works; random pieces of pictures and texts thrown together, the use of 
whatever materials were stumbled upon, the random application of materials like sand.  
For some, the destruction of meaning and the values of a decaying belligerent society were 
effected principally by the use of chance in the creation of works.  Tzara in particular 
preferred the deliberate effacement of meaning through the random association of words 
as principally destructive.  Others saw chance as a way to tap into the spontaneous order of 
life and nature beyond the rationality of their contemporary society.  Arp (1971, 28) 
declared, “Dada aimed to destroy the reasonable deceptions of man and recover the natural 
and unreasonable order.”  Janco (1971, 36) defined Dada as “a synonym for pure, childlike, 
direct, primal.”  Chance also played a role in the important relation of everyday life to Dada 
activities and works.  Ball (cited in Richter 1997, 49) clarifies:  
It was an adventure even to find a stone, a clock-movement a tram-ticket, a pretty leg, an 
 insect, the corner of one’s own room; all these things could inspire pure and direct feeling.  
 When art is brought into life with everyday life and individual experience, it is exposed to 
 the same risks, the same unforeseeable laws of chance, the same interplay of living forces.  
 Art is no longer a ‘serious and weighty’ emotional stimulus, nor a sentimental tragedy, but 
 the fruit of experience and joy in life. 
 
Life itself was spontaneous; cultivating the creative potentiality of chance required 
attention to its ubiquitous operation.   
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 Though they seemed to tap an aesthetic impulse, techniques like collage also had 
critical psychological effects.  Richter (1997, 114) writes: 
[T]hey cut up photographs, stuck them together in provocative ways, added drawings, cut 
 these up too, pasted in bits of newspapers, or old letters, or whatever happened to be lying 
 around – to confront a crazy world with its own image. 
 
Torn from their familiar context, bits of meaning were suddenly brought under a new 
critical light.  Such techniques generated specific effects involving the juxtaposition of 
previously incongruous elements.  Ernst (1948, 13) describes it thus:  
A ready-made reality (a canoe), finding itself in the presence of another and hardly less 
 absurd reality (a vacuum cleaner), in a place where both of them must feel displaced (a 
 forest), will, by this very fact, escape into anew absolute value, true and poetic: canoe and 
 vacuum cleaner will make love.  The mechanism of collage, it seems to me, is revealed by 
 this very simple example. 
 
Out of these formerly estranged materials, new meanings, new truths arrived, shaking up 
any supposedly fixed set of references.  A significant function of such practices was to 
create controversy.  Dada performances as well were typically chaotic juxtapositions of 
various elements designed in part to shock unwitting audiences.  Richter (1997, 66) 
describes it thus: “The devising and raising of public hell was an essential function of any 
Dada movement….And when the public, like insects or bacteria, had developed immunity to 
one kind of poison, we had to think of another.” 
 As a critical community of artists and writers, Dada developed a set of diagnostic 
and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the early 
twentieth century.  For them, art served an essential function in maintaining the bellicose 
bourgeois façade of Western civilization and its pervasive rationalization.  In order to 
remedy this state of affairs, Dadaists developed and adapted various avant-garde 
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techniques to a new emphasis on chance and everyday life.  Such means of protest were 
intended to provoke the development of a critical space.  
6.5. Surrealism (1924 – 1938)53 
 In 1924, former Dadaists Breton, Aragon, Soupault, and others announced the 
formation of the Surrealists.  The center of this new movement was Paris, though groups 
also organized in dozens of other countries and major events were held in London and New 
York.  Breton exerted a powerful leadership over the Parisian group and steered it through 
difficult times; he established Surrealism as an independent force in the avant-garde, 
responded to various events like the French war in Morocco and the rise of fascism, and 
navigated a tumultuous and ultimately unsuccessful relationship with the French 
Communist Party that was the primary impetus for internal conflict.  In exile during World 
War II, the movement came home to France somewhat discredited for its lack of 
participation in the Resistance.  In part from the sustained efforts of Breton, Surrealism 
survived into at least the 1960s as a coherent intellectual force.   
6.5.1. Diagnosis 
 The central problematic that occupied the Surrealists throughout almost the 
entirety of their existence was the role of cultural production in the social revolution.54  The 
consolidation of the Bolshevik regime in Russia following the Civil War was a principal 
catalyst for this focus.  The arrival of an alternative to capitalism precipitated the 
development of a new orientation towards political action among artists and writers 
(Maerhofer 2009).  The Surrealists represented the most prominent avant-garde effort to 
                                                          
53
 My resources for the Surrealist movement include a collection of manifestoes (Breton 1969), essays 
(Lippard 1970), and histories (Lewis 1988; Nadeau 1965; Short 1996; Suleiman 1991). 
54 The term most often used by the Surrealists was ‘expression in all its forms.’ 
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navigate this difficulty.   Like Dada, the Surrealists regarded much of their contemporary 
culture, especially art, as complicit in the maintenance of a general system of oppression.  
This system manifested itself especially in wars and colonization, the repression of speech, 
especially artistic expression, and the growing threat of fascism as the 1930s proceeded.  
However, under Breton the Surrealists developed a more systematic diagnosis of the 
problem than Dada.     
This ‘rationalization’ of Dadaist revolt was especially inspired by Freudian 
psychoanalysis.  Like Freud, the Surrealists posited the existence of a mental realm or 
sphere corresponding to the unconscious.  Often described as the ‘marvelous,’ 
manifestations of this vast psychic domain included dreams, madness, childhood, 
imagination, the play of chance, and other experiences and products that challenged 
routinized ways of seeing and acting.  These routinized patterns are best understood as the 
logical antinomies or oppositions that organized human life: morality/immorality; 
rationality/irrationality; love/hate; death/life.  This psychic realm of the marvelous 
evidenced the transcendence of these contradictions.  Breton (1969, 123) is clear: 
“Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of mind at which life 
and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable and the 
incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions.”  Further, he states: 
“I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are 
seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a surreality” (Breton 1969, 14). 
This deep wealth was for the Surrealists the root of human freedom.  The capacity to 
imagine, to break down all barriers in thought, was the highest Surrealist value; conversely, 
“to reduce the imagination to a state of slavery…is to betray all sense of absolute justice 
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within oneself” (Breton 1969, 4).  This freedom is organized and animated by desire, the 
cacophony of mental movements initiated by the unconscious that burst into the waking 
mind.  From desire and freedom springs all true creativity, unhinged and unencumbered.   
Only with true freedom do the contradictions that sustain everyday life dissolve.  As Breton 
(Breton 1969, 14) states, “the marvelous is always beautiful, anything marvelous is 
beautiful, in fact only the marvelous is beautiful.” 
This realm of the unconscious lay beyond the confines and strictures of the mental 
structures, the values and norms that maintained the nationalist, capitalist, religious, 
familial, and above all rational order.  This dominant order of bourgeois rationality 
appalled the Surrealists, because it represented the slavery of the imagination.  Breton 
(1969, 4) describes it thus: 
Though he may later [following childhood] try to pull himself together upon occasion, 
having felt that he is losing by slow degrees all reason for living, incapable as he has become 
of being able to rise to some exceptional situation such as love, he will hardly succeed.  This 
is because he henceforth belongs body and soul to an imperative practical necessity which 
demands his constant attention.  None of his gestures will be expansive, none of his ideas 
generous or far-reaching.  In his mind’s eye, events real or imagined will be seen only as 
they relate to a welter of similar events, events in which he has not participated, abortive 
events. 
 
Maintained by logical antinomies, this structure of mental oppression constrained the 
desires that raged within each individual to unleash fundamental creative forces.   
6.5.2. Prognosis 
In response to this discovery, Surrealism proposed a project of expressive 
liberation.  Aragon (1970, 37) begins: “the relationship born of the negation of the real by 
the marvelous is essentially of an ethical nature, and the marvelous is always the 
materialization of a moral symbol in violent opposition to the morality of the world from 
which it arises.”  The duty of the Surrealists, then, is to “make the point of the marvelous,” 
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to engage in symbolic conflict with the morality of their time, with the logical antinomies of 
daily life.  As Breton (1969, 128) states, “everything remains to be done, every means must 
be worth trying, in order to lay waste to the ideas of family, country, religion.”  This conflict 
of ideas established the opening salvos of a social revolution, a revolution of the mind.  
However, the means to this liberation required elucidation and experimentation.   
Above all, the Surrealists saw their actions as experimental attempts to explore the 
marvelous.  Breton (1969, 136) again clarifies:  
The idea of Surrealism aims quite simply at the total recovery of the psychic force by a 
 means which is nothing other than the dizzying descent into ourselves, the systematic 
 illumination of hidden places and the progressive darkening of other places, the perpetual 
 excursion into the mist of forbidden territory… 
 
In their view, the excavation, or ‘materialization’ in Aragon’s terminology, of this rich 
source of counter-logic was fundamentally corrosive of the established bourgeois order.   
Various means of exploration were developed. Most notably, the Surrealists argued 
that through the “fortuitous juxtaposition” of apparently unrelated objects, words, or 
images - processes relatively unmediated by rational procedures - the organized recesses 
of the unconscious broke through the confines of rationality (Breton 1969, 37).  Ernst 
(1970, 135) explains:  
It became evident that the more arbitrarily elements were brought together, the greater 
 was the certainty that a totally or partially new interpretation had to occur through the 
 transcending spark.  The joy accompanying every successful metamorphosis does not 
 correspond to a miserable aesthetic propensity to distraction, but to the intellect’s very 
 ancient, vital need for liberation from the deceptive and boring paradise of fixed memories, 
 and for explorations of a new, greater range of experience. 
 
Thus, the Surrealists either created or formalized various techniques of cultural production 
ranging from automatic writing to exquisite corpse to the further utilization of means like 
photomontage and collage.  Each of these tactics sought to replace the conscious and 
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deliberative creator with the random unconscious act, known as automatism.  As defined 
by Breton (1969, 26), Surrealism was, “pure psychic automatism, by which one proposes to 
express, either verbally, in writing, or by any other manner, the real functioning of thought.  
Dictation of thought in the absence of all control exercised by reason, outside of all 
aesthetic and moral preoccupations.”  
The desired effect of these methods was liberation.  Breton (1969, 123) argues, 
“Surrealism attempted to provoke, from the intellectual and moral point of view, an attack 
of conscience, of the most general and serious kind.”  Tactics like automatic writing were 
designed to provoke and shock by the suggestion of heterogeneous association.  Breton 
(cited in Nadeau 1965, 104) claims that “the immediate reality of the surrealist revolution 
is not so much to change anything in the physical… order…as to create a movement in 
men’s minds.”  Elsewhere, he offers a more detailed explanation: 
The hordes of words which…Dada and Surrealism set about to let loose…will slowly  but 
 surely make their way into the silly little towns and cities of literature such as it is still 
 being taught in this day and age and, here confusing without any difficulty the poor and rich 
 sections, they will calmly consume a great number of towers.  The population, taking the 
 tact that the only edifice which has, thanks to our efforts, been seriously shaken to date is 
 that of poetry, is not overly on its guard; it is setting up insignificant little defensive dikes 
 here and there.  People pretend not to pay too much attention to the fact that the logical 
 mechanism of the sentence alone reveals itself to be increasingly powerless to provoke the 
 emotional shock in man which really makes his life meaningful.  By comparison, the 
 products of this…activity, such as those which Surrealism offers him in ever-increasing 
 numbers in the form of books, paintings, and films, are products which he looked at 
 dumfounded at first, but which he now surrounds himself with, and begins, more or less 
 timidly, to rely on to shake up his settled ways of thinking (Breton 1969, 152). 
 
Surrealist means of influence thus rely on the gradual corrosion of the reified 
consciousness of everyday life though the corruption of language (and symbols).  These 
techniques rely on a series of psychological mechanisms that satisfy the basic human desire 
for meaningful experience. 
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 At first glance the social revolution that the Surrealists anticipated was solely at the 
level of consciousness.  This apparently idealist emphasis seemed to close off the field of 
practical political action.  Still, Breton consistently sought a cooperative relationship with 
the French Communist Party in an effort to align his movement with the most powerful 
revolutionary organization in France.  This entailed at one point the disavowal of the very 
notion of a Surrealist revolution.  Referring to the party, Breton (1969, 140) noted, “I really 
fail to see…why we should refrain from supporting the Revolution, provided we view the 
problems of love, dreams, madness, art, and religion from the same angle they do.”  The 
most heated debates, aside from charges of idealism and immaturity, often raged over the 
preference of many communists, including important party organs, for proletarian 
literature over the avant-garde.  Outside of these efforts, the Surrealists were also involved 
in various political campaigns against French nationalism and fascism.  More generally, 
they saw the liberation of the subconscious as a necessary condition for revolutionary 
political action. 
As a critical community of artists and writers, the Surrealists developed a series of 
diagnostic and prognostic discourses regarding the problem of artistic production in the 
early twentieth century.  They defined the unconscious as the source of human freedom 
and the existing social regime as detrimental to its exercise.  In order to remedy this state 
of affairs, the Surrealists developed and adapted various avant-garde techniques to a new 
emphasis on the psychic realm and everyday life.  Such means of protest were intended to 
provoke the disintegration of existing values. 
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6.6. The Situationist International (1957-1968)55 
 
 After World War II, a diversity of avant-garde groups sought to take the mantle of 
innovation and opposition from the Surrealists.  In 1957, several of these groups merged to 
form the SI.  The movement was centered primarily in Paris, though it had affiliated groups 
and activities across Europe.  Held together in large part by the efforts of Guy Debord, the 
chief theoretician of the movement, the SI established an increasingly belligerent position 
against not only Western capitalism and Soviet socialism, but also nearly all Leftist groups 
and individuals that claimed to represent the vanguard of social revolution, including 
especially the French Communist Party and the artistic avant-garde.  Immediately prior to 
the massive French general strike of 1968, the group published their two most important 
works: Debord’s (1995) theoretically sophisticated The Society of the Spectacle and Raoul 
Vaneigem’s (1983) playful and poetic The Revolution of Everyday Life.  Soon after the end of 
the protests the group gradually dissolved. 
6.6.1. Diagnosis 
  The central problematic that animated the SI was the role of cultural production in 
consumer capitalism. The SI sought, first, to explain how capitalism had survived the 
tumultuous first half of the twentieth century and, second, to identify the effects of this 
consumer-oriented society in the field of resistance and revolution.  Addressing the 
perceived failings of Surrealism, especially their reliance on Freudianism, the SI developed 
a relatively novel variant of Marxism, which they applied not only to advanced Western 
economies, but also to the Soviet Union.   
                                                          
55 My resources for the SI are the movement’s journals (Knabb 2006), an early series of correspondences 
(Debord 2009), SI books (Debord 1995; Vaneigem 1983), and histories (Home 1988; Marcus 1990; 
McDonough 2007; Plant 1992). 
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The SI argued that in order to survive, capitalism (and state socialism) was forced to 
create new markets by perpetually crafting new desires.  The unprecedented economic 
condition in which human nature and subjectivity – the terrain of desire - are brought 
under the sway of the economy is that of the “spectacle.”  This essential Situationist 
concept, an elaboration of Marx’s notion of alienation, is an attempt to describe human life 
under a consumption-oriented social system.  It specifies the inverted image of social 
relations, relationships that are characterized by a fundamental distance and separation 
enforced by the mediation of spectacular imagery, by representations of desires.  Debord 
(1995, 12) described it thus: "The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social 
relationship between people that is mediated by images."  Such a state of affairs attests to 
the notion that, “All that once was directly lived has become mere representation” (Debord 
1995, 12).  The images that saturate everyday life include advertising billboards, television 
programs, Hollywood cinema, Soviet propaganda, the entire edifice of mass media, all of 
which decree the infinite scope of human desire.  These ensembles erect gulfs between 
individuals, who now relate to each other and themselves through the imagery of an 
unsatiated desire.  When everyone wants an impossibly beautiful Hollywood starlet, and 
when ads implore one to live life to the fullest and celebrate endless spontaneity and 
leisure, the reality of economic necessity is a perpetual disappointment.  The spectacle, 
which seeps into every crevice of everyday life and leaves no urge or desire unturned, thus 
tends towards the “colonization of social life” by the commodity, by the economic 
imperatives of efficiency, and thus, ultimately, of rationalization (Debord 195, 29).  Debord 
(1995, 28) explains: “the economy transforms the world, but transforms it into a world of 
the economy.” 
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The gulf between individuals is the source of inauthenticity.  The SI argued that an 
economy that dominates everyday life so thoroughly that it commodifies all forms of 
mediation between individuals necessarily yields a degraded human experience.  The 
inferior existence occasioned by this economic condition is multiply flawed: it fails to 
satisfy the desires it creates; it extinguishes community, the direct relations that survived 
even under pre-spectacular capitalism; it dissolves the capacity for critical thought; and it 
engenders a perpetual malaise of isolation, passivity, and inefficacy.  At its cruelest, the 
spectacular invasion of everyday life masquerades as authenticity in the moment of leisure; 
the consumption of leisure time manages to only reproduce the spectacle in more refined 
forms: “what has been passed off as authentic life turns out to be merely a life more 
authentically spectacular” (Debord 1995, 112). 
The SI believed that despite the abundance of capitalism the spectacle paradoxically 
amplified the conquest of bare necessity.  Once capitalism achieved the ability to produce 
and distribute beyond the means necessary to reproduce its population, it continued to 
reproduce the alienation specific to commodity relations.  In other words, because 
consumers must purchase commodities in the market system, they are still, despite the 
productive capacity of the system, hitched to the imperative of survival; their lives are still 
determined by consumption, by the possession of things.  In direct opposition to the vulgar 
economism of survival, the SI’s highest value was life.  Life represented the fullest 
expression of creative energies and impulses.  It stood for the passionate exploration of 
infinite possibility and spontaneity, the only condition of existence that could satisfy the 
desires generated by the spectacle.   
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It is this fundamental distinction that animates the SI.  Vaneigem (1983, 159) argues 
that, “Capitalism has demystified survival.  It has made the poverty of daily life intolerable 
in view of the increasing wealth of technical possibilities.”  This very intolerance is the stuff 
of passion, of life.  Elsewhere he notes, “By force-feeding survival to satiation point, 
consumer society awakens a new appetite for life” (Vaneigem 1983, 98).  The system is 
doomed to collapse precisely because it offers what it cannot fulfill, mainly the desire to 
live an authentic life.  In fact, for Vaneigem (1983, 6), “the desire to live is a political 
decision.”  
6.6.2. Prognosis 
 The very nature of the spectacle necessitated conflict on the terrain of culture, the 
topography of images and desires.  Art was clearly complicit in the maintenance of the 
regime of survival.  As Debord and Wilman (2007, 14) put it: 
 Every reasonably aware person of our time is aware of the obvious fact that art can no 
 longer be justified as a superior activity, or even as a compensatory activity to which one 
 might honorably devote oneself. The reason for this deterioration is clearly the emergence 
 of productive forces that necessitate other production relations and a new practice of life.  
 
Art, understood as a specialized activity, was only valid when it renounced its specialized 
position in the social structure and sank into the interventions practiced on the everyday. 
The situationists consider cultural activity in its totality as an experimental method for 
 constructing everyday life, a method that can and should be continually developed with the 
 extension of leisure and the withering of the division of labor (beginning with the division of 
 artistic labour).  
Art can stop being an interpretation of sensations and become an immediate creation of 
 more highly evolved sensations. The problem is how to produce ourselves, and not the 
 things which enslave us (Debord 2007c, 53). 
The SI’s response was to formulate a strategy of propaganda and experimentation.  This 
entailed “the systematic provocative dissemination of a host of proposals aimed at turning 
the whole of life into an exciting game, combined with constant depreciation of all current 
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diversions” (Debord 2007a, 9).  Experimentation involved activity which, “consists in 
setting up, on the basis of more or less clearly recognized desires, a temporary field of 
activity favorable to these desires” (SI 2007, 49).  Such fields are new ambiences, areas in 
which new behaviors and languages are forged and discarded; in other words, situations, 
the construction of which is a central goal of the SI, involve the “immediate participation in 
a passionate abundance of life by means of deliberately arranged variations of ephemeral 
moments” (Debord 2007b, 53).  The strategy of propaganda and experimentation 
ultimately sought to create situations as the organizing principle of a new society. 
 The SI formalized two distinct tactical means.  The first is the derive, a wandering or 
drifting through an urban environment in order to explore the contour of the environment 
and its emotional and behavioral effects on individuals.56  Derives and their attendant 
mappings were part of a more systematic attempt at developing psychogeography, a 
mapping of these effects.  Psychogeography assumed that physical environments were 
variably conducive to cultural expression.  Constant (2007, 71), for example, argues that 
the commercialization and increased automobile traffic of certain Parisian neighborhoods 
stifled “the natural expression of collective creativity,” a possibility only when direct social 
relations are possible.  Psychogeography itself was part of the broader attempt to fashion a 
radical architecture, a prospective ‘unitary urbanism’ in which the function of structures 
was subordinate to their ludic or playful potentialities.   
The second means of resistance, détournement. refers to the appropriation of 
materials in the cultural environment in such a manner as to invert or lead astray its initial 
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 The concept of derive owes its origins largely to the poet Baudelaire’s concept of the flâneur and the 
Surrealists emphasis on spontaneous activity, especially as recounted in their novels.   
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meaning in order to subvert the article and the spectacle as a whole.  In a surrealist 
description, Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus: 
Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new 
 combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of 
 images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart 
 their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed….The mutual interference of 
 two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the 
 original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be 
 used. 
 
This process of détournement, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new 
meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable tactic.  In 
principle, everything and anything can be détourned, can be made to expose its role in the 
spectacle as well as the spectacle itself: “all goods proposed by the spectacular system, 
from cars to televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28).   
Because the spectacle has colonized everyday life, it is precisely on this terrain where it 
must be fought with its own weapons, from films to comics to radio to advertising. 
 Because détournement involves the appropriation of the spectacle, it is constantly in 
danger of being recuperated back into the service of the spectacle.  Recuperation is, “the 
process whereby the spectacle ―take[s] up and use[s] [the vocabulary of revolutionary 
discourse] to support the existing networks of power” (Plant 1992, 76).57  It is the de-
politicization or re-commodification of revolutionary weapons.  “Words forged by 
revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the battlefield, they fall 
into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225).   Situationist propaganda 
thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the spectacle’s ability to 
                                                          
57 This concept is part of the Situationist critique of the Soviet Union, labor unions, and the avant-garde, all of 
whom they regarded as insufficiently aware of the degree to which their practices supported the spectacular 
mode of production, whether it was run by capitalists or bureaucrats.   
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neutralize oppositional means.  In such a situation, “the only historically justified tactic is 
extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14).   
 At a more general strategic level, the SI also sought to express their general disdain 
for alienated relations, relations of separation and passivity.  This entailed the fundamental 
rejection of all relations of hierarchy, especially in the State but also, importantly, in the 
organizations tasked with revolution.  Debord (1995, 88) is clear:  
In the struggle between the revolutionary organization and class society, the weapons are 
 nothing other than the essence of the combatants themselves: the revolutionary organ-
 ization cannot reproduce within itself the dominant society's conditions of separation 
 and hierarchy. 
 
True revolutionaries do not give orders; they together erect a total participatory 
democracy that, through the momentum of its own novelty, crafts perpetual situations. 
The SI developed a set of diagnostic and prognostic discourses that identified a 
pattern of conflict on the terrain of culture and everyday life.  This theoretical project was 
strongly informed by its predecessors in the avant-garde.  As the SI acknowledged, 
détournement has a fairly esteemed genealogy running through Dada and Surrealism.  By 
juxtaposing different elements and decontextualizing cultural artifacts, creative acts and 
works can disorient perception and cognition to such a degree as to open up new 
possibilities for consciousness.  For Dadaists, Surrealists, and the SI, these possibilities 
included critique of the values and practices of bourgeois society and capitalism and, 
especially for the latter two, new conceptions of values and practices that could organize a 
future and better social order.  As a critical community, the SI formalized these techniques 
and the logic of cultural resistance on the terrain of the everyday at a new height of 





 This chapter considers whether Dada, the Surrealists, and the SI can be described as 
critical communities in the sense suggested by Rochon (1998) and Teune (2005).  
Together, these movements developed not only a theoretical foundation for cultural 
contestation but also various means by which to do so.  This logic postulates that 
contemporary culture and everyday life is the battlefield and everything found therein are 
the weapons.  Through a radical critique first aimed at art as a separate sphere of activity, 
the tremendous experimental and innovative capabilities of modern artists are unleashed 
on the world of objects, words, and practices.  In doing so, they progressively formulated a 
coherent method of criticism. This critique and the attendant wealth of means of 
contestation evidence the development of a politicized aesthetic disposition, a weaponized 
capacity to aesthetically appropriate virtually any object, practice, or discourse.  It thus 
appears that these avant-garde movements did behave as critical communities offering 













CHAPTER 7. FIELD AND IDENTITY 
 
Broadly construed, everyday social organization is composed of fields, networks, 
and identities.  This chapter aims, first, to present evidence of the content of collective 
identity within the sample of CJOs.  A secondary goal is to provide empirical support for 
hypothesized relationships between CJOs and the field of cultural production.   
 This chapter proceeds in three parts.  First, I review the literature on collective 
identity.  Second, I situate this analysis within the theoretical developments presented 
previous chapters.  Specifically, I establish the relevant relations between identities, 
biographies of cultural production, and fields.  Hypotheses and propositions are developed 
to flesh out these theoretical relations for empirical inquiry.   Third, the developed 
hypotheses and propositions provide guides for empirical inquiry. 
7.1. Collective Identity 
7.1.1. Political Participation and Social Movements 
 The literature on collective identity is enormous and spans a variety of disciplines 
including social psychology, anthropology, political science, and sociology.  As might be 
expected, the dialogue between the fields is minimal.  This is especially frustrating 
considering the importance attributed to collective identity in social movement studies.  
Because contentious politics is a form of political activity, I briefly consult both the social 
movements and political participation literatures on the question of collective identity. 
  Efforts to explain conventional political behavior often utilize collective identity as 
an explanatory variable.  Two relatively distinct literatures are relevant: partisanship and 
group consciousness.  Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes’ (1960) argue that party 
identification – the direction of identification with a particular political party and the 
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strength of the resulting attachment - acts as a perceptual filter.  Individuals process 
information and make voting decisions in part by selecting facts that favor the object of 
their attachment and rejecting information that disfavors it.  Subsequent research wrestled 
with the myriad implications of this conception of partisan identity, including the origin of 
partisanship and the degree to which voting is rational (Fiorina 1981; Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler 2002; Key 1966; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976).   
Work on voter turnout and other forms of political participation addressed a focus 
on group consciousness beyond partisanship.  In order to explain high levels of 
involvement in politics among resource-poor minorities, Verba and Nie (1972; Verba, Nie, 
and Kim 1978) argued that group membership was a potent factor in explaining group-
based mobilization that, unlike voting, require resources and organization.  However, the 
particular mechanisms linking identification to participation were left unspecified.  Others 
further developed the concept by distinguishing between group identification and group 
consciousness (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981; Chong and Rogers 2005).  These 
scholars argued that group consciousness - a politicized awareness of the status of one’s 
group relative to others – mediates the relationship between identifying with a group and 
participating in political action.  Thus, while identification is a necessary condition in the 
causal chain, more proximate factors include group efficacy, satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the status of one’s group, support for collective action, ideology, and others. 
In social movement studies, scholars also utilize the concept of collective identity as 
an explanatory variable.  Though typically marginalized in resource mobilization theory 
(RMT) and the political opportunity approach (see Chapter Ten), the concept is 
paradoxically central.  The polity model offered by Gamson (1990) and Tilly (1978) 
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stresses a key distinction between the members of the political system and those with 
limited or no access to it.  Tilly’s early concept of a ‘catnet’ emphasized the importance of 
close relational ties and their categorical definition in the shaping of collective identity.  
NSM theory is especially associated with the effort to link identification with activism 
(Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).  
The most prominent conceptualization is offered by Melucci (1996, ch. 4), who defines 
collective identity as a meso-level property of certain social interactions.  For him, identity 
is a negotiated and conflictual process defining the basic orientation of a group of 
individuals and the field of actors, opportunities, and constraints they face in pursuing their 
goals.  At the macro-level, Melucci uses this concept to explain the mobilization and 
orientation of the peace, women’s, and environmental movements among others.  
Irreducible to social class, collective actors associated with these identities – lifestyles, 
sexual orientations, environmentalism, etc. - forged new collective concerns and goals, and 
thus new social and political issues.  At the micro-level, Melucci and others endeavored to 
explain the decision to participate in activism through an individual’s level of subjective 
identification with a group (Pizzorno 1978; Melucci 1996).  Early efforts to synthesize RMT 
and social psychological approaches were motivated by the failure of the former to 
adequately account for mobilization through a cost-benefit analysis.  In order to fill out the 
explanation, scholars turned to concepts like ideology, solidarity, and identity that focused 
attention on subjective relations to groups (Klandermans 1984).   
7.1.2. Collective Identity and Ideology 
 In studies of voting behavior, one of the more stubborn questions involves the 
relative weight of partisanship and ideology in determining vote choice.  At a more general 
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remove, this question concerns the degree to which an individual’s identification with a 
social or political group and that same individual’s ideology affects individual political 
decisions.  Verba and Nie (1972; Verba et al1978) demonstrate that the aggregate level of 
objective and subjective group identification in a society strongly constrains the level of 
participation in political activities that require non-trivial costs and risks, i.e., campaign 
activity.  They anticipate this finding because, in contrast to acts like voting, group conflict 
requires the mobilization of group resources.  While Verba and Nie explicitly exclude 
protest from their analysis, Chong and Rogers (2005, 352) extend this argument in two 
ways.  First, in distinguishing group identification and group consciousness they argue that 
the latter is the more proximate cause of political activity.  Second, they suggest that the 
political actions that require the most significant costs and risks are direct action tactics 
like demonstrations.  Recall that developments in the group consciousness literature 
construed the concept as a bundle of mediating motivational variables between 
identification and action.  Chong and Rogers essentially reduce this bundle to group 
ideology and solidarity.  In other words, they argue that the effect of ideology is particularly 
strong with respect to the decision to protest.  Yet, ideology is rooted in identity, the latter 
occupying a more distant causal position relative to action.   
Beyond the question of mobilization, scholars explain variation in the strategies and 
tactics of activists through collective identity (Dalton 1994; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; 
Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992).  In contrast to the 
political participation literature, the approach taken in social movement studies generally 
utilizes a qualitative emphasis in order to determine the relation between collective 
identity and strategic and tactical choice.  Thus, it has more or less assimilated studies that 
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focus on ideology.  Several scholars have utilized the beliefs and values held by activists as 
a prominent independent variable for explaining tactical choice (Dalton 1994; Downey 
1986; Gamson 1989; Nepstad 2008; Zald 2000).  The literature on the environmental 
movement is particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology 
and strategy (Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dryzek 1997).  In his study of the 
strategies of environmental movements, Dalton (1994) uses identity and ideology 
interchangeably.  Below, I consider the implications of this discussion. 
7.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 In order to establish a relationship between culture jammers and the field of 
cultural production and determine the content of their collective identities, I elaborate on 
the theoretical developments of Chapters Two and Three.  First, I develop hypotheses 
regarding the contexts of artistic socialization and the aesthetic disposition.  Second, I 
consider the most relevant aspects of collective identity: identification and evaluation, and 
briefly establish a relation between identity and ideology.   
7.2.1. Biography  
 The first task of this chapter is to generate a brief sketch of an objective basis for 
collective identity by situating CJOs within the field of cultural production.  This entails a 
biographical analysis.  First, I suggest that culture jammers possess extensive experience 
with cultural production, especially artistic production, prior to activism.  Complementing 
Chapter Five, experience with artistic production includes an education in art, literature, or 
art history, and/or a work environment that requires familiarity with forms of cultural 
production.  Both of these social fields represent significant opportunities for immersion in 
the world of cultural production, especially the field of art.  According to the theoretical 
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approach taken here, such contexts encourage the development of sets of skills and 
knowledge specific to the arts, what Bourdieu calls the aesthetic disposition.58  NSM theory 
likewise anticipates a specific demographic profile for participants and sympathizers, one 
that stresses the development of a new middle class of professionals and semi-
professionals.  In particular, this new class includes those who participate in cultural 
production, such as journalists, academics, artists, and others (Klandermans and Tarrow 
1988; Kriesi 1989; Kriesi et al 1995; Melucci 1989; 1996).   My focus is on the skill sets that 
such biographies may express. 
 If culture jammers are endowed with sets of artistic skills and knowledge that shape 
their tactical choices, and if these skills sets are derived from extensive experience with 
social contexts of artistic production, we should expect culture jammers to possess such 
experience.  This expectation is borne out in Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that culture 
jammers are highly educated.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
 H7.1: those with an arts education or arts occupation prior to participation in culture  
  jamming are more likely to participate in cultural jamming. 
 
My primary expectation with respect to this hypothesis includes evidence of a pattern of 
experience with artistic production prior to politicization.   
 In order to move beyond inferring the possession of skill sets from social context, I 
develop hypotheses concerning more direct expressions of the aesthetic disposition.  
Ideally, these hypotheses would pertain to pre-political activity as well.  However, I am 
unable to empirically demonstrate the absence or presence of a pattern of aesthetic 
                                                          
58 In order to increase clarity, it may be crucial to reiterate here the relation between the aesthetic 
disposition, artistic skills and knowledge, skill sets, and cultural capital.  The aesthetic disposition is here 
regarded as synonymous with artistic skills and knowledge.   Skill sets in general are synonymous with bodily 
dispositions, also known as embodied cultural capital.   
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dispositions possessed by my sample of culture jammers either before or immediately after 
any relevant educational or occupational experience.  Thus, any demonstration of both pre-
political arts education and/or occupations and contemporary artistic skills and knowledge 
draws on a theoretical relationship between social context and cultural capital in order to 
establish the values on my independent variable of interest.  In other words, I infer such a 
relationship with less than ideal information.   
 I am also unable to demonstrate the presence or absence of the acquisition of an 
aesthetic disposition prior to participation in culture jamming.  This opens up a possible 
charge of reverse causation: participation in culture jamming may foster an aesthetic 
disposition. If participation in culture jamming precedes any possession of an aesthetic 
disposition, then the strength of the relationship between culture jamming and artistic 
skills and knowledge may lie solely in an endogenous loop (social reproduction), if a 
relation actually exists at all.  It is the tremendous burden of this chapter, and specifically 
the analysis below, to increase confidence in the explanation I offer as opposed to the null 
hypothesis or the reverse causation hypothesis.  This effort will rely on both the strength of 
theory and the teasing possibilities of data. 
 Additionally, Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that culture jammers possess extensive 
symbolic and cultural capital.  The aesthetic disposition is the general embodied culture 
capital of the artistic field.  Bourdieu (1986) refers to this form of cultural capital as the 
durable dispositions of the mind and body, the particular ways of seeing and doing that 
marks one’s position in the field.  Beyond the distinction between embodied and 
institutionalized cultural capital discussed in Chapter Five, Bourdieu also discusses 
objectified cultural capital.  The objectified state of capital is expressed “in the form of 
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cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.),” as “the trace or 
realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.” (Bourdieu 1986, 
47).  The following hypotheses straddle the distinction between embodied and objectified 
cultural capital.  First, recall that one of the distinguishing characteristics of the aesthetic 
disposition is the capacity and the tendency to appropriate anything aesthetically, even the 
common accoutrements of daily life.  If culture jammers possess an aesthetic disposition, 
then at the least they express this capacity.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
 H7.2: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices  
  as aesthetic is associated with participation in culture jamming. 
 
This hypothesis suggests the expectation that culture jammers will tend to describe 
everyday materials as art or aesthetic or situate such items within an artistic setting.  I 
consider the difficult questions of operationalization in my analysis below. 
 The aesthetic disposition is not merely the capacity for aestheticization.  It is 
generally the ability to situate oneself and others in a social space defined by the 
production and consumption of artistic objects.  A possible expression of the ability to play 
this game of art is the utilization of particular organizational settings oriented towards the 
presentation of artistic goods.  Thus, I hypothesize: 
 H7.3: the tendency to deploy artistic productions in organizational settings oriented  
  towards the exhibition of artistic goods is associated with participation   
  in culture jamming 
 
This hypothesis suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art 
museums, art galleries, or art centers in order to present the objectified cultural capital that 
they produce.  However, it is worth noting that artists may not engage such organizations 
or spaces because they seem them as fundamentally illegitimate or counter-effective.  This 
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hypothesis just suggests that a positive finding would be additional evidence, while a 
negative finding would, strictly speaking, not support a more general null hypothesis. 
 As discussed in Chapter Six, Bürger stresses the politicization of artistic production 
at the frontier of the avant-garde in the early twentieth century.  These movements, 
especially Dada and Surrealism, developed a politicized aesthetic disposition; while 
employing the means to constitute the world and all of its objects, discourses, and practices 
as aesthetic materials, they simultaneously constituted them as political, as suffused and 
traversed with a dimension of power.  The principal expectation here is that culture 
jammers regard art as a set of cultural activities imbued with political significance.  Art is 
not a neutral phenomenon, as the purely aesthetic disposition would suggest.  Instead, I 
suggest that culture jammers possess a politicized aesthetic disposition, an 
institutionalized artifact of the revolt of the avant-garde against the institution of art.  One 
who possesses a politicized aesthetic disposition should tend to transmute their daily 
surroundings into expressions of power relations.  I thus develop a descriptive hypothesis: 
 H7.4: the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices  
  as political is associated with participation in culture jamming. 
 
This suggests that culture jammers construct their environment such that the materials of 
everyday life serve some function of domination or resistance.   
However, the definition of culture jamming used in this study seems to guarantee an 
affirmative answer to this expectation.  As noted in Chapter One, some ensembles organize 
meaning in such a way as to legitimate, rationalize, and perpetuate some set of social 
relations that favor one group(s) in society over others.  Culture jammers engage in 
contentious collective actions that aim to disrupt these dominant ensembles of 
representation.  Such actions are defined here as political.  However, I make a basic 
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distinction between the perception of everyday objects, discourses, and practices as 
political and the range of perceptions of the political that is characteristic of the average 
person or even a fierce partisan or political ideologue.  As with the second hypothesis, I 
consider these questions of operationalization in my analysis below. 
7.2.2. Categorization and Evaluation 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the conception of collective identity 
utilized in this dissertation concerns an individual’s mutually constituted sense of their 
particular categorical membership encompassing the shared understandings and public 
representations that define the boundaries and the relations between actors and institutions.  
It unpacks the concept of identity as a social process of definition and classification of 
relations among actors and institutions, but also a subjective identification with a group 
situated within these relations.  Thus, this definition attempts to reconcile individual and 
interactional conceptions of collective identity.   
This point is particularly salient with respect to the dimension of evaluation.  All 
social relations are saturated with judgment; social classifications are not merely cognitive, 
but affective as well.  In other words, relations and classifications are organized by 
hierarchies of value and belonging that construct a ‘hot’ field of action.  Individuals thus 
possess positive or negative attitudes towards the relevant social category.   This partially 
contrasts with the approach taken by many social psychologists.  In an effort to develop a 
general conceptual framework for the analysis of collective identity, Ashmore, Deaux, and 
McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) focus on the multidimensionality of identification with a 
particular social category.  As an example, they define evaluation as “the positive or 
negative attitude that a person has toward the social category…that one claims or 
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acknowledges as one’s collective identity” (2004, 86).  My conception focuses instead on 
the sets of relations that social groups have with other groups.  Here, evaluation is 
characterized by the classifications brought to bear on the field of actors, not just those 
pertaining to a single social category.   
While much of the research on voting behavior clearly distinguishes partisanship 
from ideology, the question is more complex when consulting the literature on group 
consciousness.  In identifying specific mediating mechanisms between identity and action, 
attention falls in part on ideological beliefs.  Ashmore et al (2004) describe this elaboration 
of collective identification as the content and meaning of identity.  In particular, they 
describe ideology as beliefs about the social position of one’s group.   Such positioning 
should require evaluations of other social groups.  However, people vary in the degree to 
which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse 1964).  In other 
words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed ideological 
conceptions of the world around them.  In this sense, ideology is a relatively sophisticated 
or coherent organization of the shared schemas that construct a group’s position in social 
space, including the field of politics.  Schemas are not merely cognitive; they are affective 
and normative, such that the scope and coherence of this organization provides a general 
capacity and motivation to evaluate and manipulate, acquiesce to, or venerate a given set of 
social relations.59  In other words, one might say that the more coherent the organization of 
the schemas, the more constraining the effects on choice. 
                                                          
59 This is not an outright attempt at a definition, but a general characterization of what ideology constitutes.  
The literature on ideology is enormous and riddled with difficulty (Gerring 1997).  Bourdieu regards ideology 
(doxa, symbolic domination, etc.) as the dominant logic of a field, the set of structures or social classifications 
that conceals knowledge of the essential nature of the game such that those who dominate the field can 
perpetuate their rule (Bourdieu and Eagleton 2012).  The approach taken here simply construes ideology as a 
more general (potentially dominant or subordinate) sense of social relations. 
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While I consider ideology in Chapter Ten, the descriptive analysis offered here 
elaborates on both the particular social category and the field of social categories that CJOs 
construct in their shared understandings and public representations.  However, 
particularly vexing is the difficulty of measurement.  Work in political participation tends to 
utilize variants of a Likert scale to measure the degree of identification with a social 
category.  In social movement studies, however, more qualitative analyses identify typically 
discrete collective identities.  I take the latter approach here emphasizing both the actors 
and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of positioning and the social classifications that 
are attributed to them. In particular, I focus on the array of actors and social groups that 
may be broadly designated as protagonists, antagonists, and others.   
7.3. Analysis I 
 In this chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations developed 
above is tested in the strictest sense.  The closest approximation to a test burdens the first 
hypothesis (H1), but even this effort is handicapped by the focus on one explanatory 
variable and the indeterminate representativeness of the culture jamming sample.  Instead, 
they provide more precise guides for illustration.  Hypotheses can systematically direct our 
attention to specific patterns or observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny.  The 
means of inquiry are specific to each set of hypotheses and propositions.  The data used in 
this chapter includes, first, the sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four, and second, 
additional sources specified in the course of analysis.   
7.3.1. Gender, Race and Ethnicity, and Age 
First, I consider a general but brief analysis of some objective indicators of social 
position: gender, race and ethnicity, and age.   The rest of the project deals with other 
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indicators, including occupation and class.  The distribution of genders across the sample 
generally skews male, an observation noted by Wettergren (2005, 36) regarding her 
sample.  However, some partial exceptions include the BIL, IST, RBC, and SCP.  With regards 
to race or ethnicity, white non-Hispanics constitute almost the entire sample; only RBC 
exhibited notable variation.   The data for these observations is far less than ideal, but data 
on age is even less.  Casual observation suggests that the sample is widely distributed from 
the twenties to middle age.   
7.3.2. Participation in Artistic Production 
 The first hypothesis (H7.1) assumes a positive correlation between the independent 
variable: history of participation in artistic production prior to politicization, and the 
dependent variable: participation in culture jamming.  While the dependent variable is 
dichotomous (you either participate or you don’t), the independent variable offers more 
possibilities.  Participation in artistic production can theoretically range from no 
participation (one has had no contact with any form of artistic production, whether as a 
spectator or as a participant), through a range of levels of engagement (some schooling but 
no degree, for example) to full participation (one has obtained a college level degree in the 
arts and is employed in a cultural industry).  To simplify the analysis, I reduce this 
complexity to a dichotomous variable in which one either has a certain minimum level of 
participation in cultural production or one does not.  However, in order to properly satisfy 
a causal argument, participation in artistic production must be temporally prior to 
participation in culture jamming. 
 One means of provisionally ‘testing’ this hypothesis is through the use of population 
data.  If we compare culture jammers to a representative sample or census of the 
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population, then a simple pattern should support the hypothesis, however weakly: culture 
jammers should ceteris paribus have a higher rate of prior participation in artistic 
production than the general population.  In order to detect such patterns, I develop a set of 
operational criteria for identifying prior participation in artistic production.   
 Table 7.1 presents data on arts education and occupations in the United States.  The 
first operational criterion for participation in artistic production is the possession of a 
bachelor’s degree in a field relevant to artistic production: visual arts, art history, 
communications, theatre, graphic design, literature, etc.  Clearly, this measure indicates the 
distribution of institutionalized cultural capital in the population.  Data from the 2009 
American Community Survey provides the distribution of bachelor degrees by field in the 
United States for everyone over 25 years of age.  Under the general field of arts, humanities, 
and other, three fields are particularly relevant: literature and languages (including English 
literature), visual and performance arts (including fine arts, commercial art, music), and 
communications (including communications, journalism, and mass media).  3.41% of the 
American population over 25 years of age in 2009 (and 12.24% of all those with bachelor 
degrees) held an undergraduate degree in one of these fields.  One should expect this figure 
to be somewhat inflated as a measure of history of participation in artistic production, 
however; there is no reason to expect fields like foreign languages or communications to 
have much if any relation to artistic production. 
 A second operational criterion is employment in a field of artistic production.  I 
argue in Chapter Six that occupations may indicate a process of institutionalization, thus 
providing marginal evidence for the distribution of institutionalized cultural capital.  Data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics provide two measures of the number of people 
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Table 7.1. Arts Education and Occupations in the Arts, United States 
Education 
2009 




Relevant Bachelor’s Degreesa 6,899 - 
 Literature and Languages 2,569 - 
 Visual And Performance Arts 2,307 - 
 Communications 2,023 - 
All Bachelor’s Degrees 56,366 12.24 
U.S. Populationb  202,045 3.41 
Occupationc 
2009 In thousands 
Relevant Occupations 
Percentage of… 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media 
Occupations 
  
 Establishment Datad 1,746 - 
 Household Datae 2,724 - 
All Occupations   
 Establishment Data 130,648 1.34 
 Household Data 139,877 1.95 
U.S. Population Over 16 Years of Age 243,323  
 Establishment Data - 0.72 
 Household Data - 1.12 
a The Survey of Public Participation in the Arts includes measures of lifetime participation in arts 
classes or lessons.  However, I believe a more powerful measure of immersion in cultural 
production consistent with theory is the attainment of a college degree.  Source: Siebens, Julie and 
Camille L. Ryan. 2012. “American Community Survey Reports: Field of Bachelor’s Degree in the 
United States: 2009.” U. S. Census Bureau. accessed July 25, 2012 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-18.pdf> 
b Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, 131st ed. U. S. 
Census Bureau. accessed July 25, 2012 
<http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/pop.pdf> 
c The Bureau of Labor Statistics utilizes two sources of data: establishment and household.  The 
former surveys businesses, while the latter surveys households.  The difference between each 
approach’s procedures does produce differing results.  For a summary of these procedures and 
their effects on their respective samples, see Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2001. “Differences Between 
Data Series.” Bureau of Labor Statistics. accessed July 26, 2012 
<http://www.bls.gov/lau/lauhvse.htm#hvse> 
d Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010. “May 2009 National Occupational Employment and Wage 
Estimates: United States.” Bureau of Labor Statistics. accessed July 25, 2012 
<http://www.bls.gov/oes/ 
2009/may/oes_nat.htm> 
e Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011. Employment and Earnings 58 (1): 206. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. accessed July 25, 2012 <http://www.bls.gov/opub/ee/empearn201101.pdf> 
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employed in the arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media sectors in 2009.  Those 
employed in these sectors account for 1.34/1.95% of all occupations.  Those employed in 
these sectors account for .72/1.12% of the population of the United States over 16 years of 
age.  However, like the previous figures for education, this occupational measure may be 
inflated; some media and likely all sports occupations need not have any relation to artistic 
production.  The measure only specifies, however, the respondent’s present occupation; 
previous employment may be in one of the relevant fields.  
 While ideally I would generate a single index, a more practical alternative is to 
utilize a variety of comparisons between the figures in Table 7.1 and the history of 
participation in artistic production in the sample of CJOs.  Turning to the sample of CJOs, 
analysis shows that six of the twelve groups (AMF, AAA, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) provide strong 
evidence for an arts occupation or education credential prior to participation in the CJO.  
The early founding members of the AMF were “all some sort of film maker, designer, 
illustrator or cartoonist” (Lasn 2005).   Both the AAA’s Steve Lambert (n.d.) and the IST’s 
Catherine D’Ignazio (Kanarinka 2012) are practicing artists, arts teachers, and Masters of 
Fine Arts.  Other members of the IST have histories in theatre, arts administration, English, 
film, and architecture; as co-founder Savic Rasovic states:  “we have a lot of education” 
(Catherine D’Ignazio, James Manning, and Savic Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 
2012).  The SCP’s Bill Brown earned a doctorate degree in American Literature and taught 
English (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 362).  The RBC’s Bill Talen was a playwright, actor, and 
artist before developing his Reverend Billy persona (Lane 2002, 63), while his partner 
Savitri D was an artist and dancer (D. and Talen 2011, 208-9).  Both of the most visible 
members of the Yes Men possess advanced degrees in the arts and teach the arts in the 
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university (Cusp Conference 2010; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 2013), though their 
culture jamming activities famously precede the creation of the Yes Men.  
 The remaining six groups (BLF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, NGL) differ in some key 
respects.  First, the only group that clearly fails to conform to the hypothesis is Negativland.  
The two founding members of the group were still in high school when the first recordings 
were made in the late 1970s (NGL 1985).   This does not mean that the early members had 
no experience with cultural production.   Domestic environments saturated with avant-
garde music may perform a similar function as an arts education or occupation, but there is 
no evidence either for or against this supplemental hypothesis.  Second, the BLF and the 
IAA are largely anonymous and use pseudonyms, though many of the BLF’s members work 
for advertising companies (Berger 2000; BLF 1999; Hua 2006), while the IAA describes 
itself as a collective of engineers, designers, and artists (Brusadin et al n.d.).   
 The remaining three groups exhibit a possible simultaneity of artistic experience 
and culture jamming practice.  While the CTM’s Gach is a practicing artist, teaches art, and 
possesses a Master of Fine Arts (California College of the Arts, 2013), he states that he 
engaged in Situationist and Dadaist activities while he was an undergraduate (Gach 2007).  
A similar pattern appears in other cases.  While Billionaires founder Andrew Boyd (2001-2) 
did have some experience in arts education (“somewhere along the way, I completed… 
various course series in new media production, computer programming, and creative 
writing”), I found no evidence that places this experience prior to his immersion in the 
fields of street theater and creative tactics.  The CAE began while the first two members, 
Steven Kurtz (a PhD in Interdisciplinary Humanities) and Steve Barnes, were in school.   
When asked about his earliest art projects, Kurtz states that he didn’t have “an a-ha 
 moment; [he] slid into art slowly.’ He was on an academic, scholarly path but found himself  
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 surrounded by those whom he didn’t find very much fun. Instead he was “attracted” to a 
 circle of artist friends, and began to face “a crisis moment of too much thinking and not 
 enough doing” (Parisi 2008). 
 
Kurtz “was teaching film studies at the time and was interested in film/video production” 
(Hirsch 2005, 25).  Additionally, all CAE members work in arts-related occupations like 
education, editing, and photography (Hirsch 2005, 28).    
 Strictly speaking, these three cases do not run afoul of the hypothesis; it concerns 
experience, while degrees are merely an operationalization.  However, they fail to provide 
evidence for or against strictly prior experience in an arts occupation or education.  If I 
consider only the six groups that show strict evidence in favor of the hypothesis, they 
constitute 50% of the sample, a figure far exceeding the prevalence of arts degrees and 
occupations in the population.  Even excluding the Canadian Adbusters from the analysis 
does not dampen the conclusion that the data generally support the hypothesis. 
7.3.3. The Aesthetic Disposition 
 Like the first hypothesis, the following three hypotheses concern the same 
dependent variable: participation in culture jamming.  The second hypothesis (H7.2) 
involves the relation of participation in culture jamming to an independent variable: the 
tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic.  
While theoretically a range of values of aesthetic perception may be considered (complete 
non-aesthetic perception to comprehensive aesthetic perception), I treat the independent 
variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.   
 The evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological: how do members of 
these groups perceive and engage their reality?  An example of the aesthetic disposition is 
provided by the Critical Art Ensemble.   The CAE employ a rhetoric that blurs the line 
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between art or aesthetics and everyday life.  They refer to the production of culture, the 
process through which the semiotic regime, the symbolic order, or authoritarian culture, 
among other monikers, negotiates its domination, as their arena of contention.  At the 
micro-level, everyday life is the where this process is negotiated; their practice “is a 
struggle over the micro-sociology of the performative matrix of everyday life (CAE 2001, 
76).  This matrix is “the aggregate interactions within social space – the dramaturgical 
activities of everyday life” (McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 149).  In order for art to achieve 
its critical function, it must make itself intelligible to the viewer.  Art discards its opacity by 
insinuating itself into the familiar.  This process seeks to penetrate everyday life, the 
repetitious concerns, pleasures, anticipations, memories, and habits of the viewer, thereby 
bringing to consciousness the relation of the particular to the general, of the concrete to the 
abstract, of the real to the virtual. CAE’s high regard for the Living Theater is instructive: 
“The Living Theater collapsed the life and art distinction…After all, only by examining 
everyday life through the frame of a dramaturgical model can one witness the poverty of 
this performative matrix” (CAE 1994, 62).   
 Similar expressions of an aesthetic sense of everyday life are available across the 
sample of CJOs.   The AMF aim to safeguard or reinvigorate the mental environment: the 
images, ideas, and flows of information that we encounter in our daily lives.  But “the ideas, 
expressions, and concerns of individual citizens no longer matter very much.  Culture isn’t 
created from the bottom up by the people anymore – it’s fed to us top down by 
corporations (Lasn 1999, 189).  “Layer upon layer of mediated artifice come between us 
and the world until we are mummified (Lasn 1999, 12).  Like the Situationists, the AMF and 
Lasn view culture and everyday life as overlaid by a media spectacle that is all–pervasive 
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(Lasn 1999, 99-109).  The CMT too have an extremely expansive sense of the terrain of art 
or aesthetics.  “One of the things that concerns us about contemporary art is that it 
positions itself as the authority on culture, but culture explodes beyond the parameters of 
art” (Gach 2007).  Yet, culture is the artists’ playground; “artists produce culture, 
participate in culture, and reflect culture” (CTM 2007).  Art is the elaborate and pragmatic 
integration of all things related into an associative life/practice…it is creative problem-
solving“ (CTM n.d.(c)).  NGL (1995, 23) appropriate an endless stream of sounds from the 
media but also a vast array of everyday sounds; “artists have always approached the entire 
world around them…as raw  material to mold and remold.”  Similar to the CAE, the RBC 
senses a performative color to everyday life: 
 I was studying thousands of shoppers…Shopping is the cornerstone  of modern American 
 life and this essence began to show itself, coming through the surface of regular dailiness. I 
 had to stand there for months to see under the patterns…I began to suspect that shopping 
 had a second underlying dance.  The gestures of driving, parking, walking, taking escalators 
 and elevators…they make up a formal dance, one that sustains everything in the world 
 around it…The shopping became a kind of marching etc. (Reverend Billy 2003, 50, 56). 
 
The SCP (2006, 174) appropriates the language of spectacle (a pervasive system of images 
that mediates social relations) directly from the Situationists and links it surveillance:  
 [T]hese two tools of power (surveillance cameras and ritualized spectacle) have become 
 ever-more relied upon since the 1970s.  As Orwell understood, [they] are closely 
 related…If they are not properly conditioned by the spectacle, people will not accept the 
 imposition of transparency; without the imposition of transparency, people will not derive 
 any satisfaction from spectacle. 
 
The Billionaires founder authored and edited a volume cataloguing creative protest:  
 This blending of art and politics is nothing new.  Tactical pranks go back at least as far as the 
 Trojan Horse.  Jesus of Nazareth overturning the tables of the money changers mastered 
 the craft of political theater… art, culture, and creative protest tactics have for centuries 
 served as fuel and foundation for successful social movements (Boyd and Mitchell 2012, 1). 
 
The most dramatic example of the tendency to perceive everyday life as aesthetic is the IST, 
one of whose projects include a highly participatory “expedition…to collect research 
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samples of infinitely small things” (IST 2005, 78).  These include text on a mirror, telephone 
poles, lottery tickets, falling leaves, and roughly 500 other examples of mundane items.   
 Additionally, some confidence may be drawn from another bit of evidence: inferring 
the capacity (but less certainly the tendency) to perceive aesthetically from a particular 
occupation: arts instruction.  This particular position requires a sense of the aesthetic 
disposition sufficient to impart it to students.  As noted previously, the AAA, IST, CAE, CTM, 
IST, SCP, and TYM all contain seminal members with histories of teaching in the arts. 
Some groups appear to actively disparage an expansive sense of aesthetics or especially art.  
The AAA (2013b; 2013c) strongly distinguishes advertising and art and raises concerns 
that the former saps the creativity out of the population.  The BLF’s Napier clearly states, 
“We don’t consider what we do to be Art” (Napier 2009), and elsewhere, in response to a 
question regarding whether the BLF produces art, member Kalman (2008) dryly replies, 
“No more than anyone would consider advertising ‘art.’  If art is a reflection of life as the 
artist sees it, and your life is marketing then I guess you could consider it art.”  Napier notes 
with regard to equating their actions with art, “It's funny that anybody would think that it 
was” (BLF 1999).  There is little information on the Yes Men, while the IAA (2005, 99) only 
hint at the scope of aestheticization when they describe their projects as “tactical aesthetics 
- we use the visual and rhetorical devices of sanctioned research organizations in an 
elaborate performance aimed at infiltrating engineering culture.”   
 Overall, eight groups exhibited the capacity and the tendency to perceive and utilize 
everyday objects, discourses, and practices as aesthetic.  Two did not (though better data 
my resolve otherwise), and two groups lacked sufficient data to identify a positive case.  
Considering the latter two as negative cases, this finding still supports the hypothesis.   
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 The third hypothesis (H7.3) involves the relation of participation in culture jamming 
to another independent variable: the tendency to deploy artistic productions in 
organizational settings oriented towards the exhibition of artistic goods.  This hypothesis 
suggests that culture jammers engage organizations and spaces like art museums, art 
galleries, or art centers in order to present and distribute the objectified cultural capital 
that they produce.  While theoretically an additive index of the degrees of involvement 
should capture this phenomenon, I again reduce this complexity to a simple dichotomous 
variable: absence or presence of the behavior.  Importantly, this activity must suggest 
something more than a twenty-year retrospective exhibition.   
 An example of the extensive use of art spaces is the Institute for Infinitely Small 
Things and co-founder Catherine D’Ignazio.  The Institute itself employs actions in a variety 
of art settings, especially art galleries and art festivals (IST n.d.).  As an established artist 
before the founding of the IST, D’Ignazio presented works from 2001-2013 in such venues 
as physical and online art galleries, art festivals, art museums, media centers and 
conferences (Kanarinka 2012).  Other groups perform similarly.  The AAA and Steve 
Lambert (n.d.) have extensive histories of art world exhibition, as do groups like the CAE, 
CTM, IAA, and the SCP.  As a musical group, Negativland performs many live shows and is 
featured in music magazines and music web sites.  The RBC regularly performs on stage at 
various locales, such as theatres and art auditoriums.  Even the Yes Men have enjoyed the 
use of art spaces like galleries and museums as well as film festivals (Suparak n.d.).  In 
contrast, I have found only minor evidence of extensive use of artistic venues by the BLF or 
its members and no evidence for the AMF or the Billionaires.   
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 Notable engagements with the art world occur with nine of the twelve groups.   The 
remaining three groups do not appear to exhibit this tendency.  This suggests strong 
support the hypothesis. 
 The final hypothesis (H7.4) of this chapter involves the relation of participation in 
culture jamming to the tendency to perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and 
practices as political.  Like the second hypothesis, a range of values of political perception 
may be considered (complete apolitical perception to comprehensive political perception).  
I treat the independent variable as dichotomous: absence or presence.   
 Again, the evidence here is textual and at times phenomenological. An example of 
this pervasive sense of politics is provided by the Institute for Infinitely Small Things.   
According to co-founder D’Ignazio, the IST asks the question, “how are you invited as a 
citizen to participate in the public realm” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal 
interview, August 27, 2012)?  From this perspective, the materials and rules of public and 
quasi-public space – even infinitely small things - all possess some political potentiality.  In 
reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s argument that the French Revolution began with the 
absence of a simple formality – a greeting – the IST (2005, 80-1) state, “[T]hese everyday 
spaces – the absolute war of a missing signal – are micropolitical…They are beginnings of 
whole other worlds that might also materialize to nothing.”  The minutiae are especially 
significant, because all objects and actions are embedded in wider social and political 
contexts. 
The myths of individuality, originality, an authenticity are all emphasized by corporations 
 as advertising constructions, to sell more products.  It’s not just about artistic authority, but 
 the whole we are embedded in.  It’s always political and always economic.  What I see as the 
 Institute’s mission is a way of engaging people in conversation, producing these strange 
 situations and dealing with politics of everyday life (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006). 
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Other examples of the pervasive politicization of everyday life can be found across the 
sample.  With a bit of tongue-in-cheek, the BLF stress the ubiquity of advertising. For them, 
it “suffuses all corners of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our 
dreams are often indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier 
and Thomas 2006).  Great fields of human pursuit and creativity are reduced to “marketing 
strategies,” while the Ad itself not only defines the self but also the world.  This condition is 
a symptom of an asymmetric power relationship between corporations and the public; 
“[P]ublic space should include areas in which the public can truly express itself,” rather 
than just running around the hamster wheel of commerce at the mall” (Black n.d.).  The 
CAE seek to “develop tactics and tools of resistance against the authoritarian tendencies of 
a given cultural situation” (Hirsch 2005).  Such situations include “galleries and museums, 
radio, TV, festivals, bars and clubs, the net, [and] the street” (McKenzie and Schneider2000, 
136).  The group insist that “no matter what variety of everyday life systems a person 
participates in, an element of radical practice can always be initiated within it” (CAE 1996, 
52).  Thus, “politics [can] not be separated from…cultural practice” (Little 1999, 194).  The 
RBC, much like the AMF, mark out a wide sense of the political:    
Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to 
 ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals. 
 We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history, 
 sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect  
 us, to support us, to help us…  
 
Above all we try to complexify the moment of purchase, to snap people out their hypnosis 
 and back into the mystery of being human. We remind people that things come from 
 somewhere, that products have a resource past, a labor past (RBC 2012). 
 
Reverend Billy (2006, 112) continually expands the scope of politics: “They are 
trademarking the water and the air, the radio frequencies and the cyber portals, the forests 
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and the horizon and the street corner to the left of or front door.”  More dramatically, “our 
opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to retreat or advance. It melts into the 
air” (Talen 2003, 127).  In this sense, resistance entails taking control of one’s stories and 
one’s life.  Similar patterns of politicization are seen in the CTM (2006b): “Authority 
commonly wields power through the manipulation of sign systems which individuals are 
collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and control.”  The scope 
extends beyond the abstract sense of culture, however.  The group began as a concrete 
investigation into micro-politics at the individual and community level by peculiar 
practitioners of power: a ninja, a private investigator, and a magician.  Like others, 
Negativland stress the all-pervasive presence of advertising and an environment saturated 
with media.  The SCP also exhibits a comprehensive politicization.  Even the “transparent 
surfaces, mirrored surfaces, and surveillance cameras” of contemporary urban architecture 
are symptoms of the spectacle and it’s relation to surveillance (SCP 2006, 176). Television 
shows, voyeurism, the Internet: these merely tap into the total rendering of everything as 
image, as transparent and recorded, the mediating principle of the spectacle.  Bound with 
surveillance the spectacle organizes desire and discipline at the service of the State. 
 Other groups do not provide evidence of such pervasive politicization and instead 
seem to focus on more specific areas of politicization.  The IAA’s politics centers on the 
cultures of engineering, surveillance, and militarization, while the AAA focuses on the 
politics of outdoor advertising.  The Billionaires and the Yes Men likewise provide little to 
no evidence of a comprehensive politicized perception.60 
                                                          
60 Yet, TYM member Bonanno was involved in the Barbie Liberation Organization, an action that critiqued the 
gender stereotypes of toy action figures and dolls. 
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Overall, eight of the groups in the sample exhibited the capacity and the tendency to 
perceive and utilize everyday objects, discourses, and practices as political.  The remaining 
four suggest a limited conception of politics.  This finding supports the hypothesis.   
Table 7.2 summarizes the data on the biographies of artistic production.  While the 
results are not overwhelming, they do suggest a general pattern: most of the groups 
possess a politicized aesthetic disposition either developed or honed in an educational or 
occupational setting (IST, RBC, SCP, with the AMF, CTM, CAE close as well).  Still, some 
groups appear to avoid the expression of an aesthetic disposition, the BLF especially, 
although they clearly appreciate Art and distinguish it from advertising, a point made as 
well by the AAA.61  While the BLF admire the creativity of advertisers, the AAA suggests 
that it dulls creativity.  Others appear to possess a narrower conception of the political.  
This is especially the case with the Billionaires and the Yes Men. Importantly, the quality of  
 
Table 7.2. The Arts and CJOs 








AMF Yes Yes No Yes 
AAA Yes No Yes No 
BLF 2 No No Yes 
BIL 1 Yes No No 
CTM 1 Yes Yes Yes 
CAE 1 Yes Yes Yes 
IAA 2 2 Yes No 
IST Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NGL No Yes Yes Yes 
RBC Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SCP Yes Yes Yes Yes 
TYM Yes 2 Yes No 
1 - mixed 2 – insufficient data 
                                                          
61 It is worth stressing that the aesthetic disposition is not itself a set of value judgments.  One possessing the 
aesthetic disposition may utilize the world and its myriad objects aesthetically, but define other forms of 
appropriation as non-aesthetic. 
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the data pertinent to all four hypotheses is not ideal.  As I note above, formal education in 
the arts or an arts occupation are not the only social contexts that may generate or 
maintain a sense of the aesthetic game.  More data may reveal and earlier history of culture 
jamming in my positive, mixed, or insufficient data cases.  If so, the skills and knowledge 
developed in these contexts may be a function of activism.  More data may also reveal the 
form of activism is a function of education.  However, the results are broadly consistent 
with the relation explored by my theoretical approach.  The CJOs considered here have a 
far higher rate of immersion in these contexts than the population.  As noted, some culture 
jamming groups precede the operational measures of education, while only one (NGL) 
precedes any experience in college-level arts education or an arts occupation.   
Still, it is worth reiterating that I am not offering the argument that formal education 
and occupation are the only individual-level determinants of culture jamming.  As I noted in 
the introduction, culture jamming is an age-old practice, part of the wider history of 
creative activism noted by Boyd above.  Instead, and as I will show in later chapters, I am 
arguing that the sets of skills and knowledge that constitute an aesthetic disposition offer 
incentives for culture jamming as a tactical choice.   
7.4. Analysis II 
The rest of this chapter elaborates on both the particular social category and the 
field of social categories that CJOs construct in their shared understandings and public 
representations.  I emphasize both the actors and institutions pertinent to a CJO’s sense of 
positioning and the social classifications that are attributed to them. In particular, I focus 
on the array of actors and social groups that may be broadly designated as protagonists, 
antagonists, and others.  
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7.4.1. Protagonists 
 Most of the groups in the sample (AMF, AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC, and the SCP) 
view themselves as part of a wider community of artists or, more generally, as cultural 
producers or cultural activists.  The AMF are especially keen on identifying themselves as 
culture jammers, part of “a loose network of media activists who see ourselves as the 
advance shock troops of the most significant social movement of the next twenty years” 
(Lasn 1999, xi).  At the launch of the AMF: 
we were all some sort of film maker, designer, illustrator or cartoonist and right from the 
 start we decided that if we were going to launch this culture jamming movement then it 
 would have to be driven by TV, posters, postcards, art, statues, performance art and all 
 those tricks of the trade (Lasn 2005). 
 
The CAE define themselves as “five tactical media artists dedicated to exploring the 
intersections between art, technology, critical theory, and political activism” I(McKenzie 
and Schneider 2000, 136).  Elsewhere, they identify with a contemporary, though 
unrecognizable, avant-garde consisting of artists-activists who eschew the traditional role 
designations assigned to either group.  Hence, CAE (1996, 48-9), “call for artists, once 
outside the parameters of cultural production for other members of the culture industry, to 
separate their work from the system of signs which shape the non-specialist’s perception of 
art.”  As they argue, both “the political activist and the cultural activist (anachronistically 
known as the artist) can still produce disturbances” (CAE 1994, 12).  By opening the 
website with the statement, “The Anti-Advertising Agency was a collaboration between 
myself and dozens of other artists,” founder Steve Lambert also emphasizes an artist self-
presentation (AAA 2013a).  Negativland (1995, 23) “respond (as artists always have) to our 
environment.”  Like CAE, Gach emphasizes a ‘shape-shifting’ identity that respects the 
exigencies of each situation by utilizing artistic or more generally cultural materials:  
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We don’t think of ourselves as artists doing an art project unless we’re doing it in an arts 
 venue or applying for an arts grant.  Instead, we recognize that, like all people, we are 
 essentially shape-shifters.  Specialization is a temporal condition – different identities at 
 different times (CTM 2007). 
 
But the work of the artist, including the magical and the martial, extends beyond the art 
context: “art can be creative and poetic and spiritual, [but] it is also in many respects 
utilitarian” (Gach 2008a).  It can be used to solve problems, because art is, at its most 
general, “a way of manifesting your intentions, as a way of creating change in the world” 
(Gach 2007).  The RBC (n.d.(a)) identify as “a radical performance community.”   
Some groups are somewhat more idiosyncratic or general.  Instead of artists, the 
BLF present themselves as Jarry-esque pranksters, a point underscored by their frequent 
use of humorous masks when engaging the media or other public audiences.   Groups like 
the Billionaires and the Yes Men (and to some extent the BLF) often eschew reliance on 
such categories in order to either focus attention on their ironic identities as billionaire 
protesters or to empower potential imitators. 
Another notable category aside from, but inclusive of, artist-activist is a de-centered 
conception of identity.  The CTM’s shape-shifting has already been discussed, while the CAE 
(2012b, 62) welcomes “any kind of hybrid – artist, scientist, technician, craftsperson, 
theorist, activist.”  Similarly, the IAA plays up a diversity of identities from which members 
can draw on, especially engineer and artist.  More generally, some groups develop a 
universal sense of identity: 
Consumerism is normalized in the mind of the average person, sometimes we even refer to 
 ourselves as consumers forgetting that we are also citizens, humans, men, women, animals. 
 We forget that we share many resources, public spaces, libraries, information, history, 
 sidewalks, streets, schools that we created laws and covenants and governments to protect 
 us,, to support us, to help us (RBC 2012). 
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As activists, many groups locate themselves relative to other activists and social 
movements.  By far the most common movements that CJOs show strong identification 
with, or sympathy for, are the anti-globalization or global justice, environmental, and civil 
rights movements (AMF, BIL, RBS, SCP, TYM).  The Occupy movement also gathers a great 
deal of positive sympathies.  While groups like the Yes Men and the RBC directly 
participated in both the Occupy and anti-globalization movements, and the AMF famously 
provided the spark for the former movement, some, like the IST and the SCP, keep their 
distance from the Occupy movement.  AIDS activists ACT-UP are particularly inspirational 
for the CAE, while the AMF are highly critical of, though sympathetic to, activists like that 
focus on identity politics.   
 As artists, many groups in the sample situate themselves relative to artists as well as 
the field of art as a whole.  By far the most common positive associations are with the 
Dadaists, Surrealists, and the Situationists (AMF, BLF, BIL, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP).  
Others include Augusto Boal, Antonin Artaud, the Living Theatre, Abbie Hoffman, and 
Alfred Jarry.  Some are mildly critical of the Situationists (BLF and TYM) and typically fall 
for less intellectualist pranksters like Hoffman and Jarry.  Delicate distinctions are made by 
groups like the CAE and the SCP.  A unifying theme is the importance of many 1960s artists, 
including many that flowered in the counterculture and developed various practices and 
justifications for cultural resistance.  The CTM’s Gach sizes it up nicely: “In terms of 
contemporary art there is certainly a debt of gratitude that deserves to be paid to the 
Situationists, Provo, the Yippies, the Diggers, and everyone else organizing happenings, 
interventions, and provocations over 50 years” (CTM 2007).   
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 The art world in general is often viewed with a degree of ambivalence.  While The 
CAE and the IST are particularly critical of the art world’s ideology of individual genius and 
controlled environments, both regard art institutions as basically allied spaces and 
networks that serve some functions but not others.  This ambivalence is nicely captured by 
a discussion between IST members Manning and Rasovic: 
What’s interesting is that the few times that we’ve fallen flat is when we try to do those 
 projects in the context of the art world like in the museum.  They strip it down to this point 
 where it is basically a window display… 
 
If we are going to look for allies where else do you have them?  Most of the people working 
 there understand what you are going through.  Most of the people working there work for 
 little money and love of art (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 
 2012 
 
The relationship between the art world and many of the groups is nicely captured by CTM’s 
Gach (2007): 
 For me, personally, I went through a period when I was anti-institutional.  Wanted nothing 
 to do with the artworld. Part of the difficulties is wanting something from the art world that 
 it could not offer.  The shift came appreciating the art world for what it can offer, shouldn’t 
 try to squeeze blood from stone.  We are definitely incorporating aesthetic strategies. 
 
 But what properties inhere in these sets of categories?  A prevalent sense of self in 
this sample is one of agency, awareness, and freedom. With regard to the AAA, Lambert 
(2007) contends that, “It may not be completely obvious, but part of this project is about 
freedom. Freedom from these commercial images and ideas that permeate and limit our 
imagination of what is possible in the world – ideas about what life is for.”  The BLF stress 
the freedom and agency that comes with talking back to the media and corporations.  While 
ironically touting the virtues of heteronomy over freedom (Segal n.d.), they emphasize the 
stakes more clearly: “It's either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense 
of my own mental environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed 
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palimpsest” (Black n.d.).  Such values are especially prominent in the self-presentations of 
the AMF.  Lasn (1999: 146) consistently evokes images of freedom and autonomy:  
the goal of this workshop is to spark a dramatic personal mindshift that will change the way 
 you relate to corporations.  Once you’ve experienced this shift, you’ll feel ashamed for 
 having been so docile and subservient for so long.  Your days will be charged with a new 
 sense of autonomy and mission.   
 
And elsewhere, he sketches a strong sense of revelation, of an awareness of truth: 
  
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same again.  
 Your life veers off in strange new directions.  It’s very exciting and a little scary.  Ideas blossom into 
 obsessions.  The imperative to live life differently keeps building until the day it breaks through the 
 surface (Lasn 1999, xiv)  
 
The IAA are clear as well in their operators manual: “our goal is to provide you with a 
comfortable venue in which you can function as an autonomous entity ascribed to the 
simple ideologies of truth, love, and courage” (IAA Operative 2008, 8). 
Freedom, awareness, and agency are conditions for a life of spontaneity, creativity, 
and authenticity.  The AAA’s (2013c) Lambert views freedom as in part the expression of 
creativity.  The RBC defines freedom as in part the creation of original, authentic stories, 
stories forged in a rich spontaneous life, the “hot, complex human living” of public life 
(Talen 2006, 108).  Likewise, the CTM (n.d.(c)) view themselves as engaged in a 
fundamentally creative enterprise, “creative problem-solving” in the service of a “complete 
realization of a creative liberation of the ‘true will to live.’”  The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 106) 
lays it on thick: “Living in the moment, pursuing the authentic gesture, living close to the 
edge-call it what you will-when it’s genuine, it’s the force that makes life worth living.”  
Importantly, this understanding of life and authentic culture supersedes economic 
motivations.  Negativland (1995, 22) state it thus: 
 How and why should these laws apply when the infringement is not done for economic 
 gain?...For the law to claim that this alleged motive is the whole criterion for legal 
 deliberation is to admit that music, itself, is not to be taken seriously.  Culture is more than 
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 commerce.  It may actually have something to say about commerce. It may even use 
 examples of commerce to comment upon it. 
 
The AAA (2013b) expands this understanding to the mundane: “Look around and you’ll 
notice all the important things in life don’t make money – like loving others, giving gifts, 
sharing time with friends. It might not make financial sense, but this is a new kind of 
company with new kinds of goals.”  The BLF concur when they state, “the movement to 
convert open or public space into display advertising is deforming the  community and 
pitting those who value art and community against those who respect only money” (Black 
n.d.). 
Culture jamming groups also tend to express a strong sense of social responsibility, 
honesty, and egalitarianism.  Politically, many construct a sense of self as citizen, democrat, 
and participant.  The AAA’s Lambert (2007) is clear: “Personally, what we call it isn’t 
important to me. I think it’s about being a citizen. I am an artist and I am a citizen.”  The 
CTM (n.d.(b)) defines the purpose of tactical magic as, “activating the social imaginary with 
notions of responsible citizenship through creative action.”  The RBC (n.d.(a)) emphatically 
declares that through action in public space, “we become citizens again” and become 
responsible for the environment and others.  The CAE dissents on this point as they regard 
the concept of the citizen as “completely bankrupt” (Little 1999, 197).  A constant theme is 
support for real democracy.  This is especially pronounced in the importance of dialogue in 
the public sphere.  The BLF construe their activities as “simply having a dialogue with the 
advertisers” (Haller and Napier 2006, 93).  The IAA contributes to the reinvigoration of 
public space, including the free exchange of ideas and widening the scope of debate 
(Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117).  The AMF’s emphasizes a battle of ideas, the opening up of a 
wider dialogue between corporations, consumers, and citizens.  The CAE (1994, 27) declare 
225 
that “artists-activists…have been left with the responsibility to help provide a critical 
discourse” with respect to the frontiers of power, whether it is cyberspace or the body.  
This discourse is one of honesty and truth.  Both the RBC and the SCP speak of reclaiming a 
suppressed history: “Celebratory history, or condemning & counteracting suppression & 
failure of historical memory, is what the SCP attempts to do when it performs its 
performances on important dates” (SCP 2006, 43).  The Yes Men are unconcealers by trade: 
“these things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something 
about their nature that is really scary, we want to bring that to, we want to show that, we 
want to demonstrate that (Ollman, Prince, and Smith 2004).   
The most radical understanding of democracy is provided by the SCP and the CAE.  
Most of the SCP self-identify as anarchists (Bill Brown, personal communication, July 6, 
2012), a point Brown clarifies when he advocates direct democracy on a community-level 
as opposed to representative democracy (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 373).  The CAE  
describes themselves as practical anarchists devoted to principles of liberty and social 
justice (Little 1999, 194).  Like the SCP, this anarchism connotes a strong sense of 
democracy, egalitarianism, and anti-authoritarianism, though the CAE are extremely 
skeptical of almost all forms of social organization.  In contrast to the SCP, the CAE refer to 
‘community’ as a mythical concept and undesirable reality; “Solidarity based on similarity 
through shared ethnicity, and interconnected familial networks supported by a shared 
sense of place and history, work against the possibility of power through diversity” 
(McKenzie and Schneider 2000, 146). 
Importantly, some groups are prone to distance themselves from the Left.  The 
AMF’s Lasn (1999, 118-9) declares: “we are not Lefties.”  He describes the traditional 
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opposition as “tired, self-satisfied, and dogmatic,” lacking in passion, and “no longer 
pin[ing] for real change.”  Yet, they smother every effort at legitimate change, “muscl[ing] in 
on every major struggle and social protest of the past half century…but[now] they are the 
problem.”  The CAE are clear:  
Admittedly, CAE isn't fond of progressives primarily because they still believe the state will 
 save them. The Law/the Logos/the Patriarchy is not going to help anyone, and empowering 
 it further only serves to increase the gravity of power bearing down on us. But because of 
 faith in democracy (or at least its simulation), they are always ready to be the dupes of 
 various power vectors (CAE and Dery 1997). 
 
However, others like the Billionaires and Yes Men are quite clear on their affinity for the 
Left as an agency for positive social change. 
Thus with some deviations, the CJOs studied here define themselves as authentic 
and creative artist-activists fulfilling their roles as responsible and free democratic citizens 
by engaging in a public dialogue with power and authority.   
7.4.2. Antagonists 
The primary antagonists of my sample are economic elites and the economic system 
that favors them.  Eight groups situate multi-national corporations (MNCs), economic 
globalization, international organizations like the IMF, and the legal frameworks that 
empower and sustain them as their primary antagonists (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IST, NGL, 
RBC, TYM).  Media corporations are especially common antagonists.  According to the 
sample of culture jamming groups, these foes possess a number of distinguishing 
characteristics.  First, they are essentially non-democratic organizations and structures.  
Corporations possess enormous resources that effectively subvert the egalitarian 
principles of political democracy.  Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example:  
One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though 
 they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have…when 
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 a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict 
 automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant’s inability to pay 
 the costs of mounting a proper defense.   
 
The AMF’s Lasn summarizes the relationship between economic power and political 
power: “Considering their vast financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had 
more power than any private citizen.  They could defend and exploit their rights and 
freedom more vigorously than any individual and therefore they were more free” (Lasn 
1999, 68).  The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace (say it slow) is clear as well: “I actually 
believe in a fair and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” 
(Schartz 2010).  The RBC is stark: “The ideal conditions for consumerism [free market 
capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and Talen 2011, 
136).  The enormous resources they wield and the influence they possess stands in stark 
contrast to their lack of accountability.  For example, the Yes Men (2004, 9) are incensed at 
the global power of the World Trade Organization, because like so many such institutions, 
“they were not elected by anyone.  They are not accountable to any constituency.”  
Moreover, corporations are perceived as monologic structures.  Whereas democracy 
entails a dialogue, the marketing campaigns, advertisements, and media products of MNCs 
are not conceived as part of a broader process of public dialogue, but of an imposition of 
texts and images.  The IST implicitly makes this point in a fascinating work in which they 
publicly enact the commands of advertisements.  Such monologues are dishonest and 
conceal important truths about corporate behavior.  The Yes Men describe corporations as 
“things that are not really presenting themselves honestly, or that hide something about 
their nature that is really scary” (Ollman et al 2004).  The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 19) describes 
the language of the corporation, adspeak, as “anti-language that, whenever it runs into 
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truth and meaning, annihilates it.”  Finally, MNCs and other economic actors are portrayed 
as opposed to the freedoms of others.  The Yes Men (2004, 16) explain: 
‘free trade’ elevates the freedom of transnationals to do business however they see fit above 
 all other freedoms, including freedoms that are crucial to the vast majority of the world’s 
 people: the freedom to organize a trade union; the freedom to grow your own crops; the 
 freedom to maintain social services or protect the environment you live in; the freedom to 
 eat, the freedom to not eat certain things, the freedom to drink water. 
 
One noteworthy press release from the BLF wryly claims: 
The value of freedom has been rendered obsolete. There is no longer any need for 
 individual choice in this age when all decisions can be left to a skilled professional who 
 specializes in knowing our every desire and need: the Advertiser…The people know better. 
 Let heteronomy reign! (Segal n.d.). 
 
Thus the majority of the sample identifies their antagonists as non-democratic, resource 
rich, monologic, dishonest, and opposed to the freedoms of others.  This conception of 
economic elites is diametrically opposed to the free and responsible citizen.  Negativland 
clarify: “It means to build this society up into an amazing consumer society, where 
everyone is consuming all the time” (Hossler and Joyce 1997).  The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54) 
hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and nationhood make little sense in 
this world.  We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers. We’re consumers.”    
Second, many groups note that MNCs are non-persons or fictions.  For many, the 
Supreme Court decision Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886) wrongly 
granted corporations extensive rights equivalent to the rights of individual citizens (AMF, 
BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM).  The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 157) charges that, “corporations are in the 
most literal and chilling sense, dispassionate.”  They lack fundamental human qualities like 
compassion and responsibility. This is by design, as they simply function as instruments of 
profit maximization.  For groups like the Yes Men and especially the RBC this singular 
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purpose calls to mind highly charged language like evil and sinister, a callous disregard for 
the concerns and freedoms of others.   
More generally, many groups in the sample view a system as destructive when such 
single-minded entities proliferate and gather a wide sphere of influence.  While a number 
express positive evaluations of capitalism, the same cannot be said for the unfettered 
variety.  Note again Monet Oliver DePlace’s confession: “I actually believe in a fair and 
balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010).  The 
BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism…the free market is wonderful” 
(Burkes 2012).  Yet, the unfettered variety consumes all value in its wake: “Old fashioned 
notions about art, science and spirituality being the peak achievements and the noblest 
goals of the spirit of man have been dashed on the crystalline shores of Acquisition; the 
holy pursuit of consumer goods” (Napier and Thomas 2006).  An ideal system lacks 
oppressive MNCs and is tempered by concerns over “community need” (Napier 2009).  The 
RBC sums it up well: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free market] is to 
bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government – into the 
market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54).  This understanding of unfettered capitalism has grown 
progressively apocalyptic as the political debate over climate change continues unabated.  
The AMF, RBC, and TYM are especially prone to deploy catastrophic imagery and urgency 
in depicting the economic and cultural system’s relationship to the environment.  
Corporations and the economic system are viewed as fundamentally anti-environmental. 
TYM (2010) weighs in: “capitalism is a machine that will destroy itself given enough time 
and given enough rope and you’d just hope that it doesn’t destroy us all with it.”  For the 
RBC, capitalism destroys culture.  Talen (2012, 39) notes the prevalence of mono-culture, 
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the “Sea of Identical Details” that pervades a highly corporatized area like Times Square.  
The AMF’s Lasn (1999, xii) describes contemporary American culture as a product of “top-
down” corporate influence: “our stories are now told by distant corporations with 
something to sell as well as to tell.”   
The corporate elite are not the only foe of CJOs.  For many, the political elite also fit 
much of the description of the economic elite.  A prominent Billionaires chant celebrates, 
“This is What Plutocracy Looks Like.” Billionaire Hal. E. Burton describes the government 
as captured (Roselund 2004).  More specifically, political parties feature prominently as 
antagonists.  Republicans are almost uniformly condemned as legally corrupt lackeys of the 
economic elites.  The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) refer to the Bush administration as the Bush cartel.  
Democrats take a beating as well.  An early incarnation of the Billionaires was Billionaires 
for Bush (or Gore).  However, the Billionaires and the Yes Men see a Democratic 
administration (in this case Obama) as sympathetic but constrained by regular politics: 
In the '30s, things changed dramatically in a progressive direction, similar to after a crash. 
 And after everybody saw that there was a major problem with the way things had been 
 done--which was a very free-market way. It had led to a collapse, and there was a 
 progressive president who was ready to make those changes. But people took to the streets 
 and forced it to happen. And what we need to do is recognize that we have a progressive 
 president now, and we need to actually take to the streets and give him the pressure that he 
 needs (TYM 2009b). 
 
Here, Obama and FDR are progressives basically in tune with the demands of the group.   
Aside from this relatively concrete vision of economic and political elites, more 
nebulous constructions are common.  Whether described as culture, spectacle, signs, or 
simply consumerism a common characterization of this sense of the enemy is its ubiquity.  
Negativland summarize their work as, “self-defense against the incessant barrage of 
corporate messages” (Baldwin 1995).  For the AMF’s Lasn (1999, 140), consumer 
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capitalism diffuses responsibility.  The culture is the problem, not the agents.  The RBC’s 
Talen (2003, 147) is succinct: “our opponent is everywhere and nowhere, does not have to 
retreat or advance. It melts into the air.”  This sense of an all-pervasive corporate influence 
is often given the description of colonizing.  The BLF note, “advertising suffuses all corners 
of our waking lives; it so permeates our consciousness that even our dreams are often 
indistinguishable from a rapid succession of TV commercials” (Napier and Thomas 2006).  
Elsewhere, BFL member Black (n.d.) claims, “our minds and attention-span are a resource 
that will be colonized and exploited, unless we work to conserve them.”  The RBC “connects 
the enjoyment we can have in the theatre or in the streets with the need to free our 
colonized imaginations” (D. and Talen 2011, 13). 
The CAE and the CTM regard the state and corporate power as part of a general 
system of power and domination operative at the micro-level.  Both speak of authoritarian 
power vectors originating in a variety of contexts and institutions.  Although they refuse to 
pin down a single term (Spectacle, Machine, etc.), the CTM (2006b) view these sources of 
authority as “commonly [wielding] power through the manipulation of sign systems which 
individuals are collectively programmed to accept as valid structures of discipline and 
control.”  Whether described as pancapitalism, authoritarian culture, or semiotic regime, 
the CAE define their adversary broadly as the overarching structure of power in society 
and the globe that serves to impose control over individuals.  The group contrasts nomadic 
liquid power with sedentary power.  Sedentary power is located in “halls of power” dubbed 
bunkers: “castles, palaces, malls, government bureaucracies, monuments, factories, the 
media, etc.” (CAE 1996, 6).  Power today is not so anchored.  As a “nomadic electronic flow,” 
it moves through “ambiguous zone[s] without borders,” and is composed of a “diffuse field 
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without location, and a fixed sight machine appearing as spectacle” (CAE 1994, 6, 11, 15).62  
Bunkers still exist, but only as “colonize[rs] of the mind (CAE 1996, 37).”  More generally, 
CAE view all of these processes and structures as expressions of the rationalization and 
instrumentalization of culture and social life.  The incessant homogenizing reductivism of 
efficiency and profit is at the core of the pancapitalist imperative. The IAA is somewhat 
more restrictive in its focus on corporate and government modes of authority.  Like the 
CAE (2012b, 81-82), which views the pre-Bush United States mode of governance as 
“friendly fascism” and the Bush mode of governance as “neofascism”, the IAA describe 
corporate and state authority as “fascist” and authoritarian (IAA Operative 2008).   
The SCP (2006, 43) is unique in the sample for focusing exclusively on the state - the “police 
state” - as the locus of oppression.  Like the CAE, the SCP describes the social system as 
spectacle.  However, the SCP’s focus on surveillance highlights state imperatives that 
reinforce order, fear, and dependence: "We don't worry for ourselves anymore…There are 
specialists that do the worrying for us. This is warping human beings" (Tavernise 2004).  
Like the construction of economic elites, governance structures and practices like 
surveillance weaken the critical faculties necessary for freedom.  Elsewhere, the SCP (2006, 
172) describe contemporary society as the “transparent society – the universal destruction 
of the rights to privacy, anonymity, and free assembly.”  The IAA comment as well on this 
dynamic between surveillance and democracy: 
Cameras take any kind of agency or responsibility that an individual citizen might have out 
 of the question.  Then you place your trust in this mechanism that you have no connection 
 to.  It has no accountability to you.  It relies on fear as the overwhelming force, rather than 
 co-operation.  Any of the traditional social values we like to associate democracy with in 
 America – all of those become really unnecessary (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 114) 
 
                                                          
62
 The sight machine basically refers to the spectacle (CAE 1994, 15). 
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Thus, most groups in the sample negatively evaluate economic elites and to a lesser extent 
political elites.  Many groups view their antagonist as a more generalized culture of 
oppression or consumerism.  The SCP and to some extent the IAA, CTM, and the CAE focus 
on the State as a significant foe, but many of the same properties are attributed to political 
institutions and actors as other groups attribute primarily to economic elites. 
7.4.3. The Public 
 Along with sketches of protagonists and antagonists, CJOs construct a sense of the 
public.  Here I focus on three broad angles: contextual, dominated, and potential.  First, 
some CJOs differentiate among publics.  One distinction separates direct and indirect 
audiences (CAE, IST, TYM).  Here, the IST’s D’Ignazio distinguishes a general from a specific 
audience, the latter largely determined by the nature of each project: 
There is always a kind of general audience…like the person who comes to the website... 
There’s always that audience…People who would be interested from  a general sense.  Every 
project, like the Renaming project, was for the audience in Cambridge…In a sense, they were 
our first order of audience.  It’s really small, really tight (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, 
personal interview, August 27, 2012). 
 
The Yes Men’s direct audiences are typically conference attendees.  In the case of their 
WTO events, the direct audience consisted of “foot soldiers in WTO’s war on trade unions, 
environmental protections, and indigenous rights “(TYM 2004).  As they discovered: 
our audience of lawyers in Salzburg had a theory—that the free market could bring 
 happiness to the world at large—and they had the deepest possible faith in it. We had 
 imagined that if we pushed our proposals into the outer limits of ugliness, we could horrify 
 our audience into objecting. But the nature of their faith was such that so long as our 
 proposals derived from the one true theory, there was no way they would ever see anything 
 wrong with them. (TYM n.d.(b)) 
 
The CAE are cautious about generalizing about anything like a general audience.  For them, 
the idea of a public (like a public sphere) is a myth, because public space is so thoroughly 
managed and the homogenization of an audience is a move of power. Instead, they develop 
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counter-publics “directly constituted by those who occupy” them (CAE 2012b, 15, 134).  
The Billionaires, on the other hand, are concerned with ‘voters,’ whom they parcel into 
categories like leftists, swing voters, Bush voters, and the middle.   
A second distinction involves general versus specialized audiences (AMF, CAE, CMT, 
IAA, IST, TYM).  The AMF distinguish between their general audience and two particular 
groups: economics students (Lasn 2012) and graphic designers (Lasn 2006).  Both are 
critical actors in the perpetuation of consumer society and suffer the same ambivalent 
descriptions as the general public below, but they are both more directly complicit and 
more crucial to resistance than the general public.  The IAA distinguishes between the 
public and engineers.  Like the AMF’s specialized publics, engineers are both more 
complicit and more crucial to resistance than the general public (IAA 2005).  Much the 
same can be said of the CAE’s focus on cultural producers and hackers (CAE 1994, 1996).  
Finally, some groups distinguish between audiences constituted in an art context and those 
encountered outside of this context.  The CMT’s Gach (2007) notes that art audiences 
receive the Center’s actions differently.  The IST’s Rasovic notes the contextual differences: 
It is a very different experience.  And it is one where the audience is again that audience that 
 looks at art and looks at things, a sophisticated audience versus an audience that we kind of 
 composite based on the context, a specific place, an urban place.  A museum or a gallery 
 feels like a temple.  Everybody shows up for the service, and then everybody disperses 
 (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). 
 
Second, many CJOs view the public as dominated by economic elites or the economic 
system, an oppressive culture, and/or the state.   Because this domination involves the 
third dimension of power – the acquiescence to power either as resignation or preference – 
the dominated are caught in a perilous zone encompassing victimization and complicity.  
The victimized are variously portrayed as unaware, lacking agency, colonized, exploited, 
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unwitting, predictable, etc.  The Yes Men view the public as highly susceptible to free 
market ideology: 
Ready to goosestep. Fully in sync with the bottom line… And not just the corporate man: the 
 corporate woman, the academic man, the political woman, the alcoholic child. Many, many 
 people, regardless of education, are easy prey for the ideas of the corporate decision-
 makers. Present them with a decision, they will accept it! (TYM n.d.(b)) 
 
The AAA (2013c) describes advertising as naturalized and normalized, as “understood by 
the public that [it] has the right to own, occupy, and control any available space, ” a process 
facilitated by feelings of powerlessness.  The IST’s Rasovic states, “our point was you are 
not immune to it.  Don’t think you are smart enough to reject it.  It’s seeping into us, this 
constant fear, this constant bombardment with messaging” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and 
Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  The RBC’s Talen (2006, 23) notes that, “the 
consumers, upon seeing the imagery of the product or corporation, often immediately have 
memories, fantasies, anticipations” that compel them to buy.  The BLF’s Napier (2009) 
suggests that advertising supersedes free will if it is effective.  More generally: 
I think we're in a transition period right now with popular culture kind of consuming 
 everything. The center of the universe in our world now seems to be Madison Ave and 
 Hollywood, and everything emanates out of there and ricochets all over the place. That's 
 what people are interested in, that's what motivates them, that's what they aspire to. If you 
 look at it one way, it can be very disturbing and frightening (BLF 1999). 
 
Yet, elsewhere Napier (2009) cautions against making assumptions about the awareness of 
the public: “I feel that presupposing ‘self-awareness’ in any demographic sector is as 
dangerous as presupposing stupidity or close-mindedness.” 
The AMF provides the most extreme and detailed constructions of a public 
straddling complicity and victimization.  For the AMF, consumers live mediated, 
inauthentic, unaware lives that unwittingly sustain consumer capitalism.  No longer do 
people enjoy direct relations with other people, nature, or even themselves; instead, they 
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live through the images of the spectacle of news, entertainment, and advertising.  Such a 
life, “erode[s] our ability to empathize, to take social issues seriously, to be moved by 
atrocity” (Lasn 1999, 19).  The process is sustained by a socialization process that Lasn 
(Lasn 1999, 40-1) equates with programming and brainwashing: 
The modern consumer is a Manchurian Candidate living in a trance.  He has a vague notion 
 that at some point early in his life, experiments were carried out on him, but he can’t 
 remember much about them.  While he was drugged, or too young to remember, ideas were 
 implanted into his subconscious with a view to changing his behavior. 
 
Everyone is “recruited into role and behavior patterns we did not consciously choose” 
(Lasn 1999, 53).  Those who have not developed the agency and freedom that comes with 
awareness of their programming are equated with pigs that roll over for MNCs, slaves, and 
parts of a machine.  Yet, this trance-like enslavement is strangely desirable.  Lasn’s favorite 
analogy is Huxleyan soma.  The spectacle appeals to our basic human desires and exploits 
our weaknesses.  He notes, “the strange thing is, you don’t’ really mind.  In fact, on some 
level, you’re happy as a clam” (Lasn 1999, 143).  While the AMF tend to create a distance 
between themselves and the public or consumers by stressing awareness and agency 
despite the shared experience of living in the same media environment, the Yes Men’s 
Bichlbaum highlights a political complicity common to all: “No one can govern without the 
consent of the governed. So making fun of power enables people to see in themselves 
how they are the power, and how they are propping it up—how we are all propping it up” 
(Bichlbaum 2012a).  Likewise, the SCP’s Brown declares, “we are unwitting citizens of a 
surveilled society” (Kirby 1999). The RBC’s Talen (2006, 112) speculates:  
Perhaps because we are the subjects of consumerism, we cannot show to the public air our 
 original selves.  We are in a hurry, exhausted, worn down.  Or we are giving out signals that  




 Third, many CJOs regard the public as ripe with potential for awareness, agency, and 
freedom.  In other words, while they are dominated, people are also capable of becoming 
cognizant of their domination and even participate in resistance. Adopting a first-person 
perspective, the AMF’s Lasn (1999, 143) speculates: “Once in a while, in a flash of light, you 
understand that something is wrong.”  He charges: “There is an anger, a rage-driven 
defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering.  It contains the conviction that change is 
possible…Learning how to jam our culture with this rage may be one of the few ways left to 
feel truly among the quick” (Lasn 1999, 143).  The AAA’s Lambert (2007) expresses 
optimism at the potential for people to move into a state of awareness: 
In the world I encounter, the trend is always upward. I get more emails and letters from 
 people all over the world thanking the AAA for what we do, asking for more information 
 and more ways to be involved. I also teach and I see students that more or less move from 
 passive consumers towards engaged citizens in the course of a semester. I meet more fellow 
 artists who are responding to the world around them, who want to make work that involves 
 itself in popular culture, work that addresses ideas of social control. People see the 
 relationship between the short-term desires reinforced by advertising and the long-term 
 problems like global warming and war. I admit, this may be the bubble that I walk around 
 in, but regardless, I know once people are educated, they can’t turn back. 
 
The BLF (1999) promotes “the idea that people can do this kind of thing because it makes 
them more alive.”  The CAE (2001) promote amateurism as a basic principle of tactical 
media.  While this applies to practitioners, it also applies to the wider public.  The group 
argues that the discourses and practices of science and other spheres of knowledge are 
perfectly accessible to wider audiences, and that their actions are designed as interfaces 
not to simplify knowledge, but to demystify it and thus generate a sense of critical agency 
and awareness.  For the Billionaires, not all voters are alike.  The group defines the middle 
and swing voters as susceptible to the notion that voting for a Republican is voting against 
their own interests (Boyd 2004; Haugerud 2013, 57). 
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 In general, the CJOs in the sample distinguish among different publics, sketch them 
as dominated and thus straddling a distinction between victim and complicit, and endow 
them with the capacity to resist this domination.   
7.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter I develop hypotheses about the relationship between CJOs and the 
field of artistic production and describe their collective identities.  The evidence presented 
basically supports the hypothesized relationship and establishes that CJOs have a strong 
connection to the art world and possess artistic skills and knowledge.  The content of CJO’s 
collective identities supports this relationship as well.  Most of the groups self-identify as 
artist-activists or cultural activists. 
A clear observation of this chapter is that among the CJOs studied here none engage 
in identity politics.  Such an observation might be anticipated when considering Kriesi et 
al’s (1995) study of new social movements in Europe, in which they show that some new 
social movements are not identity-oriented.  The following chapter fills out the concept of 









CHAPTER 8: NETWORKS AND RESOURCES 
As the final element of Part II of this study, this chapter concludes the analysis of 
fields, networks, and identities.  Only in social interaction are social fields and collective 
identities forged, yet together their independent effects reverberate upon the course of 
future social interactions, including contentious interactions.  This chapter aims to clarify 
this portrait of everyday social organization by presenting data regarding the various 
resources that culture jammers utilize.  This includes especially the durable social relations 
and organizational structures specific to my sample of CJOs.  Chapter Seven considers the 
role of particular social networks (school and work) in the production of specific resources 
(the aesthetic disposition).  This chapter thus attempts to establish a fuller accounting of 
the resource constraints of CJOs. 
 This chapter is divided into three parts.  First, I review the literature on social 
networks and resources in social movement theory.  Second, I situate this focus within the 
broader theoretical developments of this dissertation.  Specifically, I explore the structure 
of organization in culture jamming as well as the relevant links between networks, 
organizations, and resources.  Hypotheses and propositions are developed to flesh out 
these theoretical relations.  Third, the developed hypotheses and propositions provide 
guidance for an exploration of my sample of CJOs.  
8.1. Review 
8.1.1. Social Networks 
 Everyone knows someone.  This is the core of the concept of a social network: the 
sets of social relationships between actors, the structures of durable social interaction that 
characterize social life (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  Such relations possess a number of 
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important variable properties.  Granovetter (1973), for example, argues that interpersonal 
relations vary in strength from strong to weak to absent depending on the degrees of 
investment, intimacy, and commitment.  Relations are also distinguished by positive, 
negative, or neutral evaluations: people or organizations may be enemies, friends, or 
simply aware of one another (Labianca and Brass 2006).  Finally, social relations can be 
formal or informal (Wilson 2000).  In the former, social ties are determined by the formal 
organizational setting, as in the relation between students and teachers.  Informal social 
ties are interpersonal relationships that transcend the routines and roles of formal 
organizations; friendship and family relations are two common informal ties.  
 Two of the great debates in social movement theory over the decades revolved 
around the structure of social relations.  The first involves the question of mobilization and 
outcomes: which network structure is most conducive to the generation of social 
movements (and thus to political instability)?  For breakdown theorists, a healthy society is 
characterized by dense networks that channel political concerns into political institutions, 
whether through identification with the community and its values (Kornhauser 1959; Lang 
and Lang 1961; Smelser 1963) or through the mediation and moderation of discontent 
(Gurr 1970).  When these ties are eroded, when individuals are isolated from community 
or when grievances find no moderating medium, patterns of mobilization emerge in which 
the mass of isolated individuals in society take their grievances to the streets.  In contrast, 
solidarity theorists (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978) argue that isolated 
individuals lack the social connections to organize collective action.  Instead, dense 
networks provide the infrastructure of resources and commitments, including 
interpersonal trust and cultural frames that lower the transaction costs for mobilizing large 
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numbers of people.  While empirical studies support solidarity theory, more recent efforts 
have considered the potential multivalent effects of social ties in which different sets of ties 
or network structures have different effects (Kitts 2000; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). 
8.1.2. Networks and Organization 
 In the early years of the twentieth century, revolutionaries in Europe and the United 
States debated whether the social revolution would come under the guidance of vanguard 
parties (Lenin) or spontaneous mass uprisings (Luxembourg).  More recently, this debate, 
now less urgent, centers on the question of what effects organizational form have on 
mobilization, strategy, and outcomes.  Especially for proponents of RMT, formal and 
centralized organizations are more capable of responding to changes in the political 
environment, maintaining and deploying significant resources, and mobilizing large 
numbers of people, while the use of more conventional or institutional tactics promises 
more significant outcomes (McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1987a; Oberschall 1973).  
Others, notably Piven and Cloward (1979) in their work on poor people’s movements, 
argue that such organizations actually inhibit mobilization and settle for small concessions, 
because they develop an accommodation to the political environment that prioritizes 
organizational maintenance.  Moreover, more informal and de-centralized organizations 
tend to utilize innovative and disruptive tactics that constrain the resistance of authorities 
and thus offer better rewards for activism.   
 Today, the debate has begun to eschew the dichotomy between formal centralized 
organizations and informal de-centralized organizations.  In her study of feminist 
organizations, Staggenborg (1989; Lofland 1996) argued that formalization (especially the 
division of labor) and centralization should be understood as distinct continuous variables.  
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For example, a particular SMO may be highly informal with a weak division of labor but 
extremely centralized.  Lofland (1996) considers a wider range of qualitatively different 
means of organizing.  More dramatically, Clemens (1993; 1997) developed the concept of 
an organizational repertoire, the set of organizational forms, practices, and roles that 
citizens can draw on when engaging in politics.  Like the repertoire of contention, the 
organizational repertoire draws from the apolitical means of organization characteristic of 
everyday life.  Organizing for social change can thus take a wide variety of forms.   
 Finally, Polletta (2002) explores the varieties of organizational practices associated 
with participatory democracy.  Of note is her consideration that many such practices are 
often grounded in basic social relations, such as kinship and friendship.  This proposition 
points to an extreme case of the common argument among solidarity theorists that 
movement organization often builds directly onto the existing organization of a population.  
The “bloc recruitment” of “solidarity communities” (Oberschall 1973), the “catnets”, or 
networks formed of categories of people (Tilly 1978), and the “indigenous organizational 
strength” of a population (McAdam 1999), among others, all refer to the same notion: 
existing social networks reduce the costs of organizing by providing the identities and 
resources for nascent movements.  Most notably, Southern black churches were one of the 
organizational cores of the burgeoning civil rights movement (McAdam 1999; Morris 
1984).  They provided not only the infrastructure for the movement in its early years, 
including facilities and members, but also a great deal of its collective action frames and the 
sense of belonging and commitment.  In this argument, formal organizations are formed 
and grown primarily through informal relations and their attendant commitments and 
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cognitions.  Such work points directly to the strong links between social networks and the 
collective identities and resources they house. 
8.1.3. Resources 
 Resources are the assets that actors use to achieve their goals.  One of the most 
important resources for any form of human activity is the sets of commitments that bind 
people together.  Through these sets of social networks, resources are gathered, accessed, 
identified, and utilized.  But while social relations are essential for collective action, a full 
accounting of social movements and protest must attend to a wide variety of resources.  
The basic importance of resources to social movements became a systematic topic 
of concern primarily with the advance of RMT.  One of the central theses of this approach is 
that shifts in the availability of resources affect patterns of mobilization.  Despite its 
significance, often ruefully noted is the fact that little effort has been spared to theoretically 
ground the concept of resources (Cress and Snow 1996).  The strongest advances are 
typological.  Two basic methods are used to generate tentatively exhaustive lists of the 
resources relevant for collective action: inductive and deductive.  Through their study of 
homeless mobilization, Cress and Snow (1996) inductively develop a typology of resources 
incorporating moral (legitimacy, authority), material (basic goods, money, transportation, 
facilities, etc.), informational (knowledge relevant to collective action and organization), 
and human resources (audiences, leaders, and members).   
In contrast, Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop a deductive approach through a 
reading of the social movement literature and the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.  At least 
two categories are familiar: moral resources refer to solidarity and legitimacy, while 
material resources include physical and financial capital, including money, property, 
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equipment, etc.  The three remaining categories include cultural resources (forms of 
knowledge and cultural products, including tactical repertoires), social-organizational 
resources (social networks, physical infrastructure, and organizations), and human 
resources (labor, skills, leadership).  The key distinction between human resources and 
cultural and social-organizational resources is that the former are more proprietary and 
less widely available, while the latter are accessible.  Cultural and moral resources are 
distinct principally with respect to the latter’s scarcity; while large numbers of people can 
access cultural resources like a repertoire of contention, moral resources are harder to tap, 
because they are accrued through performance and position.   
8.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 In order to describe the sets of resources that CJOs have at their disposal, I briefly 
elaborate on the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of resources and political 
action.  First, I consider some basic efforts at distinguishing among types of resources 
before I return to Bourdieu’s concept of capital.  Second, I develop hypotheses regarding 
the relation between the social networks that members of CJOs are embedded within and 
the organizational structures that they erect for their collective cultural jamming efforts.  
Third, I briefly consider other resources that may be of interest with respect to culture 
jamming. 
8.2.1. Resources 
 While Edwards and McCarthy (2004) develop their taxonomy in part through their 
reading of Bourdieu, I argue that this effort is not quite satisfactory.   First, they distinguish 
cultural from human resources by arguing that the former are generally accessible while 
the latter are under the exclusive control of individuals.  This is particularly confused in 
245 
their insistence on equating cultural resources with habitus and human resources with 
skills and experiences.  Strictly speaking, the habitus is the sets of skills and knowledge 
possessed by an individual, group, or organization.  Second, the emphasis on proprietarity 
is unevenly employed.  While cultural and human resources are distinguished solely on this 
basis, social-organizational resources include proprietary and non-proprietary resources.  
Moreover, while material resources are highly proprietary, another material resource, 
infrastructure (a clear example of physical capital in the economic sense), is classified as 
social-organizational because it is nonproprietary.  In other words, while an analysis of 
variation in proprietarity is essential for a full accounting of resources, Edwards and 
McCarthy’s effort is taxonomically inconsistent. 
 It is perhaps valuable to return to one of their primary inspirations.  Bourdieu 
(1986) distinguishes four forms of capital.  Economic capital refers to physical and financial 
capital, to that which “is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be 
institutionalized in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu 1986, 243).  It includes money, 
real estate, infrastructure, and various material assets like equipment, vehicles, and basic 
supplies that can be readily converted into money.  Cultural capital includes the skills and 
knowledge embodied in ways of seeing and acting (bodily dispositions), the ownership of 
cultural objects like works of art, and possession of various forms of institutional 
recognition, as in academic degrees and honors.  Social capital specifies those resources 
that are, “linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 1986, 248).  It thus 
includes not only the range of commitments available to a particular agent and which can 
be called upon under various circumstances, but also the totality of capital (economic, 
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cultural, symbolic) that can be mobilized by others through these commitments.   Finally, 
symbolic capital refers to the variable property of all forms of capital that confers 
legitimacy, prestige, honor, and other forms of authority and competence.  Together, these 
four species of capital, or power, are both the objects and the materials of strategies.   
 This Bourdieusian scheme is inclusive of the categories of Edwards and McCarthy.  
Economic capital incorporates material resources and nonproprietary social-
organizational resources.  Cultural capital includes cultural and human resources.  
Symbolic capital is a generalization of moral resources, while social capital incorporates 
proprietary social-organizational resources.  The primary focus of this dissertation is on 
cultural capital, specifically the aesthetic disposition.  However, to understand culture 
jamming requires a broader understanding of the resource priorities and constraints of 
CJOs.  Emphasis will fall primarily on the various forms of social, cultural, and economic 
capital.  It is to nonproprietary social organization, or social capital, that I now turn in order 
to begin a discussion of the resources of culture jammers. 
8.2.2. Social Networks and Organization 
 For solidarity theorists, social networks and existing organizations reduce 
organizing costs by providing the resources and commitments necessary for nascent 
movement leaders to mobilize large numbers of people (McAdam 1999; Morris 1984; 
Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).  Thus, it is through the provision of incentives for action that 
prior social organization constrains the structure of movement organization; community 
organization yields social movement organization.  As this dissertation aims to 
demonstrate, Tilly’s concept of everyday social organization as a constraint on repertoires 
of contention reflects this argument with relation to tactical choice.   
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 The relation of organizing to social networks is more complex, however.  SMOs vary 
in the degree to which they are organized formally.  A high degree of formalization 
describes an SMO in which decision-making and action are organized by established 
procedures, “a developed division of labor by function, explicit membership criteria, and 
formal rules governing any subunits such as chapters and committees.  SMOs that lack 
formalized structures have few established decision-making and operational procedures, a 
minimal and changing division of labor, and loose membership requirements” 
(Staggenborg 1989, 75).   Formal rules and roles thus tend to distinguish individuals from 
their functions by clarifying the structure of the organization, while informality is more 
likely to personalize responsibilities.   
 All decision-making processes in organizations and collective actions, even those 
characterized by extensive formalization, are governed by an informal etiquette of 
deliberation (Polletta 2002, 16).  This etiquette pertains to those concerns either 
unaddressed or inadequately addressed by the formal rules and roles, as in appropriate 
body language and emotional expression, the framing of issues, and principles of legitimate 
argumentation, among others.  Such practices often operate at the level of the habitus.  As 
Chapter Two argues, the habitus is the accumulation of the practical responses, in the form 
of the employment of social classifications, to social situations.  It is the nexus of the 
relation between social fields and unfolding social interactions.  In other words, it guides a 
practical sense of relationships that governs, among other behaviors, proper and 
acceptable discussion and other essential organizing practices.   Decision-making in SMOs, 
even in formal settings, require this foundation of ‘unspoken’ coordination.   
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 The more informal the process in SMOs, the more likely the etiquette specific to 
basic social relations will govern the decision-making and organizing process.  Organizing 
in highly informal SMOs is more likely to draw on basic social ties like religious fellowship, 
student-teacher relations, friendship, and kinship, relations that are deeply embedded in 
the habitus.63  Part of reducing the costs of organization is found in the mobilization of 
familiar practices.64  Creating new formal and informal procedures for intra-organizational 
interaction is likely a costly and risky affair.  Drawing on existing and familiar models of 
interaction, often unconsciously, frees up precious resources for other tasks.  As Chapter 
Three also argues, familiar deliberative practices may also increase the benefits of 
interaction by building viable expectations and commitments regarding future interactions.  
In other words, familiarity breeds trust and solidarity and thus reduces uncertainty.  As 
solidarity theorists would argue, there is a tight relation between social movements and 
existing social networks.   
 NSM theory amends the basic solidarity hypothesis by situating the arrival of new 
organizational forms within developments in the political economy (Castells 1997; 
Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).   According to this 
perspective, previous movements generated hierarchical, bureaucratic, and large political 
organizations in order to represent the interests of some sector of society, such as the 
working class.  In contrast, for the peace, women’s, environmental, and other movements, 
                                                          
63 This is a generalization of Polletta’s (2002) argument that participatory democratic decision-making in 
SMOs draws on the norms of interaction characteristic of certain basic associational ties.  I justify this 
procedure on the observation, recognized by Polletta that not all everyday social relations, and thus not all 
etiquettes of deliberation, are transparent, egalitarian, and anti-authoritarian.  Friendship, for example, is 
exclusivist; pedagogical etiquette is fully capable of significant inequality (though Polletta [2002, 75] argues it 
also capable of more equitable applications); and ties based on faith can draw on a model of authoritarian 
charisma.  Other examples abound, particularly relations resting on significant inequalities: race, gender, etc. 
64 This is clearly an application of the argument regarding familiarity, information, and incentives found in 
Chapter Three. 
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contemporary “collective mobilization assumes forms…which do not fit into traditional 
categories, and which make evident a distinct analytical discontinuity” in the transition 
from old to new movements (Melucci 1996, 113).  These organizational forms and the 
broader organizational structure of specific movements are decentralized, autonomous, 
diffuse, amorphous, disorganized, reticular, etc.  Such forms are latent structures, 
“relatively permanent forms of network” that “interweave closely with daily life” beneath 
the vagaries of mobilization (Melucci 1996, 116).65  Such submerged networks (Melucci 
1989) reflect and refract the existing social organization of everyday life upon which they 
subsist and shape the forms of contentious collective action that emerge from them.   
 Existing data supports the relation between activism and social organization with 
respect to culture jamming.  Wettergren (2005, 48) finds that CJOs are composed of 
individuals with strong friendship ties existent prior to the establishment of the 
organization.  NSM theory anticipates precisely this manner of organization.  For example, 
Melucci (1996, 330) argues that friendship circles “are rather common in the movement 
networks and seem to perform the function of enabling simultaneous investment in two 
fields (friendship and commitment), thereby restricting possible losses”66  Furthermore, 
NSM theory suggests that such groups tend to eschew formal rules for informal task 
allocation (Melucci 1996, 329-331).  Thus, I develop two descriptive hypotheses: 
 H8.1: CJOs are informally organized. 
 
 H8.2: CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing  friendship networks. 
 
                                                          
65 This implicitly establishes a layered distinction between routine social life, contention-connected social 
interaction, and collective mobilization, one later recognized by Tilly (2008, 8). 
66 However, Melucci (1996, 330) qualifies this hypothesis by suggesting that this is the case “especially where 
professional or cultural skills are weaker.”  Considering the findings in the previous chapter, if I find evidence 
of friendship-based organization, then the hypothesized pattern of low skills and friendship circles does not 
seem to apply to culture jamming organizations. 
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Both hypotheses consider the nature of the social relations within the organization.  
However, it is worth noting that formalization is not merely a property of intra-
organizational relations, but also the manner in which an organization relates to other 
actors.  For example, obtaining 501(c) or non-profit status in the United States is a formal 
status recognized by the federal government that incentivizes the formalization of some 
internal tasks, such as record-keeping.  I develop no hypotheses relating CJOs to this sense 
of formalization.  
 Other descriptive hypotheses are also developed inductively, though there is some 
basis in the preceding discussion of NSM theory for valid expectations consonant with the 
available data.  First, SMOs vary in their degree of centralization.  Centralization refers to 
the extent to which an SMO’s primary decision-making prerogatives are concentrated in a 
small group or individual relative to the rest of the membership (Staggenborg 1989).  Some 
groups are highly concentrated, as when an individual makes all important authoritative 
decisions, while others are highly decentralized, thus diffusing important decision-making 
functions across many units or individuals without significant veto power at a center.  
Wettergren (2005, 48) argues that CJOs are highly individualistic.  I argue that together 
these insights suggest a general pattern of decentralized organization.  I thus hypothesize: 
 H8.3: CJOs are organizationally decentralized. 
I thus expect to find evidence of non-hierarchical, participatory procedures for decision-
making in my sample of CJOs.   
 Second, SMOs vary in the degree of commitment that they require of their members 
(Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Jasper 2006; Lofland 1996).  Inclusive SMOs tend to vary 
wildly in the amount of effort that members provide for the organization and the degree of 
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indoctrination required for their participation.  Exclusive SMOs tend to require significant 
contributions from all or most members and thus tend to exclude from the organization 
those who may be less committed.   Polletta (2002, 140) finds that friendship, though a 
strong tie with powerful commitments, is exclusivist;  
 If friendship supplies the trust, mutual affection, and respect that facilitate fast and fair 
 decisions, it also makes it difficult to expand the deliberative group beyond the original 
 circle.  Newcomers lack an understanding of the history of the issues at stake as well as the 
 idiosyncratic practices of this organization…Since newcomers by definition threaten 
 existing friendships, they may find it difficult to secure the trust, respect, and solicitude that 
 veterans enjoy. 
 
Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be very exclusivist.  In fact, they are 
usually composed of only two to five friends.   Thus, I offer a descriptive hypothesis: 
 H8.4: CJOs are exclusively organized. 
This hypothesis leads to two expectations.  First, membership and participation in CJOs 
tend to require a relatively high degree of commitment.  Second, contrary to Staggenborg’s 
(1989, 75) description of informal SMOs, membership is not “loosely” defined; though they 
are unwritten, there are nonetheless significant barriers to membership.  
 Finally, the size of an organization may be anticipated by considering at least three 
key variables: financial resources, membership size, and geographic scope.  As noted above, 
Wettergren (2005, 48) observes that CJOs tend to be extremely small in terms of 
membership.  If this is so, then it suggests that the economic resources of the organization 
are significantly constrained.  Additionally, the capacity for geographic scope should be 
constrained.  Furthermore, small financial resources and small memberships suggest that 
the capacity for geographic scope should be constrained in part by financial and labor 
resources.  I thus hypothesize: 
 H8.5: CJOs are organizationally small. 
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8.2.3. Organizational Resources 
 This hypothesized image of CJO paints a portrait of a relatively small, highly 
personalized, individualistic, decentralized, and exclusivist set of informal arrangements 
for organizing collective actions.  However, while organizations and social networks are 
themselves crucial resources that activists can utilize in order to further their goals, they 
often provide a variety of other resources that are crucial or beneficial to collective action.  
First, CJOs may have significant social relations with other organizations and networks.  
Such relations may include other CJOs and individuals, family, friends, websites, 
educational institutions, and a variety of other potential social, political, and economic 
arrangements.   Through these relationships culture jammers may obtain access to 
potential members, audiences, money, supplies, facilities, infrastructure, information, skills, 
and credentials, among others.   One task of this chapter is to decipher the most relevant 
social capital to culture jammers and their attendant resources.  However, while I do 
consider relations between inter-organizational resources and CJOs in Chapter Twelve, I do 
not develop any hypotheses or propositions here. 
 Second, CJOs may draw on different forms of economic or material capital.  
Infrastructure is crucial to a variety of social activities, including activism.  Of particular 
importance is the Internet.  Access to the Internet and the requisite skills for its navigation 
performs at least two important functions.  First, advanced communications technologies 
reduce transaction costs for organizing, including political activism (Bonchek 1995; Van 
Laer and Van Aelst 2010).  A variety of costs are involved in collective action, including the 
acquisition and processing of information, communication, and coordination of individuals.  
The Internet especially provides efficient, fast, and convenient means for addressing these 
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difficulties.  Second, and more importantly, the Internet offers a distinct terrain of action 
with unique capacities.  As one of the major structural changes in nearly every aspect of life 
in the last two decades, the Internet offers new spaces and issues of contestation.   I 
consider as well the myriad ways in which CJOs utilize this structural development.  
Additionally, a variety of facilities and equipment may be crucial to collective action.  At the 
least they should provide space for planning and action as well as the essential materials 
for particular actions.  Finally, financial resources, especially money, should also be 
important resources.  Although I considered the size of financial resources above, I do not 
develop specific hypotheses about the sources of these resources and culture jamming. 
8.3. Analysis 
As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations 
developed above is tested in the strictest sense.  Instead, they provide more precise guides 
for illustration.  Hypotheses can systematically direct our attention to specific patterns or 
observations that would otherwise escape scrutiny.  The means of inquiry are specific to 
each set of hypotheses and propositions.  The data used in this chapter is derived from the 
sample of CJOs specified in Chapter Four.  As a preliminary point, the following five 
hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular variable: CJOs, and its relationships with 
five variables.  I consider the nature of these variables below. 
8.3.1. Networks and Organizations 
 First, I hypothesize (H8.1) that CJOs are informally organized.  The degree of 
formalization is here constructed loosely, meaning that while it is basically treated as 
dichotomous difficult cases may be coded as mixed.  A high degree of formalization occurs 
when organizational practices - division of labor, membership criteria, operational 
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procedures, relations among subunits, etc. – are constrained by formal rules and role 
assignments are highly impersonal.  Conversely, a low degree of formalization involves 
informal if not unstable organizational practices and personalized responsibilities.  I 
consider formalization from two perspectives.  Internal formalization refers to intra-
organizational relationships and responsibilities.  External formalization refers to inter-
organizational relationships and responsibilities.   While the two are likely to co-vary, I 
analyze them as distinct phenomena.  However, principal weight is given to internal 
formalization for two reasons. First, the latter is not considered by NSM theory and, second, 
while external formalization is of intrinsic descriptive interest, I am primarily concerned 
with its possible effects on internal formalization.   External formalization such as non-
profit status or contractual relations may incentivize the formalization of internal 
procedures such as record keeping and task allocation in order to maintain the integrity of 
the relationship. 
 Five groups exhibit extremely low formalization (CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM).  For 
example, the CAE (2012b, 20) describe their model of organization as ‘organic,’ in the sense 
that specialization and interdependence arise through practice and are in part ad hoc and 
dependent on the nature of each project.  The IST’s D’Ignazio also describes the 
organizational process as ad hoc and “organic” in that projects develop out of spontaneous 
initiative (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  Like the 
CAE, specializations developed out of practice and are personalized.  The SCP’s Brown 
(personal interview, July 6, 2012) describes a looser form of organization in which he 
develops the basic action and tasks are taken up as needed by whoever appears to 
participate. 
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 Data on the question of internal formalization is less than ideal with some groups.  
None is available for three groups (AAA, CTM, IAA).   Five provide some indications of 
formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), but they vary in the capacity for conclusion.  The data here 
primarily concerns the division of labor and role personalization.  The BLF (n.d.) assign 
nom de guerre’s to colorfully named roles such as Rico T. Spoons, Director of Offence and 
English Major, Editor-at-Large.   However, the group’s strict secrecy undermines efforts at 
determining whether tasks correspond to any real role assignments, Still, because the 
group’s list of alumni allows some comparison across time I can conclude that role 
descriptions vary in transmissibility.  Some roles like field op, security, and copywriter are 
common and thus suggest the possibility of the depersonalization of roles.  However, all of 
this is speculation.  The more earnest RBC (n.d.(a))  has a Board of Directors as well as a 
choir.  Over the course of the 2004 presidential campaign, the Billionaires developed three 
salaried positions at the national level (Haugerud 2013, 125, 153-5).   A further division of 
labor was established in an executive committee and relations with chapters were 
marginally tightened, though it is not clear that anything like formal relations were 
established.  The AMF is the most internally formalized group with a clear division of labor 
among nearly two dozen people and impersonal task differentiation (with the obvious 
exception of Kalle Lasn’s position as Editor-in-Chief). 
 One prominent expression of external formalization is non-profit status.  Four 
groups in the sample possess(ed) 501(c) non-profit status (or its Canadian equivalent) or 
are closely linked to such an organization.  The RBC (n.d.(b)) is a federally-recognized non-
profit organization through their Immediate Life, Inc.  The IST is a project of iKatun, a 
501(c) non-profit organization (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, 
256 
August 27, 2012).  The AAA (2013d) is officially supported by the Lab, a 501(c) non-profit 
organization.  Finally, for the first four years of its existence, the Billionaires was an adjunct 
to the 501(c) non-profit organization, United for a Fair Economy (Haugerud 2013, 125).  In 
2003, the group splintered off and acquired tax-exempt status under Section 527 of the IRS 
tax code (Haugerud 2013, 125; Billionaires for Bush 2004a).  A later iteration, the 
Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(a)), are supported by the Institute for America’s Future, a 
501(c) non-profit foundation.  Other forms of external formalization are evident.  
Negativland operates the record label, Seeland Records, which also produces recordings for 
other artists.  For a time, the group signed to SST Records, the contractual relation to which 
constituted grounds for a lawsuit against the group (NGL 1995).  The AMF have contractual 
relations with printers (Quad/Graphics) and a variety of distributors. 
 Among the nine groups with sufficient data to make tentative conclusions, only one 
appears to obtain a significant degree of formalization (AMF).  Three groups exhibit a low 
but noticeable degree of formalization (BLF, BIL, RBC), while five exhibit low formalization 
(CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM).  External formalization is spread across these three 
classifications, including two groups in the lowest category (IST, NGL).  While any 
conclusion is at best tentative considering the variety of data and methodological 
constraints, it is clear that the majority of CJOs in the sample lack the kind of formalized 
procedures and practices associated with bureaucratic organizations.  This provides 
minimal support for the NSM hypothesis. 
 Second, I hypothesize (H8.2) that CJOs are primarily composed of pre-existing 
friendship networks.  I treat the latter variable as dichotomous and focus on whether or not 
friendships constitute the basic social organization of CJOs.   Data on this hypothesis is even 
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more scarce.  Only seven groups provide evidence of such friendship networks (AMF, CTM, 
CAE, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM).  The AMF began as a collaboration between friends Kalle Lasn 
and Bill Schmalz (Sommer 2012).  Negativland originated in a friendship circle in high 
school (Joyce 2007), while the IST drew friends toward collaboration (D’Ignazio, Manning, 
and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  The SCP began as the meeting of two 
friendship networks (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 359) and gathered fresh members from a 
combination of customers and friends: 
 The thing that kept the group constantly with new members, who were quite varied 
 actually, which I will return to in a moment, was Black Out Books, anarchist bookstore, in 
 which I worked every single Sunday, so that I met people and became friendly with them, 
 and also that was a way of finding people that would be interested in performing in the 
 group (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012). 
 
The CMT as well began as a conversation among friends (Gach 2008b), while the CAE 
(2012b) is composed of a friendship network originally established in the art and academic 
worlds of Tallahassee, Florida.  The Yes Men were introduced by mutual friends before 
their fortuitous absence at the battle of Seattle.  More recently, member Ostertag (2008) 
describes the group as a, “network of friends.  As you would imagine, to do this sort of 
things, it takes a lot of friends.”   However, much of these data are inconclusive.  It is unclear 
how many members of the AMF, CMT, or SCP are part of a basic friendship network 
underlying the organization.  While the data is somewhat suggestive, it is not sufficient to 
draw even tentative conclusions. 
 Third, I hypothesize (H8.3) that CJOs are organizationally decentralized.  Like 
formalization, the degree of centralization is constructed loosely.   Centralization refers to 
the proportion of the membership of an organization that has effective decision-making 
power.   High centralization refers to a low proportion of effective decision-makers.  In the 
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extreme this means one person determines the actions of the organization, whereas low 
centralization or decentralization diffuses this power to a wider portion of the 
membership.   
 Three groups clearly exhibit highly decentralized organization (CAE, IST, NGL), 
though there is some evidence that the IAA does as well.  Importantly, no group in the 
sample explicitly rejects, at least in practice, the principle of hierarchy.  In the case of the 
CAE (2001, 66), while they, 
 [do] not follow the democratic model, the collective does recognize its merits; however, CAE 
 follows Foucault’s principle that hierarchical power can be productive (it does not 
 necessarily lead to domination), and hence uses a floating hierarchy to produce projects.  
 After consensus is reached on how a project should be produced, the member with the 
 greatest expertise in the area has authority over the final product. While all members have a 
 voice in the production process, the project leader makes the final decisions. 
 
This principle of a floating hierarchy is evident as well with the IST, though consensus is 
not a necessity: 
I feel like the projects end up taking on organically, like, who is leading the project.  And 
 encouraging leaders.  We don’t follow a process like consensus-decision-making like Occupy 
 Boston.  The projects often have clear administrative leaders.  Right now Jim is leading a 
 project to put on a failure support group at BU this fall.  We have another member for us 
 who is leading project where three people are going to the Philippines to do some peace-
 building workshops with some youth there….I’m very in favor of leaders; having leaders 
 and organizers.  They don’t have to be autocratic.  Someone who takes responsibility for it. 
 
Negativland (2005) describe their creative process as “one brain,” a stew of collaboration 
and contributions: “I don’t have a strong sense of which idea was whose, and who did what, 
and I don’t care. It just doesn’t matter.  If the idea’s great, and it’s evolving and good, then 
I’m excited.”   Less can be derived from the information on the IAA, but what can does 
suggest a collaborative process: “Brainstorming session.  Three is the best.  Can fit in a 
booth at a bar.  Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own.  When you 
aren’t making any money and it’s your money, that’s really important” (Brusadin et al n.d.).   
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 Data are insufficient to determine the degree of centralization in seven cases (AMF, 
AAA, BLF, CTM, IAA, RBC, TYM).  However, two groups do show signs of organizational 
centralization (BIL, SCP).    The Billionaires are exceptional in the sample because they 
established a large network of chapters across the country many of which were nominally 
under a national leadership.  However, according to Haugerud (2013, 156) the national 
leadership primarily provided models for action (songs, slogans, images, etc.), advice, and 
hands-on aid especially in electoral battleground states.  She also finds that the group’s 
organizing principle approximated meritocracy, not radical egalitarianism or consensus 
decision-making; while they sought to encourage participation, those who did the most 
work tended to have the most power (Haugerud 2013, 154-5).  The SCP’s Brown describes 
the group’s organization as a loose form of personalized centralization, in which Brown 
generally established the initiative by organizing actions and from there feedback and 
suggestions would shape the unfolding project. 
 Within the NY-SCP it was hierarchical, as in I was the one, not so much in control, but I 
 wrote the plays, was the media spokesperson, chose the time and place for performances, 
 was the one who invited people, so that inside of the group, we were not really anarchist in 
 organization (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012). 
 
Elsewhere he describes in more detail how the group was organized: 
It was collaborative in that…...I fancied myself leading something like a big band, like the 
 Mingus Big Band, led by Charles Mingus.  He’s always gonna be playing bass there and it can 
 still sound like the Mingus Big Band even though the horn players change.  So what I’d do is 
 I had an e-mail list of 10-15 people who were interested in performing.  So I’d invite all of 
 them and say, “the proposal is to perform on July 4th of 2012, let’s say.  I propose that we do 
 this, that, and the other thing.  I propose that we do this play.”  There would be a self-
 selection process, which was whose available.  Then the people who were available would 
 say, “nah I’m getting tired of that play that you proposed, why don’t we do something else?” 
 Which would either be they would propose something else, write something else, which 
 would take place in another location, so they had advanced notice, the freedom, and the 
 opportunity to choose other things (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012). 
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However, because of the paucity of data on other groups, conclusions are at best tentative.   
What is clear is that of the groups with available data, none exhibit strong centralized 
organization.  Even among the Billionaires and the SCP, feedback, collaboration, and 
participation are cultivated among the less committed. 
 Fourth, I hypothesize (H8.4) that CJOs are exclusively organized.  Similar to 
formalization and centralization the degree of exclusivity is constructed loosely.  
Exclusivity refers here to organizational membership requirements.  Several groups in the 
sample strongly support the development of like-minded groups and copycat actions (AAA, 
BLF, BIL, SCP, TYM).  However, such efforts do not in themselves constitute inclusive 
organization.  Inclusive membership is principally characterized by low-cost commitments 
and a lack of exclusionary criteria like race, gender, age, income, ideology, religion, 
occupation, education, family, or friendship.   
 Five groups in the sample exhibit exclusive organization (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP).  
McManic (2003) notes, “you can't sign up for the BLF. It has to tap you. ‘Not just anybody 
gets invited into the BLF, because it's dangerous and essentially illegal," says Napier’.” 
Addressing the scope of the group, the CAE (2012b, 20) argue that it, “had to stay small 
enough that everyone felt their voice was heard, and could see themselves in the process 
and the product.”  Opening up the group to more members would dilute the balance of 
contributions and sense of participation.  The IAA make similar statements about optimal 
group organization: 
It changes, but we keep it 3-5.  Small, like a cell.  It’s small enough that whatever does 
 happen, everyone can take a part in it.  Brainstorming session.  Three is the best.  Can fit in a 
 booth at a bar.  Everybody can take a stake in it, have a part they call their own.  When you 
 aren’t making any money and it’s your money, that’s really important (Brusadin et al n.d.). 
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Like most musical groups, Negativland have restrictive criteria for joining.  The SCP’s 
Brown describes their brand of exclusivity: 
 If you want to give it a bad spin, we’re sectarian. If you want to give it a good  spin, we prize 
 our autonomy. So, that means like the Situationists, that we don’t just admit anybody into 
 the group. We don’t want to have a big group in which lots of people join. The idea is just a 
 proliferation of independent groups who have the name in common (Scheinke and Brown 
 2003, 363). 
 
Elsewhere, the SCP (n.d.(b)) lays out there criteria: 
On occasion, we (the New York Surveillance Camera Players) are contacted by people who 
 want to "get involved" in what we are doing. Though we wish to encourage everyone to get 
 involved in the struggle to protect and defend our collective and individual rights to privacy, 
 anonymity and free assembly, we need to make clear the types of involvement that we 
 encourage, and those that we do not.  
We encourage potential performers to contact us. To become a performer with the SCP, you 
 1) must be unreservedly in accord with the SCP's basic positions; 2) must be someone who 
 lives in  or near New York City, or is passing through NYC when the SCP is scheduled to 
 perform; 3) must be comfortable with and (ideally) capable of deriving pleasure from 
 appearing in public and, of course, on the closed-circuit television monitors of who-knows-
 how-many surveillance systems; 4) need not be one of the SCP's media spokespeople, but 
 should be comfortable with the fact that the group is media-friendly and so is often 
 videotaped and interviewed; 5) need not have any professional training as an actor; 6) 
 cannot be a professional actor; 7) cannot expect financial compensation for your 
 involvement; 8) must  be an anarchist, autonomist, libertarian, free-thinker or 
 "independent"; 9) cannot be a  Communist, Socialist, Marxist, Leninist, Trotskyite or Maoist, 
 an adherent to the ideologies of the Republican, Democratic or Reform Parties in the 
 United States, or someone who is racist, sexist or homophobic; and 10) cannot be a police 
 officer, an informant of any kind, a private security guard or a member of any of the United 
 States' armed forces or intelligence agencies. 
 Data are insufficient to make a determination with respect to four groups (AAA, 
AMF, CTM, TYM).  For example, the Yes Men (n.d.(b)) explicitly address the question how a 
“person turn[s] into a Yes Man?”: 
 A person (male or female) becomes a Yes Man by exposing, perhaps deviously, the nastiness 
 of powerful evildoers. If this describes what you do, or want to do (the exposing, not the 
 evildoing), please visit [link provided]…More precisely, there are all kinds of ways of doing 
 what we call "Identity Correction." Soon, we'll post a little list of some ways that we've 
 thought of. There are plenty of ways that we haven't thought of, too. 
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The link provided leads readers to the Yes Lab’s “Get Involved” page.  From there, it is clear 
that by Yes Men (2013) they simply mean like-minded groups (‘progressive’ is their term) 
and similar actions.  It thus remains unclear what organizational membership entails 
beyond a “network of friends” (Ostertag 2008).  With the AAA (2013c), there is some 
evidence that the group expresses a very loose sense of membership: 
1. Start your own Anti-Advertising Agency campaign! Look around the site, see what we’re 
about, and do your own Anti-Advertising campaign. Send us pictures and we’ll post 
them here. 
2. Sign up on Steve Lambert’s mailing list. 
3. Look for free downloads with our projects, or go to our downloads page to download 
recent AAA poster designs, stencils, stickers, and other projects to put up in your town! 
4. Send us a self addressed, postage paid, business sized envelope and we’ll send you 
these “you don’t need it” stickers. 
5. Check back for news, project updates, new downloads and opportunities to work with 
the AAA. 
 
Yet, elsewhere Lambert describes the AAA (2013a) as a “collaboration between myself and 
dozens of other artists.”   
 The remaining three groups suggest an inclusive sense of membership.  The 
Billionaires cultivated chapters and participation with varying levels of commitment.  The 
RBC (n.d.(c) address the question directly: “What is Membership in the Church of Stop 
Shopping? When we tour in your part of the world, we'll let you know, maybe you can help 
us visit. We'll send notice of "Spiritual Trespassings" in the lobbies of big banks that finance 
climate change… things like that.”  A loose and inclusive sense of membership is provided 
by the IST: 
 First of all, if anyone wants to be a member, you’re just a member.  You join the e-mail list, 
 and you’re in.  So when we do talks, for example, we say, If you wanna join, you can just 
 come up and say, I wanna join, and then you are on the e-mail list.  And then it’s up to you if 




Clearly, relatively little commitment is needed to join these groups and no apparently 
exclusive criteria are publicized. 
 Although the data are better for his hypothesis than the preceding ones, the results 
remain inconclusive.  Five groups exhibit exclusion (BLF, CAE, IAA, NGL, SCP), while three 
groups practice inclusion (BIL, IST, RBC) with four suffering from insufficient data.    What 
this does suggest is that inclusive membership may be more prevalent than the NSM 
hypothesis suggests. 
 Finally, I hypothesize (H8.5) that CJOs are organizationally small.  While I initially 
analyze the sample with a conception of organizational size ranging from small to medium 
to large, I ultimately treat it as dichotomous –the organization is small or it is not - 
considering the hypothesis.   Distinguishing small from medium and large is somewhat 
arbitrary, but the presentation of data should allow for reasonable evaluations of my 
classifications.  I break the concept of organizational size down into two component 
variables: membership size and financial resources.  For example, a small organization will 
have a membership of two to twenty-five people, a bare minimum of financial resources 
usually derived from member’s day jobs or some meager source of income, and a local 
organizational distribution across a city, county, or state.  The balance of these variables in 
determining organizational size is not clearly laid out here, but ideally the effort will be 
transparent.  Table 8.1 summarizes the data. 
 First, at least seven CJOs have memberships of less than twenty five people (BLF, 
CTM, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP).   These range from the three to five of the IAA to slightly 
large groups like the BLF, IST, or the SCP.  Two groups lack sufficient data to make a 
determination as to the extent of their membership (AAA, TYM).  The AAA (2013a) has a 
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AMF 100+ Medium 
AAA 2 Small 
BLF 15+ Small 
BIL 1,000+ Medium 
CTM 5-12 2 
CAE 5 Small 
IAA 3-5 Small 
IST Small Small 
NGL 4-6 Small 
RBC 50+ Medium 
SCP 10-20 Small 
TYM 2 2 
1 = mixed 2 = insufficient data 
 
clear core membership of a dozen people; however, as noted above a looser sense of 
membership may make their network notably larger.  The Yes Men’s refusal to publicly 
delimit organizational membership makes a determination impossible, although the group 
at least includes three members: Bichlbaum, Bonanno, and Ostertag).  The remaining three 
groups are larger (AMF, BIL, RBC).  The RBC (n.d.(a)) is a core of roughly fifty performers, 
but they claim a congregation in the thousands.  The AMF is a core of ten to eighteen 
members with hundreds of contributors (AMF 2005; Lasn, Nurse, and Torbett 2012).  
Again, the Billionaires are unique.  While most chapters are primarily composed of a few 
dozen people, at one point the Manhattan chapter included roughly 150 members 
(Haugerud 2013, 131).  Altogether, the franchise or hub-node structure of the organization 
incorporated at its height in the fall of 2004 over a thousand people, though dispersed over 
roughly 100 chapters. 
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 Second, seven groups in the sample tend to utilize few financial resources (AAA, 
BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP).   The AAA began as a $35,000 grant that stretched over a six 
year period (Creative Work Fund 2004; Vartanian 2010).  The CAE (2000b) do not receive 
grants.  Instead, “we just hobble along from project to project, usually working with an 
extremely limited budget. A lot of our imaginative power goes into figuring out how to 
make things for minimal cost.”  The IAA is slim on funding as well: “We sort of use the 
access we get at our day jobs to sort of allow us to make projects that we couldn’t 
otherwise.  We don’t have any funding ever.  Every now and then we get something. But for 
the most part it’s basically out of pocket” (Brusadin et al n.d.).  The SCP receives “no 
funding. This requires just money for the mail, the post-office box, and the webhosting—
that’s it” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 365).  The meager financial position of Negativland 
(2005) was transparent following lawsuits from Island and SST Records.  The IST describes 
its parent organization, iKatun, as “probably the 501(c)(3) with the smallest budget in the 
country” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), while the 
BLF describe the extremely minimal resources required for ‘billboard improvement’ 
(Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006). 
 Three groups exhibit notably larger financial requirements and resources (AMF, 
BIL, RBC).  The AMF produces and markets a magazine with high production quality, 
markets a shoe product – Blackspot sneakers – and staffs ten full-time employees (Lasn et 
al 2012).  At their height, the Billionaires managed to employ three full-time salaried staff 
and acquired from $150,000 to $200,000 in the first half of 2004 (Haugerud 2013, 126).  
The RBC (n.d.(b)) claims a “low budget,” but they also have “office costs,” frequently tour 
nationally and internationally (recall the size of the membership), and enjoy a “matching 
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grant” in which, “every dollar you give means two dollars for The Church.”  Finally, two 
groups lack sufficient data to determine their financial resources (CTM, TYM).  The Yes Men 
claim a small budget: “There’s no budget, so you have to find sofas to sleep on, and frequent 
flyer tickets, and somebody who is willing to print a business card, and, you know, just a 
network of friends (Ostertag 2008).”  Elsewhere, they note: 
It just so happens that we can't afford to take a vacation, so we've had to rely on the 
 generosity of friends and acquaintances in various places…As for the money to build our 
 Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New York Times ($6000 for 80,000 
 copies), it came from our mailing list (TYM n.d.(b)). 
 
Yet, they raised over $100,000 in less than two months for their current film (TYM 2012c). 
 Considering the distribution of membership size and financial resources across the 
sample, eight out of twelve groups are classified as organizationally small (AAA, BLF, CTM, 
CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP).  Three of the remaining are somewhat larger than small (AMF, 
BIL, RBC), while the Yes Men provide insufficient data.  Still, even considering the variation 
between groups like the IAA and the AMF, the core of the AMF and the RBC is still relatively 
small compared to larger SMOs and interest groups.  It is the Billionaires that truly stands 
out as a relatively sizable organization, a status principally a consequence of its large 
numbers of chapters.  Considered individually, most of these chapters would be as large as 
the average group in the sample.   In contrast to the four preceding hypotheses, these 
findings provide some support for the notion that CJOs are organizationally small.   
 Table 8.2 summarizes the data on all five organizational hypotheses.  While glancing 
only at sufficient data points towards a confirmation of the NSM hypotheses, the paucity of 
information muddies confidence in this conclusion.  Moreover, evidence of degrees of 
formality, inclusivity, centralization, as well as medium-size suggests that the structures of 
CJOs vary more than simple dichotomous conceptions of organization would imply.  In 
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Table 8.2. The Organizational Structures of CJOs 
 Informal Friendship Decentralization Exclusive Small 
AMF No2 Yes2 2 2 No 
AAA 2 2 2 2 Yes 
BLF 12 2 2 Yes Yes 
BIL 12 2 1 No No 
CTM 2 Yes2 2 2 Yes 
CAE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IAA 2 2 Yes2 Yes Yes 
IST Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
NGL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RBC 1 2 2 No No 
SCP Yes Yes2 1 Yes Yes 
TYM Yes Yes 2 2 2 
1 = mixed 2 = insufficient data 
 
particular, the AMF, BIL, and RBC appear somewhat organizationally distinct from the rest 
of the sample in being larger and possibly more formalized, if not inclusive.  In addition, 
there appears to be too little data to note any correlation between friendship networks and 
exclusivity, as Polletta suggests. 
8.3.2. Organizational Resources 
 In this and the previous chapter I consider particular skill sets and organizations as 
resources that activists utilize in their contentious interactions.  Here, I look further at the 
social and economic capital available to CJOs.  It is worth noting that while social capital 
helps individuals and organizations gain access to economic and other forms of capital, 
economic capital can also be converted into social capital through investments in 
relationships. 
 The previous section considers two particular forms of social capital: friendship 
networks and the organization itself.  However, social capital encompasses a diversity of 
resources including relations with other organizations: other SMOs, interest groups, 
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foundations, businesses, universities, and others.  I begin with other activists, SMOs, and 
related organizations.   CJOs develop and utilize extensive networks of activists for various 
purposes.  The most intimate forms of relationships are cross-memberships.  For example, 
the Yes Men and the IAA shared members (Brusadin et al n.d.).  The Billionaires shared 
members with groups like United for a Fair Economy, its parent organization until 2003,  
Reclaim the Streets!, and many other groups (Haugerud 2013, 84, 192).  The BFL are 
nominally part of the Cacophany Society (Burkes 2012).  The AAA and the San Francisco 
Print Collective enjoyed overlapping memberships as well (AAA 2013d).  Now a university 
professor, Ricardo Dominguez held memberships in the CAE, ACT UP/Tallahassee, the 
Electronic Disturbance Theater, and thing.net (Dominguez 2004).  The RBC (n.d.(a)) shares 
members with the Living Theatre (2009).  Many groups in the sample also collaborate with 
other activists.  The AMF have an extensive network of relations with activists, including 
sister publications in four countries.  They also run the Powershift Advocacy Advertising 
Agency, a campaign assistance organization (AMF 2005).  The AAA (2013a) collaborated 
with hosts of different activists and artists for each project, including the Graffiti Research 
Lab, the Yes Men, Code Pink, and Improv Everywhere.  Hagerud (2013, 192) finds that the 
Billionaires collaborated with the Yes Men, US Uncut, and others.  BIL founder Boyd 
collaborated with dozens of activist individuals and organizations in compiling his 2012 
book Beautiful Trouble.  The BLF famously worked with culture jammer Ron English on 
some projects.  The CAE (2001, ch. 6) worked with the IAA on developing contestational 
robots, while the CTM (n.d.(a)) frequently collaborates with activists in various campaigns.  
Negativland run their radio program “Over the Edge” on a station owned by the 
progressive non-profit corporation, Pacfica Radio (Joyce 1995).  The group also connected 
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with activist documentarian Craig Baldwin (1995) and contributed to Creative Commons 
(Parkins 2008). The RBC participates in Buy Nothing Day, a campaign initiated by the AMF, 
and collaborates with local activist groups across the world.  The SCP (2006) worked with 
the New York Civil Liberties Union, various independent anti-surveillance groups, and Not 
Bored journal, while the Yes Men have collaborated with many groups in the sample and 
more, especially with the establishment of the Yes Lab.  Finally, some CJOs utilize their 
websites to post long lists of links to like-minded organizations and individuals (BIL, BLF, 
IAA, RBC, SCP). 
 As further evidence of the placement of CJOs within the field of art, many groups in 
the sample possess notable relations with arts organizations (AAA, CAE, CTM, IST, RBC, 
TYM).  In the previous chapter I noted the extent of arts occupations in the sample, 
especially arts teaching.  Art departments, universities, and centers such as the San 
Francisco Art Institute, the Lab, Eyebeam Art and Technology Center, MIT Media Lab, the 
Museum of Modern Art, the Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, Creative Work Fund, 
Rhizome, Creative Capital, and others are prominent examples of arts-related organizations 
with long-lasting or significant relationships with some of the groups in the sample.   
 Some CJOs engage in regular beneficial relations with business enterprises or, 
similarly, relations with non-profit organizations that produce and distribute objectified 
cultural capital like books or films.  The AMF, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, and TYM all produce 
books and magazines that require printers, distributors, and retailers.  The RBC and the 
TYM produced feature-length documentary films with the aid of filmmakers, studios, 
donors, and retailers.  The AMF (n.d.(b)) markets the Blackspot shoe that is produced by a 
family-owned union shop in Portugal.  Somewhat different relations are also evident.  The 
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SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 2012) worked at an anarchist bookstore that 
provided numerous opportunities to meet and recruit people.  The BLF and the IAA confess 
to utilizing time and materials at their jobs at private companies (Kalman 2006; Brusadin 
et al n.d.).  The Yes Men (2012c) funded their latest documentary film through Kickstarter. 
Social capital is important for many reasons, but here it is significant for the access it 
provides to other resources.  First and foremost, social relations provide much-needed 
access to economic capital.  I discuss financial resources above, many of which come in the 
form of grants and non-profit status.  Many of the groups in the sample set up donations 
pages on their websites that streamline the act of individual monetary contributions (AMF, 
BIL, CTM, IST, RBC, TYM).  Such groups occasionally utilize mailing lists or other online 
means to plead for donations for particular projects or other contribution. The Yes Men 
(n.d.(b)) provide one example:  
As for the money to build our Survivaball and other props, and to print up the fake New 
 York Times ($6000 for 80,000 copies), it came from our mailing list, to which we sent calls 
 asking for help. Today, a fundraising platform like Kickstarter could do pretty much the 
 same thing. 
 
Other forms of relevant economic capital include physical infrastructure such as offices, 
places to eat and sleep, and exhibition spaces.  Other resources include office supplies and 
equipment, clothing, and valuable information.   
 A final form of economic or physical capital is the Internet.  Access to the Internet 
provides a number of advantages for CJOs.  As noted, it allows groups to establish regular 
public links with like-minded groups through their websites as well as simplify the 
donations process.  It also decreases the costs of communicating both within the group (e-
mail) and with others.  Every group in the sample operates a website that serves numerous 
functions, including publicizing the goals, strategies, and tactics of the organization, 
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disseminating collective action frames, and offering various ways to contribute beyond 
donations, including purchasing media, joining the mailing list, and joining the organization 
or engaging in similar actions. 
8.4. Conclusion 
 Chapters Five and Six establishes the structures and incentives of the field of artistic 
production, while Chapter Seven presents descriptions of the content of CJO’s collective 
identities as well as evidence relating culture jammers to the artistic field.  Through an 
analysis of the social and economic capital available to CJOs, especially the structure of 
their organizations, this chapter concludes the analysis of the fields, networks, and 
identities constituting everyday social organization.  Part III of this dissertation follows 
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CHAPTER 9. GOALS AND STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS 
 While Part II of this study details the set of independent variables (networks, fields, 
and identities, and by extension their resource constraints) that constitute everyday social 
organization, the primary dependent variable of this study is tactical choice.  However, 
although a great deal of existing research has focused exclusively on the relation of tactics 
to variables like identity, incentives, politics, or organization, more recent work argues that 
tactics must be studied within the context of other components of the strategic approach of 
a social movement organization: issues, frames, targets, alliances, solutions, etc.  Together, 
these constellations of strategic elements constitute the logics or “strategic orientations” of 
organizational actors.  The primary task of this chapter is to present data regarding the 
goals and the strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs.   
 This chapter is segmented into three parts.  First, I review the literature on goals 
and strategic orientations.  While the latter concept is decomposed into issues, targets, and 
tactics, this review will focus only on the general logic of strategy.  Second, I develop 
several descriptive hypotheses and propositions that aid in the description of culture 
jamming goals and strategic orientations.  Third, I present evidence of the goals and the 
general strategic approaches of my sample of CJOs, including their issues, by utilizing the 
hypotheses and propositions developed in the preceding section.  This chapter is thus 
primarily descriptive.  Description of the targets and tactics of the CJOs in my sample is left 
to the following two chapters. 
 A final preliminary point is in order.  Strictly speaking, goals are not the dependent 
variable in this study.  While implications may be deduced from Chapters Two and Three 
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that can contribute to an explanation of goal selection, for this study goals are an 
exogenous variable.   
9.1. Review 
9.1.1. Goals 
 Strategy is oriented towards goals, also called demands or claims.  Consequently, an 
analysis of strategy requires a preliminary analysis of goals.  Scholarly efforts to broadly 
describe the goals of SMOs and social movements are numerous.  I focus on three basic and 
mutually inclusive approaches.67   
Traditionally, the issues and goals of social movements were designated as either 
instrumental or symbolic (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963), while more recent 
scholarship utilizes a similar strategy-oriented and identity-oriented distinction (Cohen 
1985; Rucht 1988; Tourraine 1981).6869  Instrumental or strategic goals involve a desired 
change in the external environment, especially in economic or political institutions, actors, 
and policies.  Such conceptions identify action-outcome linkages that specify movement 
action as means towards tangible or material ends.  The emphasis on this set of goals is 
principally associated with RMT (Gamson 1990; Jenkins 1983; Oberschall 1973; McCarthy 
and Zald 1973; 1987a) and political process or opportunity theory (Kitschelt 1986; 
                                                          
67 There are other approaches of course.  For example, an early effort by Tilly (1978) distinguishes 
competitive, reactive, and proactive claims based on which group(s) possesses the resources of interest. This 
review focuses on the most common and influential approaches. 
68 Tilly (2006a, 32) makes a further distinction between program, standing, and identity claims.  Identity 
claims “assert the presence of a substantial collective actor”; standing claims “say that we Xs not only exist, 
but occupy a certain position within the regime”; and program claims “call for their objects to take an action, 
adopt a policy, or otherwise commit themselves to a change.” 
69 The distinction is somewhat similar to the debate over expressive or intrinsic incentives in rational choice 
theory.  Whiteley (1995) argues that empirical support for psychological incentives derived from the process 
of voting (including the beliefs and values implicated in the act, such as the famous ‘D’ term) disconfirms the 
rationalist approach.  Opp (1989; 2011) argues that the rational actor model incorporates such incentives, 
because they can be interpreted as costs and benefits.  As clarified in Chapter Three, the approach taken here 
is that “the rational actor model is premised on individuals’ evaluating the costs and benefits of participating 
rather than the particular types of benefits associated with participating” (Leighley 1995, 195). 
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McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978; 1986).  These approaches criticized earlier 
scholarship for assuming that while normal political activity is channeled into official 
institutional channels, protest is a frustrated response to social change.  In contrast, these 
scholars developed an approach in which activism is a strategic means to influence policy 
(Gamson 1990; Tilly 1978).  In this polity model, the government is inclusive and 
responsive to the pressures of insiders, but those lacking access to the polity, typically as a 
result of low resources or institutional exclusion, must utilize more disruptive means in 
order to gain entry.  The primary concern of challengers, then, is the state, the set of 
political institutions, actors, and resources that defines the scope of the polity.   
In contrast, symbolic or identity-related goals are personal, expressive, or cultural; 
they seek to challenge practices or ideas in the private sphere or in civil society and involve 
the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity.  Such goals are in general 
means as well as ends; the action is directed inwards or is diffuse in its intentions.  In this 
sense, action symbolizes or expresses some change instead of forging a causal link between 
action and environmental effects.  While early attempts to explain social movements and 
other forms of collective behavior argued that protest was a symbolic or expressive 
attempt to reduce psychological distress (Blumer 1951; Kornhauser 1959), the emphasis 
on rationality and strategy by RMT and political process theory theory led to a rejection of 
social psychological explanations of activism.  In response, NSM theorists developed 
accounts of movements focusing on the development of conflicts over the creation and 
expression of new ways of living (Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985).  
As Melucci (1985, 801) describes it: 
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The medium, the movement itself as a new medium, is the message. As Prophets without 
 enchantment, contemporary movements practice in the present the change they are struggling 
 for: they redefine the meaning of social action for the whole society. 
 
Recent efforts utilize less holistic explanations of social conflict but nonetheless retain the 
emphasis on goals of value or identity expression (Gamson 1989; Jasper 1997). 
A similar distinction in the literature considers whether activism is guided by 
materialist or postmaterialist values and goals.  Inglehart (1977; 1990) famously argues 
that variation in the economic security of a generation in its formative years determines 
their long-term value structure.  Under conditions of scarcity, the development of 
materialist values prioritizes goals of economic and physical security such as national 
security and wages.  Under conditions of affluence, the development of postmaterialist 
values prioritizes quality of life and personal development issues such as human rights, the 
environment, and the quality of democracy.  According to Inglehart, this generational shift 
in values and goals has far-reaching effects on political participation, including the 
development of new political issues, political parties, and social movements. 
While the instrumental/symbolic distinction focuses on the internal or external 
orientation of the movement or group, scholars also developed a basic distinction between 
movements or groups that desire limited or moderate social or political change and those 
that pursue complete or radical change, though it operates more or less like a spectrum 
(Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Gamson 1990; Haines 1988; McAdam 1999).  Moderates or 
reformists tend to be in broad agreement with the existing social and political order such 
that their most basic values are not in conflict with this system.  This typically implies an 
emphasis on reforming or modifying existing institutions.  Conversely, radicals or 
revolutionaries are characterized by a general disagreement with the existing political and 
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social structure and significant dissonance between their values and the values of the 
system.  Their goals express the desire to abolish and replace or radically transform the 
organization of power in society.  A third and related set of goals regarding the SMO’s 
orientation towards the social system involve not the degree of change desired in the 
system, but the degree of autonomy from the system.  Turner and Killian (1987, 292) refer 
to this objective as ‘separation,’ the establishment and maintenance of a space free from 
control or interference from political or social authorities. 
 Finally, within rational choice theory efforts to explain collective action principally 
focus on the question of mobilization (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell 
and Oliver 1993; Olson 1965; Opp 1989).  This question is particularly vexing from this 
perspective, because it is presented as a paradox of participation: rational individuals will 
not join collective actions, yet we observe collective action everywhere.  This paradox 
arises in part from what is called the collective action problem.  This dilemma is 
determined in large part by the nature of the desired object of a group: public goods.  
Goods vary along at least two important dimension: 1) the degree to which people can be 
excluded from their consumption, and 2) the degree to which the quantity of the good is 
reduced through consumption (rivalrous).70  This produces a typology of four types of 
economic goods (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9).  Table 9.1 specifies the relevant 
dimensions.  Private goods, like gasoline or apples, are highly rivalrous and excludable.  
Common goods, like fisheries or oil reserves, are rivalrous but non-excludable.  The most 
                                                          
70 However, these dimensions do not exhaust variation in the nature of public goods.  For example, many note 
that some public goods, known as step goods, do not yield benefits until a certain threshold or discrete 
amount of contributions is met, while continuous goods are more gradual in their production (Hardin 1982; 
Marwell and Oliver 1993; Opp 2009).  Accordingly, variable production functions affect a variety of social 
movement activity, including strategy. 
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Table 9.1. Types of Economic Goods 
 Excludable Non-Excludable 
Rivalrous Private Good Common Good 
Non-Rivalrous Club Good Public Good 
 
important goods for this analysis are club goods and public goods.  Public goods are 
generally non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  Typical examples include clean air and 
national defense.  Club goods are non-rivalrous but excludable.  Typical examples include 
religious services and country clubs.  Club goods are distinguished from public goods by 
the capacity to exclude others from consumption, including non-contributors to the 
production of the club good.  Public goods, on the other hand, are characterized by the 
inclusion of non-contributors from the consumption of the good.  It is this quality of public 
goods that makes their provision so theoretically problematic: why contribute to the 
production of a good everyone will benefit from when someone else can incur the costs? 
9.1.2. Strategy 
But goals are only the telos of strategy.  In order to integrate organizational 
activities, employ organizational resources, and conceptually link their activities and 
resources to outcomes internal and external to the organization, actors develop strategies 
(Ganz 2000, 1010).  Strategies are basic or general plans that organizations utilize in order 
to achieve their goals.  By constraining an SMO’s sense of what is appropriate and effective 
strategy facilitates a variety of choices including the selection of issues, tactics, frames, 
alliances, recruitment programs, targets, and others.  Recent work considers the 
interdependence of the various elements of strategy as essential to the explanation of any 
one component.  As Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 6) argue: 
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the choice to  utilize  highly confrontational tactics has implications for choices about 
 organization models, who to appeal  to,  and  who  to  secure  resources  from,  among 
 others.  As such, discrete strategic choices must be seen as components of broader 
 decision-making processes. 
 
Together, these clusters of choices and the strategy that organizes them are referred to as 
strategic logics or strategic orientations (Downey and Rohlinger 2008; Larson 2011; Rucht 
1988; 1990).   Scholars have focused on different configurations of these components.  
Dalton (1994) suggests five factors are constitutive: efforts to mobilize participants and 
their contributions, the selection of issues and their solutions, the alliances with other 
SMOs, and the tactics they use to pursue their claims.  In his study of effective leadership in 
activist groups, Ganz (2000, 1010; 2009) conceptualizes strategy as the “conceptual link we 
make  between  the  places,  the  times  and  ways  we  mobilize  and  deploy  our resources, 
and  the  goals  we  hope  to  achieve."  Strategy is thus composed of the types of tactics 
utilized, the targets of these actions, and the timing of the action.  Meyer (2007; Meyer and 
Staggenborg 2012) decomposes strategy into the claims or demands of actors, their tactics, 
and the particular sites or venues within which they choose to press their claims.  The more 
common approach, however, is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs 
(Earl and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008).    
9.1.3. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation 
 Scholars have identified a number of important dimensions that allow finer 
distinctions among varieties of strategic approaches.71  I briefly consider three.72  First, as 
                                                          
71 Strategies may also be distinguished as discrete categories, such as bargaining, or subcultural retrenchment 
(Rucht 1990) as opposed to dimensions.  I focus here only on dimensions of strategic orientations. 
72 Downey and Rohlinger (2008) include the depth of the challenge presented by an SMO or movement as an 
additional dimension of strategic orientations.  However, my distinction between goals and strategic 
orientations emphasizes that whether a movement or SMO is moderate or radical is a reflection of its goals 
and not of its general strategic approach to their goals.  In fact, the two may vary for strategic reasons: radical 
groups may utilize a relatively non-confrontational strategy in order to avoid heavy repression or engage 
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with goals, a basic distinction between logics or orientations that are instrumental and 
strategic from those that are expressive, symbolic, or identity-oriented has proven 
relatively durable (Aberle 1966; Breines 1982; Gusfield 1963; Jasper and Polletta 2001; 
Jenkins 1983; Rucht 1988; 1990).  I elaborate more on this distinction in my theoretical 
discussion below.   
 Second, scholars consider the degree of risk involved in engaging in actions and the 
closely related dimension of the degree of disruption introduced into everyday life when 
characterizing strategies (DeNardo 1985; Kriesi et al 1995; Piven and Cloward 1979).73  
This set of dimensions is often described as a spectrum ranging from conventional to 
unconventional (or disruptive) to violent (Tarrow 1998).  From this perspective, strategies 
range from a low to a high threshold for adoption.  While some generate relatively low 
risks or little anticipated financial or physical harm, others produce much higher 
expectations for high risks for participants, including financial ruin, physical harm, or even 
death.  The corresponding social consequences of such variation in risks involve the degree 
of disruptiveness of the strategic approach; the more the strategic approach involves the 
disruption of social routines and expectations, including sources of support for opponents, 
the more risks that are involved in engaging in contentious politics.  Because disrupting 
social life can increase the costs that opponents are willing to pay in order to repress 
activism, activists can face increasingly extreme threats of harm.  However, the basic 
strategy of disruption involves increasing negative sanctions on opponents (blocking 
traffic, mobilizing public support, etc.) such that the costs of non-compliance outweigh the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
channels of influence they perceive to be more effective, while moderate SMOs may utilize more disruptive 
strategies to gather media attention. 
73 This distinction is synonymous with a similar distinction in tactics, principally because tactics are the 
means of disruption. 
281 
costs of compliance (Lipsky 1968).  Movements and SMOs are thus faced with the difficult 
strategic and tactical question of how much disruption to generate before the authorities 
can respond with more extensive and effective repressive measures. 
 Third, scholars distinguish strategies along a continuum representing the variable 
scope of the appeal of an SMO to the population, often couched in terms of the distribution 
of commitments required by an SMO (DeNardo 1985; Downey and Rohlinger 2008; see also 
Jasper 2006).  Some SMOs focus their energies and resources on a small circle of heavy 
contributors, a hard-core of activists.  While the vast majority of SMOs must cultivate a core 
of committed members, others are oriented toward developing a broad support base with a 
low set of commitments.  Downey and Rohlinger (2008) refer to the former as insular 
orientations; they help SMOs maintain ‘abeyance structures:’ internal organization, 
solidarity, and collective identification during periods of relative demobilization.  Mass 
orientations are conducive to mass mobilization, including the development of large social 
networks, access to significant resources, and wider public appeal.   
9.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
In order to determine the content of the goals and strategic orientations of culture 
jammers, I elaborate on each relevant concept.   First, I consider a set of expectations 
regarding the goals of CJOs, in part relying on some basic but disputed distinctions in NSM 
theory.  Second, I develop propositions and hypotheses regarding the strategic orientations 
of these groups. 
9.2.1. Goals 
  Collective action is defined in part by the pursuit of shared interests.  Thus, action is 
oriented towards the attainment of some array of goals or priorities in order to focus the 
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organization of resources and actions.  As noted in Chapter Three this variety can in part be 
analyzed hierarchically (Jasper 2006, ch. 3).  The broadest and most comprehensive goals 
are the primary orienting principles of strategies.  These may be generally referred to as 
goals.  Examples may include gender or racial equality, ending a war, establishing a 
communist system, developing solidarity, criminalizing abortion, generatin a space 
temporarily free of the market economy, or ending local corruption.  Lower levels are 
referred to as objectives; they guide more specific courses of action.  If the broad goal of an 
SMO is to end a war, then more specific objectives may include maintaining an SMO, fund-
raising, increasing public support for ending the war, pressuring political leaders to oppose 
the war, mobilizing people for demonstrations against the war, training activists in styles of 
protest and leadership, etc.  Goals and objectives serve as the ends in this analysis, but 
objectives are simultaneously means towards an end of goal attainment.  
Of course, objectives can contradict or defer resources from goals.  There is no 
necessary complicity between organizational goals and objectives.  This is so because goals, 
as I define them here, are the public representation of an SMO’s central purpose, while 
objectives, which need not be publicly disclosed, are more specific concrete directives.  
Slippage between the two can result from a number of conditions, including intra-
organizational conflict or the strategic advantages of misrepresenting the goal of an 
organization.74  One of the most common forms of misdirection is captured by a 
generalized paraphrasing of Ambrose Bierce (1999 [1906], 148): private interest 
masquerading as public interest.   In democratic contexts, however, large voluntary 
                                                          
74
 In the context of a dictatorship, an NGO that claims to further the interests of some constituency may in fact 
represent the interests of the state in surveilling communities, acquiring foreign aid, and projecting a 
reformist and democratic political process. 
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organizations may be constrained by the importance of aligning their actions with their 
public statements of purpose.  As established in Chapter Three, I assume that SMOs pursue 
one primary goal and that all objectives, including organizational maintenance, are 
subordinate to this goal.   
Preliminary to the analysis of strategy is the description of organizational goals and 
objectives.  Thus, while individuals have their own interests relative to organizations 
(Jasper 2006; Olson 1965), I consider only the sets of collective goals and objectives 
specific to my sample of CJOs.  This offers an opportunity to consider a set of hypotheses 
regarding the characteristics of new and old social movements.  As noted in Chapter Two, 
NSM theorists (Melucci 1985; 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; Touraine 1981; 1985) argue that 
movements like the women’s, environmental, DIY, and other movements are distinct from 
old social movements due to their emphasis on culture and identity as opposed to politics 
and strategy, civil society as opposed to the state or the economy, and post-materialist as 
opposed to materialist values.  However, criticisms of these NSM approaches point to the 
political and instrumental goals of these movements and the cultural and identity-oriented 
goals of old social movements (Calhoun 1993b; Pichardo 1997).   Within the social 
movement literature, culture jammers and culture jamming in general are often described 
as akin to or adjuncts to new social movements (Binay 2005; Kozinets and Handelman 
2004; Wettergren 2005).  Their goals are pegged as symbolic, expressive, personal, post-
materialist, and cultural.  The following sets of hypotheses draw from this set of 
expectations.   
Table 9.2 schematizes some of the disputed differences between old and new social 
movements.  First, instrumental goals are organized like extrinsic expected action-outcome 
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Table 9.2. The Goals of Old and New Social Movements 
 Old Social Movements New Social Movements 
Mode Instrumental Symbolic 
Field Political Cultural 
Value Orientation Materialism Post-materialism 
Good Public Club 
 
structures.75  Such structures are characterized by the expectation that actions produce 
outcomes or changes in the state of the world, which in turn produce changes in utility for 
the SMO.  Most importantly, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of 
effectiveness.  In other words, this structure is defined not by the effects of any or all sets of 
incentives on the SMO’s utility, but by the capacity for an action to achieve the goal.  
Symbolic goals are organized as intrinsic action-outcome structures.  Such structures are 
characterized by the expectation that actions are outcomes within the set of direct relations 
imminent to the action itself.  Such intrinsic outcomes produce changes in the utility of the 
SMO.  Again, this change in utility is determined by the perceptions of effectiveness.  With 
respect to this type, effectiveness still involves the capacity of an action to achieve a goal, 
but the goal is not change in the state of the world, but a change in the state of the SMO or 
those who identify with it.76  Melucci (1996, 329) considers this distinction with respect to 
the new social movements: 
                                                          
75 My use of the terms instrumental and strategic should, at some point, raise eyebrows considering my 
theoretical emphases on goals and the weighting of expectations.   It is clear from the discussion in Chapter 
Three and this chapter that the theoretical approach taken in this dissertation does not recognize “non-
strategic” or “non-instrumental” goals.  I assume that SMO activity is goal-directed.  The goal may be intrinsic 
or extrinsic, but to distinguish one type of goal as instrumental or strategic either presumes that the 
remaining goals lack instrumentality or strategy or that they possess some attributes in addition to their 
instrumentality or strategy.  Neither of these seems appropriate.  My argument is that the temporality of 
incentives is essential for a rational actor model, not the type of incentive.   
76
 This does not exhaust the distinction, however.  SMOs with instrumental goals may also pursue symbolic 
objectives, such as the creation and maintenance of solidarity and collective identity.  However, as discussed 
in Chapter Three and above, what distinguishes this set of goals and objectives from an SMO with symbolic 
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In the movements’ networks, a large quantity of resources are (sic) allocated to the creation 
 and maintenance of a specific identity rather than to the pursuit of external objectives.  In 
 contrast to traditional collective actors, there has been a substantial shift from investment 
 for the purposes of political action to an allocation of resources for the maintenance of an 
 internal market for symbolic goods. 
 
Insofar as existing scholarship suggests a pattern of variance of expected action-outcome 
linkages across SMOs, and insofar as CJOs resemble the collective mobilizations of new 
social movements, we can develop a descriptive hypothesis: 
H9.1: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic goals. 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards achieving goals that 
primarily focus on the processes of action as opposed to tangible effects on institutions or 
actors. 
 Second, often associated with this classification is a distinction among the fields of 
action that SMOs or movements operate within.  At their most basic, the goals of SMOs can 
involve politics or culture.  Political goals entail, for example, challenging or protecting 
laws, statutes, regulations, office holders, enforcement and bureaucratic practices, and 
judicial decisions; in other words, they involve an orientation towards the state.  In 
contrast, culture goals focus on and through civil society or the private sphere or, more 
generally, non-state structures.  Such goals entail, for example, changing or protecting the 
personnel or practices of various social organizations like churches, schools, corporations, 
non-profits, the media, other SMOs, etc., or challenging or protecting norms and practices 
relating to various social institutions like marriage, patriarchy, hetero-normativity, public 
property, capitalism, or culture in general.  These examples make it clear that the 
instrumental/symbolic and politics/culture distinction, if they are viable, may easily vary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
goals is that the symbolic objectives, even though heterogeneous in structure to the instrumental goal, are 
nonetheless subordinate to it.   
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independently.  An SMO may pursue instrumental goals aimed at changing the policies of 
the Catholic Church or Starbucks, or they may pursue symbolic goals aimed at challenging 
the state’s capacity and/or right to organize public space or engage in war. 
 The most persistent characterization of culture jamming common among academics 
(Kozinets and Handelman 2007; Sandlin and Callahan 2009) and activists (Klein 2000; 
Peretti 2001) is that it involves a critique of consumer capitalism.  Consequently, the 
appropriate field of action is culture.  As I stressed in Chapter One, however, I do not define 
culture jamming by a particular emphasis on capitalism or excessive commercialized 
consumption.  I do define culture jamming as a technique at the level of representation, 
however.  While this would seem to suggest that the goals of CJOs are by definition oriented 
towards the cultural field of action, the distinction I consider here is not whether the action 
is intrinsic or extrinsic, nor whether the tactic is cultural in nature, but whether or not the 
goal is political (the state) or cultural (civil society).  I argue that such a distinction is 
helpful in identifying an additional goal dimension.  Still, the tendency to equate culture 
jamming with a critique of consumer capitalism does suggest a plausible descriptive 
hypothesis: 
H9.2: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural goals. 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are oriented towards changing or challenging actors 
or institutions outside of the state. 
Third is a distinction between materialist and post-materialist goals.  Goals that are 
inspired by materialist values tend to emphasize economic and physical security, while 
postmaterialist goals tend to emphasize self-expression and quality of life.  Several studies 
purport to show a link between post-materialism and participation in new social 
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movements (Inglehart 1990b; Kriesi 1989).77  The most extensive effort to link culture 
jamming and post-materialism is found in the political consumerism literature (Stolle, 
Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005).  These observations suggest a third descriptive hypothesis: 
H9.3: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of post-materialist goals. 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs are generally oriented towards issues concerning 
the environment, rights, and lifestyle, among others.  
 Fourth, a public/club good distinction is analytically distinct from the previous three 
classifications.  While strictly speaking, public goods are not by definition provided by the 
state, the authoritative capacity of the state to develop and implement public policy on a 
wide variety of issues is often an implicit focus of collective action analyses.  In this sense, 
public good goals would essentially mark the intersection of extrinsic and political goals.  
However, public goods like knowledge are frequently produced and distributed by other 
actors, while states also produce club goods such as libraries and food stamp programs.  
Club good goals are distinguished by the presence of crowding or congestion (only so many 
can consume the good at any time) and exclusion mechanisms so that those who consume 
the good contribute to its provision.  In this sense they can be extrinsic or intrinsic objects 
operative in either field of action.  For example, an SMO may seek to change the 
membership criteria of an organization, such as the Catholic Church or the Boy Scouts.  
More generally, intense social interactions, which are generative of collective identification 
and solidarity, function as exclusionary mechanisms but are also susceptible to crowding 
or congestion.  Like religious services, SMOs and movements with intrinsic goals are 
concerned primarily with the goods specific to the group, such as the experience of 
                                                          
77 Though there is considerable evidence supporting the more general descriptive null hypothesis that post-
materialism does not constitute a distinct cluster of values, I do not consider this literature here. 
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opposition, autonomy, and community.  Finally, a public/club goods distinction varies 
independently of the material/post-material classification.  While Opp 1990) considers 
post-material values as public good preferences, Kriesi et al’s (1995) concept of subcultural 
movements implies that most such movements, including the women’s movement and the 
gay rights movement, are concerned with producing club goods.  Materialist goals can 
involve the production of either club goods or public goods. 
 Kriesi et al (1995, ch. 7) offer the best analysis of the nature of the good desired by 
some of the new social movements.  While their work does not strictly support the 
overarching hypothesis represented in Table 9.2, along with the discussion above it does 
suggest that only club goods are associated with the intrinsic goal structure expected of 
CJOs. While both types of goods may be found on all other values, this consideration does 
suggest that: 
H9.4: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods. 
This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue the production of 
goods that do not deteriorate through consumption but are nonetheless characterized by 
the capacity to exclude people from their benefits.   
 Finally, there is no a priori reason (no deductive or inductive hypotheses) to expect 
CJOs to pursue radical or moderate goals.  However, because autonomy is a post-materialist 
value, one weak hypothesis can be developed: 
 H9.5: CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous goals. 
This leads to the expectation, though weak, that CJOs are prone to pursue a space or 
practice free of interference from forces that they deem objectionable. 
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9.2.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientation 
 One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the 
strategic orientations of CJOs.  I seek to guide this operation by suggesting descriptive 
hypotheses and propositions that tease out some of the essential properties of oppositional 
strategy.  The general hypothesis of the dimensionality of strategic orientations is that 
variation in strategic choices is structured along whichever dimension is hypothesized to 
be of interest.  First, like goals, strategic orientations can be distinguished based on their 
emphasis on intrinsic or extrinsic challenges.  In general, we might anticipate that groups 
that pursue intrinsic goals will express intrinsic orientations.  I thus hypothesize 
 H9.6: CJOs are associated with intrinsic orientations 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs develop basic orientations that are isomorphic with 
their goal structure. 
Second, SMOs are distinguished by the breadth of appeal they aim to cultivate.  At 
one extreme, an SMO may appeal to a broad swath of people and seek to develop a mass 
base by lowering the commitments required.  At the other extreme, an SMO may seek to 
maximize the commitments of a core membership at the expense of developing a broad 
base.  The hypothesized exclusivity of CJOs suggests that insularity may be the 
preponderant strategic orientation.  I thus hypothesize 
H9.7: CJOs are associated with an insular orientation. 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs focus their energies on developing tight and 
committed support bases as opposed to a broader mass support base. 
Finally, SMO strategies vary in the costs they incur for participants or the degree of 
disruption they introduce into everyday life.  While the two concepts are conceptually 
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distinct, the general assumption is that they tend to co-vary, though we can posit a causal 
hypothesis: the more disruptive a tactic, the higher the costs of participating.  It is precisely 
this relationship, however, that suggests that it is more fruitful to classify strategies by 
their degree of expected social disruption.  Recall that costs can be distinguished as either 
intrinsic or extrinsic.  Focusing on disruption allows us to disaggregate the transaction and 
prospective costs (and benefits) of actions and to determine the nature of their relationship 
with social disruption as a strategy.  For example, in their classification of tactics Van Laer 
and Van Aelst (2010) develop what amounts to an additive index that sums the two types 
of costs.  Tactics with high costs have high thresholds for adoption, while actions with low 
costs have low thresholds.  Culture jamming is classified as a high-threshold action, 
because 1) it requires more knowledge of communications technology than e-mails or 
online petitions, and 2) the potential costs of engaging in possibly illegal actions are not 
insignificant.  While culture jamming is intended as a disruptive process, it is positioned at 
roughly the same point along the threshold dimension as Internet-supported tactics like 
sit-ins and occupations.  While the costs incurred by these actions may or may not be 
roughly equivalent in this instance, it seems hard to imagine that in general the degree of 
social disruption is equivalent, even roughly so.  This suggests the obvious implication that, 
at the least, the transaction costs of actions should be distinguished from the level of 
expected disruption.  Consider, for example, Tarrow’s (1998, 94) observation that, 
“[V]iolence is the easiest kind of collective action for small groups to initiate without 
encountering major costs of coordination and control.”   
So what can I conclude about the degree of social disruption intended by CJOs?  
Much of the work on social movement strategy focuses on the capacity of activists to 
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initiate social disruption and its effects on other actors (Lipsky 1968; Piven and Cloward 
1978; Tarrow 1998).  Disruption involves a sudden change in social routines and 
understandings, an obstruction in the daily activities of various social groups.   It results 
not only in an increase in uncertainty for various actors, but also costs that may be 
regarded as negative inducements to comply with the demands of activists. 
In order to measure the level of social disruption, it is useful to consider two 
indicators: the size of mobilization and the level of violence.  DeNardo (1985) argues, first, 
that the number of people that an SMO or movement mobilizes in actual demonstrations is 
not only an expression of the scope of their support in society, but is itself an indicator of 
disruption.  During political events like marches and rallies, people take up space, 
especially public space.  A consequence of this occupation of space is the cessation or 
detouring, at extra expense, of the mundane activities that typically occupy this space, as 
well as the costs incurred by authorities in policing or suppressing the collective action.  
Consequently, an increase in numbers (or, perhaps more specifically, an increase in the 
mobilized proportion of the population) is more or less an increase in disruption.  Violence 
as well is disruptive.  The use of force, especially in the threatened or actual damaging of 
property of the harming of people, increases the sense of insecurity and threat posed by 
activists.  Although there are direct costs to violence, the threat of violence or mild coercion 
can, like the size of mobilization, deter normal social activity and increase policing costs. 
Recall that I defined culture jamming as a form of intended disruption in Chapter One.  
While this disruption occurs on the plane of representation, this does not exclude the 
disruption of actual social routines.  Recall as well that culture jamming is non-violent.  
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These considerations weakly suggest that the strategies of CJOs are typically oriented 
towards minor or low disruption.  I develop a descriptive hypothesis: 
H9.8: CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize relatively small numbers of  
  people. 
 
This leads to the expectation that CJOs tend to develop basic plans for action that typically 
involve as few as two or as many as ten or twenty people.  This hypothesis would seem to 
pass too close to Chapter Eight’s exclusivity hypothesis.  However, it is important to note 
that that hypothesis refers to organizational membership.  This hypothesis refers to the 
total number of mobilized at an action.  However, because Chapter One essentially and 
sensibly defines culture jamming as non-violent (though without actually defining it as 
such), it seems fruitless to consider a further hypothesis regarding an orientation towards 
violence. 
9.2.3. Interdependence 
 Strategy refers to the broader organization of interdependent choices that aim to 
further the interests of the organization.  In decomposing this conception, the most 
common perspective is to focus on the issues, targets, and tactics utilized by SMOs (Earl 
and Kimport 2008; Larson 2009; 2011; Walker et al 2008).  This is the approach taken in 
this chapter.  Larson (2011, 3) provides some elaboration. 
Issues - the perceived problems and proposed solutions that animate social 
 movements – e.g., worker protections, civil rights, tax relief, protection of clean 
 water.  
 
Targets - the objects of challengers’ campaigns that are expected to take action on 
 an issue – e.g., lawmakers, a private business, university administrators, the public, 
 the President. 
 
Tactics - the practices that challengers perform when interacting with and   
 attempting to influence those outside of their ranks – e.g., lobbying, picketing,  
 meeting with elites, destroying property, speaking to the media, petitioning. 
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While clearly this list does not exhaust the wide range of activities and concerns that 
organizations engage in, it does capture the most important set of strategic elements.  
Strategy need not be explicit or coherent.  Actions and choices may stray from even the 
formal expression of strategy through experimentation and improvisation.  However, all 
actors ultimately seek to link their actions to actual or potential outcomes.  SMOs may be 
constrained by demands both internal and external to justify their actions and relate them 
to outcomes.  Participants and members need to know more or less why their contributions 
and why the action as a whole are crucial to the campaign.  SMOs may also justify their 
action to the media, bystanders, the state, and other important organizations, because they 
possess important desired resources.  SMOs may also define their actions in opposition to 
counter-framing efforts by opponents or media frames that aim to discredit or trivialize the 
SMOs strategies and solutions.  These justifications of past, present, and future actions 
come in the form of prognostic framing actions (Snow and Benford 1988).  Such framing 
efforts seek to explain and justify the actions of SMOs as expressions of broader strategic 
orientations to the problems identified in diagnostic framing efforts. 
 Recall that the interdependence of strategic choices is a hypothesis.  It suggests that 
strategic elements (issues, targets, and tactics) tend to cluster together and mutually 
constrain one another.  For example, issues constrain targets, as when anti-sweatshop 
campaigns focus on corporations and the institutions and organizations that support them.   
9.2.4. Issues 
 In this chapter I describe the issues pursued by CJOs.  Issues are the problems that 
SMOs seek to solve and that other actors like political parties engage in order to pursue 
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their interests.  I distinguish between two approaches to issues.78  Multi-issue SMOs tend to 
take broad approaches to politics, often as a result of the claim that they represent 
significant sectors of society, such as labor unions.  Single-issue SMOs take a narrower 
approach by focusing on one issue or a small set of issues that are closely related.  In 
contrast to the general focus of the labor or socialist movements, new social movements 
are associated with a plethora of single-issue organizations (Melucci 1996; Rucht 1990; 
Klandermans and Tarrow 1988).  I thus hypothesize: 
 H9.9: CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues. 
This leads to the expectation that the sample of CJOs will tend to pursue a relatively small 
or minimal set of social problems and specific issues, as opposed to a broad, general 
approach that encompasses a variety of issues. 
9.3. Analysis 
9.3.1. Goals 
 Like the other concepts in this project, attempting to summarize the goals of twelve 
CJOs offers numerous difficulties.  The approach taken here will engage the relevant 
hypotheses of this chapter as guides to disciplining efforts at goal description.  As a 
preliminary point, the following five hypotheses are descriptive and involve a singular 
variable: CJOs, and its relationships with five variables.  These five variables are 
constructed loosely, meaning that while they are treated as dichotomous, i.e. extrinsic or 
intrinsic, difficult cases may be coded as mixed.   
 First, I hypothesize (H9.1) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of intrinsic 
goals.  An example of a group that pursues such goals is offered by the IST.  They succinctly 
                                                          
78 This distinction may also be construed as another dimension of strategic orientation.  I consider it here 
separately, because in my analysis below I consider qualitative variation in issues as well. 
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describe their goal as “creative, participatory research that aims to temporarily transform 
public spaces and instigate dialogue about democracy, spatial justice and everyday life” 
(IST, 2012).  For member D’Ignazio (Karanika), “often what the Institute’s projects are 
about is calling attention to [the] assumptions” surrounding public space (D’Ignazio, 
Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  But calling attention, while it 
can and perhaps does extend to the wider audience that accesses the group’s websites and 
other related media, is primarily performed in the immediacy of interaction.  Member 
Manning states:  
I don’t think we ever walk into a project thinking, we’ll have the delusion that we’ll change 
 the world or we are going to have this mass following.  I think it is very much about the one-
 on-one or small group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we 
 are annoying.  At least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea.  
 (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). 
 
One particularly insightful consideration of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is offered by 
the AAA’s Steve Lambert (2007): 
Basically the idea is that everyone has to move through certain steps to change their 
 behaviors…For example, you can’t adopt a new behavior without first being aware that 
 there is an alternative to what you are currently doing. Once you are aware, you need 
 information on how to change that behavior. Once you have the information, you need 
 motivation to start…And on and on. 
 
So part of the measure of success for me is not just how many people saw this, but did I 
 move them along on a step? Did this piece really make a difference in this person’s life? Did 
 it have a profound effect on their thinking? Did it change their perspective on the world? 
 Will it change their behavior in the future? 
 
Lambert’s extrinsic goal is ideally to dramatically reduce the amount of outdoor advertising 
in the urban landscape and replace it with works of art.  This involves both supporting legal 
efforts to remove illegal advertising (not a culture jamming tactic) as well as moving people 
towards behavioral change, one that involves an increased awareness of the ubiquity of 
outdoor advertising and the political and artistic preference to change it.  It is the emphasis 
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on a movement towards behavioral change – an emphasis on actions that potentially 
change the state of affairs - that establishes the extrinsicity of the action. 
One case that suggests the difficulties of measurement is the BLF, a group whose 
primary goal appears to be an effort to weaken the power of advertising on the individual 
consciousness.  Members Napier and Thomas (2006) state, “Each time you change the 
Advertising message in your own mind…you enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising.”  
Elsewhere, Napier is paraphrased as arguing that, “When people realize advertising is NOT 
a one-way street – that this is a liberated country and dialogue is expected – then the 
market will truly be free, and on top of it, the world will be a more fun place to live (Burkes 
2012).  Member Black (n.d.) claims that, “the battleground, the theater of operations is 
human consciousness.”  Here, the emphasis is on realization, a shift in consciousness that 
empowers the individual.  Although the group positively evaluates the possible effects on 
behavior, their focus is more modest:  
[W]e’re all just telling people, ‘Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly 
 through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue. And you don’t 
 necessarily have to climb on up and alter a billboard’ (Haller and Napier 2006, 93) 
 
Measurement is extremely fuzzy on this question.  However, across the sample as a whole a 
slight majority of CJOs appear to pursue extrinsic goals.  While two groups pursue intrinsic 
goals (BFL, IST), eight pursue extrinsic goals (AMF, AAA, BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM), with 
the IAA and NGL straddling the distinction.79  What I can conclude, if anything, is that I have 
found little support here for this hypothesis.  I try to make sense of this finding further 
below. 
                                                          
79 “I think our projects generally play a dual role. On the one hand, they are pedagogical devices that provoke 
public discussion of critical issues. This conception of work fits neatly within the confines of "art practice." At 
the same time, our projects are functional tools that dissidents can actually use. In this regard, our work has 
more to do with engineering (or at least hacker) practice” (Schienke and IAA 2002, 104). 
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 Second, I hypothesize (H9.2) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural 
goals.  One clear example of a group pursuing such a goal is the CAE.  The CAE seek to 
develop practices of resistance against what they term the semiotic regime or the symbolic 
order, the particular dominant structure of power that constitutes the pervasive 
“instrumentalization/rationalization of culture” (Little 1999, 194).  Power is expressed and 
enacted in cultural practices irreducible to political institutions, although they perform a 
function of reification, as do a variety of social, economic, religious, and cultural 
institutions.  In contrast to the CAE’s manifestly cultural goal, the SCP is a clear example of a 
group with a political goal.  The SCP aim to completely eradicate the public surveillance 
camera.  The focus here is principally on the perceived unconstitutionality of the state 
surveillance of public areas, especially as found in New York City.  As founder Bill Brown 
states, “the people who operate the cameras that worry us are the FBI, the NYPD, and the 
state, not the corporations” (Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012). 
 This distinction between cultural and political goals appears problematic, however, 
when considering groups like AMF or Negativland.  The AMF clearly pursues objectives 
within the political field of action.  For example, one of their most noteworthy efforts 
involves the Media Carta, a charter aimed at challenging the corporate control of television 
and other means of mass communication.  The charter states: 
 As a start, we demand the right to buy radio and television airtime under the same rules and 
 conditions as advertising agencies. We ask our media regulators to set aside two minutes of 
 every broadcast hour for citizen-produced messages. We want the six largest media 
 corporations in the world broken up into smaller units (AMF 2009). 
 
Yet, this apparent emphasis on the political field of action is subservient to a broader goal 
of cultural revolution, of which the Media Carta is merely a means.  Opening the airways is 
part of a broader project of initiating ‘meme warfare,’ “a war of ideas against the keepers of 
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the current system, and we go right to the very foundations of that system, then we can 
begin a war of ideas where the good guys can eventually win” (Lasn n.d.).  This war of ideas 
is at the core of the AMF’s mission, for they see their ultimate goal as a fundamental shift in 
lifestyle.  As Lasn (2007) notes, “We are rather a philosophical than a political movement. 
We want people to think, to rethink their way of life.”  
For their part, Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA seem to straddle the cultural/ 
political distinction.  On the one hand, Negativland seek to raise consciousness by breaking 
the spell of corporate advertising.  With respect to their Dispepsi album, for example, 
member Mark Hosler states that “I hope that by the time you get to the end of the record 
you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one product,” but “it’s also at the same time 
symbolic of any large corporation and the kind of advertising they do.  And I hope people 
take it both ways (Hosler and Joyce 1997).  On the other hand, in the wake of their lawsuit 
with Island Records over their U2 single, they’ve pursued modifications to copyright law 
that expand protections for artists that utilize fragments of copyrighted works (NGL 1995).  
The CTM and the IAA are less clear examples, and thus constitute more precarious 
measurements.  With the CTM, for example, this arises in part because the group does not 
identify a specific or even general goal to which their actions may contribute; instead, they 
focus on crafting and testing tactics that they or others may deploy in the service of cultural 
or political goals.  As member Gach (2007) states, “One thing we are doing and one of the 
reasons we are called the Center for Tactical Magic is that we are creating templates for 
tactics.  You may not create your own tactical ice cream unit, but you might borrow your 
mom’s minivan, and conduct nomadic activities on your street.”  These templates are 
intended to serve purposes beyond merely raising consciousness; instead, they function as 
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investigations into the particular sets of power relations – typically involving governments, 
militaries, and/or corporations -  as well as augmentations of existing strategies (Paglen 
and Gach n.d.). 
Across the sample as a whole about half of the CJOs pursue cultural goals (AMF, 
AAA, BLF, IST, CAE, RBC).  Only three groups (BIL, SCP, TYM) pursue clearly political goals, 
with Negativland, the CTM, and the IAA straddling the distinction.  Like the first hypothesis, 
this one finds cautious support. 
Third, I hypothesize (H9.3) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of post-
materialist goals.  Nearly the entire sample unequivocally pursues post-materialist goals, 
thus supporting the hypothesis.  The goal of the SCP, for example, is to maximize freedom 
and autonomy by completely eradicating the public surveillance camera and its pervasive 
invasion of privacy.  There are some notable partial exceptions.  One of the two major goals 
of the Billionaires (the other is campaign finance reform) is to increase awareness of 
increasing inequality in the United States, especially among swing voters in battleground 
states during presidential election years.  Another prominent materialist value concerns 
protection of the environment.  While this has long been construed as a post-materialist 
concern, especially in terms of the aesthetics of nature, it is also clear that questions of 
pollution and climate change also directly impact concerns over health and physical well-
being.  Most prominently expressed by RBC and the AMF, a focus on the environment 
straddles a materialist/post-materialist goal distinction by pursuing the reorientation of 
lifestyle along a more environmentally sustainable path.  The Yes Men also pursue 
materialist/post-materialist goals, for example goals concerning social insurance and the 
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allocation of natural resources like water.  I do not include the CTM in this particular 
analysis due to the ambiguity of their goal. 
 Fourth, I hypothesize (H9.4) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of club goods.  
The IST presents a clear example of the pursuit of a club good in which the immediate field 
of interaction and those who participate is restricted by an exclusion mechanism.  In their 
case, usually the particular spatial confines of the scenario limit the number of people that 
can participate.  As Manning notes, “I think it is very much about the one-on-one or small 
group that maybe they will get something out or maybe they will think we are annoying.  At 
least we have that interaction or that moment where we changed an idea” (D’Ignazio, 
Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  This moment of interaction 
for the IST is the production of a club good of spontaneity, participation, conversation, and 
inquiry into the politics of the everyday.  In contrast, groups like the Yes Men ultimately 
pursue the production of public goods, principally the reduction of corporate power and 
the democratization of globalization, although some club goods, such as social insurance 
programs, are included as a consequence of this general focus. 
 Most of the cases in the sample pursue public goods (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, NGL, RBC, 
SCP, and TYM).  Only two groups pursue club goods (CAE and IST), while IAA straddle the 
distinction.  I excluded the CTM from the analysis.  This finding provides little support for 
the hypothesis.  I attempt to explain this finding further below.  
Fifth, I hypothesize (H9.5) that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of autonomous 
goals.  One example of a group pursuing an autonomous goal is the Billboard Liberation 
Front.  As Napier urges, “Advertising is a language. You’re being spoken to constantly 
through these ads. But you can talk back to them! You can make it a dialogue” (Haller and 
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Napier 2006, 93).  This dialogue constitutes an assertion of freedom and autonomy from 
the oppression of corporate advertising, which supersedes free will: 
It's either write, or be written. I can raise a pen or a brush in defense of my own mental 
 environment, or allow myself to be the passive, infinitely impressed palimpsest which is the 
 consumer caught in the maw of a marketing campaign (Black n.d.). 
 
The Billionaires pursue a moderate goal of restricting the influence of corporations in 
elections and public policy.  Member Hal E. Burton explains that “the purpose of 
Billionaires is “to expose the capture of the government by corporations” (Roselund 2004), 
a point upon which founder Andrew Boyd (2002, 370) elaborates: “to educate the public 
about the twin evils of campaign finance corruption and economic inequality.”  However, 
this pedagogical focus not only involves drawing in media attention to their issues, goal, 
and objectives but also affecting voter turnout and political preferences (Boyd 2004).   
Groups that pursue both extrinsic and autonomous goals appear to straddle the 
distinction between moderation or reform and autonomy.   Like the RBC, the AMF provides 
an example of a group pursing a goal of autonomy and reform in their emphasis on lifestyle 
change.  These groups express broad opposition to consumer and neoliberal values, while 
emphasizing freedom and community.  In the principle book-length treatment of the AMF’s 
philosophy, Kalle Lasn (1999, especially 165-184) argues at length for a “downshifter” 
lifestyle, one that is more attuned to the non-material, more aware of the social and 
environmental repercussions of individual actions, and free of the slavery of the 
consciousness by corporations.  While such a cultural shift would have wide-reaching 
political, social, cultural, and economic effects, they only constitute a reformist agenda.  As 
noted by Nomai (2008, 147), Lasn does not oppose corporations, the pursuit of profit, or 
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consumerism.  Instead, he calls for the reassertion of the ultimate power of individuals over 
culture and corporations and an environmentally sustainable future.   
Unlike the previous goal dimensions, this dimension (or more accurately, two 
dimensions) offers three values: moderate, radical, and/or autonomy.  Two groups pursue 
goals of autonomy (BLF, CAE, IAA), but three other groups pursue a mixture of autonomy 
and moderate goals (AMF, IAA, and RBC).  While the RBC and AMF pursue the most 
relatively radical goals, even these goals can best be described as moderate.  Six groups 
pursue moderate goals (AAA, BIL, IST, NGL, SCP, TYM), while the CTM is not included in the 
analysis.  While roughly half the sample dabbles in autonomy, it is not clear that this 
constitutes strong support for the hypothesis. 
 Table 9.3 summarizes the data on each hypothesis.  The only group that 
unequivocally conforms to every expectation is the CAE, while the SCP and the Billionaires 
are the furthest from the expected goal profiles of CJOs.  Clearly, the evidence strongly 
supports only one of the hypotheses: post- materialism, while the expectation of club goods 
 
Table 9.3. The Goal Profiles of CJOs 
 Intrinsic Cultural Post-Materialist Club Good Autonomy 
AMF Extrinsic Cultural 1 Public Moderate/Autonomy 
AAA Extrinsic Cultural Post-Materialist Public Moderate 
BLF Intrinsic Cultural Post-Materialist Public Autonomy 
BIL Extrinsic Political 1 Public Moderate 
CTM Extrinsic 1 2 2 2 
CAE Extrinsic Cultural Post-Materialist Club Autonomy 
IAA 1 1 Post-Materialist 1 Moderate/Autonomy 
IST Intrinsic Cultural Post-Materialist Club Moderate 
NGL 1 1 Post-Materialist Public Moderate 
RBC Extrinsic Cultural 1 Public Moderate/Autonomy 
SCP Extrinsic Political Post-Materialist Public Moderate 
TYM Extrinsic Political 1 Public Moderate 
1 = mixed             2 = insufficient data 
303 
is almost completely frustrated.  The rest of the hypotheses offer mixed results, though the 
majority of cases appear to be cultural, as expected, and extrinsic and moderate, which is 
not what was expected.  Importantly, the number of mixed cases suggests the difficulty in 
determining the specific qualities of the general or primary goal of an SMO.  Below I seek to 
explain some of these findings. 
9.3.2. Dimensions of Strategic Orientations 
One of the two primary tasks of this chapter is to offer empirical descriptions of the 
strategic orientations of CJOs.  First, I hypothesize (H9.6) that CJOs are associated with 
intrinsic orientations. The data on this hypothesis proves difficult to summarize due to the 
heterogeneity of the goal structures in the sample.  This makes it imperative that I 
reconsider the distinction between goals and objectives.  Goals constitute the primary 
concern of an SMO, whereas objectives constitute the set of secondary goals that contribute 
to the achievement of the goal.  I assume that objectives are subordinate to the goal and 
hierarchical, though they may be heterogeneous.  In Chapter Three I define heterogeneity 
or homogeneity as the intrinsincity or extrinsicity of a goal and an objective.  Here, I expand 
that definition to include the array of values specific to each of the dimensions specified 
above.   
 The gist of my argument is that while a particular group’s primary goal may be 
extrinsic and/or focus on the production of a public good, a central objective may involve 
an intrinsic action/outcome linkage or the production of club goods.  In order to flesh this 
argument out I consider the Yes Men.   The Yes Men see themselves as contributing to the 
anti-globalization or global justice movement(s), the series of collective actions and 
organizations that basically defines itself as pursuing a more equitable and democratic 
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globalization.  As they state: “When people ask us whether what we're doing makes a 
difference, or ask what we accomplish, we say that mainly, we see our work as contributing 
to a cumulative movement that does effect change” (TYM n.d.(b)).  This change involves the 
development of a “new legal framework to govern the behavior of corporations” in order to 
replace a focus on short-term profits with a more socially responsible agenda (TYM 
2009b).  Such a goal is extrinsic, political, moderate, and concerns the production of a 
bundle of primarily public goods. 
In order to achieve this goal, however, the Yes Men engage in strategies and tactics 
that concern the pursuit of objectives that in some cases vary significantly in their formal 
characteristics from their wider goal.  Many Yes Men actions involve impersonating 
members or representatives of some target (the WTO, Chamber of Commerce, Shell, etc.) 
and presenting satirical but ‘honest’ content at conferences.  These audience members 
constitute what Nomai (2008, 73) calls the Yes Men’s direct audience.  For the group, “the 
direct audience is crucial because without them there would be no scene” (Bichlbaum 
2008, 255).  Such actions are organized by the pursuit of specific objectives – the staging of 
actions - that are intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concern the production of a club good.  
Once the scene is generated, however, a more significant objective is concerned, namely the 
diffusion of the action to a wider viewing public.  This involves accessing the mass media, 
especially the mainstream media.  This wider indirect audience of media and public 
opinion is their primary audience; “this is just a gimmick to get a certain amount of press 
attention for a certain number of issues.  It’s nothing more and in no way a movement” 
(Bichlbaum 2008, 259).  Some of their actions essentially bypass the initial objective of the 
club good, such as their impersonation of a Dow Chemical spokesperson on a BBC news 
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broadcast.  They also produce documentaries and books about their actions, do press, 
releases, and operate a website.  In reaching this wider audience, however, their specific 
objectives seem less clear.  For example, member Mike Bonanno claims: 
For the people who see the film, it just seems to work in a different way. It's a slower-
 burning thing, more people see it and talk about it.  In terms of changing people's 
 consciousness in a slow and subtle way, it really has an effect. We see high school students, 
 for example, who see The Yes Men and show it to their friends and so on. It makes a 
 difference (TYM 2009a). 
 
Yet, elsewhere member Andy Bichlbaum suggests: “what we do is galvanize people who are 
already on our side.  Changing the minds of people on the other side is something this work 
can do, and does in extraordinary moments, but doing that is more of a fact-to-face kind of 
thing” (TYM 2012b).  Elsewhere, Bonanno makes “no large claims about trying to build a 
social movement or even necessarily making much of a difference in the world.  He simply 
said he saw himself helping to build morale for those really are in the trenches doing the 
hard work of organizing for change” (Haugerud 2013, 195).  These modest claims suggest 
that the Yes Men hope to increase the amount of scrutiny brought to bear on certain issues 
relevant to their wider goal of social change.  In particular, they seek to increase awareness 
and solidarity among an ideologically sympathetic population, if not those on the fence.  
Such an objective is apparently intrinsic, cultural, moderate, and concerns the production 
of a public good, namely the diffusion of information through the media and possible 
preference change among some of the audience. 
 These objectives are, again, subordinate to the wider goal.  The Yes Men see the 
production of these goods as contributing to part of the wider effort; one that is sustained 
by both legal and electoral challenges as well as civil disobedience.  What they do is “just 
one piece of the activism puzzle.  It’s not the whole thing at all” (TYM 2012b), because the 
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actions of the Yes Men “only [go] so far.  The real engine is street protest and other forms of 
mass movement” (Bichlbaum 2008, 259). 
 This strategic orientation is roughly similar across the cases of groups with extrinsic 
goals.  The Billionaires’ Andrew Boyd (n.d.) expresses the same sentiment as TYM: 
I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to – 
 creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a 
 corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime, 
 and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful. But then there has to be 
 a larger movement that keeps holding their feet to the fire.  
 
Elsewhere, Boyd (2004) states a further clarification:  
There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more effective…It's only really fair to 
 compare [Billionaires for Bush] to other things of the same order. It's very effective at 
 getting media attention. It's very effective at inviting people who don't have a strong history 
 of political activism, but share progressive values and views, and are skilled, creative 
 professionals…Whether it's actually effective at changing anybody's mind is a whole other 
 matter. Whether it's the most effective voice with which to engage individual swing voters 
 face to face…some ways no, and some way (sic) yes. 
 
Much like TYM, this final modest point finds a more robust counterpart:  
What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of 
 it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving 
 corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those 
 in the middle (Boyd 2004). 
 
This sense that these groups seek to raise consciousness, awareness, change political 
preferences, or change political behavior as part of a wider struggle distinguishes them 
from groups that pursue intrinsic goals.  While the IST and the BLF do situate itself within 
particular artistic and political milieus populated by similar groups past and present, their 
strategic orientation is less conceived as part of a broader movement, and instead focuses 
on developing specific instances or events of freedom, community, or discourse; in other 
words, they try to create spaces of difference and dissent.  For the BLF, this space or event 
is a public good, one accessible to all through a reading of the billboard in person or in the 
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media and crafted through the production of a club good: the expression of autonomy and 
freedom by the BLF itself in the creation of a culture jam on a billboard.  For the groups 
pursuing broader extrinsic goals, this process is ultimately subordinate to a wider goal – 
democratizing globalization, reforming corporate behavior, reducing advertising or 
surveillance, changing authoritarian culture, etc.  
 Next, I hypothesize (H9.7) that CJOs are associated with insular orientations.  Six 
groups in the sample conform to this expectation (BLF, CAE, IAA, IST, NGL, SCP).  These 
groups express little to no interest in utilizing the resources of a broad support base and 
cultivating wide appeal.  Instead, they are more interested in developing internal 
relationships and engaging audiences.  Two groups lack sufficient data to determine their 
orientation (CTM, TYM), while the remaining four express some degree of mass orientation 
(AMF, AAA, BIL, RBC).  For example, the AMF boasts of a network of activists approaching 
100,000 (Lasn et al 2012).  The AAA (2013c) asks for others to engage in AAA actions on 
their own and share the experience on the group’s website.  The Billionaires is the closest 
thing to a mass organization in the sample.  While insularity is the predominant orientation 
in the sample, the four cases of mass orientations do not provide strong support for the 
hypothesis.  
 Finally, I hypothesize (H10.8) that CJOs are associated with the tendency to mobilize 
relatively small numbers of people.  This hypothesis aims to determine the extent of social 
disruption specific to my sample of CJOs.  As expected, almost the entire sample of CJOs is 
oriented towards relatively small mobilizations (see Table 9.4).  Some groups (BLF, NGL, 
and TYM) are concerned not with attracting non-members, but with simply performing 
their actions, though the TYM require the unwitting participation of large numbers of  
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Scope of  
Issue Agenda 
AMF No Large Multi-Issue 
AAA No Small Single Issue 
BLF Yes Small Single issue 
BIL No Small Single Issue 
CTM 2 Small Multi/Single 
CAE Yes Small  Single Issue 
IAA Yes Small Single Issue 
IST Yes Small Single Issue 
NGL Yes Small Single Issue 
RBC No Small Multi-Issue 
SCP Yes Small Single Issue 
TYM 2 Small Single Issue 
1 = Mixed                   2 = Insufficient Data 
 
people in some of their actions.  Still others pursue small engagements with a handful of 
participants and audience members, some of them bystanders (AAA, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, 
and SCP).  Three groups differ somewhat from this pattern: the AMF, BIL, and RBC.  The 
AMF in particular are occasionally oriented towards large mobilizations with events such 
as Buy Nothing Day.  The Billionaires are also keen on mobilizing more than a small handful 
of participants, though even their largest actions involve less than a hundred participants.  
The RBC are clearly the most civil disobedient of the entire sample.  While their actions 
range in size of participation from very small store interventions to larger protests, they 
also visibly and dramatically occupy private space, such as a Starbucks or Disney store.  
They claim that “the fastest way to reclaim public space is to go and get in it…The only real 
authority in public space is public action.  Bodies in space, talking and listening: the 
freedom starts there” (D. and Talen 2011, 136).  Contact with the police and security 
guards are routine features of this approach.   
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9.3.3. Issues 
 In order to further flesh out the strategic orientation of culture jamming 
orientations as the interdependence of strategic choices, I consider in this chapter the 
issues that CJOs select as relevant.  Analysis of targets and tactics proceeds in the following 
chapters. 
 I hypothesize (H10.7) that CJOs are associated with a focus on single issues.  For 
example, the AAA is strictly concerned with the issue of outdoor advertising, while the SCP 
is exclusively concerned with the presence of public surveillance cameras.  In contrast, the 
AMF focuses on an extremely wide set of issues including the relation of mass food 
production to various physical and psychological conditions, access to media outlets, the 
environmental impact of automobiles, and the harmful effects of the cosmetics and 
advertising industries, as well as more recent concerns with U.S. foreign policy.   
 As expected, most cases in the sample pursued a single-issue agenda (see Table 9.4).  
Nine groups conformed to this expectation, while the AMF and the RBC pursued multi-issue 
agendas.  The CTM again proves difficult to pigeonhole. 
 I briefly move beyond a general characterization of the scope of a group’s issue 
agenda by attending to some of the substantive concerns of the groups.  Some issues do 
appear common across some or much of the sample.  These include especially the harmful 
effects of advertising, the privatization of public space, and media concentration, all of 
which are issues bound up with the freedoms of speech and expression.  The AMF, AAA, 
BLF, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL, RBC all exhibit strong concern over these issues and define 
their actions as addressing them.  The BLF’s Napier state: 
 But I have to admit I’m pretty irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the 
 public spaces.  I find that completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these 
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 billboards are in a public space and I have to look at them…Those spaces belong to all of us” 
 (Berger 2000). 
 
The AMF’s Media Carta charter directly targets the problem of the concentration of media 
outlets in the hands of a small number of corporations, while their entire mission takes 
issue with the harmful pervasiveness of advertising.  Other issues of note include economic 
inequality, the power of corporations in politics, and the environment.  Opposition to 
surveillance cameras is notable in four groups: the CAE, IAA, RBC, and SCP.  More 
idiosyncratic issues include biotechnology (CAE), the relation between defense research, 
engineering departments, and protest policing (CAE and IAA), the resurgence of 
nationalism (CAE and IST), and copyright law (NGL), among others.  
9.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I develop hypotheses regarding the goals and strategic orientations 
of CJOs.  Results were mixed on the general NSM hypothesis.  The majority of CJOs in this 
sample tends to develop strategic orientations that are either extrinsically oriented but 
involve the production of club good or intrinsic objectives or they primarily focus on 
intrinsic goals.  Groups like the BLF and the CAE conform to this latter understanding of 
culture jamming, one that appears to confirm the generic hypothesis of NSM theory.  
However, the majority of the sample does not strictly conform to this understanding.  I 
suggest two ways to consider this frustration.  First, as suggested in the conclusion of 
Chapter Seven, most CJOs are not engaged identity politics.  Instead, they consider 
themselves part of what Kriesi et al (1995) call instrumental movements.  This is made 
clear by many of the goals of the groups in the sample, goals broadly sympathetic to the 
anti-globalization or global justice and environmental movements, a point casually made in 
the introduction to this dissertation.   
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Second, one of the reasons that CJOs may choose to utilize the strategies that they do 
– low social disruption - is that they may perceive the political environment to be 
inopportune for more extrinsically oriented objectives, what Yes Men member Bichlbaum 
(2008, 259) described as the real engine of social change,  “street protest and other forms 
of mass movement.”  Kriesi et al (1995) suggest a similar mechanism at play in the relation 
of subcultural movements to political opportunities.  They argue that movements like the 
gay rights or women’s movements are prone to shift to a more instrumental approach 
when they encounter sustained facilitation (a concept explored further in Chapter Twelve) 
and a more counter-cultural (aggressive) approach when they encounter sustained (though 
not too heavy) repression.  More generally, scholars now acknowledge the importance of 
‘abeyance structures,’ networks and organizations of dissent that maintain solidarity, 
ideology, and identity as well as resources during periods of low mobilization (Taylor 
1989).  However, such structures and relations do not necessarily evaporate during periods 
of high mobilization. Social movements are diverse and in many cases characterized by 
extensive organizational specialization (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Haines 1988).  Thus, I 
suggest here that part of this process of responding to the perception of adverse 
opportunities involves an emphasis on modest strategies that maintain solidarity, ideology, 
and identity, generate media awareness, and change political preferences.  With respect to 
my sample of CJOs, this involves the structure of strategic orientations described above: 
extrinsic and public good goals with an emphasis on intrinsic and club or public good 
objectives and low social disruption.  In the following chapter I consider the question of 
political opportunities, while this more general hypothesis I consider in the remaining 
chapters. 
312 
CHAPTER 10. IDENTITY AND STRATEGY 
 
 Chapter Nine describes the goals and strategic orientations of CJOs.  This chapter’s 
primary task is to relate these strategic considerations to the collective identities of these 
organizations using data collected from my sample of CJOs.  The primary argument of this 
chapter is that identities are the shared understandings that shape the ideologies of these 
organizations.  Ideologies refer here to the cognitive, affective, and normative evaluation of 
relevant social relations and the capacity and motivation to modify or venerate these 
relations.  These social relations are the stable and volatile aspects of the available 
structure of opportunities and threats.   In turn, these evaluations form the foundation for 
strategic orientations.  This chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture 
jamming to everyday social organization.   
  This chapter is organized into three parts.  First, I review the concept of an 
opportunity structure and consider the literature on targeting strategies.  Second, I develop 
theoretical relations between strategic orientations and collective identities.  In order to 
relate identities and strategies, I focus on the ideologies of CJOs and opportunity structures. 
Third, I present data on the variety of targets that CJOs engage in their strategic choices. 
 An important caveat concerns the scope of this chapter.  Chapter Nine develops the 
relation between goals and strategic orientations.  This chapter elaborates the relation 
between collective identities and strategic orientations.  My additional emphasis on targets 
in this chapter implicitly suggests that sets of hypotheses may be developed relating goals 
to targets through strategic orientations.  However, while Chapter Nine explicitly avoids 
addressing the determinants of goal selection, the model utilized in this dissertation does 
suggest that collective identities and goals constitute two independent explanatory 
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variables.  However, because the focus of this dissertation remains an explanation of 
tactical choice and due to space and time constraints, target selection is only considered as 
part of the constraining context on the choice in tactics. 
10.1. Opportunity Structures 
10.1.1. Political Opportunities 
Along with RMT, political process theory helped revive the study of social 
movements in the 1970s  (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 
et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).  Earlier social movement 
theory largely neglected political motivations and the political context in favor of an 
emphasis on social structure and psychology (Blumer 1951; Lang and Lang 1961; Smelser 
1963).80  As political scientists sounded the call to “bring the state back in,” opportunity 
theorists situated protest activity adjacent to the political environment.  This explicitly 
political perspective calls attention to a variety of factors exogenous to a social movement: 
regime type; laws, regulations, and judicial decisions; relationships between political 
actors, especially the party in government; public opinion and the mass media.  These 
contextual features offer opportunities and constraints that inhibit, channel, or instigate 
collective challenges to elites and activists. 
However, identifying the salient factors that constitute political opportunity 
structures (POS) as well as their relative stability over time has proven somewhat 
contentious.  Early efforts typically conflated durable structural characteristics with more 
unstable situational or conjunctural factors.  For example, Kitschelt’s (1986) classification 
                                                          
80 Even Olson’s (1965) groundbreaking theory of collective action disregards both political institutions and 
political motivation; political activity is only rational insofar as economic inducements are offered in the form 
of material selective incentives.   
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of West Germany as a closed opportunity structure was at odds with most scholars of West 
German politics.  Instead, closed opportunities were the result of contingent strategies by 
various political actors, especially the SPD, in spite of the open federal structure of the West 
German constitutional system (Rootes 1999).  This reduction of agency to structure 
sparked one of the longest-running critiques of the approach (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; 
2011).  Later practitioners would acknowledge this problem by distinguishing stable from 
volatile aspects of the environment (Kriesi et al 1995; Meyer 1990; Rucht 1990; Tarrow 
1998).  For example, Tarrow (1998) identifies five sources of opportunities and constraints 
on contentious politics: the degree of access to the political system, the stability of political 
alignments, divided elites, influential allies, and repression and facilitation.  However, 
drawing on Kriesi et al’s (1995) conceptualization of stable opportunities, he stresses that 
these situational opportunities function within a broader context of stable opportunities, 
including variation in the strength of the state and the prevailing strategies that authorities 
utilize against challengers.  Still, Tarrow is quick to stress that even concepts like state 
strength are too general and abstract to capture the nuances of politics. 
The chief import of political variables is their perceived facility in explaining 
variance in protest mobilization, strategies, and outcomes across time and across 
institutional contexts.  However, the form of the relationship between opportunities and 
mobilization is often ill-specified or ignored (Opp 2009).  Eisinger (1973) distinguishes a 
negative linear relation – closed opportunities yield more protest through a frustration-
aggression mechanism – from a curvilinear relation in which expanding opportunities 
signal decreasing costs for activism and thus initially yield increasing protest.  As the 
structure continues to open, however, rising expectations are met by increases in 
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satisfaction.  Many scholars utilize an implicit hypothesis of a positive linear relationship in 
which increasing opportunities produce increasing protest (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).  
Goldstone (2004) argues that the primary predictive utility of POS is minimal, consisting 
primarily in the argument that once access is opened – once effective democracy is 
instituted – social movements become a regular feature of the political landscape.   
 With respect to the question of strategy, Marks and McAdam (original emphasis, 
1999: 102) provide the most succinct theoretical proposition: 
Organizers are also very likely to tailor their efforts to the specific kinds of changes they see 
 taking place in the political systems they seek to challenge.  In particular, where and how 
 they seek to press their claims will reflect their view of where the system is newly 
 vulnerable or receptive to their efforts 
 
Yet this reasonable conjecture has led to relatively anemic theorizing on the relationship.  
For most POS scholars, institutional contexts are specified at the national level with little 
effort to specify mechanisms.  For example, one hypothesis suggests that the more open the 
political system, the less disruptive the protests (Kitschelt 1986).  Kitschelt suggests that 
the structure of opportunities in each context translates directly into the calculus of protest 
mobilization.  While this may be helpful for explaining variation in strategies and tactics 
across entire populations and across time, opportunities and constraints are not uniform 
across movements or SMOs.  The distribution of these factors across a population of 
activists can yield variable strategies and tactics.  For example, the perception of the level 
of threat posed by an SMO may yield repression by authorities, thus making some actions 
more or less attractive to other SMOs (Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).     
10.1.2. Discursive Opportunities and Irony 
 Over the last decade, scholars have identified several other possible opportunity 
structures of relevance to the study of contentious politics ranging from the economic 
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(King 2008; Soule 2009) to the discursive (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon, 
Newman, Muse, and Terrell 2007).  In an effort to amend the framing literature’s relative 
lack of emphasis on exogenous framing constraints, several scholars suggest that 
discursive processes in a given society are constrained by the overall discursive 
opportunity structure.  As Lipsky argued (1968), protest is a process oriented not only 
towards the target (government), but also the reference publics that have influence over 
the political process.  In order to maximize their bargaining capacity, activists develop 
strategies and tactics that appeal to the mass media, which in turn publicizes the protests 
to these reference publics.  Like the POS, this sphere of publicity is not neutral.  The 
discursive environment is a field strewn with opportunities and constraints that can 
channel, inhibit, or facilitate collective action.  The most important discursive players are 
the various mass media, but other major political actors, as well as various SMOs, utilize 
their own discursive repertoires in an effort to increase support for their goals while 
criticizing their opponents (Steinberg 1995; 1998; 1999a; 1999b).  In addition, this 
discursive struggle – frames, counter-frames, and the framing contests within a social 
movement – mediates between objective POS and social movement mobilization, strategy, 
and outcomes.  Defining a political context as open or closed is itself a discursive conflict.  
For example, a government that is opposed to an SMO may characterize the activists 
demands as illegitimate and marginal, while simultaneously arguing either that the 
government is unable to concede or that it refuses to do so.  If the mass media refuse to 
cover the group’s non-violent demonstrations, parrot the government narrative, or utilize 
their own set of frames depicting the activists unfavorably, the SMO’s prospects for success 
are indeed bleak, and mobilization may suffer accordingly.   
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 The concept of discursive opportunities travels to non-democratic regimes as well.  
State monopolies on mass media as well as the frequent use of surveillance and informants 
to identify dissenters can severely constrict the opportunities available even for political 
discussion.  This repressive environment makes the articulation of overt contentious 
frames very risky (Johnston 2006; Johnston and Mueller 2001; Thornton 2002; Wedeen 
1999).  As a consequence, “opposition movements have become skilled at mounting 
unobtrusive, symbolic, and peaceful forms of disruption that avoid repression, while 
symbolizing contention” (Tarrow 1998, 103).  In particular, ‘unobtrusive’ (Johnston and 
Mueller 2001) or ‘small’ (Johnston 2006) contention involves secure spaces of discourse: 
cafes, official cultural organizations, literary or scientific circles, etc., wherein grievances, 
ideologies, and identities can be articulated free from the overwhelming repression of the 
state.  Johnston and Mueller are explicit that the contentious nature of oppositional talk is a 
function of the overwhelming risks that critical public speech holds for ordinary citizens, 
let alone activists.  Following this logic, Tarrow (1998, 103) hypothesizes that “the more 
closed citizens’ access to legitimate participation, the more sensitive citizens are to the 
meanings of symbolic forms of protest.”  Presumably, this sensitivity translates into a 
widely distributed capacity to decipher more sophisticated, subtle, or covert forms of 
expression.  Many note, for example, the use of irony and ambiguity in contentious 
expressions under authoritarian regimes (Johnston 2006; Thornton 2002; Wedeen 1999).  
 Some works have explored the use of irony in more democratic contexts.  Without 
referring to framing, Stewart et al (2007, 195) identify rhetorical strategies in social 
movements that contribute to the construction of ridicule, including the use of irony.  Some 
works consider the role of irony in culture jamming.  Day (2008; 2011) and Wettergren 
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(2005, ch. 8) argue that irony helps to create stronger feelings of collective identity by 
appealing to sympathizers’ sense of humor.  In Chapter One, I identify culture jamming as a 
form of ironic framing.  One interpretation of rational choice theory would suggest that, 
assuming that activists regard their audience as endowed with variable degrees of 
interpretive sophistication (varying resource constraints), framing strategies would be 
constructed as maximally simplistic and straightforward (low cognitive costs) in order to 
appeal to the most adherents.  From this perspective, frames are created and distributed in 
order to be effective.  However, if a frame increases the cognitive demands on audiences – if 
it requires more effort and more skill to successfully interpret – how can it be said to be a 
rational choice?  Under repressive conditions, sophisticated frames are not anomalous, 
because the (repression) costs of overt simple contentious frames are presumably higher 
than the (cognitive) costs of the more subtle frames.  Under less repressive political 
contexts like democracy, however, the use of ironic framing, or culture jamming, would 
appear to be an occasion in which movement actors choose a deliberately more difficult 
discursive device over the overt straightforward alternative that risks little to no costs.  
This dissertation is an effort to explain this subtle anomaly in rational choice theory. 
10.1.3. Targets 
Within the literature on targets there are two basic but related ways to conceptually 
distinguish among targets.  The first concerns differences in the basic orientation towards 
the target (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996).  According to 
Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political action is directed 
towards some object of claims.  These objects are those collective actors or identities to 
which activists press their claims.  These actors, however, are only one form of target.  
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Scholars have identified a number of other important targets that social movement actors 
engage.  Gamson (1990) distinguishes between antagonist, beneficiary, and constituency 
targets.  Antagonists are Tilly’s objects of claims: those actors or institutions whose actions 
the protagonists believe can address their grievances.  They are in this sense the targets of 
influence, the group that an SMO seeks in order to provide benefits to beneficiary targets.  
Beneficiaries are those actors or institutions that the protagonists believe will benefit from 
these desired changes.  Finally, constituency targets are those actors or institutions whose 
commitment the protagonists seek – in the form of participation and contributions - in 
order to pursue the desired changes of the SMO.  Importantly, while Gamson introduced 
some methodological qualifications, these categories are not logically exclusive.  
Beneficiaries can also be constituents, for example.     
In his study of local, ad hoc, and relatively powerless SMOs, Lipsky (1968) identified 
four audiences that the group seeks to influence.  Some are essentially the same as Gamson.  
Both distinguish between constituents and antagonists or target groups.  However, Lipsky 
assumes that beneficiaries and constituents are the same: the SMO initially draws support 
from those they seek to benefit.  However, because the support base of the SMO is low in 
resources, it lacks the capacity to bargain with the target group.  In order to generate an 
effective bargaining capacity, it must interact with two other basic types of actors: the 
communications media and the reference publics of the target group.  Through the media, 
the SMO can ramify its actions and message and generate a favorable reaction among these 
reference publics.  In turn, the target group will respond to the reference publics. 
McCarthy, Smith, and Zald (1996) makes an effort to distinguish SMO targets by identifying 
four arenas in which movement actors seek to further their goals.  These actors target the 
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agenda within each arena, the hierarchy of issues most salient to that arena.  The public 
agenda refers to the general population’s aggregated concerns.  Those issues that are given 
the most attention across the mass media are the media agenda.  The electoral agenda 
denotes the set of issues that drive campaigns for political office.  Finally, the governmental 
agenda specifies the salient concerns of officials within political institutions.   
The second means by which scholars distinguish targets is inductive or ad hoc, 
though it relies on a basic distinction between state and non-state targets.  While the state 
is the most common single focus of protest, a variety of other actors are also prominent 
targets, including schools and school boards, corporations, labor unions, religious and 
medical organizations, and the public (Van Dyke et al 2004; Walker et al2008).  Often this 
approach is premised on the assumption that protest events are primarily oriented 
towards objects of claims or Gamson’s antagonists.  In attempting to capture variation in 
targets across my sample of CJOs, I utilize both approaches below. 
10.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 In order to relate the identities of my sample of CJOs to their strategic orientations, I 
develop the theoretical insights initially presented in Chapters Two and Rhree.  First, I 
consider the relation of opportunity structures to everyday social organization, especially 
the shared understandings constitutive of collective identities.  Second, I relate these 
considerations to the ideologies I discuss in Chapter Three and to the strategic orientations 
I describe in Chapter Nine.  Finally, I consider differing targeting strategies. 
While I draw extensively from Tilly in this chapter, my efforts to elaborate on 
concepts like strategic situations and their relations to opportunity structures are largely 
my own.  This is primarily, though not exclusively, a consequence of the static decision 
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theoretic analysis pursued so far in this dissertation.  I offer only a rudimentary analysis of 
objective structures here.  Most of the focus here is on the subjective or attitudinal 
correlates, the perceptions of these actors and institutions by SMOs.  Instead, this single-
actor model of tactical choice primarily focuses on the perception of the general structures 
of opportunity and threat.  Clearly, any consideration of interactions with political 
authorities and media outlets, to name a few, would require a more robust and dynamic 
analysis.  I tentatively venture such an analysis in Chapter Twelve.  Consequently, the focus 
here is on establishing the generalized sense of the strategic situation recognized by SMOs 
and represented in their ideologies.  This leads to the related point that the initial utility of 
analyses of opportunities and threats lay in the quantification of objective environmental 
characteristics in order to facilitate rigorous cross-case comparison.  However, the 
distinction between perceived and objective opportunities is now recognized as a fruitful 
one (Tarrow 1998).  These considerations lead me to briefly note that, “the evaluation of 
one’s capacities [and those of other actors] is itself shaped by former experiences with 
authorities – [which] may explain why, contrary to what would be expected on the basis of 
a simple [objective] POS model, people sometimes do not use the opportunities available to 
them” (Kriesi et al 1995, 246).  The following section considers this relation between 
structures of opportunity, patterns of attribution and evaluation, and collective action. 
10.2.1. Collective Identities and Opportunity Structures 
Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) rightly point out that the concept of strategic 
orientation is broader than Tilly’s repertoires of contention.  They argue that in contrast to 
the focus on tactics, strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing 
principle.”   However, in his work on repertoires of contention Tilly developed hypotheses 
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relating claims or issues and identities to the sets of tactics that actors would utilize.81  
McAdam et al (2001, 138) define repertoires of contention as “ensembles of claim-making 
routines available to particular pairs of identities.”  This definition clearly clusters claims, 
performances, and identities.  For Tilly, one of the defining features of a repertoire of 
contention is that it can contribute to an explanation of tactical choice through the 
specification of, networks, identities, and claims.  Preferences for certain tactics tend to 
cluster around these variables.   
The model presented in Figure 10.1 introduces a set of relationships in order to 
better explain the relation of identities to strategic orientations.  Linking the shared 
understandings of actors with the opportunity structures available to them is the set of 
durable social relations and social fields that these actors are embedded within.  In order to 
elaborate, I consider the concept of an opportunity structure.  As noted above, the POS 
refers to the arrangement of threats and opportunities offered by both durable political 
structures and the more volatile alignments among political actors.  Opportunities refer to 
the features of this environment affecting “the probability that social protest actions will 
lead to success in achieving a desired outcome,” while threats connote those constraints 
shaping  “the costs that a social group will incur from protest or that it expects to suffer if it 
does not act” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181, 183).  Such factors include the degree of 
access, facilitation, prior success, and repression meted out to challengers by political 
actors.   For example, high capacity democratic regimes are generally tolerant of a wide 
variety of political activity, but generally effective at suppressing highly disruptive activism, 
including violence. 
                                                          
81 He hypothesizes: “For a given set of actors and issues, those performances change relatively little from one 

















Figure 10.1 Understandings, Opportunities, and Strategy 
 
As stressed in Chapter Three, my conception of structures of opportunity and threat 
emphasizes the production of information through interactions with protagonists, 
antagonists, and neutrals.  While it is clear that direct interactions with actors can produce 
updated estimates of the probability of success or the costs of inaction or protest, in some 
ways the indirect effects of interaction are more crucial (Koopmans 2005).  Figure 10.2 is a 
simple formalization of the mediated relation of opportunity structures to action.  Here, 
opportunity structures, including the more volatile configurations of power within a 
political regime, constitute constraints played out in the strategic interactions (direct and 
indirect) among the major political actors in a given political regime: police, courts, 
militaries, other SMOs, countermovement SMOs, interest groups, the public, media 
organizations, political parties, and other groups.  Importantly, these interactions are not 
exclusively antagonistic.   In the broader political participation literature, for example, a 
prominent explanation of variation in political activity is the degree to which individuals 
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Figure 10.2. Opportunities, Information, and Action 
 
campaigns (Hansen and Rosenstone 1993; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978), an argument echoed 
in solidarity theorist’s emphasis on the mobilizing effects of political entrepreneur’s use of 
pre-existing networks (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978).   
These strategic interactions produce information externalities that provide updated 
perceptions of the prevailing opportunities and threats available to actors.  In turn, these 
constraints provide updated expectations regarding the costs and benefits of various 
contentious collective actions.  A notable illustration of this process is found in Tarrow’s 
(1998) claim that social movements are generated partly through the effects of ‘early 
risers’.  In his model, early successes by activists produce flows of information about the 
political environment.  This information signals new prospects for collective action that 
diffuse to the wider public, including other activists.  Conversely, perceived collective 
action failures may generate information flows that dampen the prospects for success.   
Strategic Interactions 




Recall the basic relation between schemas and information established in Chapter 
Three, especially Figure 3.2.  While current information initiates the decision process by 
offering the relevant cues for a sketch of the situation, the shared schemas activated by this 
information constrain the effects of additional information on the decision process.   In 
other words, we tend to experience and analyze events through the lens of our prior 
experiences.  Figure 10.1 employs a parallel consideration.  The distinction between 
understandings and opportunities mirrors the relation between schemas and information; 
shared understandings are composed of schemas, while the opportunities and threats 
offered by an opportunity structure through strategic interactions are carried along by an 
updated stream of information.82  One consequence of this distinction is that the sets of 
actors and institutions that comprise the stable and volatile aspects of opportunity 
structures are also embedded in sets of social relationships and social fields.  As noted in 
Chapter Two and as hinted in Figure 10.1, these durable social relations and the fields in 
which they are embedded are maintained in part by collective identities, the shared 
understandings and public representations that define the boundaries of these relations.  
Thus, socialization into a set of social relations and social fields produces shared 
understandings about sets of actors and institutions, while direct or indirect interactions 
with these same institutions and actors produce the information flows that update actors 
                                                          
82 As I noted in Chapter Three, these (free and costly) streams (which may vary systematically across contexts 
in terms of the quantity and quality of information) are intervening variables between the opportunity 
structures that activists face - contexts inclusive of sets of institutions and interactions that produce up-to-
date contextual information - and the perception and evaluation of these opportunities and threats.   
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on the opportunities and threats available to them and others.83  This point is crucial.  
Within the constraints offered by these information-generating contexts, SMOs and 
authorities respond to each other with tactics that vary across the system (chosen actions).  
The POS – a significant constraint on the responses of political actors to activists and other 
actors - thus generates current information about the various constraints the political 
context offers, as well as updated information on the effectiveness of actions.   
However, corresponding to the constraint imposed on choice by schemas (see 
Figure 3.2), choices in tactics are constrained by the definition of the strategic situation 
facing an SMO and the motivations to engage in collective action.  These assessments 
constitute a shared sense of the strategic significance of social relations; they identify the 
range of appropriate (and thus inappropriate) means for action. As shared schemas, these 
ideologies refer here to the relatively sophisticated or coherent organization of the 
cognitive, affective, and normative evaluations of relevant social relations and the 
motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate these relations.  Thus, ideologies are not 
merely “the verbal image of a good society,” (Downs 1957, 96) but, as implied by Downs’ 
analysis, the preference structure relating different configurations of social relations – the 
good society being the upmost desired.   
In this understanding of ideology, each actor assesses their position relative to 
others, especially the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of actors.  Vulnerabilities 
are an SMO’s sense of the degrees or points of access available to them within a structure 
and the basic means of governing or restricting these points.  Motivations refer to an SMO’s 
                                                          
83
 Recall, for example, the notion that the practical sense that animates the habitus – the sets of dispositions 
generated by social fields and social interaction - is a variably efficient capacity for exploiting the 
opportunities available in a social field. 
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sense of the preferences of actors and the incentive structures they are embedded within.  
Capacities are an SMO’s sense of the resources and the autonomy that actors and 
institutions constituting a structure possess that may be utilized to influence the 
protagonist(s). From the perspective of an SMO, each structure of opportunities and threats 
possesses some configuration of these basic factors.  For example, imagine an SMO that 
perceives the political environment to be extremely open, but believes that the major 
actors, say Congress or Parliament, are greedy survivalists unwilling to act against the 
interests of corporate campaign donors.  Such a sense of the strategic situation does not 
necessarily close off all strategic options, but rather makes some or many options far less 
attractive than a neutral sense of the situation. 
A preliminary point must be considered.  As noted in Chapter Seven, people vary in 
the degree to which their evaluations are internally coherent or organized (Converse 
1964).  In other words, some people possess more belief constraint or more developed 
ideological conceptions of the world around them than others.  Consequently, one might 
say that the more coherent the organization of the schemas –the stronger or the more rigid 
the ideology - the more constraining the effects on choice.  I note as well in Chapter Seven 
that the rejection of grand narratives – an observation by Wettergren (2005, 48) regarding 
her sample of CJO’s - may suggest the possibility that these organizations do not exhibit the 
coherence of a constraining ideology.  Yet, Mueller and Judd (1981) found that political 
activists, like political elites, possess high belief constraint and belief consensus, likely as a 
consequence of higher levels of commitment and participation than the general population.  
These possibly contradictory expectations may be reconciled with the observation that the 
rejection of grand narratives itself constitutes an ideological position, insofar as we 
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recognize that ideologies need not be totalistic.  How coherent such an ideology may be 
relative to others remains an open question.  Nevertheless, insofar as an “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” anticipates the reliance on local or micro-narratives – from the 
rejection of totalizing universal schemas like Marxism, religion, etc. to the embrace of 
heterogeneous and particular ‘languages games’ (Lyotard 1984, xxiv) - this discussion does 
suggest a particular hypothesis: 
H10.1: CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over   
  metanarratives. 
 
I thus expect to find evidence of a tendency to restrict or qualify claims of knowledge while 
embracing or emphasizing local conditions or situations as particular or singular events.84 
Additionally, one characteristic of the embrace of micro-narratives is the celebration 
or toleration of pluralism and difference, of heterogeneous interests, capacities, and 
behaviors.  A wealth of research in political science and psychology supports the charge 
that self-identified liberals tend to be more tolerant of other groups than conservatives 
(McAdams et al 2008; McClosky and Brill 1983; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; 
Tetlock 1983).  If we construe ideology generally and quantitatively, much like the 
standard Likert scale of liberalism, then a preference for micro-narratives should be 
broadly associated with liberalism.  This tentative conclusion and the tendency in the 
literature to associate culture jamming with opposition to capitalism suggests a hypothesis: 
H10.2: CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal ideology 
Empirically, this chapter focuses on that aspect of the structure of opportunities and 
threats that is captured by a more robust conception of ideology, meaning a more 
qualitative and expansive conception.  Thus, the first task is to build on the previous 
                                                          
84 The degree to which this distinction holds empirically will be addressed as well. 
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description of collective identities by stressing the preferences for various configurations 
of social relations and the strategic significance of actual social relationships.  Two 
preliminary considerations are relevant.  First, a focus on targets would seem paramount in 
determining which social relations are strategically significant.  Strictly speaking, such a 
consideration would violate the incredibly simplified order of relations established in 
Figure 10.1; strategic orientations, shaped both by collective identities and goals (in this 
model), are the interdependencies of strategic choices, including choices in targets.  
Instead, ideologies sketch the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of those actors 
most important for determining the occurrence and trajectory of conflict and cooperation.   
As a simplifying procedure I focus on three basic structures of opportunity and 
threat that constitute the most salient social relations for contentious collective action: the 
state, the media, and the market.  Political process or opportunity theorists argue that the 
political regime is the most important factor explaining social movement activity (Eisinger 
1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; McAdam 1999; Meyer 
2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).  Much attention has already fallen on this argument here.  
Also noted above, others argue that the discursive environment offers sets of opportunities 
and threats for contentious collective action (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al 
2007).  Finally, because of the common targeting of corporations in contemporary 
contentious politics, many scholars emphasize the importance of economic or market 
opportunity structures in determining whether the characteristics of economic institutions 
and actors and their relations to other actors and institutions affect the mobilization, 
strategy, and outcomes of protest (King 2008; Soule 2009). 
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Second, an exclusive focus on an actor’s perception of the structure of opportunities 
and threats available to them risks subjectivizing all objective correlates in the 
environment.  However, the learning process presented in Figure 3.2 emphasizes a role for 
information obtained from the environment, especially direct and indirect interactions 
with other actors.  As a consequence, at least two implications follow from the conception 
of ideology.  First, because relations with relevant institutions and actors are generally 
durable (repeated interactions) over time they accumulate sets of schemas expressing the 
vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of these relations.  Second, these schemas, 
which constitute an SMO’s sense of the strategic situation, provide the crucial capacity for 
an SMO to more or less effectively interpret the opportunities and threats available to them 
indirectly through the stream of information or directly through interaction with political 
actors.  They also establish the relation of actual social relations to ideal social relations, as 
in the good society or dystopian societies. 
10.2.3. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations 
The positioning of an actor relative to other actors and institutions and the strategic 
situation that this positioning offers is deeply informed by their collective identities.  These 
identities are part of the shared understandings generated by social relations and the 
exigencies of social fields and, as such, are constitutive of everyday social organization.  
These shared understandings of our social world define not only who others are, but also 
who we are.  In this sense, they contribute to the definition not only of the capacities and 
motivations for strategic interaction (ideologies) but also of our basic preferences for 
strategy (strategic orientations).  Downey and Rohlinger (2008, 31n1) are straight-      
forward: strategic orientation “emphasizes collective identity as an organizing principle.”    
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In Figure 10.1, strategic orientations are distinguished from shared understandings 
in general and ideologies in particular.  Ideologies highlight the basic strategic significance 
of social relations and the motivation to modify, acquiesce to, or venerate them; strategic 
orientations are the basic plans that organize action around these relations and 
motivations.  Strategic orientations are thus the basic organization of interdependent 
choices informed by descriptions and intuitions of vulnerabilities, motivations, and 
capacities; they inform basic strategic choices, including the issues, tactics, and targets that 
are most appropriate.  Because of this close relationship, however, a strict causal 
relationship is not considered for the purposes of this dissertation.  Instead, the empirical 
analysis here will focus on identifying patterns of association between ideologies and 
strategic orientations.  Crucially, as argued in Chapter Nine, strategic orientations are 
oriented in part by goals.  Because this dissertation does not consider the determinants of 
goal selection, ideologies are here considered independent of goals.   
10.2.4. Targets 
In Chapter Nine I provide empirical analyses of the issues of CJOs, but I delayed my 
analysis of their targets and tactics.  In order to further my account of the strategic 
orientations within my sample, it is imperative that I describe their targets.  As a 
preliminary point, I note that a target is some object towards which an SMO directs its 
actions.   
According to Tilly (2008; McAdam et al 2001), by definition all contentious political 
action is directed towards some object of claims.  These objects are those collective actors 
or identities to which activists press their claims.  As noted in Chapter Eight, collective 
identities involve public representations of relations between actors and institutions.  
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Strictly speaking, only actors are capable of interaction, either as individuals or 
organizations in the guise of collective or personal identities.  Tilly (2008, 6) describes 
contentious claims making as “always involving at least one subject reaching visibly 
towards at least one object.”  However, when this reaching extends towards a disembodied, 
abstract system, such as art, nature, or communism, how can this be said to be an object 
capable of interaction?  The answer, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) argue, is that all 
action, no matter how abstract the description of its object, must target some concrete 
objects that represent this object.  In this sense there are potentially two targeted objects: a 
concrete object and the object represented in the concrete object, as when a banker or an 
insurance company represents capitalism or a stop sign or the police station represents the 
state.85  The question remains as to whether or not the concrete object’s interests are 
involved.  McAdam et al (2001, 5) define contention as an interaction in which claims made 
by some subject on an object, such as an SMO, “would, if realized, affect the interests of at 
least one of the claimants.”  One may speculate that if the rules, norms, and practices 
governing situations and relations are altered (institutions), then the interests of actors 
organized by these rules, norms, and practices are affected.    
In this chapter, I focus only on Gamson’s (1990) antagonist targets.  Antagonist 
targets are those actors or institutions whose actions the protagonists believe can address 
their grievances.  I do not consider here an analysis of represented targets.  Such an 
analysis unfolds in Chapter Seven.  However, I utilize an inductive or ad hoc approach to 
identifying the actual range of targets through an analysis of my sample.  In Chapter Nine I 
                                                          
85 This is conceptually distinct from the concept of proxy targeting: “the strategy of protesting or disrupting 
one institution in order to effect change in a secondary, removed target” (Walker et al 2008, 25).  Of course, 
the two may overlap. 
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draw on NSM theory in hypothesizing that CJOs are associated with the pursuit of cultural 
goals.  Moreover, in Chapter One I noted how many understandings of culture jamming 
assume that it opposes corporate policies.  Together, these suggest that CJOs target 
corporations.  I thus hypothesize: 
H10.3. CJOs are associated with the targeting of corporations. 
I thus anticipate that the preponderance of targeting strategies in the sample focus on 
corporations, specifically MNCs. 
10.3. Analysis 
As with the previous chapter, none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations 
developed above is tested in the strictest sense.  The data derives from the sample of CJOs 
specified in Chapter Four.  Below, I describe the ideologies of the groups in the sample, 
their relation to goals and strategic orientations, and their targeting strategies.  Due to the 
space constraints of this dissertation, the process of presenting this data necessarily does 
violence to variation within the sample.  However, when possible I note this variation. 
10.3.1. Ideals and Ideology 
 I begin with a general sketch of the ideal set of social relations for the groups in the 
sample.  To be brief, many appear to have a preference for a more egalitarian and 
sustainable economic system coupled with a more responsive and accountable democratic 
political system.  The Billionaire’s Monet Oliver DePlace is clear: “I actually believe in a fair 
and balanced capitalist system — it’s just that’s not what we’re living in” (Schwartz 2010).  
The BLF’s Napier explains, “My beef is not with capitalism…the free market is wonderful.”  
But like the Billionaires, Napier’s vision is not one of an untempered free market.  His ideal 
is a system in which “individuals and small businesses [interact] with each one another out 
334 
of choice as well as necessity driven by self-interest tempered with community need” 
(Napier 2009).  Channeling Churchill, he throws a bone to democracy, the “worst form of 
government, except for all the others” (Napier 2009).  The Yes Men (2009b) describe an 
ideal state of affairs as one in which the: 
Corporate bottom line…is defined as being a benefit to people and the environment, and 
 that necessarily is going to eliminate the imperative for endless growth and the imperative 
 for endless profit…Because short-term profitability is not what's going to make the world a 
 better place. So we need to create a new legal framework to govern the behavior of 
 corporations…The basic idea is really simple...It should just be straight up taxes and 
 incentives. Regulations and incentives, regulations sometimes in the form of taxes and 
 regulations in the form of simple outright laws against practices that we know are going to 
 kill us in the long run. 
 
Similarly, despite their rhetoric the AMF appear to view an ideal world as one in which 
democratic institutions are responsive to individual and community needs and markets 
reflect the true (ecological) costs of goods and services, what Lasn (2007; 2001) calls 
“radical democracy” and a “more grassroots kind of capitalism.”  This vision does not 
annihilate corporations per se, but simply grounds them in the public interest and revokes 
the charters of those who transgress against that interest.  An example of such an interest is 
the ensured access of citizens to participate in the public discourse on public airwaves. 
 There are cultural correlates as well to this political economy of freedom and 
community.  Such a system allows for a more spontaneous authentic culture and thus the 
crafting of a genuine participatory public sphere.  For the AMF, only a culture created from 
the bottom-up by free autonomous citizens is lived and authentic.  This world of meaning 
draws from actual experiences with nature, community, creativity, and our emotional 
unmediated selves and provides us with a proper sense of our social responsibilities.   
Similarly, the RBC describe an ideal world in which the Commons is a public space in which 
authentic stories are created and shared, in which “hot, complex human living” is 
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unencumbered by power (Talen 2006, 108).  For the BLF, such a world involves a dialogue 
among citizens as they note with tongue-in-cheek: “Our ultimate goal is nothing short of a 
personal and singular Billboard for each citizen” (Napier and Thomas 2006).   
 This general ideal of soft-core capitalism is not the only vision offered within the 
sample.  The SCP in particular presents a distinct anarchist vision: 
A gradual collapsing back to the human scale.  Replace both [surveillance cameras and 
 police departments] by communities who watch themselves. So this very much rhymes with 
 whether or not you believe in direct democracy or representative democracy, which in 
 many ways the police are the representative democracy, the governance. You can still have 
 governance, it would be self-governance politically, as well as in communities the police 
 come right from the community instead of being an artificial prosthesis (Scheinke and 
 Brown 2003, 372). 
 
Other groups either provide insufficient data (CTM, IAA, IST), or they refuse to express one.  
Instead of a clear prescription, the CAE (2000b) stresses a preference for abstract ideals 
such as tolerance and autonomy: “Our practice is about process only--the process of 
resistance. We have no final cause in mind, no utopias, and no solid social categories. CAE 
interacts with the becomings of lived time in an effort to expand difference.”  
10.3.3. Narratives and Liberalism 
In light of these ideals, I consider this chapter’s two hypotheses.  Such an analysis 
provides additional leverage in understanding the ideological approach of CJOs.  First, I 
hypothesize (H10.1) that CJOs are associated with the preference for micro-narratives over 
metanarratives.  Metanarratives are totalizing philosophies, myths, or ideologies of history 
and knowledge that aim to legitimize a particular version of the ‘truth.’  Traditional 
examples include Christianity, Marxism, and Enlightenment rationalism and progress.  In 
contrast, local or micro-narratives are comparatively modest stories that pertain to 
particular contexts in a manner similar to Wittgenstein’s language games.   
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 Nearly without exception, the sample of CJOs rejects traditional grand narratives.  
The IST is an example of a group with a relatively clear focus on micro-narratives.  Rasovic 
states, “Our political agenda is completely transparent.  And it feels true to the audience, 
and it feels like the audience knows that it’s true.  Meaning, it’s right now, right here 
between us.  Not like some abstraction that I have to then interpret” (D’Ignazio, Manning, 
and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012).  Explicit in this statement is a focus on 
the imminence that characterizes the politics of the IST.  From project to project, the group 
stimulates the spontaneity and potential of a situation by providing extremely minimal but 
provocative narratives.  Another prominent example is the IAA: 
We sort of shy away from promoting a particular ideology.  If we had an answer, we might 
 promote it.  We ask questions.  We try to get other people to ask questions.  Too many 
 voices promoting their particular ideology, and I really don’t think any of them are right.  
 The important part is to get people who aren’t talking to one another, talking to each other 
 (Brusadin et al n.d.). 
 
In contrast, the CAE is the group in the sample that suggests a metanarrative.  The group’s 
comparatively theoretical output is a voluminous effort to identify and promote effective 
resistant practices.  This task entails assessing historical and existing approaches to dissent 
and, most notably, sketching the political, economic, and cultural context of resistance.  In 
fulfilling the latter objective, the group argues that over the course of the last century the 
nature of power shifted from a sedentary model based in an analogic cosmology to a more 
pervasive liquid or nomadic power rooted in a digital cosmology. 
Capitalism is primarily a digital political-economy, much as the medieval economy was 
 primarily analogic. Pancapitalism’s use of the digital thus far has been horrifying, whether 
 one considers the pathological separation and alienation of Taylorist production, the false 
 democracy of consumption, the repressive apparatus of surveillance, or the biotechnologies 
 of eugenics.  Digital culture is on this same trajectory, with its primary manifestation being 
 an invasive mass media that functions as a reproduction and distribution network for the 
 ideology of capital (CAE 2001, 76). 
 
337 
Such changes are rooted in material conditions, including technological change.  
Importantly, “We believe that resistance to authoritarian structures and trends is 
permanent and forever” (Little 1999, 194).  The CAE thus appear to suggest a 
metanarrative of permanent resistance.   
At first glance, with the exception of the CAE, Wettergren’s (2005, 48) finding that 
culture jammers privilege micro-narratives is reproduced here.  Yet, her conception of a 
metanarrative is never elucidated.  Instead, she appears to rely on a strict Lyotardian sense 
of a metanarrative.  A looser conception does suggest that some CJOs adhere to an 
environmental or ecological grand narrative.  This is especially the case with the AMF, 
which describes capitalism as a “Doomsday Machine” enabled by consumerism (Lasn n.d.), 
and the RBC, for whom consumerism, militarism, and catastrophic climate change are 
intimately linked in Talen’s (2012) The End of the World.86  While there is evidence that 
other groups link the economic system to climate change (AAA, NGL, TYM), only the AMF 
and the RBC make environmentalism a key aspect of their projects.  Still, three out of 
twelve does not bode well for a counter-hypothesis. 
Second, I hypothesize (H10.2) that CJOs are associated with the expression of liberal 
ideology.  The Likert seven-point scale of liberalism arguably measures a respondent’s 
answer to the question,” how much government intervention in the economy should there 
be?” (Downs 1957, 115).  It may also refer to one’s position on other dimensions, such as 
attitudes toward social change and equality: “By left we shall mean advocating social 
change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall 
                                                          
86 Both the AMF and the RBC are included in Wettergren’s (2005) sample.  However, the RBC is clear that it 
was only in 2006 that the group clearly linked consumerism to environmental degradation and climate 
change (D. and Talen 2011, 91).   
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mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change 
toward equality” (Lipset, Lazarsfield, Barton, and Linz 1962, 1135).  These famous 
understandings of ideology point towards the means (government) and/or the ends 
(equality) that constitute the liberal or left end of the scale.  I do not consider the enormous 
literature on ideology, but instead take this general sketch of liberalism and determine how 
closely the groups in the sample approach it.   
The brief analysis of ideal social relations does offer a sense of the degree to which 
the sample of CJOs adheres to the ‘ends’ of liberal ideology.  In addition, in Chapter Seven I 
note how CJOs construct their understanding of the political Left.  It is perhaps safe to say 
that on a uni-dimensional scale of ideology the entire sample registers liberal, but the 
evidence for four groups is not quite sufficient (BLF, CTM, IAA, IST).  The remaining eight 
groups provide some evidence that a multi-dimensional scale may prove more helpful in 
simplifying ideology (AMF, AAA, BIL, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM).  Groups like the AMF and 
the Yes Men are relatively straight-forward liberals.  The AMF feels that part of the solution 
to the problem of consumer culture is to develop laws, regulations, and court decisions that 
effectively curtail the translation of economic power into disproportional political power.  
Above, the Yes Men (2009b) describe their ideal as one in which corporations are heavily 
constrained by taxes and incentives in order to produce a more egalitarian and sustainable 
system.  However, the CAE and the SCP – the two avowed anarchists of the sample – are 
strictly anti-state and focus heavily on autonomy, freedom, and privacy.  As usual, 
anarchism does not neatly fall into the usual “means” sense of ideology.  While they clearly 
answer Downs’ query with a resounding ‘no government at all,’ anarchists are also 
radically egalitarian.  The CAE tackle this conceptual problem: 
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To reduce CAE's position to a distorted simplicity, we are, admittedly, antistate and 
 committed to liberationist practices. The radical Right would probably say the same thing 
 about itself. However,  CAE is not dedicated to racism, sexism, militarism, Christian (or any 
 other) fundamentalism, patriotic revolution, laissez-faire capitalism, or blind obedience to 
 authority. These are, however, characteristics representative of the radical Right. Given 
 these characteristics, one has to question how committed this movement is to principles of 
 anti-state or liberationist practice (CAE and Dery 1997). 
 
The SCP (2006, 57; Brown, personal interview, July 6, 2012) is concerned with sexual, 
religious, racial, and political profiling, and perhaps puts the matter to rest when Brown 
describes himself as “ultraleft” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 361). 
 Table 10.1 summarizes the data for both hypotheses.  It appears that in general the 
sample of CJOs rejects meta-narratives and adheres to a generally liberal ideology, though 
an environmental narrative has taken hold for a few groups.  The adherence to anarchism 
does suggest that a multidimensional view of ideology may be more helpful.  In the analysis 
that follows I briefly describe the predominant ideological currents in the sample of groups 
by focusing on the motivations, capacities, and vulnerabilities of the actors in the relevant 
opportunity structures. 
 





AMF No Yes 
AAA Yes Yes 
BLF Yes 2 
BIL Yes Yes 
CTM Yes 2 
CAE No Yes 
IAA Yes 2 
IST Yes 2 
NGL Yes Yes 
RBC No Yes 
SCP Yes Yes 
TYM Yes Yes 
1 = mixed 2 = insufficient data 
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10.3.2. Motivations and Capacities 
 In contrast to the ideal set of social relations, CJOs sketch a present and in some 
cases a past that spells out the problematic nature of contemporary society.  In so doing 
they assess the strategic situations that surround them.   
 A central concern for most in the sample is the conversion of economic power into 
political power.  For these groups, democracy is based on the principle of political equality.  
Underlying this institution of formal equality, however, is an economic system that 
generates enormous inequalities in wealth.  Such a system reflects its social and economic 
disparities in its political outcomes despite the principles of its political institutions.  The 
wealthy enjoy a disproportionate amount of influence in politics, while the interests of the 
middle class and especially marginalized groups like the poor will either be infrequently 
accommodated or rationalized out of the political system.  The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 68) 
summarizes the relationship between economics and politics: “Considering their vast 
financial resources, corporations thereafter actually had more power than any private 
citizen.  They could defend and exploit their rights and freedom more vigorously than any 
individual and therefore they were more free.”  This unequal freedom enjoyed by economic 
elites is associated with free market capitalism.  Capitalism aims to absorb (commodify) all 
possible goods and services in order to maximize profits.  To do so, it must encroach on 
those areas of life essential to a healthy society, strong democracy, and sustainable 
environment.  As the RBC sums it up: “a principal strategy of Consumerism [unfettered free 
market] is to bring all public institutions – public spaces and, of course, the government – 
into the market” (D. and Talen 2011, 54).  Because markets generate and aggravate 
economic inequalities and underinvest in public goods, the effort to roll back the 
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mechanisms (like government and community) that can alleviate some of these perceived 
ills can generate significant backlash and potentially threaten the entire project of 
expanding the market system.  Consequently, economic elites pursue profits and social 
control measures that ensure the continued existence and growth of the system, even to 
the detriment of true democracy.  As the RBC states, “The ideal conditions for consumerism 
[free market capitalism] are almost never the ideal conditions for civic democracy” (D. and 
Talen 2011, 136).   
 The conversion of economic resources into political power is accomplished in 
multiple interrelated ways.  First, economic elites utilize direct means such as lobbying, 
advising, writing legislation, lawsuits, and the funding of campaigns and super PACs.  These 
means of influence are particularly addressed by the Billionaires, who point to the variety 
of actors that contribute to the structure of plutocracy, including the Chamber of 
Commerce, the American Legislative Exchange Council, and both major political parties 
(Opprecht 2012).  Negativland (1995, 24) provides an example of the clash of formal 
equality and economic inequality in an institutional context:  
One failing of the U.S. legal system is that it treats the plaintiff and the defendant as though 
 they are equally powerful entities, regardless of the actual resources each may have…when 
 a corporation goes after a small business or low-income individual, the conflict 
 automatically rolls outside of the court system because of the defendant’s inability to pay 
 the costs of mounting a proper defense.   
 
Some of these techniques are perceived as legal corruption and represent a particularly 
odious expression of the degree to which the government is captured by corporate 
interests. 
A more insidious means of converting economic into political power involves the 
control of mass media, public space, and copyright law.  Many groups see the concentration 
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of media outlets in the hands of an increasingly small number of major multinational 
corporations and the deregulation of the industry as a serious threat to democracy.  
Because ownership amounts to effective control over the content of media outlets, 
corporations narrow the range of issues and media frames that citizens encounter in their 
news consumption.  As the Billionaires for Bush (2004b, 15) wryly note, “we bought up and 
merged the media to ensure that our economic policies were the standard by which all 
policy must be judged.”  The AMF chime in: “in North America there’s a lack of media space 
in which to challenge consumptive, commercial and corporate agendas” (Lasn 1999, 33).  
This has the unfortunate consequence of providing viewers and readers with insufficient 
information to properly perform their roles as critical citizens.  The AMF bear witness to 
the “loss of diversity” in the mass media (Lasn 1999, 25)  Another means for constricting 
public discourse is the  use of copyright and trademark law to repress dissent: “we’re 
taking on the powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business.  They’re the 
powers that be…they have made themselves, through a whole set of copyright and 
trademark laws, practically immune from criticism” (Hosler and Joyce 1997). 
The notion of the paucity of media space keys in to a wider sense in which economic 
power narrows the range of public debate.  Many groups in the sample see physical public 
space as increasingly colonized by private interests (AMF, AAA, BLF, IAA, and RBC).  They 
view billboards and other forms of outdoor advertising as ubiquitous and effective in 
squeezing out citizen and dissident messages.  The BLF’s Jack Napier fumes, “I’m pretty 
irate at a handful of billboard corporations controlling all the public spaces.  I find that 
completely undemocratic and I didn’t vote for it – and yet these billboards are in a public 
space and I have to look at them” (Berger 2000).  Similarly, AAA founder Steve Lambert 
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was driven to challenge outdoor advertising when he witnessed muralists driven from the 
walls by owners selling their space to advertisers (Newman 2008).  Groups like the IAA and 
the RBC view the enclosure of the modern commons as a general phenomenon involving 
the proliferation of quasi-public spaces like malls.  The IAA notes:   
One of the key functions of a public space within a healthy society is to be a place where 
 people tend to congregate, where you have a free exchange of ideas, and encounter those 
 that may not be like you…As public spaces disappear, they are replaced by privatized ones 
 that not play these roles (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 117), 
 
These crucial roles evaporate because: 
 
The privatization of public space has had a chilling effect on activist communications. As 
 malls replace marketplaces and parking lots replace parks, distributing unsanctioned 
 information is becoming an increasingly high-risk endeavor. Once protected by free-speech  
 laws, activists now face fines, imprisonment, and bodily harm for distributing literature on 
 what had previously been considered public property (IAA n.d.(b)). 
 
Thus, corporations indirectly translate economic power into political power through the 
control of space and public dialogue. 
Many groups also bear witness to the utilization of a third dimension of power in the 
translation of economic resources into political power.  For example, the Billionaires note 
the importance of the creation and maintenance of ideology, or the sets of justifications 
that legitimate the capitalist free market system by equating the interests of economic 
elites with the common good (Opprecht 2012).  The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues: 
Somehow over the last thirty-forty years with Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the US and 
 all for Milton Friendman…We’ve gotten this ideology that you just let companies do what 
 they want, don’t bother them, don’t incentivize them or regulate them or anything.  Things’ll 
 be great.  It’s completely preposterous (Yes Lab Media 2009). 
 
For other groups, these justifications are engrained in habits of consumption and 
perception deliberately crafted and exploited by corporations and advertisers in order to 
maximize profits.  Negativland member Don Joyce describes advertising as “desire 
mongering.  To put a desire in you,  to make you feel insufficient, inadequate, unhappy, 
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dissatisfied” (Hossler and Joyce 1997).  The BLF likewise link advertising to the definition 
of self and the world: “He who controls the Ad speaks with the voice of our Age” (Napier 
and Thomas 2006).  This voice bypasses our free will and submerges in our subconscious 
(Napier 2009).  The IST’s Rasovic urges awareness: “You assume immunity to a lot of these 
[advertising] messages and you are not immune, you’re a sponge” (Kanarinka and Pirun 
2006).  The AAA’s Lambert sketches a cycle of what he calls normalization: 
Outdoor advertising has become unavoidable. Traditional billboards and transit shelters 
 have cleared the way for more pervasive methods...In urban areas commercial content is 
 placed in our sight and into our consciousness every moment we are  in public space… 
 Through long-term commercial saturation, it has become implicitly understood by the 
 public that advertising has the right to own, occupy and control every inch of available 
 space. The steady normalization of invasive advertising dulls the public’s perception of their 
 surroundings, re-enforcing a general attitude of powerlessness toward creativity and 
 change, thus a cycle develops enabling advertisers to slowly and consistently increase the 
 saturation of advertising with little or no public outcry (AAA 2013c). 
 
The AMF’s Lasn (1999, 54) hits at the general concern: “the notions of citizenship and 
nationhood make little sense in this world.  We’re not fathers and mothers and brothers: 
We’re consumers.”  Some groups view this third dimension of power at a somewhat deeper 
level than the other groups.  For them, concepts like community and public are 
problematic, because they homogenize populations and practices that are inherently 
characterized by difference.  Technologies like the Internet and biotechnology are largely 
colonized by corporate interests in perpetual efforts to increase the efficiency of productive 
forces like the body and to render capital and thus power free of the moorings of the real.  
To put it bleakly, “We are currently witnessing an ongoing process of aggressive body 
invasion, guided by authoritarian demands for thoroughly rationalized flesh and 
instrumental human behavior” (CAE 2012b, 55).  The CAE (1996, 37) stresses the 
alienation of the spectacle as an important factor in the operation of power:  
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While mass media brings its viewer the world, the world is also held at bay while the viewer 
 commits her gaze to the screen, forever separated from others and from communal space. 
 In this case, the bunker is both material and ideational. On one hand, it serves as a concrete 
 garrison where images (troops) reside. On the other hand, it confirms state-sponsored 
 reality, by forever solidifying the reified notions of class, race, and gender. 
 
Similarly, the AMF describes the mediation of the spectacle as a distance from nature and 
other people.  The RBC’s Talen (2012, 17-18) emphasizes the catastrophe of alienation: 
There is a direct relationship between each additional minute that we are separated  and 
 every pound of greenhouse gas that is added into the air.  The greater the distance that 
 individual human beings are from one another, the more CO2 we put in the air…Our global 
 economy, fundamentalist religion, and national security are each based on increasing the 
 distance between us. 
 
CJOs thus sense a variety of increasingly penetrating means to ensure control and profits. 
The state performs a supportive role in the myriad ways that economic elites pursue 
their interests.  Many groups view the relationship between the government and 
corporations as asymmetric and dependent.  Negativland states they are, “taking on the 
powers that be, which is really the world of corporate business.  They’re the powers that 
be!  More powerful than government, more worldwide influential than any government” 
(Hosler and Joyce 1997).  In this vision, government is subservient.  Billionaire Hal E. 
Burton “explained that the purpose of the Billionaires is to expose the capture of the 
government by corporations’” (Roselund 2004).  In concrete terms, this means that 
political actors produce political outcomes – judicial decisions, laws, regulations, etc. – that 
advance the interests of economic and political elites.  Activists encounter the state in 
numerous ways, but a prominent one is on the streets.  Many argue that the police are less 
concerned with protecting citizen’s freedoms of speech and assembly than with protecting 
property and profit.  Reverend Billy describes an RBC mall action: 
We ended up in Abercrombie and fitch underneath a big stuffed moosehead hanging his 
 head over the cash register, while hundreds of us are on our knees to this great dead moose-
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 face, with the snoopy ferris wheel spinning in the background and a dozen police persons 
 clucking PRIVATE POPERTY PIVATE PROPERTY (Talen 2006, 133). 
 
Elsewhere, he links the Patriot Act and surveillance to corporate marketing: 
 The police can ask their large friends the skyscraper to get the master shots.  The buildings 
 of New York City are now bristling with surveillance cameras cocked down like that know 
 something about us pedestrians….The buildings are soaking up our images, the patterns of 
 our wanderings, who we kiss and why and who we shout at and who we pay….It’s for 
 security, we’re told, but we know that ultimately the Patriot Act has it’s evil twin 
 information sucker: corporate marketing.  Someday it will all be fed into Christmas (Talen 
 2006, 190). 
 
The CAE are clear: “Our position is that government is not a public apparatus.  Public and 
private vectors really don’t exist as discrete entities” (Little 1999, 194).  Furthermore: 
[The] function [of the political sector] is to mediate the contradictions [between economic 
 and moral ideology]. As an arm of the economy, the legitimized political sector has the 
 unenviable task of keeping the economy as free of regulation as possible, while seeming to 
 meet contradictory cultural demands. For example, the master narrative of the welfare state 
 has been a key site of inertia in the United States. The idea that the destitute must be given a 
 second chance, the sick be cared for, and the ignorant be educated, is antithetical to the 
 construction and maintenance of bourgeois economy. The government’s role in this conflict 
 is to maintain a symbolic order conducive to the perception that the welfare state is 
 functioning on behalf of its citizens, while allowing the business sector to follow its anti-
 welfare agenda (CAE 1994, 113). 
 
A notable consequence of this perceived relationship between the political and economic 
elites is that CJOs are extremely distrustful and cynical of government.  The BLF’s Napier 
(n.d.) expresses this skepticism as directly as he knows how: “If you think that the (any) 
government works in YOUR best interest, I've got a great bridge in Manhattan you might be 
interested in buying.”  In this hostile political environment, the groups in the sample tend 
to possess a tempered sense of the prospects for basic social change.  The BLF’s Napier 
claims that, “it’s getting to the point where you can’t do any real serious political work 
without being threatened by the Powers That Be” (Haller and Napier 2006, 90).  This is 
especially the case during a Republican White House: “When the Bush cartel was in office, 
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there was not a whole lot of hope of creating actual change. It was more a matter of keeping 
spirits up and hope alive” (TYM (n.d.(b)).  
While most CJOs recognize little autonomy for government, some exceptions are 
noted.  The Yes Men (original emphasis, n.d.(b)) explain, “There's nothing mysterious about 
it: when Obama finds himself cornered by industrial lobbyists, he needs to be able to point 
out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can't do what you're asking me to – those 
people won't let me." Still, the pattern is clear: in a plutocracy, government is only 
responsive under exceptional circumstances.  However, other groups in the sample afford 
political actors significant independence from corporate interests.  Political elites and the 
state are driven by the desire for private gain, but more importantly, they are also driven 
by distinct imperatives for social control and the establishment of an ever-penetrating 
order.  Most notably, the SCP focuses on the state as the locus of hierarchy and oppression 
in the social system as opposed to the economic system.  While he is largely sympathetic to, 
and indeed utilizes the concept of the spectacle as a means to decipher an image-saturated 
social system, member Brown is very clear: “I think that the Commodity is in service of the 
State, and the State is not in service of the Commodity” (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 366).  
For example:   
When we hear the word “privatization” we almost always think of it in terms of private 
 companies taking on the functions that used to be public, as if it’s purely a corporate 
 phenomena. So, I would agree provided that we register that  privatization could also be a 
 strategy of governing. It isn’t simply a way to give goodies over to the private sector and 
 bankrupting the government. The government has something to gain from the destruction 
 of public spaces that may not be financial, but that it makes the public easier to control. So, 
 it is a strategy of both the corporate entities as well as the government. To enrich upon it 
 more privatization as a term in that way catches both of those senses—privatization is 
 privatizing government functions and having them run by corporations. But, it is also 
 teaching people to stay in their own private lives, to no longer have a political awareness, in 
 a sense, that your private life is always a public life. So, privatization is a turn away from 
 public life towards the private  as well. It’s mimicked by governmental functions, but the 
 functions continue to exist, even though police have become privatized, the plaza has 
348 
 become privatized, the government still very much exists (Scheinke and Brown 2003, 
 370). 
 
Brown stresses as well the function of surveillance in a transparent society: social control.  
By transgressing the fundamental right to privacy, surveillance weakens an individual’s 
and a community’s capacity for responsibility and freedom. 
10.3.3. Vulnerabilities  
 According to CJOs the deck is stacked against activists hoping to effect meaningful 
social change.  Actors with enormous resources utilize a variety of means to establish their 
control over political and economic outcomes.  Yet, all of the groups in the sample identify 
vulnerabilities in their antagonists and the public that allow some measure of success in 
pursuing their goals.   
 First, as noted in Chapter Seven, the sample of groups constructs a sense of the 
public as to some degree capable of acknowledging domination and engaging in resistance.  
For example, the Billionaires recognize that not all voters are alike.  Some hold less 
tenaciously to conservative ideology, while some that do may have a personal distaste for 
corporate influence.  As Boyd (2004) notes: 
What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of 
 it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving 
 corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those 
 in the middle. 
 
Another straightforward vulnerability recognized by some groups lies in the nature 
of the political system.  Because politicians are ultimately concerned with political survival, 
citizens can signal that they are sufficiently upset with some set of laws and practices to 
outweigh the enormous influence of capital.  This is most clearly expressed by the Yes Men: 
“The people’s only real control, or the only power, is through government unfortunately” 
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(Yes Lab Media 2009).  As noted above, “When Obama finds himself cornered by industrial 
lobbyists, he needs to be able to point out the window (or at CNN) and say "Sorry, I can't do 
what you're asking me to – those people won't let me" (TYM n.d.(b)).   
Beyond this conventional sense of possibility, CJOs identify various points of 
exploitation. The most basic vulnerability is the observation that efforts to control meaning 
and perception are never complete or total.  Communication, language, signs, images, and 
symbols are too fluid and polyvalent to impose a singular reading.  The CTM (2006b, Gach 
2007) regard magic, defined broadly as one’s will manifesting one’s creative energy, as “an 
open-source technology that doesn’t exclusively belong to advertising execs and policy-
makers.”  Elsewhere, they acknowledge that “technologies can be used to control and 
oppress just as they can be used to liberate and make life more enjoyable” (CTM 2006a).  
The AMF explicitly reject the notion that recuperation by corporations and marketers 
makes culture jamming irrelevant: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being sucked 
up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe in that 
kind of cynicism!  I’ve seen enough images, jams, and détournements work to not be afraid 
of that” (Lasn 2002).  Such instability of meaning offers challengers countless paths to 
corrupt the originally intended message. 
Next, CJOs recognize the perceived successes of their antagonists’ strategies and 
tactics in engaging audiences (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, IAA, NGL, TYM).  Recall that 
corporations (and governments) develop and deploy extremely persuasive forms of 
rhetoric and imagery, forms that, according to the BLF’s Napier (2006), bypass our faculty 
of reason and capacity for free will.  In other words, they utilize emotional and 
physiological mechanisms as opposed to rational persuasion.  Argumentation is 
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comparatively ineffective: “I don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26 
letters of the alphabet—writing stories that whine about our culture and complaining 
about corporations—will do much.  It has been proven to be totally ineffective” (Lasn 
2005).  The AAA (2013b) explains: 
We’re borrowing tools that have been researched and tested by marketers for decades and 
 using them to our own ends. Many of those marketing methods are very effective, that’s 
 why businesses are so invested in them. So why reinvent the wheel when we can just insert 
 one gear to make the whole thing run in another direction? 
 
Negativland describe their record Dispepsi as a mimicking of advertising: “I hope that by 
the time you get to the end of the record you’re starting to get sick of hearing about this one 
product….I think the whole record simulates Pepsi’s multinational corporate form of 
advertising, which is basically saturation (Hosler and Joyce 1997).  The AMF’s Lasn 
(original emphasis, 1999, 131-2) also discusses the vulnerability of the advertisement: 
A well-produced “subvertisement” mimics the look and feel of the target ad, prompting the 
 classic double take as viewers realize what they’re seeing is in fact the very opposite of what 
 they expected…Suppose you don’t have the money to launch a real print ad campaign.  What 
 you can do is mimic the million-dollar look and feel of your opponent’s campaign, thereby 
 détourning their own carefully worked out, button-pushing memes in your favor.  They 
 spend millions building their corporate cool, and you keep stealing their electricity. 
 
Antagonists are also vulnerable to other forms of mimicry.  In a culture that privileges the 
wealthy, the Yes Men simply pretend to be the privileged.  ”Well, the culture that we’re in 
respects money, and so if you pretend to be very very fabulously wealthy and powerful, 
then people listen to you.  It’s miraculous.  Whereas if you’re a regular individual like us, 
they’re never gonna listen to us” (Yes Lab Media 2009).  Similarly, the Billionaires adopt 
the garb and mannerisms of the wealthy to invert the stereotype of the leftist activist 
(Haugerud 2013).   
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 CJOs also note the importance of humor in engaging audiences by bypassing initial 
misconceptions or reducing tensions.  The BLF’s Kalman (2008) uses humor because it is a 
common marketing tool, while Napier notes, “We try to use humorous messages so people 
aren’t overtly offended by them.  You don’t go up and spray paint “Fuck Exxon” on a 
billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they go, Commies!” 
(Haller and Napier 2006).  The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2012a) agrees: “If you’re angry about 
something, you rant.  But pushing facts down people’s throats doesn’t work.  Humor can 
really sideswipe this problem.  It’s like there’s a wall between you and a person, and if you 
make a joke, it’s a crack in the wall.”  The Billionaire’s Boyd (2004) suggests that humor is, 
“very disarming. It's very pleasurable, so people choose to engage with it, or if they find 
themselves engaging with it, they choose to stick around or pay more attention to it.”   
 The mass media are vulnerable as well.  The SCP’s Brown (2009) sums it up well: 
the media “are not a monolith and you can exploit cracks, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions within them.”  Beyond the essential contested nature of language and 
images, the media as a set of actors and practices also lacks the capacity and the motivation 
to impose totalized control: 
The media is not nearly as conniving, sophisticated and in control as we think it is.  From 
 what I’ve seen behind the scenes, it comes out looking so well just because it is technically 
 flash. But these people are not in full control of what they are doing…they do lose control 
 on occasion (Brown 2009). 
 
How and why do they lose control?  Brown (2009) asserts that “the great weakness of the 
news media is that they need to fill their content 24/7.  In the moments when they are 
stretched thin they might put something on the air that in their better judgement would 
probably keep off the air.”  The Yes Men describe some of these cracks:  
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I think of journalists as collaborators. There are a lot of really bad journalistic 
organizations-there’s nothing good about CNN or MSNBC—but there are a lot of individual 
journalists, including at CNN and MSNBC, that are really friendly and love Occupy.  When 
you do creative actions, it’s like you’re giving journalists an extra token that allows them to 
say something important. (Bichlbaum 2012a) 
 
The BLF note as well that being creative and humorous catches the eye of the media 
(Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006).  Haugerud (2013, 168) notes that the Billionaires exploit 
the cracks in the ‘unwitting’ media and thus maintain a position neither of resistance nor of 
complicity. 
 Some groups express more suspicious positions than the majority of the sample.  
This is especially the case with the CAE.  In their many published works, the group 
deciphers the political, social, and cultural environment in order to find points of 
vulnerability.  In essence, indirect means of influence are considered completely 
unproductive if not counter-effective aside from the exigencies of some local conflicts.  
Indirect means include media manipulation: “using [a] spectacle of disobedience designed 
to muster public sympathy and support is a losing proposition” because “mass media 
allegiance is skewed toward the status quo” (CAE 2001, 15).  “Since the airwaves and 
pressure owned by corporate entities, and since capitalist structures have huge budgets 
allotted for public relations, there is no way that activist groups can outdo them.”  Likewise, 
political and corporate authorities are unresponsive to mass movements, because the 
structure of power has shifted from concrete ‘bunkers’ like monuments, bureaucracies, 
banks, and barracks to a virtual stream characterized by velocity without place.  
Consequently, disrupting the streets and confronting tangible authoritarian entities are 
practices similar to attacking a shadow.  Ultimately, vulnerabilities lie in two positions: the 
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interfaces between everyday life, the body, and liquid power, and the blocking of 
information. The SCP is more direct with respect to political authorities:  
People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do 
 something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so 
 that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way.  And in all cases the response 
 was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem.  Either did  
 nothing or created the problem themselves.  So it seems pointless in either case to ask them 
 to produce the solution, to go to somebody else” (Brown, personal interview, July 6,  2012) 
 
For the anarchists in the sample, systemic, especially political, vulnerabilities are 
somewhat less apparent.  Notably, the IST gives little to no indication of a relationship to 
wider political or economic structures.  For the majority of groups, the system is somewhat 
closed, but mass progressive movements and careful engagement with audiences can 
exploit some cracks in the system. 
10.3.4. Ideologies and Strategic Orientations 
 Above, I suggested that the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that 
CJOs perceive and the ideal systems they construct - what I am calling ideology - constrain 
the strategic orientations of these groups.  In Chapter Nine I find that the strategic 
orientations of the sample are primarily intrinsic and concern low social disruption, though 
there are notable exceptions, while their degree of insularity varies.  My effort to explain 
these findings rested on an argument relating structures of opportunity to organizational 
specialization. In the same chapter I argue that some CJOs pursue extrinsic goals with 
intrinsic strategic orientations because they view their organization as a part of wider 
activist efforts.  They thus define themselves as occupying a position in the division of labor 
that characterizes progressive movements or wider networks of cultural and political 
activism.  This position involves the maintenance of solidarity, ideology, and identity, 
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generating media awareness, and changing political preferences.  They occupy this niche in 
part because of the perception of adverse opportunities. 
 This general expectation of the perception of a relatively closed opportunity 
structure is supported by the findings in this chapter.  CJOs bear witness to a closed 
structure with a few points of access.  There is some variation in this perception.  Relative 
to the rest of the sample, the Billionaires sense a mildly closed system.  They also pursue 
extrinsic goals with some mix of an intrinsic and extrinsic mass strategic orientation and 
utilize a medium-sized organizational model.  In contrast, the CAE, which views the 
structure of opportunity as inhospitable, is highly insular, small, and pursues an extremely 
vague and ill-expressed extrinsic goal.  An adverse climate should also be associated with 
the low social disruption characteristic of almost the entire sample (the RBC being the 
notable partial exception).  
10.3.5. Targets 
 Above, I hypothesize (H10.3) that CJOs are associated with the targeting of 
corporations.  Unlike previous hypotheses in this study, the targets of CJOs constitute a 
variable with values constructed post hoc.   However, the categories employed are basically 
standard.  I focus on five: corporations, governments, political parties, interest groups, and 
militaries.  In this analysis, government refers to not only local, regional, and national 
government, but intergovernmental organizations like the WTO or the World Bank.  
Although somewhat unconventional in the social movement literature, a focus on political 
parties and interest groups is appropriate from a political science perspective.   Moreover, 
while there may be considerable overlap between government and political parties, 
relevant CJOs do perceive some important distinctions. Finally, the military refers here to a 
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subset of the government: the agency or department that constitutes and directs a 
government’s military forces.  In the case of the United States, the particular agency would 
be the Department of Defense and any subunits therein.  Some excluded targets are 
religious and educational institutions.  Negativland does take swipes at Christianity and the 
IAA does concern itself with engineering departments, but these are exceptional cases.87   I 
focus here on the most prominent concrete target pursued by the CJOs in the sample.  
Table 10.2 presents the data for this hypothesis.  With the sole exception of the SCP, 
CJOs target corporations.  Prominent examples include Exxon, Monsanto, Dow Chemical, 
Time Warner, Disney, Bank of America, etc.  The targeted corporations tend to be multi-
national in scope and industrial, media, or financial in nature.  There are other examples, 
however.  The Billionaires often target corporations involved in the health care and 
insurance industries.  At a prominent second place is government.  Only one group (BLF) 
does not target government.  In many cases, governments are conceived as the agents that  
 








AMF X X X X X 
AAA X X    
BLF X     
BIL X X X X  
CTM X X   X 
CAE X X   X 
IAA X X   X 
IST X     
NGL X X    
RBS X X    
SCP  X    
TYM X X X X  
                                                          
87 Other examples abound.  For example, outside of the sample the Guerrilla Girls target the art world. 
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can help manipulate corporate behavior.  All levels of government, including the 
international, are targeted, as are foreign governments.  The remaining three categories 
denote less frequent targets.  The AMF, BIL, and TYM prominently target political parties 
and interest groups.  By far the most notable interest group is the Chamber of Commerce, 
but lobbyists in general are targets.  Finally, four groups target the military (AMF, CTM, 
CAE, IAA).  This data provide substantial support for the hypothesis, but it also emphasizes 
the importance of government for CJOs, a target often ignored in analyses of culture 
jamming. 
10.4. Conclusion 
The primary argument of this chapter is that identities are the shared 
understandings that shape the ideologies of these organizations.  In turn, ideologies 
constrain the strategic orientations of SMOs.  I present descriptions of these ideologies, or 
the structures of motivation, capacity, and vulnerability that CJOs perceive - the durable 
social relations that generate opportunities and threats - and the ideal systems they 
construct.  Next, I relate these ideologies to the strategic orientations described in the 
previous chapter by focusing on the degree to which CJOs perceive these structures to be 
open or closed. Finally, I describe the targets of CJOs.  By focusing on identities and 
ideologies, this chapter thus begins the analysis of a relation of culture jamming to 






CHAPTER 11. EFFECTIVENESS, FAMILIARITY 
AND TACTICAL CHOICE 
 
 Chapter Ten develops theoretical relationships between collective identities, 
opportunity structures, strategic orientations, and the variety of strategic choices governed 
by strategic orientations.  The primary task of this chapter is to expand upon these 
advances by further developing the theoretical insights of Chapters Two and Three as well 
as illustrating and, when possible, providing some semblance of a test of hypotheses using 
the data described in Chapter Four.  Whereas Chapters Nine and Ten put special emphasis 
on issues and targeting respectively, the focus here shifts to explaining tactical choice.  In 
other words, this chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed 
to petition, demonstrate, strike, or riot. 
 This chapter is divided into three parts.  First, I review the various approaches to 
explaining tactical choice.  Second, I develop a set of theoretical relationships between the 
goals and ideologies of SMOs.  These involve the attribution of effectiveness and the 
distribution of familiarity.  Out of this discussion I develop a number of hypotheses.  Third, 
I employ these hypotheses in an effort to guide an empirical analysis of the tactical choices 
of my sample of CJOs.   
11.1. Tactical Choice 
 Explaining variation in tactics has received less attention than the question of 
mobilization.  Still, efforts at theory construction do provide some direction.  Below, I 
present the most noteworthy independent variables offered by the field.  The review is 
organized by three basic approaches found in the literature: RMT and its prominent 
relation political opportunity or process theory, collective action theory, and cultural 
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perspectives.  Importantly, this review highlights those variables distinctly associated with 
each approach.    
11.1.1. Resource Mobilization Theory 
RMT identifies organizational, resource, and interactional variables as the principle 
explanations of variation in strategic and tactical choices among SMOs (Gamson 1990; 
Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973).  These include the 
effects of the organizational structure of the SMO (Piven and Cloward 1979; Polletta 2002; 
Staggenborg 1988; 1989), the variable resource endowments of the constituency of the 
SMO (Gamson 1990; Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1999; Piven and Cloward 1979; Tarrow 1998), 
and the SMO’s dependence on different sources of resource contributions (Lipsky 1968; 
McAdam 1999; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977; Piven and Cloward 1979).  The theory’s 
primary insight is that variation n the capacity for protest is decisive in accounting for 
mobilization.  It is not a function of grievances or social breakdown, as decades of research 
had argued.  The motivations for protest are assumed to be basically constant.  While more 
transient forms of activism do not require strong organization, social movements 
necessitate the development of formal divisions of labor and rules of decision-making in 
order to manage the resource requirements of sustained conflict.  Professional activists 
must develop formal organizations that can mobilize resources (money, membership, 
legitimacy, etc.) in the pursuit of goals on behalf of a movement constituency.   
The conditions that shape an SMO’s ability to mobilize are of particular interest.  
While other actors like corporations, political parties, and interest groups compete and 
cooperate for resources in a given population, SMOs are at a distinct disadvantage due to 
the nature of their goals and the generally low resource endowments of their constituency.  
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Each SMO seeks the acquisition of scarce resources from a variety of sources such as 
donations, volunteers, foundations, or the media in order to further their organizational 
interests.  Competition and cooperation among SMOs, authorities, counter-movements, the 
media, and the general public for these scarce resources is affected by variation in the 
general resource endowments of a population.  However, organizational strategies are also 
essential in adapting to whatever resource environment an SMO faces.  These strategies 
typically involve the marketing of a product: the set of goals and tactics that each SMO 
offers in the pursuit of shared interests.  Thus, according to RMT, organization, resources, 
and interaction shape variation in tactical choices.    
11.1.2. Political Opportunities 
 Political process theory or opportunity models joined the chorus in political science 
to ‘bring the state back in’ by turning to political variables to explain contentious 
phenomena (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al 1995; 
McAdam 1999; Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978).  While closely akin to RMT in its 
emphasis on resources and strategic interaction, these approaches argue that the political 
context decisively shapes the nature of political action.  The state especially performs this 
unique structuring role primarily for two reasons.  First, it crafts authoritative public policy 
for a territory and population.  Actions of the state are public goods or public bads that 
often affect the entire incentive structure of a population.  Second, the state possesses 
capacities far in excess of the other organizations in society, including the use of organized 
violence.  Thus, the structure of a population’s political institutions and actors at a given 
moment - the POS - may provide varieties of opportunities for and constraints on 
contentious collective action.   These characteristics range from the basic features of the 
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political regime such as federal or unitary structures and the capacity of the state to 
enforce policy to more flexible configurations of power among political elites such as 
changes in governing parties.  In order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by a 
vulnerable political space and further their agenda activists develop strategies and deploy 
tactics tailored to these conditions 
A general proposition ventured by this approach is that the relative openness of the 
political system to challenge shapes tactical choices.  While this is may be helpful for 
explaining variation in strategies and tactics across populations and across time, 
opportunities and constraints are not necessarily uniform across movements or SMOs; the 
distribution of these factors across a population of activists can yield variable strategies 
and tactics.  For example, the perception of the level of threat posed by an SMO may yield 
different forms and levels of repression by political authorities, thus making some forms of 
action more or less attractive to other SMOs (McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998).  Thus, political 
opportunity theory extends the RMT emphasis on interaction by focusing on the political 
context. 
11.1.3. Collective Action Theory 
 Collective action theory also provides notable contributions to an explanation of 
tactical choice (Chong 1991; Harris 1982; Lichbach 1995; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Olson 
1965; Opp 1989).  The principal goals of such analyses lie in determining under what 
conditions a collective action problem is operative and identifying the range of solutions to 
the result: the underproduction of public goods.  The problem can be stated thus: if one 
assumes that individuals are self-interested rational utility-maximizers, then they will tend 
to underinvest in the production of public goods.  As noted in Chapter Nine, public goods 
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are goods with at least two basic properties: non-rivalry and non-exclusion.  Rational 
actors have little to no incentive to participate in the production of a good that they will 
consume regardless of whether they contribute to its production.  In other words, the good 
generated is an externality; benefits can be received with no costs.  Rational individuals 
thus have incentives to ‘free-ride.’  If everyone free rides, then there is no public good. 
 Collective action theory’s emphasis on the free rider problem has generated a 
tremendous literature oriented toward explaining mobilization.  Efforts to explain strategic 
and tactical choices are not as common (DeNardo 1985; Freeman 1983; Marwell and Oliver 
1992; Opp 2009).   They start with the basic assumption, in line with the general model, 
that each strategic and tactical option has a set of associated costs and benefits shaped by 
the constraints unique to the decision context.88  Choice is constrained by any number of 
factors, including resources, values, and political repression.  Whichever action yields the 
highest utility under constraints, or the highest benefits minus costs relative to the 
alternatives, is the chosen action. 
11.1.4. Cultural Approaches 
 Cultural approaches in the field of social movements also offer a number of 
explanations for tactical choice.  In general, they consider the various processes and 
products of sense-making that activists utilize in order to interpret their environment and 
achieve their goals.  They assume above all that actions are sensible only as a virtue of the 
meanings that actors provide them.  Before actors can be rational or strategic, they must 
                                                          
88
 Both RMT and political process theory appropriate this concern over the costs and benefits of collective 
action in order to provide some semblance of micro-foundational theory (Eisinger 1973; McCarthy and Zald 
1973; 1977; 1987a; Oberschall 1973).  For example, Tarrow (1998, 76-77) defines political opportunities as 
features of the political environment that create incentives for action.  However, the position of collective 
action theory within these approaches is ambiguous and incomplete. Opp (2009) is critical of both their 
failure to explicitly assimilate the collective action approach into their analyses despite their implicit and 
often explicit reliance on it and their misinterpretations of the theory. 
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make sense of their world and the actions of other actors.  These meanings are shaped by a 
variety of social determinants, including social interaction and/or social structures.  These 
determinants configure and reproduce the sets of meanings that constrain social life by 
inducing cooperation and animating social conflict.  Because each action can express 
variable meanings and thus have variable effects on political behavior, understanding the 
range of interpretations and their determinants is a decisive procedure in explaining social 
movement activity.  Although the literature is replete with a diversity of cultural variables 
that are often ill-defined, three in particular constitute the bulk of the literature: framing, 
collective identity, and ideology.   
 Utilized in numerous fields from psychology to economics to sociology, though 
lacking in any common theoretical framework, frame theory explains variation in strategy 
and tactics through a variety of framing processes (Gamson 1992; Johnston and Noakes 
2005; Snow and Benford 1988; 2000a; Snow et al 1986).  In the context of social movement 
studies, framing is a social process of crafting and employing meaning in a strategic effort 
to further one’s interests.  These meanings are constellations of representations that 
simplify reality by highlighting certain elements and excluding others.  Whether in 
discussion or contention, the definitions of social reality represented in contentious frames 
can define a social situation in myriad ways that are conducive to or inhibitive of social 
movement activity.  Framing is thus a significant part of the ‘meaning work’ involved in 
generating, sustaining, and inhibiting collective action.  This labor includes the diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational functions essential to collective action as well as the 
countering of such frames propagated by opponents.  For framing scholars, the diagnostic 
framing efforts of activists, specifically the identification and elaboration of problems, 
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grievances, and responsibility for injustices, restricts the range of solutions available, 
including choices in tactics.   
 NSM theories (Castells 1997; Habermas 1981; Melucci 1989; 1996; Offe 1985; 
Touraine 1981; 1985) and recent cultural and cognitive approaches (Eyerman and Jamison 
1991; Jasper 1997; Jasper and Polletta 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992) turn to collective 
identity in order to explain social movement activity.  As noted in Chapter One, NSM 
theories identify new forms of collective action as products of broad structural changes in 
the nature of the political economy.  These changes, many of which focus on the 
development of new class configurations amidst the rise of information and service 
industries, tend to shift the focus of contention from issues of material well-being to post-
materialist life politics.  However, beyond the effects of the structural position of actors, 
these theorists are not explicit about the factors that shape differences in tactical choice 
among activists (Opp 2009).  More recent approaches are more explicit.  Activists choose 
tactics that best conform to who they believe they are.  Choices are expressions and 
confirmations of their values, beliefs, and their construction of themselves and others.  In 
other words, variation in the content of collective identity shapes the tactical choices of 
activists.  
 Early studies of social movements attended to ideology as an explanatory variable 
(Turner and Killian 1987; Wilson 1973), but emerging RMT and political opportunity 
theory dismissed social psychological explanations of mobilization.  Recent emphases on 
resources, politics, and frames prompted several scholars to propose a reintegration of 
ideology into studies of social movement activity (Dalton 1994; Zald 2000).  This 
“ideologically structured action” approach develops the argument that basic sets of value 
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and beliefs constrain social movement activity ranging from organizational choices to 
tactical approaches.  Several studies utilize the beliefs and values held by activists as a 
prominent independent variable for explaining variation in tactics (Downey 1986; Gamson 
1989; Nepstad 2008).  The literature on European environmental movements is 
particularly well-developed in its work on the relationship between ideology and strategy 
(Brulle 2000; Carmin and Balser 2002; Dalton 1994; Dryzek 1997).    
11.2. Theory and Hypotheses  
11.2.1. The Structure of Repertoires 
DeNardo (1985, 262) observes that “to explain why one strategy [or tactic] is 
adopted is to explain why other strategies [or tactics] are not.”  This entails first the 
identification of the range of tactics available to protesters.  As Ennis (1987, 522) argues, “A 
theory of tactics must start with the range of options available to a given actor at a moment 
in time.”  There are at least two possible avenues: deduction and induction.   
In the most complex formal analysis of strategic choice in the literature, DeNardo 
(1985) classifies radical strategies and tactics along two continuous variables in order to 
capture their degree of disruption: the number of people mobilized and the degree of 
violence.  Evaluations of the utility of strategic choices are functions of various constraints, 
including the level of support in the population, the degree of responsiveness of the regime 
to radical demands, state repression, and a number of dichotomous psychological variables 
including the intensity of preferences among radicals and their patience with respect to the 
desired outcomes of action.  While the virtues of his theory are numerous, it does not 
attempt to capture variation in choices among tactics that introduce roughly the same level 
of disruption when the action is peaceful.  In other words, when both mobilization and 
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violence are held constant, qualitative variation in strategic and tactical choices is not 
explained.  Finer theoretical instruments are required. 
 In this chapter, I begin a cursory effort to identify what Ennis (1987) refers to as the 
structure and meaning of culture jamming repertoires.  Beginning from a list of tactics 
utilized in the Boston area over a five year period, Ennis measures the similarity and 
differences in attitudes towards tactics regarding their support, use, and effectiveness.  
Structures of association are then identified across the data that cluster and distinguish 
sets of tactics.  Ennis’s approach is thus to develop a list of tactics from recent local practice 
and allow respondents to evaluate them.  An alternative approach is to allow respondents 
to develop their own sets of classifications and evaluate them appropriately.  While the 
former assumes that the list derived prior to the survey is sufficiently exhaustive and 
complete to offer a compelling source of comparable data, the latter approach makes no 
such assumption but instead seeks to identify what such a list might look like.  Additionally, 
the latter approach allows for more rigorous testing of a theory of tactics that involves 
variation in intersubjective recognition and evaluation in the categories of tactics.   
 This question requires some engagement here in order to answer the question: how 
do I conceive the range of tactics available to activists for hypotheses development?  This 
concern will be addressed in two ways.  First, through my sample of the culture jamming 
repertoire of contention I develop a description of their tactical repertoires, while also 
incorporating a wider set of data to fill out what constitutes the culture jamming repertoire 
of contention.  The effort is thus entirely inductive.  Second, I rely on conventional 
distinctions between tactics in the development of hypotheses.  For example, in the first 
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hypotheses I distinguish conventional or institutional tactics from all other tactics and 
violent tactics from all other tactics.   
11.2.2. The Attribution of Effectiveness 
 In Figure 3.3, I present a schematic set of relationships in which the attribution of 
effectiveness across a set of tactics is in part a result of an SMO’s ideology.  As Polletta 
(2002, 20) observes, “our very criteria for assessing what is instrumental, strategic, 
efficient…are based on the social associations underpinning those conceptions.”  In Chapter 
Three, I defined effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals and 
objectives of an SMO.  It constitutes a continuous variable ranging from counter-effective to 
ineffective to effective.  Accordingly, an SMO defines its preference structure over tactics by 
attributing varying degrees of effectiveness to the tactics of the repertoire of contention.  
Figure 11.1 presents the general relationships that attribute effectiveness.  Effectiveness is 
defined and constrained in this analysis principally by the goals of an SMO and its ideology.  
Strategic orientations are developed in response to these considerations, clarifying an 
SMO’s sense of what constitutes effective action for them. 
 In the previous chapter I link ideologies and strategic orientations, while in Chapter 
Nine I develop descriptions of goals and strategic orientations.  The task here necessitates a 
return to all three.  Table 11.1 recaps the relevant descriptive hypotheses.  In Chapter Nine 
 
Ideology     
     
  Strategic Orientation  Action 
     
Goals     
     
Figure 11.1. Relations of Effectiveness 
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Table 11.1. Hypothesized Goals and Strategic Orientations 
Goals Strategic Orientations 
Intrinsic Intrinsic 
Cultural Insular 
Post-materialism Low Disruption 
Club Good   • Small Mobilization 
Autonomous   • No Violence 
 
I identify CJOs as associated with the pursuit of intrinsic, cultural, post-material, club good, 
and autonomous goals.  As the basic organization of strategic choices, strategic orientations 
– intrinsic, insular, and low social disruption - are general guides to an SMO’s sense of what 
is effective in the pursuit of their goals and objectives.  The pursuit of intrinsic, post-
material, club good, and autonomous goals does not provide any a priori reason to 
distinguish across strategic relations.  However, consider the pursuit of cultural goals, goals 
that focus on and through non-state structures.  From this starting point it seems plausible 
to suggest that what I referred to as the vulnerabilities, motivations, and capacities of the 
discursive and economic opportunity structures are the most determinant in shaping the 
group’s sense of effectiveness.  The relation between cultural goals and political actors and 
institutions offer one of two conditions for such an SMO: 1) politics is an irrelevant sphere 
of activity, or 2) an indirect route into politics (through non-state structures) is made more 
attractive than a direct route by some feature(s) of the political environment.  This is 
supported by Wettergren’s (2005, ch. 8) finding  and the findings of Chapter Ten that for 
CJOs the political opportunity structure is not considered favorable to larger-scale actions 
and that political institutions are perceived as basically untrustworthy if not irrelevant.  A 
hypothesis may be developed:  
H11.1: CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to conventional or institutional tactics. 
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This hypothesis does not specify whether such tactics are generally ranked as low in 
effectiveness or if they are defined as counter-effective.  It does lead us to anticipate that 
conventional or institutional tactics like voting, petitions, or lawsuits are not perceived as 
particularly useful for achieving the specific goals of the organization. 
Second, SMOs develop strategic orientations that most efficiently exploit their 
environment in order to most effectively pursue their goals.  Consider the low level of 
social disruption expected of culture jamming activities.  In part this entails a generally 
non-violent posture.  In and of itself this should bear no necessary hypotheses about the 
relation between effectiveness and violence for CJOs.  For example, violence may be 
regarded as effective but morally repugnant.  Still, it does suggest a plausible hypothesis: 
 H11.2: CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to violent tactics. 
This leads to the expectation that actions involving personal violence and property damage 
are not construed as especially efficacious. 
 The paucity of hypotheses does not mean that we lack guidance for the theoretical 
approach taken here, but rather that the process remaining is messier.   The empirical 
descriptions of ideologies and strategic orientations offered by chapters nine and eleven 
should divulge richer implications for further clarifying what kind of preference structure 
might be expected. 
11.2.3. Familiarity and Tactical Choice 
This dissertation involves the explanation of tactical choice in part through a 
translation of the concept of familiarity common to both Tilly and Bourdieu into a 
behavioral approach to collective action theory.  Figures 11.2 and 11.3 reproduce the 









a tactic being adopted within a population of SMOs is a function of the familiarity that 
actors have with the everyday correlates of the action and the percentage of the population 
that possesses these schemas.  The latter may be broadly distinguished as scarcely or 
abundantly distributed.  In the case of abundance, skills that are widely distributed provide 
certain tactics with a substantial probability of adoption across a population of SMOs.  
Conversely, skills that are scarcely distributed provide certain tactics with an increased 
probability of adoption among a small number of SMOs in the population, precisely because 
these schemas are possessed by a small part of the population.  According to the analysis 
provided in Chapter Three, schemas reduce the uncertainty in a decision context by 
providing more confidence in the estimation of expectations for some tactical alternative 
but not others.  This variation in confidence produces incentives for SMOs to discriminate 
among their tactical options on the assumption that the SMO is ambiguity averse. 
 Figure 11.3 identifies a further relation between familiarity and the probability of 
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decelerating curve.  At very low levels, marginal increases in familiarity engender 
significant decreases in transaction costs.  As familiarity continues to increase, however, it 
yields a decreasing rate of return as a more confident sketch of the possible situation 
comes into view.  Once the major details of the situation are in place, increases in 
familiarity are of less and less value in altering probabilities of tactical adoption.  Ceteris 
paribus, assuming variation in transaction costs across any set of tactical alternatives, 
differences in such costs (indeed any costs) account for differences in the probability of the 
adoption of the tactic.   
If the foregoing relation between familiarity and tactical adoption is true, then 
similar to Jasper’s (1997) argument and Carmin and Balser’s (2002) finding that personal 
experience tends to shape an SMO’s tactical repertoire, I expect those with biographies of 
artistic production to develop tactics that utilize their experiences.  In Chapter Seven I 
establish the scarcity of schemas associated with the aesthetic disposition.  The skills and 


















































Figure 11.3. Familiarity, Transaction Costs, and Tactical Adoption. 
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act in ways consistent with these skills and competencies, because, in part, they reduce 
both the uncertainty and the transaction costs associated with some action and not others.  
But does an aesthetic disposition shape tactical choices?  In a synthesis of Tilly and 
Bourdieu, Crossley (2002a, 62) offers a hypothesis: “Given the skills and competencies 
which specific fields presuppose, [actors] from different backgrounds will tend to have 
different dispositions for action in those various fields.”  Given the skills and knowledge 
which the field of artistic production presupposes, I hypothesize:  
H11.3: CJOs are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and  
  knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition. 
 
This hypothesis suggests that the tactics used by CJOs will involve the various skills and 
knowledge associated with artistic production. 
11.3. Analysis 
As with previous chapters none of the hypotheses, propositions, or expectations 
developed above is tested in the strictest sense.  The data derives from the sample of CJOs 
specified in Chapter Four.  Below, I describe the tactical repertoires of CJOs and illustrate 
hypotheses related to the attribution of effectiveness across the set of available tactics and 
the distribution of familiarity and it’s relation to culture jamming. 
11.3.1. Tactical Repertoires 
 The tactical repertoires of CJOs (and the collective culture jamming repertoire of 
contention) are the primary dependent variable of this study, though the research design of 
this study provides almost no variation in repertoires.  This effort at description is largely 
inductive.  First, CJOs are prolific producers of media.  Every group, defunct or active, 
maintains a website.  Many utilize Facebook and Twitter accounts.  Ten of the twelve 
groups published books, magazines, and/or articles (AMF, BIL, CAE, CTM, IAA, IST, NGL, 
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RBC, SCP, TYM).  Like many of the groups, the BLF provides theoretical and practical texts 
on their website as well as press releases for the media.  Only the AAA lacks equivalent 
textual media production.  Notably, some produce texts that are themselves culture jams 
including websites (AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, TYM), books (BIL, IST), magazines (AMF), and 
audio (NGL).  While almost every group produces and distributes some form of video 
content on sites like Youtube, some produce commercials, music videos, and films for 
offline distribution (AMF, BIL, NGL, RBC, TYM).  In addition, all of the groups have some 
members that participate in interviews for various media outlets. Typically these media are 
local or alternative outlets, but some groups do engage mainstream media (AMF, BIL, NGL, 
RBC, TYM). 
 Second, I develop a basic distinction between experimental and non-experimental 
tactical repertoires.  In the case of the former, CJOs utilize a wide variety of tactics that are 
experimental, highly creative, and typically change over time.  Such CJOs are “innovative 
hothouses,” organizations that possess a “high level of critical awareness, technical 
expertise in various fields, small organizational structures, an innovative and cooperative 
mindset, and a flexible agenda” (Rolfe 2005, 70).  Non-experimental repertoires are 
characterized by a narrower range of tactics and consistency in tactical choice with only 
minor variations.  In other words, the experimental CJO repertoire tends to be unstable and 
diverse, while the non-experimental variant tends to be stable and comparatively uniform.  
I define experimentation in-depth in the following chapter, but for now a general common 
sense understanding is sufficient.   
 Four groups in the sample exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST), 
while the IAA is a mixed case.  I consider the CAE here in detail.  The CAE aim to “develop 
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tactics and tools of resistance” (Hirsch 2005, 28).  Many CAE tactics are variations on street 
theater, which they define as “those performances that invent ephemeral, autonomous 
situations from which temporary public relationships emerge that can make possible 
critical dialogue on a given issue” (2001, 87).  Key references here are the invisible theater 
and happenings, performances that blur the distinction between theater and everyday life.  
Blending pedagogy, participation, and experimentation, CAE’s signature approach is what 
they describe as recombinant theater.  I provide two examples: 
1) Critical Art Ensemble designed this work to be performed at tourist sites and locations of 
 extreme consumption. Note that such locations are heavily garrisoned and fortified, so only 
 the slightest act of deviance is needed to provoke a coercive response. 
 
 The performer selected a spot near an entrance/exit area at a public site, taking a position 
 at the side of the entrance way so as to minimize blockage.  In place, he began to set up a toy 
 car track and then proceeded to push toy cars around the track. Other cars were displayed 
 for anyone else who wanted to participate. Other collective members insinuated themselves 
 into the crowd that developed, and spoke with the onlookers. 
 
 The results: The crowd generally began by speculating on the mental health of the 
 performer. Common themes were that the performer was “loony,” “on drugs,” or a “Viet 
 Nam vet.”  Some people would join the performer in pushing cars around the track, 
 sometimes as a taunt, but mostly as gesture of sympathy.  Within two to five minutes 
 security guards or police would arrive on the scene.  They would approach cautiously, 
 fearing it was a disturbed person who might be prone to violence….The sight of security 
 forces would attract more people to the scene. F 
 
2) CAE chose a harmless [Sheffield, UK] action that took place in a location where the 
 typical  activities of the local population would not be disturbed. The activity chosen was to 
 give away beer and cigarettes. The location selected for the action was a pedestrian mall 
 and transportation artery. Here CAE attempted to inject the expressive possibilities of open 
 exchange found in a public bar into a space that was reserved exclusively for consumption. 
 Although the area was allegedly a public space, no conversation, conviviality, or coming 
 together of diverse groups (or any other characteristic of bourgeois utopian public space) 
 occurred there. Once this managed space was broken by the alien gesture of offering free 
 beer and cigarettes, these very same elements of utopian public space immediately 
 emerged…The most interesting reaction from the male participants was complete 
 astonishment at the action. The whole context —a moment of meeting new people, having 
 conversations, getting drunk while waiting for the tram, getting free commodities, and so 
 on—seemed so unbelievable that as one man put it, “It’s a dream come true.” Years of 
 socialization had made it seem impossible that members of the public could appropriate the 
 space of the commodity. In this case, prior to the event, reterritorialization of the space of 
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 the commodity through public process could only be imagined in the confines of a personal, 
 interior dreamspace (CAE 2001, 90-91). 
 
The group engages in a number of other actions.  They deploy a variety of installations 
within art contexts like museums and galleries.  Some of the more interesting involve 
forays into bioart and the politics of biotechnology.  An example is the Cult of the New Eve, a 
live performance akin to a spectacular teach-in in which the group re-contextualize the 
rhetoric of biotechnology by masquerading as a cult (CAE, Vanouse, and Wilding 2000).  
One of Adbusters’ favorite tactics and a typical one for the CAE is the un-commercial.89  
Along with the culture jamming group the Institute for Applied Autonomy, CAE employ 
what they refer to as contestational robots (2001, ch. 6).  These robots are designed to take 
the place of the physically vulnerable human while performing certain functions that elicit 
the attention of authority, such as graffiti writing and pamphleteering.  Another tactic is the 
shopdropping of informative works, such as those that comment on the medical regime in 
the United States and the superfluity of technology.  Other notable actions include bicycle 
radios that blare détournements, plagiarized texts, small digital devices placed in various 
environments that display humorous and critical messages, “sorry” bricks and flags at 
tourist sites or monuments, and the renaming of streets. 
 Other groups exhibit a similar pattern.  The AAA (2013a) developed an app for the 
Mozilla Firefox browser that replaces advertisements with art, printed and distributed a 
fake New York Times, replaced public bench and video advertisements with 
subvertisements and art, shopdropped a variety of products, recorded interviews on 
outdoor advertising and played them through small covertly placed sound systems in 
                                                          
89 As Wettergren (2005, 8n2) notes, the term un-commercial actually refers to two distinct tactics.  One 
involves the spoofing of a corporate commercials in order to critique the message the corporation is sending, 
while the other resembles a short film that ‘advertises’ the concerns of the group.   
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various high traffic locations, and a variety of others.  The CTM identify their efforts as 
“experiments” and “training exercises” (Gach and Sholette 2006), as “templates for tactics” 
(Gach 2007).  They developed dozens of actions: during a protest against the 2000 Bush 
inauguration they handed out doughnuts to activists and offered them to cops; they set up 
a fortune-reading space on the sidewalk and offered to curse malignant institutions and 
provide means to  resist them; developed a black-painted ice cream truck (think SWAT 
truck) with multiple functions: surveillance, dispensing ice cream, and offering  
propaganda; and many more (CTM n.d.(a)).  The IST (2012) also developed a variety of 
approaches: they offered to sell their patriotism while intoxicated, publicly perform the 
commands explicit in advertising, shopdropped their dictionary of fear and security related 
terms, and re-staged the U.S.-Mexican border fence at a Native American reservation.   
 Seven groups possess largely non-experimental tactical repertoires (AMF, BLF, BIL, 
NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM).  An extreme example of this phenomenon is the BLF.  The group 
engages exclusively in the culture jamming of billboards.  While there are some variations 
in this tactic – for example, the subversion of a neon sign, the addition of mechanical 
elements, or the explicit use of Kantian philosophy – the basic idea remains intact.  As a 
variant of street theater, the SCP performs silent plays in front of surveillance cameras 
using poster boards to display text.  They also offer walking tours of the surveillance 
environment and produce maps identifying the cameras.  The Billionaires ‘protest’ leftist 
protesters and ‘support’ right wing protester by engaging in street theater and crashing 
events.  They adorn the garb and mannerisms of the ‘wealthy, sing satirical songs, and wave 
satirical posters with phrases like these from the Billionaires for Wealthcare (n.d.(b)): 
 • Leave No Billionaire Behind 
• Let Them Eat Advil 
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 • Because Nothing Says Freedom Like Denying Claims 
 • Our Death Panels Turn a Profit 
 
Negativland’s musical production is their primary tactic, although they also have a radio 
show.  The AMF produce un-commercials, a culture jamming magazine, and famous 
subvertisements, as well as develop campaigns such as Buy Nothing Day and TV Turnoff 
Week (now Digital Detox Week) and pursue lawsuits.  
 Two remaining groups have somewhat wider repertoires, though they do not have 
the character of experimental repertoires.  The Yes Men acquire and maintain fake 
websites for the WTO, the Bush Campaign, Dow Chemical, and other antagonists.  These 
allow the group to receive messages and requests for appearances in the media and at 
industry conferences.  Accepting the invitations in the name of their antagonists and 
carrying the pretense throughout their speaking engagements, the group present 
outlandish presentations critical of those they impersonate.  Their media hoaxes – for 
example, portraying Dow Chemical as accepting responsibility for the Bhopal, India 
industrial accident after they purchased Union Carbide –likewise seek to “correct” the 
identity of the offending party.  Other actions include fake petitions, subvertisements, 
masquerading as part of the Bush campaign, and producing and disseminating fake New 
York Times and New York Post editions.   
The two remaining groups are slightly more difficult to place.  The IAA (n.d.(a)) 
developed an app that identifies the location of surveillance cameras, a text messaging 
service that allows quick broadcasts of messages (useful for activists in the streets), an 
“airline” that helps users track private airplanes contracted by the CIA for the rendition 
program, and worked with the CAE in developing contestational robots.  The RBC engages 
in a variety of performance actions, what they call “Art Attacks” (Talen 2006, 26).  A typical 
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action involves the Reverend Billy, a crusading, wild-eyed, thundering, Elvis-style preacher 
of a gospel of shop shopping, and members of the choir either infiltrating private property 
(Starbucks, Wal-Mart, Bank of America, etc.) or occupying public space with singing, 
praying, and preaching.  Exorcisms are performed on cash registers and credit cards.  
Variations within this basic model are legion: a Thanksgiving dinner at Bank of America, 
spilling oil in the Tate Museum, congregants adorned in toad costumes symbolizing an 
extinct species.  Other performances are somewhat more idiosyncratic. The group 
frequently participates in Whirlmarts: 
In a Whirl you go up and down the aisles pushing an empty shopping cart, in a long line that 
 turns and turns and goes straight and turns again, through the Big Box, for an hour.  You 
 never put anything into the cart and keep pushing, looking straight ahead.  If anyone stops 
 you and demands an exclamation, just say “I’m not shopping” (Reverend Billy 2006, 141). 
 
Another example includes the cell phone opera (Talen 2003, 71.  In this action, participants 
dress inconspicuously and pretend to shop at some corporate establishment.  Each 
member engages in a cell phone call about shopping that evolves into a rousing 
condemnation of the entire shopping experience.  Soon, the shop is filled with a cacophony 
of indignation.  Products are lifted into the air and accused of a variety of social and 
psychological ills.  Suddenly, the anger turns into singing and the reverend bursts into a 
sermon as congregants place audio players in covert positions throughout the store.  Once 
the event is concluded, recordings of testimonials from sweatshop workers blare 
throughout the store.  Beyond these actions, the RBC is also involved in more conventional 
civil disobedience actions like the blockage of construction equipment and police. 
 Along with the production of media, the most common tactical forms in this 
discussion are performance-based actions (BIL, CTM, CAE, IST, RBC, SCP, TYM) and 
subvertisements (AMF, AAA, BLF, CAE, NGL, TYM).  Variations on shopdropping are also 
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prominent (AAA, CAE, IST, RBC), as are subversive objects situated in non-retail contexts 
(AAA, CAE, IAA, IST, RBC).   Impersonation and role-playing are prominent features of the 
performance-based actions (BIL, CAE, RBC, TYM).  Non-culture jamming actions include 
lawsuits (AMF, RBC), demonstrations (AMF), and more conventional forms of civil 
disobedience (RBC, TYM).  However, what is clear is that the examples provided and the 
many that were not included due to space constraints strongly suggest a performance and 
media-based repertoire of contention with dramatic variations and experimentation. 
11.3.2. Attribution of Effectiveness 
Above I define effectiveness as the perceived ability of a tactic to further the goals 
and objectives of an SMO.  This emphasis on goals and objectives emphasizes that while 
some tactics may be oriented directly towards the ultimate goal, others may focus on an 
objective supporting the goal.  In fact, I argue that the bulk of an SMO’s actions are oriented 
towards objectives.  This makes an analysis of effectiveness potentially extremely complex. 
To simplify the analysis, I begin with descriptions of how CJOs perceive their actions 
producing outcomes.  I follow with an analysis guided by the two hypotheses (H11.1, 
H11.2) pertinent to the question of effectiveness.   
First, I consider a point of concern.  In the account pursued by this chapter, behaving 
strategically appears to imply that tactical choice is governed simply by effectiveness.  
However, choices are governed by constraints as well.  This means that tactics perceived to 
be less effective than others may still be chosen if some constraint makes them too costly 
or another option is more beneficial.  Importantly, this implies that sets of discrete causes 
(incentives) exact independent effects on tactical choice.  The design of this study is unable 
to systematically distinguish these effects.   Moreover, a more insidious problem looms: 
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rationalization.  A group may rationalize an action as effective if it is chosen primarily for 
some other set of incentives, such as intrinsic enjoyment.  In this scenario, conclusions 
based on the evidence risk a type I error in which the effectiveness of a tactical approach is 
falsely identified as a factor in tactical choice.  An opposing hypothesis is offered by Polletta 
(2002).  She demonstrates that many so-called cultural or personal benefits do perform 
important strategic functions.  An incentive like intrinsic enjoyment may perform 
important functions such as building commitment and solidarity or developing skills 
pertinent to protest or some activity crucial to the SMO’s goal (Staggenborg 1991, 100).  
The research design of this study does not allow me to reject the rationalization hypothesis, 
and thus leads to me emphasize illustration over testing. 
Effectiveness may be defined intrinsically.  For example, a tactic must be capable of 
changing an audience member’s individual consciousness, however temporary, in the 
general direction of the CJO’s ideology in order to be regarded as effective.  Another 
example is the generation of solidarity, or the reinforcement of an audience member’s 
individual consciousness in the event that it already aligns with the CJO’s ideology.  
Effective tactics may also involve the generation of a dialogue or engaging a wide audience.   
Such notions of effectiveness constitute the common denominator among the sample of 
CJOs.  For example, the BLF describes their actions as “fauxvertising, [in which] an existing 
message is creatively falsified to reach a higher truth or deeper meaning.  It takes an 
unacceptable sales pitch and turns it into a provocative statement” (Black n.d.).  
Fauxvertising, their term for subvertising, thus expresses the ‘truth’ in advertising.  
However, provocation is not the result of simple pedantry.  For the bitter pill of truth to 
“[stick] in our minds” (Berger 2000) and [encourage] thinking (Napier n.d.), it demands a 
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more covert and pleasing coating.  Riddles serve this function: “My favorite billboards are 
ones that are enigmatic – the ones that people have a hard time figuring out right away.”  
Humor as well lubricates the processing of the message: “You don’t go up and spray paint 
“Fuck Exxon” on a billboard, because the average working guy or cop looks at that and they 
go, Commies!” (Haller and Napier 2006).   Thus, truth slides in with a Trojan Horse. 
But truth does not simply lie fallow or inert; it paradoxically inspires frustration and 
hope.  Member Kalman (2008) suggests that “what resonates most with our audience is 
expressing a collective frustration” with the ubiquity of advertising.  Once it settles into the 
mind, however, the frustration gives way to a playful anger without impotence, to hope.  
Napier (2009) describes his own experience of a sense of hope arising from the “chance 
juxtaposition of disparate images or essences that I might come across in my daily 
excursions.”  This hope arises in the realization that one need not be subject to the 
monologue of advertising; rather, one can “change the Advertising message in your own 
mind,” and “enter into the High Priesthood of Advertising” (Napier and Thomas 2006). 
The AMF posit a similar process in which a subvertisement introduces a ‘moment of truth’ 
into an otherwise dishonest means of communication.  However, crucial differences betray 
the extrinsic focus of the group.  First, the AMF strongly emphasizes behavioral change 
following the spark of authentic life.  Lasn (1999, xiv) is clear:  
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same 
 again.  Your life veers off in strange new directions.  It’s very exciting and a little scary.  
 Ideas blossom into obsessions.  The imperative to live life differently keeps building until 
 the day it breaks through the surface. 
 
Here, Lasn (2001) emphasizes not dialogue, but an arrest of the spectacle: “It's a way of 
stopping the flow of the consumer spectacle long enough to adjust your set.”  Second, the 
AMF stress the diffusion of ideas.  Lasn (1999, 123) calls the germ of the subvertisement a 
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meme, “a unit of information that leaps from brain to brain.  Memes compete with one 
another for replication, and are passed down through a population much the way genes are 
passed through a species.”  Here, he emphasizes the capacity of ideas to travel through an 
entire culture and defeat the ideas in power.  Elsewhere, Lasn (2001) notes: “The point is to 
break out of a trance. But culture jamming works on a social scale - a whole culture's satori 
is at stake.”  Thus he identifies culture jamming as a crude means of cultural change: “When 
all this cognitive dissonance reaches critical mass in our collective unconscious, our minds 
will open, the old consumer culture will heave its last” (Lasn 2001).  Finally, as with many 
other groups pursuing extrinsic goals means othe than culture jamming are required to 
open up the channels of communication to allow the memes to proliferate.  Because a 
meme war requires a level-playing field, the AMF advocates an “Industrial Pincer,” a 
movement on the level of the media (the meme war) and a grassroots level of action 
involving lawsuits, citizens groups, and protests to open the airwaves (Lasn 1999, 134).      
The Billionaires (like the Yes Men) offer more consideration of a relation between 
intrinsic objectives and extrinsic goals.  The group uses a process similar to the previous 
examples: a masquerading ‘truth’ sticks in the mind and inspires both anger and a sense of 
agency and freedom.  This performs a number of intrinsic functions: “It's very effective at 
inviting people who don't have a strong history of political activism, but share progressive 
values and views, and are skilled, creative professionals. It's good at inviting young people 
with ironic tendencies. It's good at replicating itself” (Boyd 2004).  Yet, organizing is the 
stuff of social change.  “There are a lot of forms of activism that are massively more 
effective. Like MoveOn…or Greenpeace” (Boyd 2004).  These groups and others know: 
You have to make email lists and stay in touch with the community. You have to figure out 
 what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you are 
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 doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election. You also have 
 to think about how to build power over the long term and build organizations and NGO 
 infrastructures. You have to do all this stuff. You have to have powerful charismatic leaders 
 who are maybe not “creative”, fancy, artsy or humorous (Boyd 2004). 
 
The crucial contribution of the Billionaires is to generate “media attention” (Boyd 2004).  
“Media attention is not the goal; the goal is to reach people. But media attention is a sub-
goal, in that it's probably the most important way we have of reaching people. It's not an 
ultimate goal of the campaign, but it is an operational goal” (Boyd 2004).  The media diffuse 
the message of the Billionaires to audiences far larger than the direct audiences they 
encounter on the ground.  Yet, media attention is not in itself sufficient.  It merely carries 
the message, a message that ideally shifts the salience of an issue: 
I just emphasize this again and again with people with whom I do workshops and talk to – 
 creative actions, creative interventions can draw attention to an issue; they can push a 
 corporate target which is stealing from the people or getting away with an ecological crime, 
 and you can put a spotlight on them and it can be extremely useful (Boyd n.d.)     
 
Spotlighting an issue ideally performs a number of functions, including elevating the profile 
of like-minded groups working on that issue: “But then there has to be a larger movement 
that keeps holding their feet to the fire” (Boyd n.d.).  The Billionaires thus see their action 
as buttressing long-term organized efforts to generate social change. 
 Unlike the Yes Men, however, the group suggests a possible behavioral effect 
resulting from media coverage. For example, the group speculates on the role of the 
message in voting behavior: 
 What we tell funders is that we're trying to reach voters in battleground states. One part of 
 it is suppressing Bush voters by confirming their nagging suspicions that he is serving 
 corporate interests at the expense of the average voter. We're also trying to persuade those 
 in the middle (Boyd n.d.).   
 
First, the message – economic inequality and corrupt campaign finance – may exploit the 
general distaste for the translation of economic power into political power felt even by 
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conservative voters.  If these suspicions are sufficiently confirmed, the suggestion is that 
the voters may simply refuse to vote, thus reducing the overall turnout of Bush supporters.  
Second, a similar mechanism is at play on those voters in the middle, typically centrists, 
independents, or undecideds.  However, because these voters are not loyal to a 
conservative candidate, persuasion may generate votes for the liberal candidate. 
 Another means of effecting change is expressed by the CAE.  As one of their primary 
tactics, the CAE fashion social interactions - what they call recombinant theater - that aim 
to temporarily undermine authoritarian culture.  The process of such performances begins 
with the oppressive codes and practices that “normalize” and “homogenize” an audience 
through extreme expression management, such as a pedestrian walkway at a mall.  In such 
managed contexts, the group deploys performance pieces and interactive installments that 
aim to provide an interface between the abstraction and the immediacy of contemporary 
power: “Experiencing the material effects of the real hyperreal as a means to understand its 
politics in a lived way is at the heart of our performances. It is in this realm that the 
transparent codes become opaque” (CAE 1996, 142).   
Under these conditions, a loose-knit ephemeral public can emerge. An actual construction of 
 a public (temporary though it may be) through an open field of performative practice makes 
 possible a productive pedagogy…In this way, a participatory process can emerge out of both 
 rational social interactions and nonrational libidinal trafficking that creates skepticism in an 
 individual about the taken-for-grantedness of the social codes of a given situation (CAE 
 2001, 90). 
 
Like the previous culture jams, such scenarios generate ‘moments of truth,’ but with the 
CAE there is less of an emphasis on behavioral change.  The focus is strongly directed at 
creating moments of autonomy.  However, the group does posit a connection to action, 
however vague.  First, they make a key distinction: 
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Some activities, though they are performed, are not performative. These are activities that 
 directly intervene in the distribution of power on a macro level. A strategic form is policy 
 construction and reform; a tactical form is electronic civil disobedience. These types of 
 activities CAE considers political. The other form of intervention is in changing perceptions 
 through representational exchange. Tactical media practitioners initiate social processes 
 that aid people in perceiving a social system and their roles within in it in a manner that is 
 different from the normalized perception of these phenomena. This type of action is 
 pedagogical (emphasis added, CAE 1996, 142). 
 
Political action is thus explicitly oriented towards reshaping the environment.  It is what I 
call extrinsic.  The CAE identify their actions as pedagogical.  Such actions “allow 
[participants and viewers] to…gain a greater measure of autonomy (the affirmation of their 
own desires and control over their surroundings)” (CAE 1996, 40).  Such autonomy is 
crucial in developing new ideas and conceptions - “alternative possibilities in relation to 
the specific or general issue addressed” - apart from those imposed by the authoritarianism 
of the managed situation (CAE 2001, 25).  Pedagogy thus “prepares the consciousness of 
individuals for new possibilities, and in the best cases, moves them to political action” (CAE 
2001, 25).  This work of preparation is crucial considering that much of the CAE’s texts are 
ruminations on the possibility of political action in contemporary capitalism.  Elsewhere, 
the group engages directly the question of cultural change when they emphasize, “a single 
project can at best only restructure a limited situation, while it is the aggregate of 
politicized cultural actions that can create a break or shift in culture as a whole” (CAE 
2012b, 104).  The CAE thus adhere to a basic critical mass model similar to the AMF, 
although the former refuse the efficacy of a war of ideas in an open mass media.   
The IST fashions performative contexts intended to produce a similar function to 
the CAE, although they do not emphasize the imminence of autonomy.  As they note, “We 
want people to use what we’re given in everyday life to start new conversations or think 
about a new way of inhabiting a public space...We want to invent new ways of life and new 
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ways of being social – if only temporarily” (Kanarinka and Pirun 2006).  However, the 
group are ambiguous in relating the construction of these events and broader social 
change.  While at one point, Rasovic declares “a million small influences make a change,” 
(McQuaid 2005), in a personal interview the group refused to express such a relationship 
(D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012). 
 Other models of action-outcome linkages are available.  While some of the IAA’s 
actions adhere to the common denominator of generating moments of truth, the same 
actions are also intended to perform functions such as increasing the distribution of activist 
pamphlets and removing the danger of physical harm by police from graffiti-writing. The 
AMF developed the Blackspot sneaker as a means to showcase alternatives to 
megacorporations and develop local economies.  “Our hope is that people with similar 
philosophies will be inspired by our experiment in grassroots capitalism and start their 
own business ventures, spreading indie culture and providing ever more alternatives to 
buying from megacorporations” (AMF n.d.(c)).   
 This construction of the relationship between actions and intended, if not hoped for, 
outcomes thus constitutes a basic sense of how a group construes their own actions as 
effective.  Some comparative analysis of tactical effectiveness is already demonstrated.  
Such an analysis is difficult, because tactics can perform different functions in the 
achievement of an extrinsic goal.  Nevertheless, the two hypotheses provide a guide to 
discuss the relationships between culture jamming and other forms of action. 
11.3.3. Comparative Effectiveness 
 The first hypothesis (H11.1) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to 
conventional or institutional tactics.  Recall that effectiveness varies from highly effective to 
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no effect to countereffective.  Ideally, I would utilize some measure of effectiveness similar 
to Ennis (1987).  However, the data restrict me to far more modest efforts.  Here, 
conventional or institutional tactics refer to those means of influence that engage legal and 
regular political channels such as voting, campaigning, contacts with public officials (Verba 
et al 1978), public discourse (newspaper opinion pieces, blogs, etc.), and judicial activity 
such as lawsuits.  The argument raised above claims that a hypothesized cultural goal may 
suggest an irrelevant or inhospitable political environment.  Consequently, it seems 
plausible to suggest that such tactics are likely perceived to yield little in the way of goal 
achievement.  Nevertheless, other possibilities are plausible; cultural goals may involve 
political objectives.  Under this condition of heterogeneity, such tactics may in fact rate as 
highly effective.   
Some groups in the sample find noteworthy utility in conventional or institutional 
tactics.  Among their many activities, the AMF pursue numerous lawsuits against media 
corporations (Lasn 2005).  As noted above, the Billionaires view voting as a crucial part of 
the linkage between intrinsic actions and extrinsic outcomes.  The IAA speculates that 
lawsuits, not legislative activity, will ultimately turn the tide against the privatization of 
public space (Scheinke and IAA 2002, 118).  The RBC engaged in a lawsuit following an 
arrest and used it to champion the First Amendment.  They also “often partner with large 
NGO’s and advocacy groups, while they negotiate and lobby for policy change we raise the 
profile of the effort and involve citizens more directly - creating classic inside/outside 
campaigns” (RBC 2012).  The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) regard “politics, lawsuits, letter-writing,” as 
“needed for change to happen.” While this evidence lacks a sufficient distinction between 
the use of a tactic and the perception of effectiveness, it does suggest that some CJOs 
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evaluate conventional or institutional tactics positively.  Such endorsements are not 
uniform across all such tactics, however.  For example, the AMF’s Lasn (2005) argues, “I 
don’t think any amount of whining, especially using the 26 letters of the alphabet—writing 
stories that whine about our culture and complaining about corporations—will do much. It 
has been proven to be totally ineffective.” 
 Other groups express either no evaluation of such tactics (AAA, BLF, CTM, IST, NGL) 
or a general disregard for them (CAE, SCP).  The SCP’s Brown (personal interview, July 6, 
2012) argues that appealing to the actors that created the problem of surveillance cameras, 
and in so doing utilizing those means that the same actors designed for citizens to influence 
them, is ineffective. 
People would invariably ask why are we not petitioning the various local politicians to do 
 something about surveillance, or to have politicians actually involved in regulating them, so 
 that there’d be like a city-wide list and be regulated that way.  And in all cases the response 
 was, “These are the people who didn’t do anything and created the problem.  Either did 
 nothing or created the problem themselves.  So it seems pointless in either case to ask them 
 to produce the solution, to go to somebody else. 
 
Although the data is extremely limited, the analysis does suggest that CJOs do not offer a 
blanket evaluation of conventional or institutional tactics as ineffective or countereffective. 
The second hypothesis (H11.2) states that CJOs do not attribute high effectiveness to 
violent tactics.  Violence here refers to actual or threatened physical harm to people or 
property.  The close approximation of vandalism to many acts of culture jamming, at least 
according to some antagonist, leads me to exclude such acts as property damage here.  
Little is offered by the sample of groups regarding the question of the efficacy of violence.  
All clearly endorse nonviolence, but only a small number comment in general on violence.  
The Yes Men (n.d.(a)) ruminate on the relatively low start-up costs of violence relative to 
their ‘interest’ in non-violence: 
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For a non-violent mass movement to succeed it has to have an incredible amount of 
 support. Unfortunately, it’s pretty easy to do these things the violent way, you just need a 
 relatively small force that’s really well trained. But that’s not what we’re interested in; we’re 
 interested in doing this nonviolently, like they did in India to achieve independence, and like 
 the Civil Rights movement did to change the system at the time. 
 
This does not comment on effectiveness, however.  The SCP’s Brown (2009) is clear on the 
efficacy of property damage: “in the American environment if you were destroying cameras 
people would see you as a reason for putting more cameras up: you’re just another violent 
activist.”  The AMF are the only group that appears to explicitly condone the damaging of 
property.  For example, Lasn (1999, xiv-xv) describes the efficacy of his physical jamming 
of a shopping cart dispenser with a bent coin: 
Once you experience even a few of these ‘moments of truth,’ things can never be the same 
 again.  Your life veers off in strange new directions.  It’s very exciting and a little scary.  
 Ideas blossom into obsessions.  The imperative to live life differently keeps building until 
 the day it breaks through the surface. 
 
Elsewhere, the group appears to endorse anarchist elements like the Black Bloc (AMF 
2012).  While they do not mention violence in their endorsement, the Black Bloc is known 
to occasionally engage in property destruction.  Far too little information is available to 
make any conclusions, however tentative, regarding this hypothesis. 
Violent and institutional means of influence do not exhaust the wide array of 
activities available to activists.  Here I consider forms such as boycotts, demonstrations, 
and civil disobedience.  As should be evident from the discussion above, mass mobilization 
and demonstrations are often regarded as effective or essential ingredients of social 
change.  However, the CAE (1996, 11) views such actions as ultimately ineffective because 
they focus on an increasingly antiquated understanding of power: “As far as power is 
concerned, the streets are dead capital! Nothing of value to the power elite can be found on 
the streets, nor does this class need control of the streets to efficiently run and maintain 
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state institutions.”  Others stress the efficacy of civil disobedience.  The Yes Men (2011) 
compare the power of demonstrations and civil disobedience: 
Millions of people in the streets couldn’t prevent the Iraq War. If a tenth of that many people 
 committed civil disobedience and had actually gotten arrested, what would have happened? 
 Maybe it would have stopped the war.  If it was a real threat to the system, maybe the war 
 wouldn’t have happened. It’s definitely something to try. You make it impossible for the 
 system to continue, and it stops. 
 
In contrast, the CAE (1996, 9) argue that although civil disobedience “is still effective as 
originally conceived (particularly at local levels), its efficacy fades with each passing 
decade.”  This is the case because power has evacuated the streets and gone hypermobile.  
Only in local conflicts does it retain its potency.  Finally, boycotts receive mixed support as 
well.  While the IST declare that actions like boycotts work (D’Ignazio, Manning, and 
Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012), the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum argues otherwise: 
“Actually buying products that we like and not buying products that we don’t like really 
achieves extremely little“ (Yes Lab Media 2009).  
 This analysis of the attribution of effectiveness suggests that for most groups in the 
sample culture jamming is constructed as effective for certain limited objectives and goals. 
More ambitious goals require other means of influence.  Which tactics are useful in regards 
to the latter is not terribly restrictive, although violence may not be conceived as terribly 
effective. 
11.3.4. The Aesthetic Disposition and Tactical Adoption 
  In Chapter Seven I provide evidence supporting the argument that participation in 
culture jamming is associated with an aesthetic disposition.  I build on this effort with the 
third hypothesis (H11.3) of this chapter, which states that CJOs are associated with the 
adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and knowledge associated with the aesthetic 
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disposition.  Here, tactics vary in the skills and knowledge associated with their 
deployment, a specific expression of the more general Tillyian hypothesis that repertoires 
are constrained by cognitive constraints.  I focus here on those skills associated with the 
field of art.  Although most of the practices associated with CJOs are not so difficult or costly 
that they effectively exclude all those without the requisite skills and knowledge (the skills 
are not strictly necessary to most of the actions), skills function as resources constraints in 
that their possession increases the likelihood that such actions will be taken, while the lack 
of skills decreases the likelihood that such actions will be taken.  While I spend nearly half 
of Chapter Seven providing evidence of the aesthetic disposition, here I engage two 
strategies: providing 1) a description of the skills utilized in the tactical repertoires of CJOs, 
and 2) evidence that CJOs link the skills of art with their tactics. 
 First, I describe the culture jamming repertoire of contention above as constituted 
by a basic set of tactical approaches (media production, subvertisements, performances, 
and subversive objects, including shopdropping) supplemented by experimental tactical 
repertoires.  I focus on the first four categories.  It is sufficient to suggest that more 
experimental tactics vary widely in the degree to which artistic skills are required to 
produce them.  Importantly, I focus on the techniques required to produce these actions.  
However, technicality is not the only means of establishing the degree to which artistic 
skills are relevant to actions.  The conceived relation of performances to outcomes may also 
be informed by theoretical awareness of the reception of performances and media, an 
awareness that is itself constructed by an aesthetic disposition.  I assume that this question 
has been more or less addressed in previous chapters. 
391 
By definition, media production, including film production, writing, costume and 
website design, musical production, and others, utilizes skills associated with the field of 
art.  While in some cases these tasks are handled by non-CJO agents, a great deal is 
produced DIY-style.  For example, the Yes Men’s Bichlbaum and Bonanno (2010) directed 
their second documentary, The Yes Men Fix the World.   
Subvertisements vary in their technical sophistication.  Some involve the simple 
covering or blacking out of letters in an advertisement text to change or delete a word, 
while others involve elaborate modifications integrated into the design of a billboard.  A 
reasonable conjecture suggests an interactive relationship between technical 
sophistication and the resource constraints imposed by skills.  Under low technical 
sophistication, technical artistic skills are not a determinate asset.  However, with 
increasing sophistication the value of such skills increases.  Figure 11.4 provides an 
example of a technically sophisticated Adbusters subvertisement.  Here, practical 
knowledge of painting and graphic design is required.   
Performance-based actions also vary in the degree to which they require technical 
knowledge and skills.  At their most sophisticated, they involve elaborate props, costumes, 
songs, and characterizations, while at their least sophisticated they require performers 
engaging in improvised public dialogue and actions.  The CAE perform actions that span the 
spectrum of technical difficulty.  For example, their Sheffield action involved nothing more 
than a location, simple improvised performances, and beer (CAE 2001, 90-91).  Yet, actions 
like the Cult of the New Eve required elaborate art direction (CAE et al 2000).  Because of 
this variation in technical sophistication, the same argument that applies to 








simple act of public performance often requires some degree of skill in order to develop 
confidence and translate performances into outcomes: 
Billionaires had to transform what they knew about great wealth into embodied knowledge  
 conveyed through bodily expression – in order to perform their political dissent 
 convincingly.  Improvisation and performance workshops, therefore, were part of the 
 Billionaires’ Manhattan chapter meetings.  Participants learned how to make desirable 
 impressions on audiences or deal with hecklers (don’t take the bait and step out of 
 character) or with overly enthusiastic spectators who joined in shouting slogans with them 
 – and thereby disrupting the Billionaires’ carefully crafted media image.  
 
These workshops were led by thespians, veteran performers imparting formal and tacit 
knowledge of how to achieve effective public expression. 
Subversive objects, including shopdropping, also vary in their degree of 
sophistication. Many such objects are actually media like pamphlets and books.  Others 
include food items (see Figure 11.5), unmarked packages, bricks, flags, and a host of others.  
More sophisticated forms involve elaborate graphic designs and product packaging. 
Many CJOs recognize a linkage between the skills of art and their tactical 




Figure 11.5. AAA Shopdropping.  A Coca-Cola product that informs consumers about the 




communicators are extremely important. They use their skills to give people epiphanies 
and wake them up from this media consumer nightmare that most of us are caught 
in.  When discussing why his group focuses more on consciousness and less on government 
regulation, the AAA’s Lambert (2007) reasons, “I think the reason we land on the side of 
awareness and critical thinking is because we are artists and that’s our area.”  The CTM’s 
Gach (2008a) describes his realization that art can be utilitarian (creative problem-solving) 
and thus political: 
I’ve always been interested in art. I drew and painted in high school and college, and I was 
 also interested in politics from a pretty young age. I didn’t see a connection between those 
 two for a very long time. Then I realized that art was more than just objects or things 
 hanging on walls. This opened me up to thinking about what the effect of art is on people, 
 what people bring to the art, what the art brings to them, and the relationship between the 
 art and the audience. At that point what became interesting to me was interactivity within 
 art, getting rid of objects altogether and getting into early performance art. I was also 
 coming to terms with the idea that the art is actually happening between the viewer and the 
 object, and it’s that space which is essential. Then when the object is less important, then all 
 of a sudden you start figuring out that the art object in many ways is, while it can be creative 
 and poetic and spiritual, it is also in many respects utilitarian. 
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Art as creative-problem-solving is thus a set of understandings and skills that shape the 
world according to the will of the artist.  More to the point, art is a meta-skill set that allows 
the integration of whatever skills are necessary to a task.  The CAE emphasizes eclectic skill 
sets as well: 
Each artist in the group has his or her own specialized talents. The pool of skills includes 
 performance, book arts, graphic design, computer art, film/ video, text art, photography, 
 and critical writing. CAE generally uses these skills in a tactical manner. We choose a subject 
 matter, place it in a particular context (and hence address a particular audience), and then 
 attempt to construct a meaningful work in relation to the selected context (McKenzie and 
 Schneider 2000, 136). 
 
The IST’s Rasovic comments as well on skills and practice: 
There is this art technology, new media thing that could influence, politically, strategically, 
 artistically, but we have the skills and we could do this.  I didn’t have to go to some kind of a 
 painting school to do this shit.  I mean literally, for me anyway.  It was a desire to 
 experiment, and a desire to really really use our skills, for something other than paying rent 
 and working for the man (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 
 2012). 
 
The RBC’s director, Savitri D., describes her transition from a dancer to RBC activist: 
 When I was in my teens I was very political.  I organized lots of things at my school – hunger 
 protests and peace concerts, and I was very active.  It was when I became an artist that I 
 stopped being politically active.  They were very distinct pieces of my life; I didn’t know that 
 I could put them together, though that seems so obvious now. 
  
 Then a lot of things coincided – meeting Billy and September 11th – and over about a year’s 
 time, I had the sudden understanding that I really had to dedicate myself to justice in a 
 different and new way…Yeah, I could continue being a dancer and performer and making 
 plays, but there were a lot of people doing that and a lot of people doing it really well and 
 that world wasn’t necessarily going to miss me.  But I had a sense that I had a set of skills 
 and experiences that could feed a different kind of movement in a much more powerful way 
 (D. and Talen 2011, 209). 
 
In contrast to the importance of skills demonstrated here, the SCP’s Brown offers the sole 
example of a contrary position when he notes that the SCP avoided specialists in 
performance by relying on volunteers without formal training (Brown, personal interview, 
July 6, 2012; SCP 2006, 185). 
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 Despite suffering from data deficiencies, this analysis does suggest that many of the 
CJOs in the sample are associated with the adoption of tactics that utilize the skills and 
knowledge associated with the aesthetic disposition.    
11.3.4. Uncertainty in Culture Jamming 
 Throughout this dissertation I argue that sets of skills and knowledge reduce the 
uncertainty associated with using some tactics but not others.  In Chapter Three, I made the 
assumption that SMOs, including CJOs, are ambiguity averse, meaning they have a basic 
preference for actions with more certain outcomes.  Ceteris paribus, this suggests that 
tactics associated with certain skills possessed by an SMO are more likely to be chosen than 
tactics lacking such qualities.  In this section, I provide a cursory description of CJOs 
construction of uncertainty.  I focus here on uncertainty relating to CJO actions, not 
uncertainty about the future state of the world absent CJO action. 
 Many CJOs in the sample express a strong sense of uncertainty regarding their 
actions and outcomes.  The CAE (2001, 89-90) are straightforward when they note: 
This model remains permanently experimental. The method itself may not be experimental, 
 but its application is. This type of performance is risky because the outcome is always 
 unknown. Like all experiments, this one can fail, and fail in the worst sense. While failure 
 from audience indifference to one’s gestures is always possible, experimental performance  
 can decline into a worst case scenario: a raving reinforcement of authoritarian culture. 
 
Here, the group expresses a notable sentiment: performances like the group specializes in 
are uncertain in that they can generate outcomes ranging from desirable to ineffective to 
counter-effective.  When describing their refusal to engage in illegal activity, the CAE 
comment on the uncertainty involving the discretion of law enforcement: 
No, we will walk up to the line, but we don’t cross it. There isn’t a work of art anywhere that 
 is worth going to jail for. However, as we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to 
 jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are 
 there so that arrest remains discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example - 
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 and it’s often a way to disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners 
 (Hirsch 2005). 
 
Despite their confident rhetoric, the AMF’s Lasn (n.d.) strikes a modest tone when he 
states, “I think that Adbusters is an experiment in activism that is still unfolding.  We’ve 
learnt a hell of a lot over the last twenty five years.”  The BLF’s Napier wonders whether 
corporate power is so ubiquitous that only the necessity of trying justifies it: 
 I have thought about this question of whether it’s even possible anymore to question or 
 ridicule advertising, given that it has become so accepted as the language of the culture,” he 
 says.  “All I can say is, you have to at least try.  If there isn’t some kind of insurgent spirit 
 popping up between the cracks, you might as well give it up as a society.  We’re not at that 
 point yet – not even close” (Berger 2000). 
 
The IST’s Manning describes the group’s flirtation with spontaneity: “part of our thing is 
that we don’t really know what’s gonna happen” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, 
personal interview, August 27, 2012).  In their action involving the placement of unmarked 
packages in public spaces, Manning again refers to the uncertainty of such actions: 
We thought a few times, “Should we actually do this? This might actually cause trouble?”  
 We did it of course, and nothing actually happened.  I guess there is always a little bit of that 
 feeling of are we gonna be accosted the cops.  Especially in the beginning when we were 
 doing the corporate Commands.  We were basically trespassing in a way, sneaking into 
 malls or stores or wherever we are doing these commands.  How are they gonna react?  Are 
 they gonna come after us, throw us in jail?  Is there gonna be big incident(D’Ignazio, 
 Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, August 27, 2012)? 
 
The IAA describes the first deployment of a contestational robot in Washington, D.C.: “We 
didn’t know what was going to happen.  We were fairly certain it was going to get taken 
from us.  We were gonna get caught.  We expected that to happen” (Brusadin et al n.d.).   
The same compulsion to act regardless of uncertainty is evidenced by the Yes Men 
(n.d.(b)): 
Before setting off from the States, we had tried to anticipate what might happen to us in 
 the city of Mozart. Never having addressed an audience of international lawyers before, 
 we had no idea how they would react. They had invited us thinking that we were ordinary 
 trade functionaries. They expected a garden-variety trade-conference lecture—not WTO 
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 dogma carried through to conclusions that are better left unstated in polite company. We 
 were sure to be confronted with outrage. But would we face physical danger? 
 
 These emphases on uncertainty stress what every SMO likely knows: activism is a 
relatively uncertain form of political behavior.  Uncertainties about effectiveness and 
repression are particularly salient concerns.  Yet, these CJOs describe the uncertainties they 
encounter prior to actions they nonetheless employ.  I consider why this might be the case 
in the following chapter. 
11.4. Conclusion 
 The primary concern of this chapter is to develop theoretical relationships between 
everyday social organization, including the social relations that constitute opportunity 
structures, and tactical choice.  In so doing, I provide descriptions of the culture jamming 
repertoire of contention; consider their sense of effectiveness; the aesthetic skills crucial to 
the production of their tactics; and their construction of uncertainty.  In other words, this 
chapter begins to account for why CJOs choose to culture jam as opposed to petition, 











CHAPTER 12. TACTICAL INTERACTION AND INCENTIVES 
 Previous chapters rely on a static model of tactical choice in which an SMO, once 
formed, must choose certain tactics over others in order to effectively pursue the group’s 
goals.  In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model.  In its place, I 
provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that 
CJOs face in choosing tactics.  My strategy focuses on three efforts.  First, I develop 
theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives and generate hypotheses and 
propositions regarding the relationship between particular incentives, resource 
constraints, and tactical choice.  Second, I elaborate on theoretical developments in 
previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical interaction.  In so doing, I draw 
on the concepts of détournement and recuperation presented in Chapter Six.  Third, I 
present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate these dynamics.  
12.1. Constraints and Incentives 
12.1.1. Intrinsic Incentives 
Although the central arguments of this dissertation concern effectiveness and 
familiarity, choices in tactics are made under constraints.  It is imperative to consider the 
variety  of constraints and incentives faced by CJOs in their tactical choices.  I begin with 
intrinsic incentives, which have partially been considered with the relation of schemas to 
transaction costs.  Recall first that in the case of intrinsic goals, effectiveness is determined 
by the degree to which SMO’s perceive that actions are expected to achieve desirable 
intrinsic outcomes.  Importantly, the achievement of the specific goal does not exhaust the 
range of costs and benefits that are also anticipated consequences of interaction.  I focus on 
two incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic enjoyment. 
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 First, the normative acceptability of an action refers to how the action is expected to 
comport with what an SMO’s members believe is just or right.  For Jasper (1997), all actions 
have a moral component.  They contribute to the story of our lives, the development of 
character, a continual process of affirmation, innovation, and transgression that helps guide 
our choices in life.  In this sense, the action and its associations can be the benefits (building 
or affirming character) or the costs (transgressing and suffering guilt).  Normative 
acceptability ranges from moral proscription to moral indifference to moral prescription.  
For the former, actions are written off as unacceptable, because they violate fundamental 
values and norms.  Some actions have a relatively neutral moral hue to them.  However, for 
some SMOs, some actions may be morally prescribed, meaning not to engage in them 
would be morally repugnant.  The most obvious example involves violence.  For some, 
violence may be efficacious or counter-efficacious, but it may also be morally repugnant or 
morally prescribed.   For this work, normative acceptability is primarily important for what 
it may proscribe, such as violence.   
 Second, the intrinsic enjoyment of an action refers to how much the members of an 
SMO are expected to enjoy participating in the action itself.  Opp (1989) finds no support 
for a hypothesized positive relation between the intrinsic benefits of participating in 
protest and the propensity to participate in collective action.  However, by shifting the 
question I suggest that the degree of intrinsic enjoyment that SMO members expect to 
obtain by engaging in some actions over others can affect the choice in tactics.  Intrinsic 
enjoyment ranges from highly unpleasant to indifference to highly enjoyable.  Some actions 
can be highly unpleasant, meaning they produce negative expectations regarding 
participation in the action itself.  For example, some may find high-risk activism, including 
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violence, to be intrinsically unpleasant (dangerous, stressful), while others may feel the 
opposite.  Participation in some actions as opposed to others may also include the joys of 
political expression, socializing with friends, and the thrill of danger.  Enjoyment is thus a 
composite term.  Wettergren (2005, 143) finds that participants in culture jamming find it 
highly enjoyable.  I thus hypothesize: 
 H12.1: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable relative to other  
  tactics.   
 
12.1.2. Resource Constraint 
All collective actions require the consumption of some level of time, labor, and a 
variety of other resources as an investment in either extrinsic or intrinsic outcomes.  
Because SMOs are limited in the resources they possess they are constrained in the tactics 
they choose.  Tactics can be distinguished by the amount of resources that they require 
organizers and participants to consume.  Actions that derive their force from withdrawing 
support like boycotts, long-term occupations, and strikes are defined especially by the 
opportunity costs incurred by participants.  Other actions may differ in their size or scope.  
Actions that are labor- or money-intensive like mobilizing for large-scale demonstrations 
are presumably more expensive than actions that involve smaller mobilizations.   
In previous chapters I suggest familiarity reduces the transaction costs incurred by 
some actions.  However, the only resources that familiarity directly involves are skill sets 
and social networks.  Recall the sets of hypotheses describing the organizational structures 
and strategic orientations of my sample of CJOs.  Most of the groups were organizationally 
small and possessed few resources.  These lead me to hypothesize: 
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 H11.7: CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost. 90 
In general, the lower the cost of the action, the higher the probability it will be chosen. 
12.1.3. A Note on Organizational Structures  
 Before proceeding, I briefly consider the importance of organizational structures in 
relation to tactical choice.  In Chapter Eight, I develop hypotheses that anticipate a pattern 
of organization in my sample of CJOs.  I describe such groups as small, informal, 
decentralized, exclusive, and composed of pre-existing friendships.  The literature suggests 
that variation in organizational structure should help explain variation in tactical choice.  
One promising expectation is that decentralized organizations tend to utilize more 
unconventional and disruptive tactics, whereas centralized organizations tend to utilize 
more conventional tactics (Staggenborg 1989).  Whatever the hypothesized mechanisms 
involved, they are typically internal to the organization.  Some of the incentives considered 
below, especially intrinsic enjoyment and resource expenditure, are closely related to the 
structure of organization.  First, Wettergren (2005) finds that the predominant form of 
organization among culture jammers, especially the emphasis on exclusivity and 
friendship, generates intense feelings of commitment.  I argue that this commitment has a 
discriminatory effect on the evaluation of tactics; some tactics benefit disproportionately 
from these intimate social relations, especially with respect to the intrinsic enjoyment 
derived from the action discussed below.  Some actions may generate more intrinsic 
enjoyment than others.  Enjoyment may derive, in part, from engaging in fun, thrilling, or 
intellectually or creatively stimulating actions.  These may be determined in part by one’s 
company, especially one’s friends.  While it may be reasonable to assume that just about 
                                                          
90 This hypothesis is basically a recasting of H8.5, except here the emphasis on contentious collective actions 
as opposed to the manifold operations of an organization. 
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any contentious collective action is made more attractive by the participation of friends (a 
minimal homogenous benefit across the set of tactics), it seems plausible that the character 
of some actions may generate more intrinsic enjoyment than others as a consequence of 
the mobilization of friendship networks.  In part, this may involve actions that exploit 
particular homogeneous interests across the group distinct from the collective interest.  
Such individual intrinsic interests may involve engaging in the utilization of skill sets, such 
as art or violence.   
 Next, most attention in the literature has fallen on decentralization and 
formalization.  At least two factors are relevant.  First, decentralized structures appear to 
increase the diversity of inputs into the decision-making process by increasing the 
proportion of decision-makers (Staggenborg 1989).  However, in itself this does not 
necessarily imply that decentralized structures are associated with disruptive tactics.  
Instead, it suggests that an increase in the degree of centralization is associated with a 
narrowing of the repertoire of tactics.  In this case, decentralized structures would be more 
likely to incorporate disruptive or nonconventional tactics simply because increased input 
diversity increases the probability of more inclusive tactical repertoires.  Second, 
formalization tends to increase the likelihood for adopting conventional tactics by 
increasing the incentives for efficiently apportioning resources.  In other words, the more 
that procedures and divisions of labor are clearly delineated and recorded, the more actors 
within SMOs are compelled to identify clear objectives and performance metrics in order to 
advance the organization’s interests and their own within the organization.  The reason 
may be simple (Morris 1984, 35-36).   Social disruption and tactical experimentation 
involve greater degrees of uncertainty, both internally and externally, than conventional or 
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more institutional tactics.  Through incentives to increase efficiency and clarity and thus 
produce clear results, formalization reduces the uncertainties that actors within SMOs may 
be willing to bear.91  Such incentives and structures may also decrease the capacity of an 
organization to quickly respond to new opportunities, an incapacity that may favor 
institutionalized tactics (Staggenborg 1991, 72). 
I do not develop hypotheses here, however; instead, I consider the relevant sets of 
intrinsic incentives further below. 
12.1.4. States and Corporations  
Extrinsic incentives refer to motivational factors external to the action or to the SMO 
itself.   I consider three sets relevant to this dissertation: facilitation, repression, and artistic 
experimentation.  I also consider effectiveness in light of these developments.   In Chapter 
Ten I consider the relation of opportunity structures, especially political institutions and 
actors, to the attribution of effectiveness.  There, the generalized sense of the strategic 
significance of these relations, or ideology, is the result of the accumulation of experiences 
and information from direct and indirect interactions with these actors and institutions.  
Here, I consider more specific dynamic relations between political and economic actors and 
institutions and CJOs, especially repression and facilitation.   
As with other contentious collective actors, the state and corporations respond to 
the actions of CJOs with one or more of three basic postures: repression, toleration, and/or 
facilitation.  Repression is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost 
                                                          
91 Morris also argues that these internal forces coincide with isomorphic processes (the word is DiMaggio and 
Powell’s 1983) derived from the field of organizations that an SMO finds itself within, which includes political 
parties and interest groups.  However, his argument regarding the civil rights movements rests on the 
observation that such organizations preceded the onset of contention.  He thus argues that their inability to 
develop disruptive mass strategies results in the founding of more flexible informal organizations.  I make no 
assumption about the temporal priority of formal decentralized organizations. 
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of collective action,” whereas facilitation refers to an “action that lowers a group’s cost of 
collective action” (Tilly 1978, 100).   In a democratic regime, toleration refers to the 
permissive posture of political actors with respect to the extensive set of possible SMO 
actions that do not elicit facilitation or repression.  My amendment to these definitions 
simply stresses that facilitation and repression are intended courses of action.  In practice, 
they may yield unintended consequences with possible adverse effects.   
I treat states and corporations simply.  The state is both the set of legal and 
regulatory institutions governing a social system, especially property and speech rights in 
this account, and those collective actors with the authority and the resources to change and 
enforce these institutions.  The importance of the (democratic) state can be summarized: 
“Legality matters because laws state the costs and benefits which governments are 
prepared (or at least empowered) to apply to one form of action or another” (Tilly 1978, 
102).  Of course, even democratic governments may utilize illegal or covert forms of 
response to contentious collective action, but for the purposes of this model the state and 
state actors perform roughly within the parameters of legal institutions.  Corporations are 
collective actors with enormous resources that pursue the maximization of profit. 
I assume that states and corporations are motivated to repress when they perceive 
potential benefits from increasing the costs of a group’s collective action.92  For the state, 
these benefits hinge on the strength of the threat to social groups posed by the group’s 
tactics and goals and the strength of these social groups in determining political outcomes.  
For corporations, benefits primarily accrue from avoiding the opportunity costs of 
                                                          
92 These benefits may accrue from positive support derived from repressive action, or they may derive from 
the avoided opportunity costs of choosing toleration or facilitation, i.e. a loss of support.  I refer to this 
approach as simplistic, because I do not consider the host of incentives that can differentially affect political 
actors like the police, courts, legislators, etc.   
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toleration or facilitation: negative publicity and thus lower profits.  Thus, the choices that 
SMOs make in how they will pursue their goals can affect the probability of whether states 
and corporations choose to engage in repressive action.  In contrast, I assume that states 
and corporations are motivated to facilitate when they perceive potential benefits from 
increasing the benefits of collective action.  For the state, these benefits hinge on the 
strength of the social group the SMO is perceived to represent.  For corporations, these 
benefits hinge on the perceived capacity of the SMO to increase the corporation’s profits.   
12.1.5. Repression 
I begin with repression.  An extensive literature on the relation between repression 
and mobilization eventually arrived at the conclusion - following the failure to identify a 
specific curve that fits the data - that repression is better conceptualized as a multi-
dimensional and highly contextual explanatory instrument (Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; 
Johnston and Mueller 2001).  This difficulty is not alien to the question of strategy.  Regime 
responses are always strategically selective; consequently, not all actions suffer the same 
level or type of repression.  Here, I distinguish four forms of repression potentially relevant 
to CJOs: violence, arrest, litigation, and harassment.  Violence refers to the actual or 
threatened physical harm of personal property or the body.  Arrest refers to the actual or 
threatened deprivation of liberty and/or economic sanctions.  Litigation refers to the 
process of conducting a lawsuit, a set of actions associated with potentially high economic 
and opportunity costs for defendants.  Harassment refers to actions that are typically 
repetitive and/or disruptive such as surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc. 
With respect to CJOs, occasions for state and corporate actors to repress are 
constrained.  Though I quote Tilly on the importance of law, my definition of the state 
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includes not only institutions but actors as well.  Tilly (1978, 103) notes that legal practice 
– the actual practical interpretation and application of the law in concrete circumstances – 
is crucial to understanding the constraints on state actors; in other words, the law is 
effectual partly as a function of enforcement.  Culture jamming as a form of action operates 
across the tolerant and repressive space of state and corporate strategies.  The reason is 
two-fold.  First, the very nature of culture jamming as defined in Chapter One risks 
infringing on the intellectual property rights of corporations.  Often this risk is low, because 
parody and satire are protected forms of speech.  However, in actual practice legality may 
be insufficient to deter certain limited forms of repression.  Second, culture jamming 
actions may unfold within the private property of corporations.  This risks a strategic 
response from corporate or state actors aimed at removing the action or the actors from 
the territory.  With perceptions of vandalism or suspicious collective action even 
performances in public space risk repression. 
 These considerations lead to an elaboration of the relations between types of 
repression and CJOs.  First, I consider violence and harassment as the least likely responses 
to the tactic of culture jamming.  The modern democratic state both establishes broad 
institutionalized procedures for the processing of demands and possesses an 
overwhelming monopoly on violence (Rucht 1990).  Consequently, violence as a tactic, like 
other highly disruptive actions, is extremely costly in part because it dramatically increases 
the probability that effective violence will be used as a tactic of repression by state actors. 
For CJOs, however, violence is unlikely to be encountered, because state actors are unlikely 
to perceive such groups as posing a threat or as opportunities for violence.  This is the case 
because CJOs are composed of extremely small memberships with extremely few resources 
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that instigate small collective actions without intentions of violence; they thus typically 
involve low levels of social disruption.  Corporate actors may perceive them to be a threat, 
but corporations are highly constrained by the legal institutions of the state and public 
opinion.  If violence is utilized by private actors it is likely to be arbitrary, minimal, and 
extremely short-lived, as when a security guard takes the initiative.  
 Unlike violence, harassment typically involves repetitive or disruptive responses to 
culture jammers.  As such, in many cases it requires the perception of a level of threat 
sufficient to maintain contact with the CJO beyond an initial offending collective action.  It 
also poses high risks, because repetition courts anticipation and thus possible data 
collection on the harassment.  The information can then be used against the corporate or 
state actors in the courts or in the media as an effective tactical response.  If CJOs meet with 
harassment, it is likely to come from state actors.  The police or the FBI, for example, not 
only possesses significant resources and actors proficient at modes of harassment like 
surveillance; they are also mandated to develop and utilize the skills and technologies of 
harassment.  However, a more prevalent form of harassment is transient and weak, as 
when a group is forced to abort an action in public space by security guards or police. 
 The nature of culture jamming as an oppositional tactic suggests that litigation and 
arrest are the more likely forms of repression to be meted out by state and corporate 
actors.  Although political speech is given powerful protections in democratic states, 
corporations may still significantly increase the costs for using culture jamming by filing 
lawsuits to protect their intellectual property rights and their brand image.  Because of the 
significant resource asymmetry between CJOs and corporations, corporations may engage 
in litigation because drawing the conflict into the judicial system heavily favors the types of 
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resources they possess.  Even if they ultimately lose the case, the drain on the resources of 
the CJO can significantly curtail their activities, though culture jamming is not a resource-
heavy activity.  Thus, like many SMOs and other collective actors, CJOs are forced to expand 
their tactical repertoire to include litigation when private actors sue them and possibly 
fund-raising activities in order to support the financial challenges of a lawsuit.  However, 
like all forms of repression, litigation may backfire.  As endowed as a corporation is in the 
legal game, the case may draw other experienced actors on the side of the defendants, such 
as the ACLU, or the corporation may lose quickly and swiftly (though corporations 
presumably know the risks better than CJOs), or the case may draw undesired media 
attention.  What is important to note here is that a legal response by corporations shifts the 
objectives of CJOs such that more institutional tactics are perceived as more effective.   
With respect to occupation of physical property, state actors may utilize arrest as a means 
to defuse situations, while corporate actors may file criminal charges to bolster the costs of 
this form of repression.  In the event of arrest, CJOs may voluntarily engage in litigation if 
they perceive sufficient opportunities for victory, though the costs may deter them.  
 This discussion suggests culture jamming is susceptible to some state and corporate 
strategies that intentionally increase costs.  Ceteris paribus, this makes a variety of other 
actions more attractive options, especially institutionalized modes of action and the wide 
spectrum of unambiguously tolerated non-institutionalized actions.   
12.1.6. Facilitation 
 Corporate or state actors may also facilitate collective action by lowering its costs.  
These lowered costs are not obtained by symmetrical material exchange.  In other words, 
SMOs that purchase aid as a matter of simple financial transaction are not facilitated.  Such 
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actions do not constitute a lowering of costs, but rather a redistribution of costs.  In the 
case of culture jamming, significant facilitation is less likely than repression for the simple 
reason that neither states nor corporations may find particularly significant advantages in 
supporting CJOs.  There are at least two notable exceptions, however.  First, if my argument 
that culture jamming is associated with the development of art is true it seems plausible to 
conjecture that CJOs may receive art grants and other forms of related support from state 
actors.  Such forms of facilitation typically provide material resources such as money and 
facilities, freeing up other resources like time and labor to focus on the production of 
contentious politics.  In the United States, such grants may come from federal agencies like 
the National Endowment for the Arts, state agencies, and universities, but they may also 
come from private arts organizations and corporations.  Grants and fellowships from 
federal, state, university, and private arts organizations are unlikely to provoke a negative 
response from CJOs.  However, considering the general antagonism to economic elites 
established in Chapter Seven, private corporate grants are far less likely to be accepted, 
because they may be perceived as a form of co-optation or compromise.  Corporations may 
utilize strategies to ensure the effectiveness of their marketing strategies.  One way they do 
so is by mining minority, subcultural, or countercultural trends for possible mainstream 
appeal (Klein 2000).  Another approach involves hiring contemporary artists to counsel 
and develop tactics, especially those with risky (for a corporation) approaches to 
consumerism.  It is likely that CJOs will tend to avoid these forms of facilitation. 
12.1.7. Artistic Experimentation 
 In Chapter Five I outline the structure and development of the field of cultural 
production, especially of artistic production.  One of its more notable processes is the 
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permanent state of revolution.  I note that the totality of the relations of dominance – in 
other words, the unequal distribution of capital - and the strategies that they favor in this 
field and it’s relation to other fields produces a particular set of incentives for those 
entering the subfield of restricted production.  In order to compete, an effective strategy for 
new entrants (typically younger generations) with low resources is to generate their own 
cultural capital or artistic prestige by staking positions of difference, new positions 
“beyond the positions presently occupied, ahead of them, in the avant-garde” (Bourdieu 
1993, 106).  These new positions are staked by virulent heterodoxy, by “imposing new 
modes of thought and expression which break with current modes of thought and hence 
are destined to disconcert by their ‘obscurity’ and their ‘gratuitousness’” (Bourdieu, 1996, 
239-240).   In Chapter Six I re-consider this process by suggesting that though Bourdieu 
focuses on the revolutionary principle of autonomy, twentieth century movements like 
Dada and the Situationists eventually subverted this principle by politicizing the institution 
of art despite their pioneering efforts to aestheticize everyday life.   
 This discussion suggests that artists face competing incentives for artistic 
production.  I distinguish between incentives for producing pieces with mass popular 
appeal in order to maximize popular success  (the heteronomous principle) and incentives 
for producing pieces with highly restricted appeal in order to maximize some highly 
valuable cultural capital (the autonomous principle).  For Bourdieu, one’s initial resource 
endowment heavily constrains the relative force of each incentive.  In particular, higher 
education in the arts endows actors with the capacity to produce and consume works of 
restricted artistic production.  For producers, this aesthetic disposition allows in principle 
for the exploitation of opportunities for the accumulation of cultural capital through artistic 
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innovation.  Within the game of art, the incentives for innovation – a product of the 
structure and the history of field – may be crudely construed here as a distribution of 
incentives for the production of a set of possible art works.  In Figure 12.1, I suggest that 
these incentives are distributed unevenly across this set of works.  I argue that works can 
be described in relation to existing works by placing them on a spectrum from no 
experimentation to pure experimentation.  Below I consider what tactical experimentation 
entails.  For now, I reject the use of the term ‘innovation’ for experimentation principally 
because the latter suggests more of a groping effort and the former suggests too clean of a 
break from existing practice.93   Experimentation is a testing, an uncertain employment, yet 
experiments are performed with existing materials.  In this sense, an artistic experiment is 
never strictly “new,” but instead ‘plays’ with what is already existent.  Here, experim-
entation refers to two dimensions: the degree of difference from existing works and the 
degree of popularity or diffusion of the work.  Low experimentation thus refers to an 
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High experimentation refers to comparatively significant differences from existing works 
that are marginal and recognizable by only a small audience.  A summary of Figure 12.1 
begins by emphasizing its most salient characteristic: artists derive expected benefits from 
producing artistic experiments.94  However, these incentives diminish as the degree of 
experimentation wanes.  Moving down the slope, positive incentives give way to 
disincentives for the production of works that increasingly rest on popular works.95   
Insofar as CJOs both construe their contentious political activity as artistic practice 
and possess the capacity to effectively navigate the artistic field – in other words, insofar as 
they play the game of art as the game of contentious politics - this basic incentive should 
increase the probability that they will choose tactics that are relatively experimental.    
12.1.8. Shifting Effectiveness 
 In addition to repression or facilitation, CJOs may find that the tactics they use do 
not generate the degree of effectiveness that they seek.   This perception may result from 
any number of phenomena, including a change in the perception of how audiences react, a 
change in the perception of the marketing strategies of corporations, or a change in the 
field of conflict, i.e. from the streets to the courts.  However, because of the constraining 
effects of the initial schemas, new information obtained from interactions is less likely to 
fundamentally alter the selected tactics.  Moreover, tactics vary in their modularity 
(Tarrow 1998), meaning they vary in their capacity to travel from one context to another 
and retain basic core features.  Even minimal modularity suggests that the perceived 
effectiveness of a tactic may remain basically unscathed, because the particularities of a 
                                                          
94 One may conjecture that the only other social activities that reward experimentation as fiercely as the field 
of art are the fields of science and technology. 
95 While the extreme values on the experimentation dimension are logically coherent, the highest extreme 
does not correspond to any conceivable or possible artistic work.   
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specific undertaken action may not have yielded the optimal utility capable of the tactic.  In 
other words, because tactics can be employed in a variety of ways (terrains, materials, 
modes, etc.), declines in effectiveness following bad results are likely to be marginal.  If it 
doesn’t work the first time, try it differently the second time.  Below I consider the range of 
responses by SMOs to updated expectations to more fully flesh out this discussion. 
12.2. Tactical Interaction 
Finally, I consider the dynamics of tactical interaction.  In the static model, CJOs 
select an action from a set of recognized tactics under a variety of constraints.  Because 
expectations are not dynamic, all estimates represent a stable state of the world according 
to the CJO.  In this preliminary dynamic model, expectations include estimates of the costs 
and benefits generated by extrinsic constraints, including repression, facilitation, and 
artistic experimentation.  Once an action is made, outcomes unfold, and information is 
received about the actions and the outcomes, including the effects of extrinsic constraints 
on outcomes.  This information is used to either modify or confirm the expectations used to 
initially select a tactic.  To clarify, information about the process and the outcomes of the 
initial action generates new sets of expectations regarding the set of recognized tactics.  
These new expectations are, like the initial expectations, both retrospective and 
prospective; they establish estimates of costs and benefits as well as levels of confidence 
about future possible actions based on previous actions and the environmental cues that 
help establish the second decision context. 
12.2.1. Confirmed Expectations 
Above, I note the information generated by outcomes may confirm or modify initial 
expectations.  Confirmation refers to any updating of expectations that yields a repetition 
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of the initial selection.  This should not be taken too literally, however, for repetition is 
never perfect.  Repetition may either be maximally repetitive or marginally variable.  
Maximum repetition coasts on increased confidence and satisfactory outcomes.  In 
contrast, owing to differences in circumstances or specific changes in expectations, a tactic 
may be reproduced with marginal variations.  In this case, the tactic may be regarded as 
basically sound but require some minor adjustments.  Minor or marginal adjustments 
include such changes as shifting the time of the action from morning to noon, adding more 
public speakers at rallies, making larger signs, etc.  They involve preparations and 
executions that in no way fundamentally alter the basic nature of the collective action.   
However, such adjustments involve a process analogous to searching as described in 
Chapter Three in that they involve the accumulation of information.   The resulting 
expectations are marginally adjusted to account for these marginal variations.   Similar but 
more pronounced processes occur with modification.  
12.2.2. Modification 
Modification connotes any updating of expectations that yields a change in the 
selection of a tactic.  When the updated expectations about the set of recognized tactics 
shifts the distribution of costs and benefits such that the initial tactic no longer yields the 
most efficient response to opponents, the SMO will select that tactic which does yield the 
highest benefits at the lowest cost.  Change in the selection of a tactic refers to at least two 
possible outcomes: new selection or experimentation. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the conditions under which expectations 
may be sufficiently updated to generate modification.   I focus on two: unexpected negative 
outcomes and circumstantial change independent of outcomes.  Recall the consideration of 
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the tendency towards certainty in Chapter Three.   There I present two objections: the 
fundamental uncertainty of contentious politics and the terminal decision to act.  In order 
to elaborate on the conditions productive of modification I elaborate on the first objection.  
First, unexpected responses by other actors to the initial action may force new 
expectations.  For example, although initial expectations may estimate repression as 
notably costly but unlikely, vigilant responses by opponents may increase the expected 
likelihood of repression in further interactions, thus making that particular iteration of the 
tactic less attractive.  Second, expectations may shift, because the circumstances of action 
may change independent of outcomes.   For example, this may refer to a change in public 
opinion on an issue of relevance to a movement, such as the the accident at Three Mile 
Island and the environmental movement.  I consider this further below, but both conditions 
may constitute threats or opportunities for action. 
The tendency towards perfect certainty is a consequence in part of the static model 
assumption that information increases certainty.  I modify this important assumption by 
suggesting that the information generated from interactions may lead to more uncertainty, 
and not through the consumption of strategic or inaccurate information.  This may hold for 
at least two reasons.  One, while one may assume that information about an initial 
interaction can aid an SMO in reducing the uncertainty about future actions, the initial 
failure may haunt the second effort to predict the actions of other actors  - haunt the very 
act of prediction itself - such that expectations are saddled with higher uncertainty.  Two, 
outcomes may sufficiently alter the distribution of resources and motivations across the 
field of actors  - the state of affairs from Chapter Three – such that the information 
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generated by these outcomes may be insufficient to  maintain the same sense of certainty 
into the second selection from the set of recognized tactics.   
12.2.3. Tactical Experimentation 
McAdam (1983) argues that the pace of insurgency – the dramatic shifts in 
mobilization associated with the trajectories of social movements – is a function of a 
process of tactical interaction.  In his model, challengers sustain their campaigns either 
through institutionalization or tactical experimentation.  The latter involves the diffusion of 
tactical innovations that provide challengers with newfound political advantages – social 
disruption - and thus increased mobilization.  However, though initially caught off guard, 
authorities eventually develop tactical adaptations that neutralize the tactic and depress 
protest participation.  In this model, tactical innovation is indistinguishable from tactical 
diffusion; innovations are tactical experiments that successfully diffuse.   In a later 
iteration, McAdam et al (2001, 8) define innovation contextually as unprecedented or 
forbidden means of contention within a particular regime.  Olzak and Uhrig (2001, 700) 
argue persuasively that measuring innovation is nearly impossible and almost always 
erroneous; what appear to be innovations tend to be iterations of previous actions.   
An alternative approach concerns tactical experimentation.  Tactical 
experimentation refers to the production of tactics that involve more than marginal 
adjustments to recognized tactics.  In the preceding analysis of incentives for artistic 
experimentation, I define a dimension of experimentation in which art works range from 
no experimentation to pure experimentation.   Here, I clarify this dimension by suggesting 
that experimentation only occurs beyond marginal changes to existing tactics.  In other 
words, experimentation is a property of actions that yield positive incentives in Figure 
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12.1.  However, experimentation is highly constrained and relies on existing schemas to 
develop variations on existing actions, as in processes like bricolage or more generally 
transposition.  
However, they are not unrecognizable, meaning that SMOs can produce a minimally 
confident set of expectations regarding their application.  This is so because they can still 
be grouped into existing clusters of tactics.  Recall Chapter Three’s discussion regarding the 
clustering of tactics.  Clusters are assigned singular expectations.  However, these clusters 
vary in their degree of homogeneity of tactics.  In Chapter Three I argue that the more 
familiar an SMO is with the everyday correlates of a set of tactics, the more homogeneous 
the cluster.  More homogeneous clusters are the result of a capacity and an interest in 
making finer distinctions among tactics, especially for the purposes of choosing a particular 
tactic.  Without this level of discrimination SMOs would not be able to discern any 
significant variation between a tactical experiment and an established tactic.   
Under what conditions do SMOs experiment tactically?  In line with my emphasis on 
motivational variables, I argue that the probability that SMOs will experiment increases 
under at least two basic motivational conditions: low utility ambivalence and the elusive 
high benefit opportunity.  First, SMOs may experiment when, under the condition that their 
previous tactic now provides low expected utility, they perceive the set of recognized 
tactics to likewise produce low expected utility.  In this condition, SMOs perceive only 
marginal differences among their previously preferred tactics in their capacity for 
generating desired outcomes.  This state of ambivalence thrusts an SMO into searching for 
more information.  Like those characteristic of marginal variations, these searches also 
involve finding ways to change existing tactics in order to increase effectiveness, exploit 
418 
some set of positive incentives, or reduce the force of some negative incentives.  
Experimentation is thus one of many possible ways that an SMO may deal with 
ambivalence. 
The second condition is the perception of a high benefit opportunity.  Recall the 
definition of opportunities: “the probability that social protest actions will lead to success 
in achieving a desired outcome” (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, 181).  Opportunities refer here 
to constraints in the environment that increase or decrease the perceived effectiveness of a 
tactic or sets of tactics.  The process of search that follows an initial interaction may yield 
crucial information that dramatically decreases the utility a tactic provides for an SMO.  
This may generate a condition of low utility ambivalence.  However, information may 
dramatically increase the expected utility that a tactic provides for an SMO, including the 
perceived effectiveness of the tactic or lowered expectations for repression.   This is an 
opportunity, a result of the information derived from direct and/or indirect interactions.  
This information may also yield updated perceptions of threats, though I do not suggest 
here that threats distinguish among tactics. 
Why would such opportunities increase the probability of tactical experimentation?  
Might we simply expect the tactics that experience the increase in effectiveness to be 
chosen?96  I suggest that certain opportunities may be sufficiently novel – that is, they may 
be phenomena that are relatively distinct qualitatively – that the process of search yields 
sufficient modifications to an existing tactic(s) that the modification is chosen.   
 One way to consider this qualitative novelty is to refer again to the mechanism of 
transposition.  Transposition here refers to the employment of a set of schemas from one 
                                                          
96 McAdam (1983) does find evidence that the increased use of previously successful tactics follows the 
diffusion of tactical innovations. 
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field or decision context to another.  While strictly speaking SMOs choose from among a set 
of contentious tactics, tactics themselves may be decomposed into sets of schemas that can 
originate in a variety of other contexts.97  The use of the sit-in in the early civil rights 
movement, for example, relied on sets of schemas involving such disparate phenomena as 
the extensive set of normal social interactions operative inside of business establishments 
in the South; the possible responses of authorities, white customers, and business owners 
and employees to transgression of the rules and norms of these interactions (the mixing of 
races, silence, disobedience, refusal to respond with violence); the legal order regulating 
these interactions; the responsiveness of mass media to social disruption, including local 
media; business-customer relations;  the wide array of commitments and ideals partly 
constitutive of the relations among participants (typically friends); and many more.   
If tactics are composed of sets of schemas, then experimentation may be regarded as 
the generation of new sets of associations between schemas or between elements of them.  
Note already my use of the term experimentation in two different contexts: artistic 
production (field of art) and tactical production (contentious politics).  Here, I focus on the 
transposition of three general sets of schemas: art, protest, and everyday life.   
Three points are relevant.  First, as noted in Chapters Five and Six, the field of art 
paradoxically refuses and reinforces a distinction between everyday life and art.   Second, 
the subfield of restricted production heavily incentivizes experimentation.  A consequence 
                                                          
97 Ganz (2000; 2009) makes a similar observation when he describes the importance of creativity in 
generating effective strategy.  He defines the creativity of a leadership team as a practice joining varieties of 
salient contextual knowledge – skills and know-how regarding some specific sphere of activity - and learning 
processes and experiences.  Together, they allow for a greater capacity to adapt to new circumstances by re-
contextualizing or synthesizing diverse experiences and data.  In my terminology, creativity or 
experimentation involves the variable capacity to generate new sets of associations between schemas or 
between elements of schemas.   Ganz thus implicitly assumes that tactics can be decomposed into elements 
from diverse contexts.  Transposition is thus a mechanism involving the creative use of schemas. 
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of this structural arrangement is that the universe of schemas available to artists for 
experimentation is effectively total.  Any object, discourse, or practice outside of the field of 
art immediately offers an incentive - a high benefit opportunity - to experiment by 
aesthetically appropriating it.  Third, I argue in Chapter Six that the same structure of 
incentives also generates a tendency towards the politicization of the aesthetic disposition.  
Consequently, SMOs that operate within the field of artistic production - organizations that 
play both the game of art and contentious politics - encounter significant incentives to 
experiment aesthetico-politically. 
12.2.4. Tactical Adaptation   
  Once an SMO acts, other actors respond.  If an actor’s response decreases the utility 
expected of the initial tactic in future interactions such that modification is in play – 
whether by increasing costs or reducing benefits (including effectiveness) – the initial 
tactic may be regarded as neutralized.  This pattern of response is equivalent to McAdam’s 
tactical adaptation.   I argue that one way to consider this dynamic in the context of culture 
jamming is to analyze the processes of détournement and recuperation. 
 In Chapter Six I discuss two forms of resistance formalized by the SI: the dérive and 
détournement.  Détournement refers to the appropriation of materials in the cultural 
environment – comics, street signs, toys, movies, clothing, cars, etc. - in such a manner as to 
invert, lead astray, or detour its initial meaning in order to subvert the article and the 
spectacle as a whole.  At its most general, it is synonymous with the conception of culture 
jamming utilized in this work.  Debord and Wolman (2007, 15) described it thus: 
Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can be used to make new 
 combinations. The discoveries of modern poetry regarding the analogical structure of 
 images demonstrate that when two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart 
 their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed…The mutual interference of 
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 two worlds of feeling, or the juxtaposition of two independent expressions, supersedes the 
 original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be 
 used. 
 
This process of détournement, of juxtaposing distinct elements in order to build new and 
critical meanings and relationships, was conceived as an almost universally applicable 
tactic.  In principle, everything and anything can be détourned, can be made to expose its 
role in power relationships; “all goods proposed by the spectacular system, from cars to 
televisions, also serve as weapons for that system” (Debord 1995, 28). 
 Because détournement involves the appropriation of the spectacle (or whatever 
ensemble of representation is targeted), and because it plays on the same terrain with the 
same weapons, it is constantly in danger of being recuperated back into the service of the 
spectacle.  Recuperation is, “the process whereby the spectacle ―take[s] up and use[s] [the 
vocabulary of revolutionary discourse] to support the existing networks of power” (Plant 
1992, 76).  This process involves, like détournement, the re-purposing of some object, 
practice, or discourse.  However, while détournement is a tension between multiple 
representations – a critical tension that aims to disrupt the power of an original 
representation through association – recuperation seeks to resolve this tension.  It is the 
de-politicization, re-commodification, the effective neutralization of subversive weapons.  
“Words forged by revolutionary criticism are like partisan weapons; abandoned on the 
battlefield, they fall into the hands of the counterrevolution” (Khayati 2007, 225).    
Situationist propaganda thus required a perpetual vigilance against and cognizance of the 
spectacle’s ability to neutralize oppositional practices.  Recuperations are legion: the 
working class movement, Dada, ‘revolution,’ punk rock, hip-hop, and even forms of culture 
jamming itself.  Plant (1992, 77-78) observes:  
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Dada’s anti-art and surrealism’s subversions have both assumed the mantle of 
 institutionalised art, with their works exhibited, consumed, and reproduced in contexts 
 which relieve them of all critical content.  Forty years after their adventures, the dadaists 
 looked in dismay at the fate of their agitations…Not merely are the actual works of such 
 movements transplanted into foreign  soil, but the forms, techniques, and the magic they 
 worked are also used to ends entirely  different from those with which they were developed.  
 
The result of recuperation is the renewed vitality of the system of power relationships.   
Because recuperation points to the capacity of this system to neutralize a nearly limitless 
variety of insurgent meanings and practices, “the only historically justified tactic is 
extremist innovation” (Debord and Wilson 2007, 14).   Thus, détournement is born and an 
incessant dynamic of criticism and neutralization proceeds  
 Generically, this model of détournement and recuperation mirrors McAdam’s (1983) 
dynamic model of tactical interaction.  Détournement represents the creative capacity of 
insurgents to generate novel experiences of disruption for audiences.  In turn, recuperation 
connotes the eventual effort of opponents to adapt to and neutralize this disruptive 
process. 
12.3. Analysis 
12.3.1. Intrinsic Incentives 
 In the analysis below I relate the theoretical developments above to the sample of 
CJOs introduced in Chapter Four.  A preliminary observation conjures a particular difficulty 
haunting any effort to distinguish these incentives from a sense of effectiveness regarding 
intrinsic goals and/or objectives.  In Chapter Three I state that intrinsic goals can have 
intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.  However, a particular intrinsic goal (or objective) may 
involve intrinsic enjoyment or normative acceptability.  For example, an SMO may pursue 
the practice of alternative morality as an expression of resistance to existing dominant 
moral practice.  My effort below attempts to distinguish a sense of effectiveness from 
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distinct motivations.  For example, the Yes Men (2012b) observe: “It’s not only that we 
should get attention for these kinds of things, but it’s really fun.”  Elsewhere, the group 
considers ‘fun’ strategically (meaning effectiveness).  But here, they stress that such actions 
are fun regardless of the goals.  I seek to preserve this narrow distinction below. 
I begin with two intrinsic incentives: normative acceptability and intrinsic 
enjoyment.  Perhaps the most glaring observation regarding the ethics of tactical 
alternatives is that tactics are rarely described by CJOs in explicitly moral terms.  Straight-
forward ethical pronouncements are made by the AMF’s Lasn.  He suggests that with 
culture jamming, “Once you start thinking and acting this way, once you realize that 
consumer capitalism is by its very nature unethical, and therefore it’s not unethical to jam 
it” (Lasn 1999, xv).  He further insinuates that an ethical rage manifests in culture jamming: 
There is an anger, a rage-driven defiance, that is healthy, ethical, and empowering.  It 
 contains the conviction that change is possible…Learning how to jam our culture with this 
 rage may be one of the few ways left to feel truly among the quick in the Huxleyan 
 mindscape of new millennium capitalism (Lasn 1999, 143). 
 
The CAE (2012b, 15) also define their actions as ethical: “CAE has been able to provoke a 
direct confrontation with the instances of political power…The ethical act opens the 
possibility of a counter-public sphere that is not merely formal, since it is directly 
constituted by those who occupy it.”  It is thus clear that for the CAE instances of resistance 
are by definition ethical in that they open spaces of freedom and dialogue.  Yet, it is unclear 
if, in the case of the CAE, distinguishing normative acceptability from effectiveness is 
legitimate.  Beyond these paltry examples, CJOs in the sample refrain from coloring their 
tactics or others in strong moral tones. 
 Much more is expressed regarding the intrinsic enjoyment of tactics.  Above I 
hypothesize (H12.1) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as highly enjoyable 
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relative to other tactics.  The AMF’s Lasn demonstrates above that culture jamming is not 
only ethical, but healthy and emotionally satisfying.  The RBC emphasize that their art 
interventions are “fun!” (D. and Talen 2011, 13).  The Yes Men “enjoy both the mischief and 
fun” of exposing the ills of their adversaries (Bonanno 2004), and emphasize that such 
actions perform a prefigurative function; they show “people that life can be fun” 
(Bichlbaum 2012a).  Haugerud (2013, 200-01) testifies that the Billionaires derive 
considerable joy from their creative actions.  In the case of the BLF, however, distinguishing 
intrinsic enjoyment from effectiveness is untenable.  The group describe their billboard 
escapades as “a lot of fun, mostly.  It's exciting, it's adventurous,” (BLF 1999) but as BLF 
Member Kalman (2008) argues the group emphasizes the “simple joy of changing a 
billboard.”  This joy is the moment of dialogue between advertisers and billboard bandits, 
the point of resistance itself. 
  Joy is not the only intrinsic incentive offered by culture jamming.  Haugerud’s (2013, 
200-01.) list extends to “social connection, affective solidarity, and a path to self-knowledge 
and psychic well-being,” to which I can add a sense of political efficacy and freedom.  Such 
diverse motivations are frequently expressed, but many of them are regarded as intrinsic 
objectives or goals.  For example, the IST regards its projects as investigations, research 
projects that aim to develop an imminent and spontaneous awareness of the opaque 
trappings of social situations.  Member D’Ignazio describes the possible overarching 
interest of the group as a consideration of the question: “How are you invited as a citizen to 
participate in the public realm?” (D’Ignazio, Manning, and Rasovic, personal interview, 
August 27, 2012).  Thus, the spontaneity of the group’s actions is itself a measure of their 
effectiveness.   
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 The hypothesis stipulates that CJO tactics are perceived relative to other tactics.  
Implicit comparisons abound in the discussions of groups like the Billionaires and the Yes 
Men.  These concern the relatively difficult long-term mass movement organizing 
instrumental to social change and culture jamming, which performs ancillary but possibly 
crucial functions.  The most overt consideration is offered by the Billionaire’s Boyd 
(emphasis added, n.d.) consideration of planning for electoral activism: “You have to figure 
out what is your relationship with elections and maybe have an outside strategy where you 
are doing some of the boring, painful compromising work of running an election.”   
 Thus, while there is ample evidence supporting the charge that CJOs view their own 
actions as intrinsically fun and pleasurable apart from their effectiveness, only a hint of 
data suggests that other actions are not as fun or enjoyable.  Of course, there is no evidence 
for an opposing hypothesis.  No CJO described actions other than culture jamming as fun or 
pleasurable.  I thus offer extremely tentative support for the hypothesis, but note the 
emphasis on culture jamming as an enjoyable practice. 
12.3.2. Resource Constraints 
 I hypothesize (H12.2.) that CJOs generally perceive their own tactics as low cost.  
Some support is available.  The IST’s Rasovic notes: 
We are the consumers, so we operate at that level.  We’re not Yes Men.  We do not have an 
 HBO Special.  We also don’t have weapons and listening equipment and everything else so 
 we can fight the govt.  Let’s be realistic: you wanna change the laws, you have to do a lot of 
 work, and to do that you need millions of dollars, and you need a different infrastructure.  
 We concentrate on…direct democracy. 
   
The Billionaires’ Boyd (2002), who describes the Billionaires as a grass-roots concept, 
highlights the advantages of such approaches: “Cheap and fast are generally good qualities 
for a grass-roots movement.”  Implicit references to low cost actions abound.  Groups like 
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the AMF, AAA, BLF, BIL, SCP, and TYM provide simple how-to guides and workshops for 
replicating their actions.  The IAA offers a contrasting example.  They note that making 
contestational robots is not easy, because it requires specific mechanical skills and lots of 
money (Brusadin et al n.d.).  Though data are not ideal, overall the hypothesis is supported. 
12.3.3. Repression 
 The remaining constraints and incentives are extrinsic in nature.  First, I consider 
repression.  Nearly every group in the sample acknowledges or experiences various forms 
of repression (BLF, CTM, CAE, NGL, RBC, SCP, TYM).  I take a number of approaches to 
considering the relation of repression to tactical choice.  First, I describe how the CJOs treat 
the four relevant types of repression.  Second, I focus on the relationship between 
effectiveness and repression.  Finally, I present data on the means by which CJOs deal with 
repression.  All of these analyses are oriented by an emphasis on the ways that antagonists 
and authorities respond to different tactics. 
 Above I suggest that violence is the least likely form of repression that CJOs face in 
response to their contentious performances.  Only two groups suggest the threat of 
violence (SCP, TYM).  In one attempted action, a private security guard sufficiently 
threatened the SCP such that they aborted the performance.  The SCP’s Brown (Art Toad) 
describes the guard as large and aggressive.  The guard “showed himself willing to use 
physical force to prevent the show from going on” (SCP 2006, 43).  The Yes Men (n.d.(b)) 
describe the anxiety of their early Salzburg action: “We were sure to be confronted with 
outrage. But would we face physical danger?”  These slim examples exhaust the range of 
violent repression presented by CJOs in the sample. 
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 Harassment is somewhat more prevalent.  Three groups emphasize their 
encounters with surveillance, interrogation, verbal abuse, etc. (CAE, SCP).  When asked 
about the typical reactions to the CAE’s actions, member Kurtz responds, “Mostly 
condemnations and threats from police, lawyers, churches, political figures, the FBI and 
just about any disciplinary agency you can think of” (Hirsch 2005, 32).  In the documentary 
Strange Culture, the group describes possible instances of harassment following the FBI’s 
bio-terrorism case against Kurtz (Leeson 2006).  These actions include surveillance and 
attempts to provoke members of the group into engaging in illegal activity.  The SCP (2006, 
40, 49) describes various forms of harassment from the NYPD, including phone calls pre-
empting performances.  Short-term and mild harassment is somewhat more prevalent for 
several groups (BIL, CTM, RBC, SCP, TYM).  The CTM’s Gach (2007) sketches a portrait of 
such repression: “Inevitably we would be shut down by the authorities, whether police, 
private security.  If you do anything vaguely interesting in public space that’s not 
consumerist or not transportation, at some point you’re likely to get shut down.” 
 While I argue above that violence and repetitive harassment are not the most 
common forms of repression for CJOs, I do suggest a different conclusion for arrest and 
litigation.  At least four groups express some concern or experience with arrest or similar 
law enforcement measures (BLF, CAE, RBC, TYM).  The RBC’s Reverend Billy has been 
arrested and/or fined countless times by authorities across the United States.  Typical 
charges include trespass, harassment, and disturbing the peace.  The most noteworthy 
incident involved the Reverend reciting the First Amendment to an officer.  The officer 
promptly arrested him for “Harassment of a Public Official” (Carlson 2007).  The CAE’s 
Kurtz was arrested in 2004 under multiple charges, including most controversially 
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bioterrorism (Hirsch 2005; Leeson 2006).  The ensuing legal entanglement lasted four 
years.  More generally, the group often stresses the enormous discretion that law 
enforcement officers possess in the execution of their general duties. 
As we all know you don’t have to break the law to go to jail. Just exercising one’s rights is all 
 it takes. There are plenty of laws on the books that are there so that arrest remains 
 discretionary—creating a false public emergency for example—and it’s often a way to 
 disguise that the people being arrested are in fact political prisoners (Hirsch 2005, 30). 
 
Thus, while the CAE emphasizes the legality of its actions they have come under scrutiny.  
The Yes Men’s Bichlbaum (2009) was arrested in an act of creative civil disobedience while 
his fellow participants were ticketed for trespassing.  Finally, although the BLF have never 
been caught in action, they do acknowledge the risks of arrest when they counsel security-
mindedness when ‘improving’ billboards (Thornhill and DeCoverly 2006). 
 Litigation is a particularly notable form of repression because it can dramatically 
increase the costs of engaging in protest and it dramatically changes the field of action.  The 
RBC is clear on this point: “For a group like ours, there are too many unknowns in lawsuits, 
too much of the work is in the hands of other people and experts, and being tied up in court 
depletes our resources and keeps us of the street” (D. and Talen 2011, 134).  At least three 
groups encountered some form of litigation (CAE, NGL, RBC, TYM).  The CAE’s four year 
legal battle dramatically affected the group, especially Kurtz.  Negativland (1995) suffered 
two lawsuits: one from the rock band U2’s record label for trademark violation and another 
from NGL’s record label.  Both lawsuits spurred the group to further pursue reform of 
intellectual property law.  In 2009, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sued the group for 
trademark and copyright infringement following the start-up of the Yes Men’s faux-
Chamber website and a corresponding well-publicized impersonation of the group at the 
National Press Club (Mulkern 2009). 
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 With these descriptions of CJO’s encounter with repression in tow, I now consider 
how repression can be an indirect indicator of effectiveness.  Two groups argue that the 
degree of repression an action elicits demonstrates the degree to which that action 
threatens antagonists (CAE, RBC).  The CAE (1996, 12) argue, “The assumption here is that 
key indicators of power-value are the extent to which a location or a commodity is 
defended, and the extent to which trespassers are punished.  The greater the intensity of 
defense and punishment, the greater the power-value.”  This is the primary argument of 
much of the CAE’s attribution of effectiveness.   It constitutes the group’s primary disregard 
for the “streets” as a site of political action.  The RBC’s Talen makes a similar argument in 
regards to their interventions.  He notes, “One of the ways in which we are so sure that 
there is power in Backing Away [from the Product] is that police and journalists and their 
camera people come running with such dedication when we practice it” (Talen 2006, 89). 
 Once repression is anticipated (either through initial expectations generated by 
collective identities and ideology or through information gleaned from contemporary 
events, i.e. opportunity structures), CJOs develop a number of responses intended to either 
reduce the effect of repression or re-purpose repression into aiding in the cause of the CJO.   
Several groups attempt the former.  The SCP (2006, 40) often have lawyers present at their 
actions.  The BLF have “an attorney on retainer and a legal strategy in place” (McManis 
2003).  Napier elaborates: 
Not only do we not permanently damage these billboards, but, in fact, we improve them… 
 Look at it from an advertising point of view. Any sophomore in an advertising program 
 understands that any product exposure at all increases unit sales. Look at the Apple 
 Computer improvements we made. There was a photo on the front page of The Chronicle. 
 Our legal counsel tells us that not only should we not be fined for what we're doing but that 
 we should be paid for what we've done (McManis 2003). 
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BLF member Amanda argues, “We might be able to plead the parody defense because what 
we do is not malicious, profane or offensive" (McManis 2003).  The BLF also utilize various 
security measures in thei billboard actions (Thornill and DeCoverly 2006).  The CTM’s Gach 
(2007) describes the advantages of using art as a critical medium: “When you gain support 
from them [art institutions] in a town, they are usually connected to upper economic 
structure of town.  So when you roll into a town, and the cops stop you, you get sort of carte 
blanche because of this.” 
 Some groups see at least some repression as a means to further their goals.  For 
example, TYM’s Bichlbaum (2009) describes the repercussions of his arrest: 
Sleeping on concrete was a challenge, but I met a lot of interesting people, and my arrest 
 meant major prime-time news coverage we wouldn't have otherwise had…Civil 
 disobedience is a great way to put pressure on leaders to do things we need them to do - 
 either direct heat they can feel, or via public opinion, which they also feel. 
 
The group describes a more general sentiment: “Anytime anyone has done something 
about us—saying they ‘deplore’ us, complaining that we're a Political Action Committee, 
whatever—they've looked ridiculous to the press” (TYM n.d.(b)).  The CAE go a step further 
and design some of their actions to instigate public displays of repression.  For example, in 
one of their actions a member of the group plays with a train in a public space: 
Security would eventually tell the performer to “move along.”  The performer would ignore 
 the command, and act as if he were oblivious to the people around him.  Security would 
 then threaten the performer with arrest if he did not move.  This is the moment when the 
 most interesting dialogue began, and the greatest understanding of public management 
 emerged.  The spectators were suddenly confronted with the reality that a person was 
 about to be arrested simply for playing with toy cars (CAE 1996, 52-54). 
 
The RBC took the initiative – in my language an opportunity arose - after the arrest of 
Reverend Billy for his recital of the First Amendment.  The reverend voluntarily pursued 
the case into the legal field and sued the city (Hartocollis 2007).   
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 With data constraints in mind, this consideration of repression suggests that CJOs do 
not typically face grave repression.  Violence is exceedingly unlikely.  However, CJOs do 
experience the other costly form of repression, litigation, along with arrest and some minor 
forms of harassment.  Both governments and corporations are the primary purveyors of 
repressions.  Notably, the most severe cases of repression – countless arrests - occur in 
response to the RBC’s confrontational tactical approach.   
12.3.4. Facilitation 
 Another means by which authorities and antagonists pursue their goals with respect 
to SMOs is facilitation.  I argue above that facilitation is more likely to come from 
governments and private arts organizations than corporations and that it comes primarily 
in the form of grants and fellowships.  In Chapter Eight I note that many CJOs derive 
various forms of support from a variety of organizations, including especially arts 
organizations.  For example, the AAA began as a $35,000 grant (Creative Work Fund 2004).  
Co-optation is one possible approach by which a corporation may attempt to facilitate 
critical activity on the part of a CJO.  However, like so many active efforts to instigate 
activity it comes at a price, namely the immunity of the facilitating corporation and a 
harmed reputation.  The AAA’s Lambert describes the quandaries of co-optation for anti-
corporate artists: 
But what if [activist] Neckface’s Van’s billboard paid for a round of chemo for his 
 grandmother?...There’s a measurement and you need to see who comes out ahead. On the 
 artists’ side, they get a space and get to work in the daylight, but how does working with a 
 company compromise what they are saying or could say? Do they leave with their integrity? 
 The corporation invariably comes out ahead, it gets borrowed legitimacy and credibility 
 with customers. Whatever money the artists gets, the company makes more (Wolf 2007). 
 
No corporation successfully facilitated any group in the sample.  The most striking example 
of such an attempt is offered by Negativland.  Member Hosler observes: 
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Yeah, Weiden & Kennedy, an ad agency based in Portland.  They're gigantic.  They do the ad 
 campaigns for Microsoft and Nike.  They're considered to be a "cutting edge" advertising 
 firm.  When we were working on the Dispepsi project, both [Negativland member] Don 
 Joyce and myself pretty much simultaneously got phone calls from them.  They wanted to 
 hire Negativland to create these radio ads for Miller Genuine Draft Beer.  We were right in 
 the middle of doing the Dispepsi project on advertising, so it was a depressing, sort of 
 shocking, but very healthy kind of wake-up call.  The degree to which these people try to 
 appropriate and absorb the people that are appropriating and critiquing them… it knows no 
 bounds. These ad people thought it would be really cool to hire Negativland.  They wanted 
 to give us their ads to cut up and do things with and mock them and manipulate and do our 
 Negativland "thing" to.  Since they were offering us a lot of money - $25,000 or so - both Don 
 and myself immediately thought, "Wow, we'd like that money, that sounds great.  Is this an 
 opportunity we could do something with?"  Because over the years when weird things have 
 happened to us, like when we've gotten in trouble, we've looked at these things as 
 opportunities, not problems… 
 
And I've heard people say, "Well, you were stupid to turn them down- you could have just 
 taken the money and used it for your own projects."  I think that's the rationale a lot of 
 people would use.  But I think for us, given some of the content of our work and how we're 
 perceived, if we had taken that money, I feel like it would make our work and our point of 
 view seem like a farce, and I don't see how we'd be seen as having any integrity anymore. 
 Another thing is, I just feel like somebody has to say "no" to these kinds of guys, you know? 
 We aren't going to sell out to them (NGL 2003)! 
 
Corporations do seek to facilitate culture jamming, but for some CJOs such offers are 
tainted. 
12.3.5. Experimentation 
 I argue above that incentives associated with artistic experimentation may drive 
some groups to engage in tactical experimentation.  Moreover, I suggest that this process 
may look like the dynamic between détournement and recuperation.  This final section 
considers the data relative to these theoretical developments.   
In Chapter Eleven I present data identifying four groups in the sample that clearly 
exhibit experimental repertoires (AAA, CTM, CAE, IST).  In Chapter Seven I present data 
regarding the possession of an aesthetic disposition among the groups in the sample.  Table 
12.1 reproduces this data but highlights the four cases of experimental repertoires.  Some 
observations are worth noting.  First, of the three groups with sufficient data that clearly  
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Table 12.1 Experimental Repertoires and the Arts 









AMF Yes Yes No Yes 3 
AAA Yes No Yes No 2 
BLF 2 No No Yes 1 
BIL 1 Yes No No 1.5 
CTM 1 Yes Yes Yes 3.5 
CAE 1 Yes Yes Yes 3.5 
IAA 2 2 Yes No 1 
IST Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
NGL No Yes Yes Yes 3 
RBC Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
SCP Yes Yes Yes Yes 4 
TYM Yes 2 Yes No 2 
1 - mixed 2 – insufficient data  
 
possess all four indicators of an aesthetic disposition (IST, RBC, SCP) only one utilizes an 
experimental repertoire (IST).  In fact, the three groups register across a spectrum of 
tactical variation; while the SCP has a very narrow repertoire, the RBC has a relatively wide 
repertoire.  Second, two of the experimental groups (CTM, CAE) nearly accomplish 
possession of all four indicators but are handicapped by a mixed classification on education 
or occupation.  In order to compare CJOs with experimental and non-experimental 
repertoires I develop an admittedly crude measure if the aestheti disposition – an additive 
index of each group’s values on the four indicators.  In this variable, I code No and 
insufficient data as zero, a mixed value as .5, and Yes as one.  The Total column presents the 
data.  The mean across the entire sample of twelve groups is 2.7, while the mean for the 
four experimental groups is 3.25, a difference of .55.  If the IAA is excluded (a mixed tactical 
repertoire but sorely lacking in sufficient data with respect to the aesthetic disposition), 
then the mean shifts to 2.86, sharpening the difference to roughly .4.  No test of significance 
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is provided; the sample is small and the measures are crude, but some sense of the relation 
of experimentation to the aesthetic disposition may be gleaned from Table 12.1, however 
minimal and insecure.  If anything, this analysis suggests the possibility that an aesthetic 
disposition is not sufficient for experimental repertoires, but that it may increase the 
probability that a group possesses such a repertoire. 
Beyond this penchant for experimentation, how do CJOs construct their dynamics of 
tactical experimentation?  Some acknowledge the process of recuperation.  Above I note 
the AAA recognition of recuperation through co-optation.  Perhaps most clearly, the CAE’s 
determination to develop effective tactics runs directly into the finesse of capitalism.  They 
caution that “the rate at which strategies of subversion are co-opted indicates that the 
adaptability of power is too often underestimated” (CAE 1994, 12).  Their warning is dire: 
“Once named and defined, any movement is open to co-optation.  Should tactical media 
become popularized, its recuperation is almost inevitable” (CAE 2001, 5).  Yet it is the 
interval between subversion and co-optation that the CAE recognizes itself and others as 
occupying when it notes, “credit should be given to the resisters, to the extent that the 
subversive act or product is not co-optively reinvented as quickly as the bourgeois 
aesthetic of efficiency might dictate” (CAE 1994, 12).  Negativland (2003) describe their 
experience with the cutting-edge advertising agency: 
Over the years when weird things have happened to us, like when we've gotten in trouble, 
 we've looked at these things as opportunities, not problems. In this case, my brain was 
 doing the same thing: "Can we somehow subvert these guys and do something interesting 
 with this, and turn the tables on them?" And what I then realized was, "Wait a minute, they 
 called us because they want me to be thinking exactly what I'm thinking right now! That's 
 what they want the ad to be." So then I realized that we'd been had, we were fucked. There 
 wasn't any way you could out-think them. 
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Most troubling for the group is member Hosler’s charge that, “[I]nstead of just absorbing 
different fringey, oppositional ideas, they’re absorbing the very idea of opposition, no 
matter what form it takes” (Hosler and Savan 1998).  This pessimism about the capacity of 
antagonists to recuperate seems to gnaw at some of these groups.  The BLF (1999) 
expresses a less melancholic take on recuperation: 
I know some of the advertising agencies are already keeping an eye on the billboard   
 hackers to see what they can use to sell their product.  The first time I ran across it I found it 
 annoying, and then I thought I can either be pissed off about this or I can do something 
 about it. BLF 1999 
 
The AMF’s Lasn (2002) is more optimistic: “Instead of saying, ‘Oh no, our images are being 
sucked up by the system – our images are being neutralized by their images.’ I don’t believe 
in that kind of cynicism!  I’ve seen enough images, jams, and detournements work to not be 
afraid of that.”  Still, a careful analysis of several years of Adbusters magazine by Nomai 
2008, 164) strongly supports the argument that the group’s subvertisements increased in 
technical sophistication in response to advertising campaigns that often mimicked the style 
of the AMF and other culture jammers.   
Thus some CJOs appear to recognize an imperative to avoid recuperation.  However, 
only one of the groups noted here utilizes experimental repertoires (CAE).  The data are 
consistent with an explanation of experimental repertoires (AA, CTM, IST) as the result of 
CJOs playing the game of art while playing contentious politics.  Yet, considering this 
relationship further as one of tactical interaction, of détournement and recuperation, is not 
generally supported. 
If this represents a general pattern, one way to explain it is that the dynamic of 
détournement and recuperation as tactical experimentation functions less on the level of 
the CJO – individual CJOs experiment tactically, witness or anticipate recuperation of the 
436 
tactic, and respond with more tactical experiments – and more as a set of incentives 
characterizing the field of contention.  This is how McAdam explains tactical interaction.  
Individual SMOs don’t develop tactics and themselves immediately respond to 
neutralizations of their actions.  Instead, SMOs respond to the actions of other SMOs and 
their perceived opponents.  The process can be largely indirect and mediated, like much of 
my emphasis on opportunity structures.  Thus, while some CJOs may perceive their 
individual enterprise as a continually shifting game of détournement and recuperation (like 
the CAE), what may be at play is the more general struggle of the two in the field of conflict. 
12.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I refrain from developing a complete dynamic model.  In its place, I 
provide some theoretical direction for an empirical analysis of some of the incentives that 
CJOs face in choosing tactics.  First, I develop theoretical analyses of intrinsic and extrinsic 
incentives and generate hypotheses and propositions regarding the relationship between 
particular incentives, resource constraints, and tactical choice.  Second, I elaborate on 
theoretical developments in previous chapters by considering the dynamics of tactical 
interaction.  In so doing, I draw on the concepts of détournement and recuperation 
presented in Chapter Six.  Third, I present data drawn from the sample of CJOs to illustrate 
these dynamics.   
One of the more interesting findings of this chapter is that CJOs describe their own 
actions as intrinsically enjoyable.  In the previous chapter I note that groups pursuing 
extrinsic goals tend to see culture jamming as part of a broader struggle.  In fact, the more 
directly effective means for achieving these goals include institutional and conventional 
tactics, civil disobedience, and mass movements.  While culture jamming is effective at 
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performing certain important objectives within wider projects of social change, it is also 
clear that for members of CJOs these actions are highly enjoyable.  Wettergren (2005, 143) 
makes an astute observation about her sample of CJOs: “the notion of fun and joy seem to 
be closely connected to the jammers’ evaluation of a project, more than judgment of 
efficiency in changing the system.”  In the language of incentives and preferences, CJOs may 
choose tactics that they perceive as less effective (a less preferred tactic) because they 
offset the loss in anticipated benefits by increasing the intrinsic benefits (fun and joy).  
Wettergren (2005, 142) observes elsewhere: “a fundamental component of culture 
jamming is the idea that human beings share a capacity towards ingenuity and creativity 
[see Chapter Seven’s description of protaganists and the public]…The act of protest is 
conceived as something that creates and reinforces autonomy as unpredictability and 
refusal to follow consumer impulses.”  Part of this unpredictability involves risk-taking.  
Repression is not too costly in the case of CJOs, as this chapter demonstrates.  I can thus 
contribute one possible explanation of why CJOs appear somewhat risk-tolerant in the 
preceding chapter; risk-tolerance or risk-seeking can be construed as an intrinsic incentive, 
part of the thrill of being free and developing political agency.  As a final word, this chapter 
suggests that tactical choices are made under resource constraints that make actions like 
culture jamming more attractive, including their skill sets, organizational memberships, 
and financial resources.  Tactical choice in the case of CJOs may thus involve assessments of 






 Throughout this dissertation I endeavored to provide an empirical analysis of 
culture jamming organizations and to develop a theoretical approach to explaining 
repertoire change and tactical choice.  The primary thesis mediating these empirical and 
theoretical concerns is that a close relation exists between the development of twentieth 
century art in advanced Western democracies and culture jamming.  Developing this 
argument and addressing these concerns entailed three basic tasks: the conceptualization 
of culture jamming, the development of a theoretical explanation of repertoire change and 
tactical choice, and an empirical analysis of twelve CJOs and their social, political, and 
historical contexts. 
 Each of these tasks highlights some of the key contributions of this dissertation to 
the study of protest and social movements.  In response to the lack of an adequate concept, 
I developed a rigorous conceptualization of culture jamming as a form of ironic framing, a 
contentious collective action that involves the disruption of the dominant ensemble of 
representations in a given social system.  Explicit in this conceptual analysis is the 
argument that culture jamming is a means of engaging in contentious politics.  The 
empirical analysis that follows demonstrates this insight: CJOs operate in a contentious and 
oppositional manner.  The analysis of repression in Chapter Twelve is especially 
supportive.  While repression is not overwhelming in the case of culture jamming, many 
CJOs engage in activities that elicit repressive responses from the state and corporate 
actors.  The most dramatic example is the RBC, a group whose confrontational style is 
frequently met with arrest and fines.  Other CJOs experienced varying efforts intended to 
handicap their capacity to dissent, including the use of litigation and harassment.   
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 In order to account for the decision to culture jam and to help explain the 
development of culture jamming as a set of tactics, I present an approach to theory that 
begins to integrate the macro- and micro-levels of analysis.  While synthetic approaches to 
social movement theory are not uncommon, my contribution is novel in several ways.  
First, I bring eminent sociologists Charles Tilly and Pierre Bourdieu into dialogue on 
questions of social structure and contentious politics.  Although certainly not the first effort 
to engage both scholars, it appears this dissertation is the first to open this discussion to 
collective action theory.  While both scholars were famously hostile to rational choice 
theory, I argue that bounded rationality offers a possible means of reconciling these 
disparate research programs.  Second, while social movement theory primarily focuses on 
explaining changes in mobilization, I deploy the tools of social movement theory to advance 
the beginnings of a theory of tactical choice.  Of particular interest is my use of rational 
choice theory, an approach whose myopic focus on mobilization has, as of yet, produced 
hardly a handful of reasonable efforts to explain why actgors choose one means of protest 
over others.  Third, emphasizing the boundedness of rationality in a collective action theory 
account allows for an analysis of the variable information and resource endowments 
possessed by actors.  I relate these endowments to the language of familiarity, a concept 
whose use by Tilly and Bourdieu is both generous and cavalier.  Here, I develop the notion 
of familiarity as sets of constraints and incentives that vary across actors, everyday 
activities, and sets of tactics.  The key resource of interest is Bourdieu’s concept of the 
aesthetic disposition, the set of skills developed in the field of art.  Fourth, the core of my 
theoretical approach lies in relating social contexts associated with artistic production to 
the choice to engage in culture jamming.  My emphasis on the field of art provides a crucial 
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link between context and action.  I argue that the aesthetic disposition is imparted through 
experience with sets of educational and occupational networks.  As familiarity with certain 
social activities over others, dispositions contribute to the definition of the set of 
expectations and their degrees of uncertainty that distinguishes tactical alternatives.  My 
emphasis on art is not necessarily the limit of the argument, however.  Rather, my general 
emphasis is on skill sets or dispositions and their relation to tactical choice.  Finally, I claim 
to link collective identity and ideology to an SMO’s attribution of effectiveness.  While many 
scholars sense an opposition between identity and strategy explanations of tactical choice, I 
construe the variety of ways that actors define effectiveness as an expression of the 
relation between goals (and objectives) – intrinsic or extrinsic, political or cultural, club 
good or public good, materialist or post-materialist, and moderate, radical or autonomy -  
and actions.  Such an approach accommodates identity and strategy by opening collective 
action theory to non-material incentives.    
 This study also makes a number of methodological contributions to the study of 
culture jamming.  First, the sample of CJOs utilized in the study is nearly twice as large as 
the nearest study (Wettergren 2005).  While a sample of twelve cases is not ground-
breaking, it does offer a number of opportunities to compare and contrast a wider selection 
of activities.  Such an analysis is more likely to detect overly simplified generalizations.  For 
example, while much of the academic literature on culture jamming emphasizes the mass 
media and multinational corporations as targets of CJOs, I find that many of these groups 
target government as well (if not the government alone) and, to a lesser extent, interest 
groups, political parties, and the military.  Second, the methodological constraints of this 
project, especially data and sample limitations, are recognized and incorporated into my 
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effort to make substantive knowledge claims about culture jamming.  Such claims are 
constrained by a number of conditions: selecting on the dependent variable, small sample 
size, the lack of a representative sample, ignoring the element of time in the data, and the 
prolific use of Internet sources.  In the analysis of the sample, other important concerns 
arise, especially missing or insufficient data.  Third, data collection was comprehensive and 
involved a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, including two in-depth 
interviews.   
 While novel, the general thrust of the arguments of this dissertation is not at 
variance with a great deal of social movement theory.  The broadest theoretical 
contribution of this project lies in merely synthesizing and filling-in-the-blanks of a far 
larger body of work.  However, rival explanations of repertoire change and tactical choice 
are available.  I briefly focus on two apparent rivals here: what I call a mischief hypothesis 
and Wettergren’s (2005) emotional hypothesis. 
 I argued in this dissertation that culture jamming is related to the development of 
art in the twentieth century.  However, this argument appears to run directly counter to the 
observation that this phenomenon has a history preceding the twentieth century.  Though 
Dery (1993) restricts culture jamming to a post-Dada world the notion that ironic dissent is 
a recent addition to the repertoire of contention flies in the face of the evidence.  Satirical 
performances and artfacts are plentiful throughout history.  I do not claim here to identify 
the particular conditions and mechanisms that drove individuals and groups to engage in 
satire or related actions (for example, the disuptive antics of Diogenes of Sinope).   Instead, 
I argue that to posit the historical continuity of this phenomenon is to suggest that some 
442 
constant condition is available to individuals or groups.98  For simplicity’s sake, and 
without any presumption of strictly psychological determinants, I call this condition, 
mischief.  Thus, a mischief hypothsis posits that culture jamming is an expression of some 
durable characteristic of the human condition.  I will not critique this hypothesis.  It seems 
to me that some durable factors are likely accountable for the continuity of such forms of 
action across time.  However, we lack data on the prevelance of this phenomenon.  
Impressionistic accounts are necessary, but insufficient to make the case concretely.  More 
to the point is my charge that the argument of this dissertation is not that culture jamming 
is a uniquely twentieth century development, but that the culture jamming repertoire of 
contention as we see it in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is shaped by the 
development of twentieth century art.  This relationship takes two related forms.  First, the 
historical trajectory of the field of art described in Chapters Five and Six highlights some of 
the incentives available to those associated with the field of artistic production to engage in 
culture jamming actions.  These include especially a general tendency towards 
experimentation.  These effects are more widespread today across the population due to 
the increasing size of the art field relative to the social system as a whole.  Second, and 
more importantly, the skills associated with the aesthetic disposition, itself more widely 
distributed across the population than artistic skills in previous centuries, provide 
numerous incentives to engage in culture jamming.  I argue in Chapter Eleven that such 
skills are especially important the more technically sophisticated the culture jamming 
                                                          
98 I am referring here to the simple instance of such phenomena across time, not to the ebbs and flows of 
ironic dissent.  An example of an explanation of the latter is provided by Haugerud’s (2013, 188) argument 
that such activism is more prevalent under one of two conditions: the repression of traditional dissent (a 
hostile political opportunity structure) or the inadequacy of “conventional political categories, modes of 
expression, and organization” to task of capturing social reality.   
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action.  Thus, the focus of this project is, again, not on the rise of a new type of repertoire, 
but a shift in the incentives available to contentious actors that in some cases favor the 
actions under study here.  Howeverm clearly, such an argument implies the hypothesis that 
culture jamming is more common today than in previous historical periods.  Again, 
comparable data on this question are not available.  
 This discussion clearly suggests that the mischief hypothesis can be construed as 
more than a strict alternative to my explanation; it can be regarded as a potential 
supplementary hypothesis.  I make a similar argument with respect to Wettergren’s 
emotional hypothesis.  Wettergren explains culture jamming in part as conditioned by the 
emotional culture or regime of late capitalism, the sets of prescribed and proscribed 
emotions and behaviors that maintain the hedonic structure of consumerism.  In order to 
resist this structure, culture jammers seek to develop an alternative emotional regime 
based on genuine or authentic pleasure and freedom.  In explaining the choice to engage in 
culture jamming as the means to fashion this regime, Wettergren relies on a variant of the 
micro-foundational approach Flam (2000) calls, in contrast to homo economicus and homo 
sociologicus, the “emotional man.”  Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction ritual chains serves 
as the theoretical template for Wettergren’s (2005: ch. 8) analysis.  In this theory, 
individuals and groups accrue or expend emotional energy through social interactions.  
Such energy can range from a high of confidence and happiness to lows of depression and a 
lack of initiative.  Because collective actions can vary in the amount of emotional energy 
they will provide, tactics are chosen over others principally for their contribution to an 
individual or group’s level of emotional energy.   
444 
 While Wettergren does find strong evidence that members of CJOs derive significant 
positive emotional energy from engaging in their actions, she makes the additional 
argument that CJOs engage in second-order interaction rituals.  First-order interaction 
rituals are immediate and direct forms of interaction.  In the case of CJOs this points to 
participation in the action itself.  Second-order rituals involve the the circulation of 
symbols, “in which individuals re-circulate the symbols in other contexts and groups than 
the original, or through the mediation of television and so on” (Wettergren 2005, 143).  She 
argues that “[t]he innovation and dispersal of symbols is itself an activity that generates 
solidarity and [emotional energy] because it includes an imagined and internalized 
community of the lik-eminded that will admire and acknowledge the meaning of these 
symbols” (Wettergren 2005, 144).  What Wettergren is arguing here is that CJOs engage in 
culture jamming in part due to the intrinsic enjoyment of expressing collective 
identification and establishing reputations (social positions) among their fellow activists, 
artists, and pranksters.   
An initial draft of Chapter Eleven involved an analysis of what I identified as 
symbolic identification with a collective identity.  Whereas intrinsic enjoyment refers to 
direct benefits like social interaction, identification refers to a broader sense of self that 
expresses solidarity with others not directly implicated in the action.  Although 
identification is sometimes utilized as a more general explanation of mobilization (McAdam 
and Paulsen 1993; Rochon 1998), I suggested that SMOs believe that some tactics are more 
indicative of collective identity than others.  Such incentives are typically expressed 
through the use of frames or tactics that establish a symbolic connection between the 
action and a wider community of activism or sympathizers.  Thus, it seems plausible to 
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suggest that CJOs derive benefits from utilizing tactics associated with actors under the 
condition that the SMO strongly identifies with these actors.  The inverse proposition – that 
CJOs may derive costs from utilizing tactics that they associate with their antagonists or 
those they identify negatively – seems less plausible in part because the nature of a conflict 
may generate a tendency towards the use of similar tactics, especially when the conflict is 
drawn into a highly institutionalized field like the courts, legislatures, or elections.99   
 My reasons for omitting this variable from Chapter Eleven involve the arguments 
close relation to Wettergren’s argument (considered in this Conclusion) and the difficulty 
of providing direct evidence to support it.   This is made obvious in Wettergren’s study.  
Her explanation of culture jamming as first and second-order interaction rituals follows her 
empirical analysis.  It draws its force primarily from the logic of the theoretical argument.  
The evidence supports it, but it is not conclusive.  Even the data she summons in her 
discussion of these effects falls short (Wettergren 2005, 145).  She quotes the AMF’s Lasn 
and a member of the French Adbusters, but they express strongly individual values of anti-
commercialism and autonomy.   
 Broader theoretical concerns are at stake.  The emotional man approach is a clear 
rival to theories based on rationality assumptions.  I do not have the space to engage these 
approaches in an extended dialogue.  However, I do want to note some points of interest 
regarding the mutual application of each to the subject of culture jamming.  First, the 
expectation of an emotional hypothesis– that both first and second-order interaction 
rituals increase the probability that these actors will engage in culture jammers – is not 
                                                          
99
 Of course, the literature on isomorphic processes in organizational fields suggests a set of incentives that 
may produce pressures for organizational (and presumably tactical) homogeneity even in conventional 
political activity (DiMaggio and Powell 1987).  This process is most pronounced in more institutionalized 
spheres of activities like the market or many professions.   
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strictly opposed to a hypothesis utilizing the language of incentives.  In other words, both 
approaches can generate the expectation that, in the case of CJOs, the circulation of symbols 
as a form of collective identification is associated with an increased probability of tactical 
adotion of culture jamming.  From this singular perspective, data can provide no reason to 
reject or accept either approach against the other.  However, from a theoretical standpoint, 
Collins’ theory is marginally more satisfying in that the concept of emotional energy is at 
home in the theory of interaction rituals.  In contrast, a collective action theory account of 
collective identification must rely on distinct theoretical approaches.  In other words, while 
the concept of emotional energy is endogenous to the theory of collectivce identification, 
ratoinal choice theory possesses no endogenous theory of collective identification.  For 
example, I employed Bourdieu and Tilly to fill-in-the-gaps of a rationalist account.  Here, it 
would require a supplementary explanation of collective identity, an account I argued 
Bourdieu offers in his concepts of habitus and field.  Moreover, some may suggest that an 
emotional model of action is more descriptively accurate than one based on bounded 
rationality.  However, at their core each model is a radically simplified model of motivation.  
For the emotional man action is a consequence of the balance of emotional energies 
derived from actions, while for the rational man action is a consequence of the balance of 
incentives derived from actions.   Within the emotional perspective incentives can be 
reduced to their emotional register.  Within the raional perspective the lack of a 
presumption of conscious reasoning opens the door to incorporating emotions, including 
pleasure, into the language of incentives.  However, Bourdieu’s sociology, which is part of 
the exogenous background (the filling in the blanks) of my collective action theory account, 
abandons a distinction between rationality and emotion by positing a complex psychology 
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of investment in social activity (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005, 482-483).  As a reflection of 
his somewhat structural bias (structures are more determinate than agency) Bourdieu is 
less inclined to posit a pervasive cynicism and more mindful of the level of practice 
operating below consciousness and clear intention.  Ultimately (and hopefully), 
descriptively and empirically satisfying theories of action will arrive with greater advances 
in psychology and the neuro and cognitive sciences.   
 This last comment obviously suggests a rather daunting task for future researchers. 
In concluding this dissertation I point to modest proposals for further study that highlight 
some of the difficulties experienced throughout this project.  First, the theoretical 
consideration of uncertainty in Chapter Three draws on a wide literature and several 
concepts including economic theory, ambiguity aversion, bounded rationality, and 
contentious politics.   There is no extensive theoretical or empirical treatment of risk and 
uncertainty in social movement theory despite the fact that politics is a fundamentally 
uncertain social activity (Downs 1957) and that forms of action outside of institutions are 
potentially more uncertain.  Such an analysis should consider a variety of questions.  How 
can the literatures on uncertainty in psychology, economics, and to a lesser extent political 
science and sociology contribute to a more robust understanding of uncertainty in 
contentious politics?  What kind or level of uncertainty do the various actors in contentious 
politics encounter?  How do actors utilize uncertainty strategically? How does uncertainty 
vary across SMO strategies and tactics?  What are the risk orientations of actors?  
Answering these questions and others should bring the field closer to an understanding of 
the nature of contentious politics. 
448 
Second, I noted in Chapter Eleven that effectiveness presents theoretical and 
methodological difficulties because SMOs may rationalize their actions as effective.  In 
other words, they may choose an action due to some reason or incentive other than 
effectiveness and yet produce a justification for their choice that stresses how the tactic 
contributes to the achievement of the group’s goals and objectives.  Any micro-level theory 
of tactical choice must determine how an SMO attributes effectiveness to their actions and 
the actions of others and the nature of the distribution of effectiveness across the set of 
tactics.  This problem is compounded by the fact that SMO’s do not merely pursue a goal(s) 
but a variety of objectives.  Such an account of effectiveness must recognize the process of 
rationalization as a possible confounding factor.100   
 Third, social movent theory is nearly void of micro-level theoretical accounts of 
tactical choice.  If this dissertation should sound one resounding call in the area of theory, it 
would be the necessity of developing such approaches and providing clearly articulated 
implications for testing them.  The question of mobilization absorbs much of the energy of 
the field, and rightfully so as it represents the crucial testing ground for a methodical 
approach to studying social movements.  However, a proper balance has not been struck.  
Social movements not only emerge and die off they choose to act in different ways.  The 
implications for such choices are widespread and affect outcomes, mobilization, and the 
tactical and strategic choices of other actors.  Moeover, while I utilized a theoretical 
approach associated with formal modeling, the methodological approach taken here was 
modest in its more traditional qualitative emphasis.  Formal modeling can offer a means to 
develop rigorous theories and derive hypotheses for testing and illustration.  It is not 
                                                          
100 Of course, it seems too obvious to mention, but as a general suggestion all theories of choice must 
ultimately include a theory of rationalization. 
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merely applicable to theories based on strong assumptis of rationality.  It can be used to 
develop any kind of theory insofar as such theories are logically consistent.  Yet, as this 
project makes clear even a theoretical approach that utilizes assumptions of rationality 
need not utilize such methods.  However, a particularly interesting suggestion for future 
research is the formalization of existing social movement theories in an effort to not only 
determine their logical consistency, but also to derive testable implications and identify 
clear differencs of prediction across theories.  Such an effort could also formalize the 
theoryof tactical choice provided in this dissertation.   
 In this conclusion I present a consideration of the contributions of this study to the 
field of social movements, some alternatives to my explanation of tactical choice, and some 
avenues for further research.  Such a conclusion is necessarily incomplete, but it should 
provide a general sense of the possible implications of this study for the study of political 
behavior.   
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APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW SURVEY 
I conducted three interviews for this study.  Two of these interviews involved 
engagements with members of culture jamming organizations that are part of the final 
sample of twelve groups (IST, SCP).  Each interview was semi-structured.  Below I present 
the baseline set of questions developed prior to any of the three interviews.  In each 
interview, some questions were deleted because existing sources of information provided 




 Description of Organization 
 Role in Organization 
 
Issues and Goals 
 What are the general and specific issues that your group engages?   
 If you see your actions and your organization as opposing something or someone,  
  how would you define it or them? 
 Generally, what do you hope to achieve with your actions? 
 
History 
 When and how was the group formed?   
 How did these early members know each other? 
 Why did the group form when it did? 
 What kind of environment did the group form within?  Activism? 
What kind of groups or individuals inspire the organization? 
 
Structure of Group: 
Nature of Membership 
 What does it mean to be a part of the group?   
What responsibilities do you and others have? 
 Is the group inclusive or exclusive with respect to membership?  
Decision-Making Practices 
 How do you go about making decisions as a group? 
 How are conflicts resolved? 
Resources 
 How do you meet and communicate? Internet? 
 How do you finance the organization and your actions?  
 How do you find time for the group amidst your other responsibilities?   
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 What resources are most important to the group?   
 Do you receive any support from outside sources? 
 
Relations to other Actors 
 Are you or any other member of your group part of another similar group? 
 What organizations are you or other members of the group involved with that are  
  not like this organization, such as unions or book clubs? 
 Has your group worked with or collaborated with individuals that were not   
  considered part of the group? 
 What about other groups like yourself? 
 Are there are any recurring relationships which you would classify as alliances?  
   
Audiences 
 Who is your audience? 
 How do you intend your actions to affect them? 
 What about the media?  
  Mass media? Activist media? 
  Political institutions? 
 
Strategies and Tactics 
 How would you describe your actions?   
 What kinds of actions do you do?  
 How do you promote or present your group? 
 Where did the ideas for these actions come from? 
 Have your tactics changed over time?  How? 
 
Alternative Options: Costs, Benefits, Effectiveness, Normativity 
 What are the other ways that you believe you could act politically?  Voting?    
  Marches? Violence?  
 Have you engaged in any of them? 
Why do you not choose the ones you have not engaged in?   
 Which of these do you find to be the most effective for addressing your concerns and 
  issues? 
 In general, which actions do you believe require you to expend most of your energy  
  and effort and resources?  Which require the least? 
 In general, which actions do you believe provide you with the most benefit, whether  
  intrinsic or extrinsic? 
 
Biography: Work, School, Family 
 Did you and/or the other members of the group have any experience outside of the  
  group with art or cultural production (as in theatre, film, visual arts, writing)  
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APPENDIX 3. MEASURING ARTS EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONS 
 In order to measure the relative increase in arts education and occupations across 
the third quarter of the twentieth century, I employ a series of indicators graphically 
displayed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and Table 5.1.  In this appendix I detail the construction of 
these variables. 
In order to provide as much leverage over the question at hand, I develop two 
measures of arts education.  The first, Fine Arts, is a conservative indicator expressing the 
annual percentage change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts 
minus degrees in Music and the Dramatic Arts.  Conceptually, this emphasizes the visual 
arts.  It is also distinguishable from Crane’s (1987, 9-10) broader measure of Master of Fine 
Arts degrees which includes Music and the Dramatic Arts, though it is more inclusive in 
that it also incorporates Doctorate degrees.  Such a measure should under-represent the 
absolute level of arts education.  Using these raw numbers, I calculated a new variable 
measuring the annual percentage change in Fine Arts degrees.   
The second, All Arts, is a more inclusive measure expressing the annual percentage 
change in the number of Master’s and Doctorate degrees in the Fine Arts (including Music 
and the Dramatic Arts), English, and Architecture.   In part, this indicator draws on 
Bourdieu’s insistence on the significance of the literary field, though I exclude foreign 
languages.   While the conservative measure of arts education is likely to under-represent 
absolute levels of art education (though not necessarily annual percentage change), this 
measure is more likely to over-represent absolute levels of art education,  because English 
degrees may involve emphases on grammar as opposed to creative writing.   
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In constructing this indicator, I encountered the changing categorizations of degrees 
in the Census.  From 1949 to 1955, the Fine Arts, Speech and Dramatic Arts, and Music are 
discrete categories.  From 1956 to 1966, the Fine Arts category is inclusive of Speech and 
Dramatic Arts and Music, though these are distinct subcategories.  Beginning with the 1967 
data, these categories exclude music education and speech correction, the latter of which 
clearly over-represents arts education.  However, there appears to be no distortion in the 
data from this shift as the downward trajectory it heralds continues through successive 
years.  Finally, from 1976 on, the categories for English and Journalism are replaced by 
Letters and Communication.   I chose to substitute Letters for English.   
 Occupations data presented the most difficult problems.  First, for 1940 and 1950, 
the Census provides detailed occupations data inclusive of a diversity of arts-related 
occupations across both the experienced labor force and employed persons.  By 1960, only 
the experienced labor force data on occupations remains, and by 1970 this diversity is 
aggregated into one category: Writers, Artists, and Entertainers, though which of the 
previous discrete categories is included is unclear.  As demonstrated in Table 6.1, in order 
to maximize the comparable data over five decades (1940 to 1990), I utilize one composite 
measure of multiple categories of arts occupations, one measure derived from a single 
category of arts occupations, and a single measure obtained from the National Endowment 
of the Arts.  The first variable is the sum of the values of four categories: Art and Art 
Teachers, Musicians and Music Teachers, Actors and Actresses, and Authors, Editors, and 
Reporters.   The second is derived from the single inclusive category:  Writers, Artists, and 
Entertainers, while the third is also a single Category measure.  The 1960 and 1970 data 
overlap and thus allow a comparison of two indicators at a time, from which I conclude that 
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the singular Census measure is a more conservative measurement of arts occupations.  
From this data, I calculated percentage changes to generate some tangible metric of 
comparison.  Despite the limitations of this approach, I argue that these procedures allow a 
general sketch of change in the arts labor market relative to the larger labor market, and 
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